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The Use of the Internet by Social Movements in Morocco: Implications for 
Collective Action and Political Change 
Mohamed Ben Moussa, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2007 
The thesis examines the use of the Internet by social movements in Morocco and the 
extent to which it has empowered them in various struggles against political and social 
injustices.  More specifically, it explores whether the Internet has transformed the 
collective action repertoire and enhanced social movements‘ capacity to challenge 
Morocco‘s semi-authoritarian government and erode the hegemonic social orders in the 
country.  In so doing, the thesis addresses some key polemical issues and questions 
germane to the topic, mainly the dialectic between technological and social determinisms 
and agency, the role of technology in development, and collective action and democratic 
change in the context of Muslim-majority societies.  The thesis uses a combination of 
methodological approaches to explore the structural, textual and contextual dimensions of 
the Internet‘s implications and impact.   
Through feature analysis, and framing analysis, the research studies 18 websites, 
collective blogs and wikis belonging to eight key Moroccan social movements.  It equally 
draws on rich data derived from 37 semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted with 
Moroccan social movement activists, journalists and international NGOs‘ officials.   It 
offers insights into the embeddedness of the Internet as a technology and medium, and 
into the interplay between activists‘ and users‘ practices and their social environment and 
physical world.  Moreover, using a multidisciplinary conceptual framework, namely 
social movement theory, the social study of technology, alternative media studies, radical 
democracy theory and community informatics, the thesis examines the complex and 
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multilayered interconnections between the Internet and the various social, economic and 
cultural processes shaping its appropriation and its potential for social change.  It 
concludes that the Internet plays a significant role in enhancing Moroccan social 
movements‘ collective action capabilities by favouring various forms of mobilization, 
and facilitating linkages between dispersed constituencies and translocal public spheres.  
The thesis argues, however, that the medium does not impact in any radical way the 
dominant political and social orders inasmuch as its implications and potential remain 
considerably limited by the various digital divides, and are mediated through the power 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Mapping the Field of Query 
1. Collective Action Repertoire in the Internet Age 
  On June 7, 2008, Moroccan police forces brutally ended the protest held by local 
activists and residents of the fishery port of Sidi Ifni—a small town in the south of the 
country—who were demanding more transparent distribution of local resources and 
employment opportunities.  Not content with dispersing the protestors, the police chased 
them through the town and into houses where they beat people and vandalized their 
homes.  Many of those who were detained, including women, were sexually harassed or 
tortured.  The Moroccan government denied that any serious human rights violations took 
place in what came to be called the ―black Saturday‖.  However, in the following days, 
local citizens and militants posted dozens of video clips documenting the brutality of 
police forces on video-sharing platforms, mainly YouTube and Dailymotion, and on 
blogs and online newspapers, such as hespress.com, thus belying the government‘s 
version of events and giving rise to a broad national and international solidarity 
campaign.  The videos were widely redistributed by blogs and e-mail list serves, among 
other alternative media, and were also broadcast by mainstream regional and international 
TV channels, mainly Al-Jazeera and some European TV stations.  The extensive media 
and public attention to the videos and the ensuing protests in Morocco and Europe against 
the police violence eventually forced the state to set up a parliamentary fact-finding 
committee to investigate and report on what happened. 
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A little over two years later, the Internet would again emerge as a powerful tool at the 
heart, this time, not of some limited protests leading to the set up of a fact-finding 
committee, but of big popular uprisings leading to the toppling of one despot after 
another, in the Arab world .  Since December 2010, this region has been witnessing 
unprecedented popular upheavals against despotism and dictatorship, two of which have 
toppled Tunisia‘s Ben Ali and Egypt‘s Hosni Mubarak, while the remaining are 
threatening the rule of other despots, including Libya‘s Moammar Qaddafi, Yemen‘s Ali 
Abdullah Saleh and, more recently, Syria‘s Bachar Assad.   Described as the beginning of 
―the Arab democratic spring‖, and likened to the fall of the Arab ―Berlin‖ wall, this wave 
of protests has galvanized the attention of the world not only because of its 
transformative political implications for the region, but also because of the central role of 
the Internet, specifically social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube, in these historical events. In fact, Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings have been 
widely described as ―Facebook‖, ―Twitter‖ and ―Internet‖ revolutions. The use of social 
media tools in the two countries has inspired many young people throughout the Arab 
world to launch Facebook campaigns to rally support for protests against dictatorship, 
inequalities and various forms of injustice.  In Morocco, for instance, a group of youth 
calling for more freedoms and for constitutional reforms, started a protest movement, the 
20 February movement, from a Facebook page.  Likewise, many Moroccan citizens 
living in Diaspora posted on YouTube videos scathingly critical of the regime. 
Taking the example of Morocco, my thesis is an attempt to investigate the extent to 
which the Internet enhances the capabilities of oppositional social movements toward 
advancing and achieving their demands for democracy and social and cultural equality.  
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Underpinning such a query is the argument by social movement theorists that the 
development of collective action and claims are contingent on the repertoire of contention 
available for any group at a given historical moment.  Tarrow (1998), for instance, 
explains that ―people do not simply ‗act collectively.‘  They petition, assemble, strike, 
march, occupy premises, obstruct traffic, set fires, and attack others with intent to bodily 
harm‖ (p. 20).  More importantly, repertoires available for social movements are not 
static insofar as they ―vary from place to place, time to time, and pair to pair.  But on the 
whole, when people make collective claims, they innovate within limits set by the 
repertoire already established for their place, time, and pair‖ (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 
16).  Not only does the development of media technologies, along with other collective 
action tactics such as sittings, strikes, and civil disobedience, transform how claims are 
made and communicated, but it also expands the limits of claims themselves and what 
they can achieve.  While the dust has not yet settled down on the upheavals in the various 
Arab countries, the alleged centrality of the Internet and social media in the uprisings and 
continuing protests raises crucial questions about the role of the new communication 
technology in social and political change.  
The thesis does not make the claim for a deterministic view of technology, nor does it 
promote a reifying view of it.  On the contrary, this study makes a strong case for the 
social embeddedness of the Internet as a technology and social practice.  So while the 
thesis appreciates the implications of the new technologies potential for social and 
political change, it does not view the Internet as an independent variable nor does it 
establish a mono-causal link between the technology and its social context.  The Internet 
certainly has intrinsic aspects that are rooted in the hardware and software upon which it 
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is based; nevertheless, it is equally affected by legal regulations and protocols, economic 
and business institutions and structures, as well as social practices and uses.  The 
Internet‘s potential is constantly mediated through these multiple hardware, social, 
economic, and political filters, which all shape the way it can affect the social world at 
the macro, meso and micro levels. 
It is noteworthy, however, that while the thesis steers away from establishing a mono-
causal link between the Internet and its social environment, studying the implications of 
technology for social change inescapably involves a degree of reification as a necessary 
analytical procedure.  Chandler (1995), for instance, suggests that   
reification is a difficult charge to avoid, since any use of linguistic categorization 
(including words such as ―society‖ or ―culture‖) could be said to involve 
reification.  Theorizing about technology and society is full of reification, quite 
apart from these two key terms.  Reification is involved when we divide human 
experience into ―spheres‖ variously tagged as ―social,‖ ―cultural,‖ ―educational,‖ 
―political,‖ ―ideological,‖ ―philosophical,‖ ―religious,‖ ―legal,‖ ―industrial,‖ 
―economic,‖ ―scientific,‖ or ―technological.‖  If such separation proceeds beyond 
analytical convenience it also involves what is called structural autonomy.  (para. 
4) 
Thus, the current thesis will undertake the delicate task of treading carefully between 
the need to consider, for analysis, the Internet as a separate category, and the necessity to 
avoid falling into the trap of conceiving it as an autonomous structure.  Such a task is 
carried out by drawing on a multidisciplinary theoretical approach that sheds light on the 
impact of the Internet as a technology of collective action, while, at the same time, 
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bringing out the multilevel embeddedness of the medium in various structures and 
practices. 
2. Rationale 
My research explores two highly contentious issues that present multiple practical 
challenges and intellectual concerns in politics and academia, alike.  First, the research 
explores an issue that has wide political repercussions at the local and international 
levels—namely, democracy or, to be more precise, lack thereof in the Arab world—and 
the capacity of contentious collective action in the region to address this situation.  In 
fact, while the winds of democratic change have swept many parts of the world, 
particularly Eastern Europe and Latin America, all Arab states have remained either 
autocratic or semi-autocratic.  They are unswervingly resisting any genuine 
democratization, and many of them are even sinking into more despotic forms of rule. 
Lack of democracy in the region has significant international repercussions as it is often 
linked to instability in many countries, and to the rise of fundamentalism and 
transnational terrorism.  Moreover, many studies have concluded that the democratic 
deficit in the region is negatively affecting its economic and social development, insofar 
as corrupt regimes have failed to deliver the basic necessities for their people.   
While Orientalist discourses would have the region culturally disposed to accept 
despotism as a ―natural‖ order, modern history shows that, in fact, Arab countries have 
gone through a long and hard quest for democracy and social and political equality. 
People in these countries have always engaged in various forms of collective action, from 
political parties to violent insurgency, in an effort to challenge dictatorships, even if 
many of these efforts have been largely unsuccessful (see Sadiki, 2004, for instance). The 
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last popular revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, and the continuing uprisings in many Arab 
countries further undermine the credibility of these discourses and demonstrate clearly 
that Arab peoples do support and strive for democracy and social justice. 
The same holds true for Morocco, where collective action against various types of 
injustice is deeply rooted in the collective consciousness and culture as a religious duty 
and political necessity.  This rootedness took various forms, from old Sufi orders leading 
armed insurgencies against unjust sultans, to new social movements struggling for 
identity recognition in the twenty-first century.  Indeed, Morocco‘s history since its 
independence in 1956 is a telling example of the long and bitter struggle the region‘s 
peoples have fought for democracy and equality.  For many decades, contentious groups 
representing the whole ideological spectrum, from the radical Left to ultra-fundamental 
Islamism, have opposed Morocco‘s central authorities.  While these struggles have not 
ushered the country into democracy, they have, on many occasions, compelled the regime 
to open itself to wider participation in governance, or at least to incorporate oppositional 
discourses into mainstream politics in an attempt to regain threatened legitimacy.  
Nonetheless, Moroccan civil society‘s capacity to bring about democracy is hampered by 
numerous obstacles—chief among them, limited access to public media and public 
resources, vulnerability to state repression and manipulation of the judiciary, and 
dependence on foreign aid.   
The second central issue explored by the thesis is the problematic role of technology 
in social change, and the extent to which the diffusion of new media, in general, and the 
appropriation of various online tools and software in collective action can transform the 
power balance in autocratic states.  The notion that technology can play a central role in 
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economic, social, and political development is not limited to Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs).  As argued by Alzouma (2005), at least ―since the 
end of colonialism, nearly every decade has been marked by the celebration of a new 
technology as a means for overcoming the long-lasting problems faced by developing 
countries‖ (p. 340).  In the last two decades, commentators have also highlighted the 
implications of satellite TV for political contestation and participation in the region, 
focusing on the significant impact of the Al Jazeera network in broadening the limits of 
free speech and the public sphere (El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002; Miles, 2005; Lynch, 
2006). 
As ICTs take hold slowly but steadily throughout the world, they have come to be 
viewed as an unprecedented opportunity in history that can provide solutions to many 
problems facing humanity and the millions of populations in developing countries.  This 
is clearly reflected in The ICT-for-development discourse (ICT4DEV) that has become in 
a relatively short time a foundational global narrative that shapes global and local 
development strategies, including in the political sphere.  However, compared to large-
scale research on satellite television channels and their implications on the development 
of the public sphere in the region, research on the implications of ICTs for politics and 
democracy has been scant, while existing studies have focused predominantly on Islamic-
oriented groups and discourses to the detriment of more comprehensive perspectives on 
the implications of the new technologies for collective action in this part of the world (see 
Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion of the subject).  
The slow adoption of ICTs in Arab countries during the first few years of the twenty-
first century is one factor behind this lacuna; however, the number of Internet users in the 
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region has significantly increased over the last few years, albeit with significant 
variations between countries, at one of the highest rates in the world.  In Morocco, for 
instance, the number of Internet users has risen in the last decade at a staggering rate, 
from around 100,000 in 2000 to 10,442,500 in 2010, with 33% penetration of the 
country‘s population (Internet World Stats, Internet usage statistics for Africa, 2010).  
These figures do not provide much insight into the modalities and dynamics of Internet 
use in the country because they do not reflect important variables such as user 
demographics, the type of access users have (broadband versus dial-up, for instance), and 
the objectives of usage (entertainment versus information, for instance).  However, these 
numbers do testify to the development of the Internet into a mass medium, which 
constitutes the first basis for its appropriation in the political sphere on a large scale.   
While the penetration of the Internet is still well below the popular reach of satellite 
TV, the medium remains more important for collective action for several reasons.  The 
significance of ICTs, and particularly the Internet, for collective action lies not so much 
in the impact of the medium on people and society as in what people can do with it, 
inasmuch as it offers a more flexible, non-hierarchical, and affordable form of 
communication at the grassroots level of usage and production.  While it is true that other 
small media, such as the fax, tape cassettes, and CDs, have some of these attributes, the 
singularity of the Internet lies in its synergy between multiple media and technologies, 
which allows for more creativity and horizontal communication, and a greater capacity to 
bypass control and censorship, as the examples discussed above illustrate.   
Notwithstanding existing statistics demonstrating the fast diffusion of the Internet in 
the country, and the importance of preliminary observations on the growing use of the 
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Internet in political contestation, these pieces of evidence do not constitute strong and 
sufficient proof of the impact of the medium on collective action and the political sphere 
in Morocco.  Given the scarcity of research on the issue, these initial observations on the 
potential of the medium in the context of Morocco remain highly hypothetical, and need 
to be corroborated by systemic examination and analysis.   
3. Research Statement and Questions 
Mario Diani (2000b), a key social movement theorist, summarized the principal 
questions arising from the interplay between computer-mediated communication (CMC) 
and social movements (SMs) as follows: 
 How do forms of individual participation change? 
 How do social movement organizations modify their ways of operating? 
 How do individuals and organizations connect to each other to exchange/pool 
resources and information? 
 How do these actors develop identities and solidarities? 
 How do the geographical boundaries of the network change, along with the 
underlying idea of public space?  (p. 387) 
Invoking Diani‘s list of questions as a general guide, the current thesis strives to 
examine the flowing primary question: What are the implications of the Internet for 
social movements in Morocco, and for their ability to engage in contentious collective 
action against multiple forms of injustices?  This question compresses a number of other 
key ones covering the main issues the thesis is attempting to tackle: 
1. How can the political role of the Internet and its appropriation by social 
movements be conceptualized? 
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2. To what extent is the Internet‘s potential as a medium appropriated by Moroccan 
social movements? 
3. To what extent is the potential of the Internet for collective action mediated 
through and shaped by the socioeconomic, political, and cultural context of 
Morocco? 
4. To what extent do differences and variations between social movements shape 
their appropriation of the Internet? 
5. What are the main obstacles affecting the effective use of the Internet by social 
movements? 
6. Finally, to what extent is the Internet contributing to social and political change in 
Morocco, and how can we best understand and assess this contribution? 
This primary list of questions is not exhaustive since the research covers other 
important sub-issues, such as the implications of the Internet for gender equality, the 
interplay between online and offline networks and practices, and the role of online-based 
development projects in empowering Moroccan civil society.   
The list establishes, nevertheless, tentative parameters with which to examine the core 
question in the thesis.  One of these parameters is the choice to focus on ―social 
movements‖ as a conceptual term and political and social phenomenon.  Such a choice is 
motivated by a number of reasons.  First, and according to a large number of theorists 
(Diani, 2000a; Melucci, 1989; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007; Touraine, 1981; 
1985), one of the distinctive features of social movements is that they are a form of 
contentious and oppositional collective action aimed at social, political, and/or cultural 
change.  Such a characteristic is of particular relevance to the current project, as one of its 
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main objectives is to assess the contributions of the Internet to changing, or at least 
affecting, power relations between the Moroccan state and civil society.  Second, the 
definition of social movements encompasses both institutionalized and non-
institutionalized forms of activism, which helps account for highly decentralized and 
horizontal modes of communication that distinguish many forms of online-based 
activism.  Third, social movements are constellations of organizations, groups, and 
individuals that are loosely connected, but that share collective identity and objectives.  
Four, while social movements‘ (SMs) collective action repertoire includes a large number 
of tactics and strategies, including direct forms of action, social movements cannot be 
reduced to street protests and popular uprisings.  Among the distinctive characteristics of 
social movements are their temporal longevity, and their fluctuation between short 
periods of visibility and long periods of latency (Melucci, 1989).  Social upheavals, 
uprisings and revolutions are usually the tip of the iceberg; they are the culmination of 
long, painful and sometimes silent convulsions, underground resistance and slow 
transformations. Studying collective action, thus, from the perspective of social 
movement theory enables us to better understand the social and cultural rootedness of 
political uprisings that burst out ―suddenly‖, as it is the case with the last Tunisian and 
Egyptian revolutions, for instance.  Finally, the concept of social movement allows us to 
go beyond technology-centred views that see in new social media the main and driving 
force behind social and political change.  
4. Contribution to Communication Studies and Research 
Despite the emergence of a massive body of literature dealing with the implications 
of the Internet for the political sphere and democracy, in general, research on the issue 
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within the context of developing countries has received little attention, so far.  The bulk 
of studies, in fact, have either dealt with the role of the medium in fostering direct 
democracy in Western and established democracies, or with its use by transnational 
social movements in various struggles against neo-liberal global capitalism.  
Furthermore, the existing literature on the developing world has predominantly focused, 
from the perspective of the ICT-for-development (ICT4DEV) discourse, on the role of 
ICTs in enhancing e-government and e-governance, giving short shrift to the bottom-up 
appropriation of these technologies by grassroots groups and social movements.  As a 
result, apart from a few highly publicised cases, such as the role of the Internet in the 
Zapatistas‘ struggle against the Mexican government in the mid-1990s, scant evidence 
exists on the use of ICTs and the Internet by oppositional political groups in the 
developing world.  Such a gap constitutes a significant obstacle to a better understanding 
of the role of the Internet in the social and political struggles in many regions of the 
developing world.  By focusing on Morocco, this thesis contributes to addressing this 
lacuna and to paving the way for further research on the topic in the context of 
developing countries. 
Studying the impact of the Internet on collective action in developing countries raises 
important questions on how to approach the issue, given the existence of a plethora of 
perspectives and debates within the literature on the topic.  A major dispute within 
research on the political and democratic roles of the Internet is the one involving the 
―utopian‖ and ―dystopian‖ stances on technology (Bentivegna, 2006; Dahlgren 2005; 
Dutton, Shepherd & de Gennaro, 2007; Saco, 2002).  This polemic is underpinned by two 
major stances in the general field of media studies that emphasize either structure—
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mainly from the perspective of the political economy of media—or agency, which is 
largely grounded in cultural studies (Fenton, 2007).   
Such dichotomous theorization also marks the scholarly examination of the role of 
ICTs in development, as two development paradigms are currently dominating the 
literature: on the one hand, there is the ―modernization development paradigm,‖ which 
maintains that ICTs are crucial for the development that is perceived to spread from the 
West to Southern countries (Zembylas, 2009, p.18).  On the other hand, there is the 
―social injustice development paradigm‖, according to which ICTs exacerbate existing 
inequalities, since they only benefit those who are ―already dominant politically and 
economically‖ (p.19).  Besides, as Walsham and Sahay (2006) observe, the dominant 
development paradigms are incapable of grasping the complexities surrounding such a 
complex topic as the implications of ICTs for social change in the developing world. 
Indeed, these ―issues in developing countries are normally deeply intertwined with issues 
of power, politics, donor dependencies, institutional arrangements, and inequalities of all 
sorts,‖ which calls for critical perspectives that can ―open up the ‗black box‘ as an aid to 
deeper understanding, and a stimulus to appropriate action‖ (p. 19).   
This thesis contributes to opening this ―black box‖ by critically assessing the role of 
the Internet as a socially embedded medium, and, in doing so, it transcends existing 
dichotomizations in the field by using a multidimensional approach that recognizes the 
roles of structures, technology, agency, and the multifarious interconnections between 
them.  Instead of promoting mono-causal explanations, the thesis is based on a holistic 
view that recognizes the role of the complex dynamics involving social actors and media 
practitioners, on the one hand, and technology and social and political structures, on the 
14 
 
other.  It achieves this objective by combining in an original way several theoretical 
perspectives and research methods, with a view to unravelling the complicated 
relationship between the Internet and the social world of its context and users, namely 
social movement theory, the social study of technology (SST), alternative media, radical-
democracy theories and community informatics. 
As a consequence, this thesis also contributes to research efforts that strive to 
conceptualize the political role of the Internet through social movement theory.  As will 
be discussed below in more detail, despite the existence of a vast literature on social 
movements‘ use of the Internet, very little of this research has attempted to benefit from 
social movement theory itself to analyse and understand this role (Carroll & Hackett, 
2006; Stein, 2009).  That is, while there are many studies focusing on the use of the 
Internet by and implications of the medium for social movements, they rarely draw on 
social movement theory itself to analyze, explain and interpret the multiple connections 
between the new communication technologies and these movements.  Thus, in addition to 
drawing on social-movement theory to theorize the implications of the Internet for 
collective action in Morocco, one of the three research methods employed by this study—
namely, framing analysis—is guided by and grounded in this theory.  While framing 
analysis has been extensively employed in numerous disciplines, including 
communication studies, it has rarely been applied to the examination of the Internet, and 
existing studies that draw on it, do so rather superficially (see Van Aelst & Walgrave, 
2004, for instance). 
A major advantage of applying social movement theory is that it allows us to 
understand and appreciate how various technological aspects specific to the Internet, such 
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as interactivity and networking, contribute to different levels of mobilization while 
simultaneously highlighting the role of socio-economic and political structures in 
determining the outcome of collective action.  Applying social movement theory helps 
us, for instance, interpret the process of collective identity construction as an act of 
mobilization and understand how the Internet contributes to it.  It also helps us appreciate 
individual users‘ interaction with the Internet as acts of micro-mobilization.  
Furthermore, my thesis strives to make a significant contribution to the literature on 
collective action and the political role of ICTs within the context of Islamic and Arab 
countries.  Scholarly studies on the use of the Internet in the political sphere in Muslim-
majority societies are extremely rare.  The bulk of available literature emphasizes the use 
of the Internet by religion-oriented social movements and organizations at the national 
and global levels, to the exclusion of secular social movements and organizations.  
Moreover, such studies subscribe to the dominant discourse on collective action in 
Islamic countries that is strongly marked by a descriptive approach.  As Wiktorowicz 
(2004) astutely remarks,  
the study of Islamic activism has, for the most part, remained isolated from the 
plethora of theoretical and conceptual developments that have emerged from 
research on social movements contentious politics.  Instead, most publications on 
Islamic activism are either descriptive analyses of the ideology, structure, and 
goals of various Islamic actors or histories of particular movements. (p. 3)   
The use of multiple theoretical perspectives aims to address these limitations by 
demonstrating how collective action in Islamic countries can be better conceptualized and 
analyzed in the light of existing theoretical paradigms.  Moreover, by focusing on the 
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situations of diverse Moroccan social movements that differ significantly in terms of 
ideological background, objectives, and organizational structure, the study sheds lights on 
the diversity and multiplicity characterizing the field of collective action in Muslim-
majority society, and brings out, at the same time, the differentiations marking the 
implications of the Internet for various types of social movements.   
The contributions of the current study go beyond the sphere of communication 
studies to include other disciplines, mainly political science, sociology, and cultural 
studies.  Contrary to dominant representations in Western media and academia, whereby 
Muslim-majority societies are mostly portrayed as homogeneous and where the public 
sphere is perceived as monopolized by Islamic-oriented discourses and groups, the study 
provides valuable insight into the multiplicity and contradictions marking politics and the 
public sphere in Morocco.  It especially underscores the differences and commonalities 
between secular and religion-oriented social movements, which contributes to 
establishing a more nuanced and balanced understanding of political life in the whole 
region. 
5. Organization and Chapter Breakdown 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, three of which are dedicated to data 
analysis.  The order of the chapters follows a movement from theory and back to practice 
and application.  Rather than reflect a strictly deductive approach, this order allows a 
transition from the general to the specific in order to situate the discussion and analysis of 
the role of technology into wider historical, social, and political contexts.  Thus, in 
addition to the present chapter, Chapter Two deals with the political economy of 
Morocco and the Internet in the country. The first part of the chapter provides a brief 
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discussion of the socio-economic structures and some key related facts summarizing the 
major challenges facing the country, such as social inequalities, insufficient economic 
development, and, above all, the low ranking of the country in human development 
indexes.  It also presents a historical background of Moroccan polity and democratic 
process since the country‘s independence in 1956, and discusses the role of and 
interaction between the key players in this process—namely, the monarchy, political 
parties, and civil society.  In addition, the chapter assesses the condition of basic 
freedoms in the country, especially freedom of expression.  The second part of the 
chapter provides an overview of the development of information and communication 
technologies infrastructure and use, and focuses on the diffusion of the Internet.  It also 
points out the main problems and challenges facing the diffusion of new technologies, 
especially those related to unequal access to the Internet.  Moreover, the chapter 
discusses freedom of speech online and compares it to its manifestations in offline media 
(mainly, print newspapers).   
Chapter Three presents a review of the literature, and covers some of the most 
important works and issues related to the topic of the research.  The first part of the 
chapter addresses various interpretations of the concepts of ―civil society‖ and ―social 
movements,‖ their origins, and the major theoretical paradigms that have challenged 
them.  Tracing their theoretical conception and development in Western settings, this 
chapter also discusses how the concepts were applied in non-Western contexts.  The 
second part provides an overview of the main theories as well as the seminal scholarly 
works that addressed the political role and democratic potential of the Internet, either in 
established democracies or in the context of authoritarian and developing countries.   
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Chapter Four presents the theoretical framework and methodological approach used 
in the study.  The first part presents the main theoretical models employed: social- 
movement and radical-democracy theories, alternative-media theory, the social study of 
technology (SST), and community informatics (CI) studies.  The second part of the 
chapter explains the methodological approach, which was composed of three methods: 
feature analysis, framing analysis, and in-depth-interviewing.  It is worth noting that 
Chapter Four presents only the general outlines of these three methods, since a detailed 
discussion of the methods is provided in the following three analytical chapters.   
Chapter Five is dedicated to studying the general structural features and functions of 
the eighteen websites covered by the study, and which include collective blogs and wikis, 
and belong to seven distinct social movements: (1) the Islamic-oriented movement; (2) 
the alter globalization movement; (3) the human-rights movement; (4) the 
women‘s/feminist movement; (5) the Amazigh cultural movement; (6) the unemployed-
graduates movement; and (7) the radical left movement.  Drawing on a medium-specific 
approach to content analysis, the chapter examines the extent to which Moroccan social 
movements appropriate the potential of the medium for collective action by focusing on 
the following key Web functions: (a) providing updated information; (b) enhancing 
internal cohesion and collective identity within movements and social movement 
organizations (SMOs); (c) enhancing their capacity to link to other movements and 
organizations at the national, regional, and international levels; (d) maximizing their 
ability to mobilize actual and potential constituents; and (e) building participatory 
communication structures and interactions.   
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Using framing analysis, Chapter Six examines the textual content of the studied 
websites.  It aims to complement the structural analysis used in the previous chapter by 
exploring the use of the websites to develop and deliver the ideas, symbols, and 
interpretations that play a central role in the processes and outcome of collective action.  
In doing so, the chapter assesses the extent to which the studied websites contribute to 
building agonistic public spheres, specifically through the communication of the three 
key collective action frames of injustice, identity, and agency.  Moreover, focusing on the 
case of the Israeli attack on Gaza in the winter of 2009, the chapter examines how various 
social movements framed the war and the extent to which they drew on the Internet‘s 
potential to convey the three core tasks of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational 
framing.   
Chapter Seven presents in-depth interview analysis, and discusses data generated 
from the interviews conducted with social movement activists, among others.  Using in-
depth interview analysis, the chapter examines various levels of interconnectedness 
between the technological and the social, and how the multilevel articulations between 
the two condition and shape the impact of the Internet on social movements.  
Corroborating as well as complementing many key findings in the previous chapters, this 
chapter underlines the many communication practices and forms through which the 
Internet is empowering Moroccan social movements.  In doing so, it emphasizes the 
interrelatedness and complementariness of the Internet and diverse forms of 
communication, as well as the relation between professional and citizen journalism.   
In addition, the chapter demonstrates however that the empowering role of the 
Internet is hampered by serious limitations resulting from multiple types of divides, 
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which significantly restrict the impact social-movement groups can have when using the 
medium to contest the dominant political and social orders.  While the consequences of 
the divides regarding access, skill, and usage are highlighted, the chapter places more 
emphasis on gender and motivational divides as the most complex and enduring forms of 
divide hindering the political role of the Internet in the country.  Finally, by comparing 
two distinct ICT4DEV projects targeting Moroccan civil society, the chapter sheds light 
on the limitations of the dominant discourse regarding the role of technology in 
development, particularly in terms of how to achieve sustainability, and points out 
possible ways in which such projects can learn from existing experiences in the field.   
Finally, Chapter Eight presents a summary of the main findings and the conclusions 
of the study, and discusses how the main research questions of the study have been 
answered.  The chapter also discusses the significance of the research findings and their 
contribution to communication studies and to the sub-field dealing with the political use 
and applications of ICTs, in particular.  The chapter also points out the limitations of the 
study and how it can be built upon for future research.   
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Chapter Two: The Political Economy of a Country and a Medium 
Sisyphus in the Digital Age 
Introduction 
Using Greek mythology as a metaphor to grasp the complex relationship between 
civil society and the monarchy in Morocco, Canadian sociologist Lise Garon (2003) 
explains:  
This is already an old story, which alternates between periods of intense civil 
activity and strong-arm rule, between freedom and tyranny.  This story is 
reminiscent of the legendary Sisyphus, the Greek hero condemned eternally to roll 
a heavy rock up a hill.  He always stops halfway to rest, and hence, the rock rolls 
again to the bottom of the slope and he must start work all over again.  It has been 
the destiny of Moroccan civil society to be like Sisyphus, whose endless efforts to 
counteract the pull of authoritarian temptation do not prevent the rock of freedom 
from returning to the bottom of the slope. (p. 6) 
Garon also highlighted the pivotal role that media, especially opposition party 
newspapers, played in the standoff between the Moroccan Monarchy and its opposition 
during the Amaoui affair in 1992.  The affair broke out when opposition parties, trade 
unions, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) defied King Hassan II‘s 
regime to demand the release of Noubir Amaoui, an outspoken trade union leader who 
was jailed for demanding the transfer of some of the king‘s powers to parliament.  
Garon demonstrated how competition over control of and within the public sphere can 
shape these struggles and their outcomes.  But as the public sphere in Morocco is being 
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steadily, albeit slowly, transformed by the diffusion of various information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), particularly mobile media and the Internet, can 
cyber-activism and online mobilization have any major impact on the Sisyphean efforts 
to push the ―rock‖ of change over the steep hill of Morocco‘s stagnant polity?   
This chapter provides a historical background and socioeconomic context for the 
tumultuous and sometimes dubious relationships between the Monarchy and 
oppositional political parties and civil groups, and the implications of these relationships 
for democratic change in the country.  It also discusses the infrastructure and 
development of ICTs, and the Internet, in particular.  The chapter, thus, provides a wider 
socioeconomic and political context for the discussion in subsequent chapters, especially 
those dealing with data analysis.  This is important because a key argument advanced in 
this thesis is that technology is a social phenomenon and, therefore, studying its impact 
cannot be performed satisfactorily without understanding its social embeddedness and 
the historicity of those appropriating it.   
1. The Political Economy of Morocco 
1.1 The economy and human development: Background. 
Morocco has a strategic position in the Northwest of Africa.  It has two coastlines, 
one on the Atlantic Ocean and the other on the Mediterranean Sea, and is the closest 
point in Africa to Europe (see figure 1).  As such, it has always been at the crossroads of 
civilizations and in the middle of cultural flows.  Yet, this strategic position has not 
translated into economic success.  According to The Human Development Report issued 
annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Morocco‘s gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita is estimated at $4,108 (USD), which gave it a 
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ranking of 118 out of 177 countries (UNDP - Morocco, 2009).  Whilst this rank 
positions Morocco among middle-income countries, the country‘s performance in 
human and social development is comparable to low-income ones since, in this regard, it 
ranks 130 out of 177 (UNDP - Morocco, 2009).  Thus, although Morocco has always 
been a faithful disciple of development policies and agencies (Desrues & Moyano, 
2001; Schlumberger, 2000; Dillman, 2001; Cohen & Jaidi, 2006), human development 
indices demonstrate that it has broadly failed to achieve adequate and sustained 
economic and social development.  
 
Figure 1. Map of Morocco. 
It is true that economic and human development indices do not reflect the relative 
progress that the country has made in many areas since its independence from France in 
1956.  For instance, ―between 1980 and 2010, Morocco‘s life expectancy at birth 
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increased by 14 years, mean years of schooling increased by about 3 years and expected 
years of schooling increased by 5 years‖ (UNDP, 2010, pp. 3-4).  Moreover, in 2005, 
Morocco launched the National Initiative for Human Development, a two-billion-dollar 
social development plan to alleviate poverty and unemployment, and improve life 
conditions in the country's urban slums, thus marking ―a turning point in Morocco‘s 
economic and social policy since independence‖ (Martin, 2006, p. 433).  
Nonetheless, after almost five years since the project was launched, the country‘s 
economic and human development indexes are still low.  According to the 2009 UN 
Human Development Report, the adult literacy rate is estimated at 55.6% (ranking the 
country 132
nd
), while illiteracy among women is much higher, with a rate exceeding 
60%.  Moreover, Morocco ranks 96
th
 in the Human Poverty Index (HPI).  These indices 
situate the country in a lower position compared to other countries with similar 
economic potential, as well as to other countries in the region (see figure 2).  In fact, the 
Moroccan economy has been described as one with ―high potential and low 
performance,‖ due to various factors such as ―population growth, weather conditions 
and mismanagement of economic policy‖ (Cherkaoui & Ben Ali, 2003, p. 3).  Indeed, 
both the Moroccan economy and state are based on a clientelistic system, which is 
described as one where networks of contacts to decision makers determine access to and 
distribution of resources (Schlumberger, 2000).  In these conditions, economic 
liberalization adopted by the country since the 1970s became a mere ―instrument to 
legitimize political power by bestowing privileges and benefits upon its allies and 
employing large sectors of the middle class in the public administration‖ (Desrues & 
Moyano, 2001, pp. 32–33).   
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In fact, under the close, and sometimes direct, auspices of international financial 
agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the 
country adopted development policies that prioritized economic growth over social 
development, which was believed to be merely an outcome of the former.  Thus, in the 
name of efficiency and economic competitiveness, the state sharply reduced its 
investment in social development and the welfare state, abandoning the largest segments 
of the population to poverty.  These policies have only exacerbated the existing huge 
social inequalities between classes and regions, and resulted in the concentration of 
almost 40% of the country‘s wealth in 1% of the territory, while ―more than 77% of 
territory contributes around 10% of value added to the economy,‖ according to a 2003 
government study (Cohen & Jaidi, 2006, p. 44).   
In addition, the liberal orientation of the economy was in appearance only, insofar 
as economic liberalization was reduced to privatization and became ―a perfect medium 
for the continuation of clientelistic practices within the state apparatus, benefiting a 
large sector of the elite with close ties to those in power‖ (Desrues & Moyano, 2001, p. 
33).  Thus, a few decades after the launching of Structural Adjustment Programs, as  
Maghraoui (2001) observes, Morocco‘s economy is still relying on the same resources 
since the 1960s, mainly loans, agriculture, phosphates, tourism, remittances from 
Moroccans expatriates, and light manufacturing (p. 76).  More importantly, the country 
has found itself, at the turn of the twenty-first century, ―heavily in debt and ill-prepared 
for the next development ideology-integration into the global market‖  




Figure 2. Human development index for Morocco. 
1.2 The political system. 
1.2.1 The colonial era: The rise of the modern political system. 
Unlike the majority of Arab counties, Morocco was never subjugated to the mighty 
Ottoman Empire.  It also repelled colonial powers for a long time and maintained its 
independence for a longer period, compared to its neighboring countries.
1
  Cohen and 
Jaidi (2006) maintain that ―the tribal structure, religious tradition of maraboutism 
(Islamic mysticism centered on saints and brotherhoods) and the sultanate contributed to 
the independence and integrity of the country and its capacity to contest foreign 
enemies, from the Turks to Spaniards‖ (p. xi).  The key role played by the sultanate or 
central power in maintaining the independence of the country, and later in reclaiming it 
                                                 
1
 Neighboring Algeria, for instance, was colonized for 130 years between 1830 and 1961, while the French 
Protectorate in Morocco lasted only 44 years (from 1912 to 1956).   
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from the French Protectorate, is represented by the longevity of the current Alaouite 
dynasty, which came to power in 1660, and is ―the longest continuous dynasty in 
recorded history‖ (Watson, 2006, p. 31).  Although the modern Moroccan political 
system was established after the end of the period of French colonial rule in 1956, key 
players within this system had been active long before this date.  The first organized 
political groups emerged during the 1930s with the creation of the Committee for 
Moroccan Action (CAM) that led to the establishment of the nationalist and largely 
secular Istiqlal (Independence) party (IP) in 1943.  Along with the IP, which 
spearheaded resistance against French rule, two other political parties of lesser influence 
appeared in the same period, namely the Moroccan Communist Party (PCM) and the 
Democratic Independence Party (PDI). 
1.2.2 The monarchy: Divine and secular powers. 
Unlike in other countries in the region, the struggle for independence in Morocco 
was ―centered around the capture, revival, and renewal of a traditional institution, the 
monarchy‖ (Watson, 2006, p. 34).  This particularity has characterized modern 
Moroccan polity ever since.  In fact, the monarchy, or the sultanate, played a crucial role 
in the success of the nationalist movement‘s struggle to end the French Protectorate.  As 
Glennie and Mepham (2007) point out, 
[t]he sultan Mohammed V came under strong pressure from the colonial 
authorities to collaborate and reach a political deal short of independence, but he 
chose instead to publicly advocate the demand for full independence made by 
Istiqlal and other parties.  He was forced into exile by the protectorate government 
in 1953, but this only served to increase his popularity and further strengthened 
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the nationalist opposition forces.  Such was the pressure from the Moroccan public 
that the French were compelled to allow Mohammed V to return from exile, upon 
which he was greeted as a national hero by much of Moroccan society. (p. 6)  
This may explain, at least in part, why a large number of Moroccans support the 
monarchy as a guarantor and symbol of stability and unity, despite its poor record in the 
domains of human rights and social justice for many years after independence.  Indeed, 
the historical role played by the monarchy has consolidated its legitimacy beyond the 
persona of the king.  As a consequence, although Moroccans ―may consider the king 
personally unfair or unjust, they nonetheless identify with the monarchy as a symbol of 
national unity and a legitimate form of governance‖ (Maghraoui, 2001, p. 75).   
After Independence, King Mohamed V sought to reinforce the monarchy‘s 
legitimacy and influence by incorporating the elites into the newly established state 
apparatus, and allowing the national-movement parties to participate in a national-unity 
government.  Following a short period of uneasy co-existence, this fragile unity broke 
down as the king appeared unwilling to substantially share power with political parties 
that called for the establishment of a real constitutional monarchy.  Consequently, the 
king dismissed Abdullah Ibrahim‘s2 first left-wing government in 1960 and created his 
own after assuming the role of prime minister, thus proving that ―the constitutional 
reforms were more cosmetic than real‖ (Glennie & Mepham, 2007, p. 7).  This action 
ushered the country into a long period of absolute rule characterized by intense 
repression, interrupted by short periods of political openness, which characterized the 
Moroccan polity until the late 1990s.   
                                                 
2
 He is considered the first socialist politician to head a Moroccan government.   
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When Hassan II succeeded to the throne in 1961, the Monarchy was already an 
established institution with direct control over political life.  The new king reinforced 
this role by both renewing and reinvigorating traditional practices and discourses, and 
through the extensive use of patronage and coercive force.  Although historically the 
monarchy has never been the sole political power in the country, it has always had the 
advantage over its rivals in that it is an institution enjoying both religious and secular 
legitimacy.  Therefore, after the country achieved independence in the mid-1950s, the 
monarchy ―alone claimed to be something of an institution, and it alone combined the 
elements of religious legitimacy and the rudiments of an administrative and military 
apparatus requisite for the establishment of an effective state system‖ (Vinogradov & 
Waterbury, 1971, p. 38).  The Moroccan king is considered to be a Sharif (i.e., a 
descendant of the Prophet), and assumed the title of ―Amir-Al-Muminin‖ (Commander 
of the Faithful), which makes him the supreme religious authority in the country.  
Likewise, the monarch derives his authority and legitimacy ―from collective will, 
through the annual oath of allegiance by representatives of the community in a 
ceremony known as ―Bay‘a‖3 (Maghraoui, 2001, p. 75).   
In addition, the king exerts power and influence through an effective system that 
combines traditional Makhzen networks, defined by Ottaway and Riley (2006) as an 
―elite of palace retainers, regional and provincial administrators, and military officers, 
connected to [the monarchy] by entrenched patronage networks,‖ and a modern 
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 The bay‘a is ―a contract of allegiance between the king and the people (….) This contract is renewed 
every year by the ulamas [religious scholars], the members of the government, the members of Parliament, 
the higher officials in the administration of the public sector, the provinces, and the military corps.  Within 
this contract, in return for the people‘s obedience, the king insures public security and order‖ (Cherkaoui & 




administrative apparatus that ensures loyalty and obedience (p. 4).  Drawing on 
traditional and modern regimes and orders, the monarchy‘s power and legitimacy has 
been reinforced by the use of ―repression, corruption, and cooptation‖ to either stifle 
opposition or appease it according to circumstances (Maghraoui, 2001, p. 13).  The 
king‘s overwhelming religious and secular authority is reflected by and enshrined within 
the successive constitutions adopted since Independence
4
, which allows the Makhzen to 
use the judiciary system to silence opposition when repression is not an option.   
1.2.3 The democratic process in Morocco: The eternal ascent of Sisyphus?  
Morocco‘s political history and democratization process since independence has 
been marked by the complex and unsteady relationship between civil society and 
political parties on one hand, and the Makhzen, on the other.  In over half a century, this 
relationship has gone through cyclical periods of uneasy coexistence, confrontation, 
cooperation, co-optation and suppression, during which the monarchy has often 
succeeded in emerging as the most powerful institution in the country, without being 
able to completely monopolize the political scene.  Even during the bleak periods of the 
state‘s violent suppression of opposition parties and movements in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the king often sought to appease his opponents by inviting them to join the government 
and even soliciting their services, especially in regard to thorny issues like the conflict in 
the Western Sahara.   
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 Article 19 of the constitution of Morocco states that ―The King (…) shall be the Supreme Representative 
of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof.  He shall be the guarantor of the perpetuation and the 
continuity of the State. As Defender of the Faith, he shall ensure the respect for the Constitution.  He shall 
be the Protector of the rights and liberties of the citizens, social groups, and organizations.‖ (Smith & 




In fact, Morocco‘s political history stands out in the region as one marked by 
serious, though hitherto unsuccessful, attempts to move towards real democratization 
(Bendourou, 1996; Desrues & Moyano, 2001; Cavatorta, 2005, 2006).  Magraoui (2002) 
maintains that in the 1950s, ―Morocco was one of the rare newly independent states to 
embark on a path of political pluralism and market economics‖ (p. 24).  The pluralism 
that characterized the Moroccan polity over decades has had, despites its grave 
limitations, a considerable impact on the political culture of the people.  Thus, according 
to a large survey
5
 that tested support for democratic institutions and norms in 32 Muslim 
countries, including Arab ones, Morocco topped all other Arab countries and was 
exceeded only by Turkey (Fattah, 2006).  Morocco is also ―considered to have gone 
farther than any other Arab state along the path of political emancipation‖ (UNDP - 
Arab World, 2009, p. 28).  But despite this rich political culture and experience, 
democratic transition has hitherto failed to materialize and the process is stagnating, at 
best.  Summarizing the contradictions that distinguish Moroccan politics, Leveau (1997) 
points out that Morocco is neither a democracy nor a dictatorship, as its political system 
is based on ―authoritarian pluralism‖ (p. 95).   
On the eve of independence from the French Protectorate in 1956, power relations 
were relatively balanced between the monarchy and the national movement formed by 
existing political parties and civil society groups (mainly trade unions).  King Mohamed 
V convened a government of national unity that included the Istiqlal party and, later on, 
the National Union of Popular Forces party (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, or 
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 The survey was conducted as part of Fattah‘s research in Democratic Values in the Muslim World (2006). 
The survey ―covers 31,380 literate Muslims in thirty-two Muslim countries across the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia, as well as minority Muslim communities in the United States, 
Europe and India‖ (Fattah, 2006, p. 3).  
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UNFP), the left wing of Istiqlal that split off in 1959.  The co-existence between the 
monarchy and the political parties reached its peak with the constitution of the left-wing 
government of Abdullah Ibrahim, which only lasted two years (between 1958 and 
1960).  With the death of Mohamed V in 1961 and his succession by King Hassan II, 
this uneasy co-existence came to a halt as the new king forcefully and swiftly led the 
country into an absolutist monarchy through repression, police terror, and extensive co-
optation.   
Between 1961 and 1998, ―King Hassan II reigned over Morocco exactly as if he 
were running a medieval absolutist state‖ (Maghraoui, 2001, p. 13).  But while civil 
society actors and institutions were severely curtailed and weakened by the state‘s 
repressive machine, they were never completely destroyed, and several actors managed 
to survive independently and to challenge the king‘s authority (Garon, 2003).  During 
this period, the first parliament was elected in May 1963 only to be interrupted in 1965 
by the proclamation of a state of emergency.  In 1970, the one-chamber parliament was 
supplanted by a bicameral one, and a new assembly was elected that was close to the 
monarchy.  This parliament was, in turn, soon interrupted by the two unsuccessful 
military coups of 1971 and 1972 that were followed by a reconstruction of politics and 
the drafting of a new constitution (Cherkaoui & Ben Ali, 2003).  This bleak period in the 
history of the country was dubbed the ―Years of Lead‖ to refer to state human-rights 
violations and repression of opposition groups and activists that would last till the end of 
the 1990s.   
Nevertheless, the particularity of the Moroccan experience in the region stems from 
the fact that even during the darkest periods of repression, the Makhzen, paradoxically, 
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often had to appease opposition, integrating part of the elite class into the government, 
and bestowing legitimacy on its actions by constantly reviewing the constitution.  As 
pointed out by Zerhouni (2004), ―the rule of King Hassan was characterized by 
alternating phases of authoritarianism and liberalization‖ (p. 63).  These phases of 
liberalization were usually measures undertaken to face political and economic crises, 
rather than genuine moves to change the political structure.  After the Green March
6
 that 
allowed Morocco to annex the Western Sahara in 1975, King Hassan II needed to build 
a national consensus over the issue of ―territorial integrity‖.  A period of political 
opening was thus initiated where the leftist USFP party ―changed its strategy from 
criticism and boycott and agreed to operate as a ‗constructive opposition‘ in the 
parliament‖ (p. 63).  This period was again interrupted in the late 1980s by the 
imposition of restrictions on the opposition and its newspapers.   
Due to domestic and international conjunctures, mainly the severe and prolonged 
economic crisis beginning in the 1980s, the social unrests of the 1990s, and the 
transformation of world politics in the post-Cold War era, the monarchy tried again to 
introduce initiatives to allow for more democratic reforms and economic liberalization.  
These initiatives included the constitutional revisions of 1992 and 1996, the creation of 
the Consultative Council on Human Rights in 1990, the general royal amnesty that was 
preceded by various partial pardons, and the improvement of the electoral consultations 
transparency (Human Development Report - Morocco, 2009, p. 13).  The revision of the 
constitution in 1992 ―led to a renewed interest in the electoral process‖ (Cherkaoui & 
Ben Ali, 2003, p. 746).  As a consequence, five opposition parties presented a 
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 The Green March was a mass demonstration organized by the Moroccan government in 1975 to force 
Spain to hand over Western Sahara to Morocco.   
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memorandum to the king demanding institutional reforms.  the negotiations culminated 
in the appointment of the socialist leader, Abderhman Youssoufi, as a prime minister in 
1998, after his party, the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), won in the 
country‘s first relatively transparent democratic elections in 1997.  This political 
process, widely known as ―alternance‖ (alternation), continued after Mohamed VI took 
power in 1999.   
The current king marked his first years of reign with a series of political reforms, 
such as the release of political prisoners and the rehabilitation and compensation for the 
victims of the Years of Lead, the establishment of the Equity and Reconciliation 
Commission (IRC), the organization of open and relatively fair bicameral elections in 
2002 and 2007, the permission of more freedom of speech, and the adoption of the new 
Family Code in 2004.  The latter measure was, in fact, described as ―a landmark reform 
of the status of Moroccan women as it puts them on equal footing with men in regard to 
marriage and children‖ (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2009).  Mohamed 
VI‘s first years in power have drawn much praise and generated great hopes for the 
democratization process in the country.  Denoeux (2001), for instance, holds that 
well ahead of the country‘s political class, King Mohammed VI has sought to 
chart a new course for the Kingdom.  In the process he has displayed political 
audacity and courage.  In tune with his people and their aspirations, he has proven 
to be a powerful catalyst for change. (p. 84) 
Nonetheless, after over 10 years in power, Mohamed VI has not transformed the 
country into a democracy, nor has he alleviated in any significant way the social and 
economic disparities that plague the county.  Assessing his first decade in power, a large 
35 
 
number of commentators have drawn a less optimistic and rosy picture of his reign than 
the image that many perceived when the king had just acceded the throne.  While 
acknowledging the king‘s achievements, Turquoi (2009) advances that at the political 
level,   
l'équilibre des pouvoirs entre le palais royal et les partis reste un vœu pieux.  Le 
Maroc est toujours dirigé par le roi et ses proches.  Le gouvernement compte peu.  
Le Parlement n'est qu'une chambre d'enregistrement.  Les élections locales de juin 
témoignent de cette emprise du palais royal.  Elles ont été marquées, sur fond 
d'abstention massive, par le triomphe du parti de "l'ami du roi," Fouad Ali El-
Himma, parti créé il y a moins d'un an.  (para. 8) 
Zerhouni (2004) has explained that profound changes failed to materialize because 
the country‘s political system has not been able to produce a new political elite capable 
of translating intentions and laws into real changes.  It is a situation where the monarchy 
plays a vital role by perpetuating ―elite immobilisme‖ and reinforcing the ―clientelist 
network in which economic self-interest became part of elite members‘ shared values‖ 
(p. 61).  Many observers have commented that the monarchy‘s move towards more 
political openness is not driven by a genuine commitment to democracy, but rather by a 
need to engage traditional elites in government while building more consensus and 
legitimacy around the institution of the monarchy itself (Desrues & Moyano, 2001; 
Smith & Loudiy, 2005; Watson, 2006).  This state of affairs was clearly reflected in the 
last legislative elections in September 2007, for which the rate of participation did not 
top 37% of the registered electorate.  The low participation reveals how the majority of 
people ―do not take these elections seriously because they know that ‗the game is 
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fixed‘‖ (Maghraoui, 2001, p. 80).  According to Desrues and Moyano (2001), the 
success of the democratic transition in the country depends on many conditions that 
have not all been realized, chief among them the development of a strong and 
independent civil society.  For Smith and Louidy (2005), Morocco‘s case is not a 
democracy in transition, but rather a semi-authoritarian regime that will never change 
unless it is challenged.  The well-known journalist Aboubakr Jamaii (2009) argues that 
Mohamed VI failed to respect a tacit agreement between King Hassan II and civil 
society that led to the experience of ―alternance‖ and provided the gradual opening of 
the political system into real participation and power sharing: 
Le bilan de ces dix dernières années est tout simplement nul.  Rien n'a été fait pour 
entamer une réforme constitutionnelle.  Pis encore, aux yeux de la monarchie: 
évoquer la réforme de la Constitution confine au blasphème et expose ses 
promoteurs à la marginalisation politique et aux foudres des médias aux ordres.  
(Le Monde, para. 4) 
The ―War on Terror‖ launched after September 11, 2001 and the Casablanca terrorist 
attacks that shocked the country in 20037 provided the state with more pretexts and an 
international cover and support for its repressive policies.  In fact, immediately after these 
attacks, indiscriminate arrests of presumed Islamist militants were carried out, with the 
number of those arrested estimated to be between 10,000 and 20,000 people (Turquoi, 
2009).  Yet, ―no widespread international condemnation of Morocco has been issued 
following the publication of Amnesty International‘s 2004 report detailing the repressive 
practices of the regime‖ (Cavatorta, 2005, p. 563).  These conclusions seem to sadly 
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 On May 16, 2003, a series of suicide bombings hit several targets in Casablanca, the economic capital of 
the country, and resulted in the death of 45 people.    
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confirm Garon‘s image of Sisyphus: after ten years, the rock of democratization is falling 
down the long slope again.  Is democratic change in Morocco doomed to an eternal, 
cyclical ascension and fall?  Garon (2003), though not very optimistic, is not pessimistic 
either, affirming that what characterizes the Moroccan model of civil society, beyond its 
―dangerous alliances‖ with the Makhzen, is ―its stable character, with neither progress 
nor setback of the spectacular type‖ (p. 81).  Zerhouni (2004) adopts a more optimistic 
stance, affirming that despite its many shortcomings, the last phase of political 
liberalization has allowed a large part of the elite to participate in various forms of 
political arena, and since resources are limited, ―increases in the number of the elite 
might make it more difficult to maintain the current clientelist system‖ (p. 62).   
1.2.5 Media and freedom of speech. 
Freedom of speech and the press have followed the same cycles of openness and 
restrictions that have characterized politics in the country since independence.  After 
decades of direct and violent censorship, restrictions were eased in the late 1990s as a 
part of the deal between the late King Hassan II and opposition parties.  Since then, 
freedom of speech and the press have developed considerably, especially since 
Mohamed VI took power.  In the past few years, a large number of independent 
publications have appeared—overall, there are 600 newspapers and magazines in Arabic 
and French—while private radio and television stations were allowed to operate for the 
first time in 2006.  So far, there are eleven radio stations and one private television 
station.  A significant number of non-partisan, professional, and highly critical 
publications have appeared in this period; they are projects launched by a ―new breed of 
journalists [that] has capitalized on the absence of a strategic and strong political 
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opposition to attract new readers and gain credibility in the cultural media landscape‖ 
(Douai, 2009, p. 8).  Initially comprising mainly weekly magazines in French, such as 
Le Journal, this new generation of publications developed to include many Arabic titles, 
-.  For more than a decade, these publications have played an influential role in 
expanding the horizon and quality of the public sphere, as they ―have gradually broken 
taboos, turned political reporting and analysis into an everyday topic, and stolen readers 
from the now ailing political party organs‖ (Reporters Without Borders, 2003, para. 3).   
However, like many other civil rights in the country, this freedom remains fragile 
and fluctuating, since the state still resorts, though not as systematically as before, to 
repression in order to silence criticism on certain taboo subjects, mainly the monarchy, 
religion, and the issue of the Western Sahara.
8
  Smith and Loudiy (2005) succinctly 
point out that the country ―is animated by an opening of discourse opportunities 
unthinkable just a decade ago‖ (p. 1087).  But they also note that, paradoxically, it is 
―still marked by fear, censorship, surveillance, detentions, [and] torture‖ (p. 1087).  
Indeed, the honeymoon between the independent press and the new monarch did not last 
long before severe restrictions and harassment were used again whenever the ―red lines‖ 
were crossed, including criticism of the monarchy, the issue of the Western Sahara, and, 
in some instances, failure to ―respect‖ the Islamic religion.  The new state policy 
towards the independent press was clearly defined by King Mohamed VI himself in the 
following terms:  
Of course I am in favour of [freedom of the press].  But I would like this freedom 
to be a responsible one ... Journalists aren‘t angels, after all.  Personally, I 
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 The conflict of the Western Sahara has opposed Morocco and the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro), which has been backed by neighbouring Algeria since 
1975 when Morocco annexed the province after seizing it from Spain.   
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appreciate the role of critic played by the Moroccan press and journalists in public 
debate.  But let‘s avoid giving in to the temptation of the imported model.  
Otherwise our own values will be undermined and individual freedoms will be 
jeopardised ... The law sets limits ... It must apply to everyone.  When the press 
speaks of human rights, it sometimes forgets to respect those rights itself.  
(Reporters without Borders, 2003, para. 3) 
The desire to see the outspoken press be more ―responsible‖ was manifested in new 
methods of curtailment.  To avoid international publicity and embarrassment, the state 
has had recourse largely to a new strategy to silence the media, namely ―economic ruin.‖  
However, when hefty fines fail to do the job, imprisonment of journalists and closure of 
publications through ―kangaroo trials‖ await those who cross the lines.  This is 
facilitated by the fact that ―the press laws and the law of Audiovisual Communication 
provide many loopholes through which the government can intimidate and prosecute 
writers, newspapers and channels‖ (Open Arab Net, 2009, para. 10). Thus, in the last 
decade, Morocco‘s docile and state-controlled judiciary has given 25 years of prison to 
several journalists and almost $3 million (USD) in fines. In 2008, the Arabic daily 
AlMassae alone was sentenced to pay fines of around $750,000 (USD) (Wendell, 2009, 
p. 142).  The years 2009 and 2010 were deemed the worst for freedom of the press, with 
a record number of journalists sentenced to prison; subsequently, the country‘s world 
ranking in freedom of expression published annually by Reporters Without Borders 




 in 2009 and to 135
th
 in 2010 (RWB, Press 
Freedom Index, 2010).   
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2. ICTs and the Internet in Morocco: Towards an Information Society?  
2.1 Official discourse and policy on ICTs. 
Despite formidable economic and social challenges facing the country, Morocco has 
made considerable progress in the domain of ICTs.  Gray (2002), from the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), contends that ―despite the fact that Morocco has the 
region‘s lowest GDP per capita, its liberalized telecom environment has allowed it to 
take the region‘s lead in the mobile sector‖ (para. 3).  Within Moroccan official 
discourse, the liberalization of the communication sector is often described as a vital 
step towards wider societal adoption of new technologies that can accelerate economic 
and social development.  This is why, and similarly to the rest of the developing world, 
―the information revolution is viewed as a highly political affair and not as a technical 
challenge‖ (Wilson, 2006, p. 6). 
The development of ICTs in Morocco gained real momentum after 1997, when a 
landmark Post Office and Telecommunication Act (Law 24-96) was passed that 
provided for the liberalization of the telecommunication industry and set up an 
independent regulatory agency, Agence Nationale de Réglementation des 
Telecommunication (ANRT).  Two years later, the government awarded the second 
mobile phone operator license to Médi Télécom (Méditel) through an international 
tender for $1.1 billion (USD), ―the most lucrative award for a GSM license ever in a 
developing nation‖ (Willis, 2006, pp. 39–40).  In 1999, another telecommunication 
company, WANA Corporate (formerly Maroc Connect), was established and later 
marketed its Internet services under the brand Wanadoo.  The company was initially a 
subsidiary of France Télécom, but is now controlled by the Moroccan conglomerate 
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Omnium Nord-Africain (ONA).  In 2008, the company won the third mobile license 
and, through marketing its third-generation (3G) mobile system, it controls less than 2% 
of mobile market in Morocco (ANRT, 2008).   
2.2 The rapid growth in the ICT sector: Network capitalism. 
Since 1999, the number of mobile subscribers increased dramatically, going from 
just 250,000 in 1999 (Hajji, 2002) to 16 million in 2006, and almost 23 million in 2008, 
which represents 73.98% of the country‘s population (ANRT, 2008, p. 23).  In 
comparison, fixed telephony has scarcely developed over the last few years, with a 
penetration rate of only 9.70% of the population (p. 23).  In spite of the exponential 
growth in mobile phone use, prepaid subscriptions remains the dominant type of service, 
with 95.96% of total mobile subscriptions, a situation that can be attributed to the high 
cost of mobile communication and subscription compared to the income of the majority 
of people.  The huge surge in the number of mobile users in the country, however, has 
been seen by exponents of the liberalization of telecommunication as a success story to 
be emulated in the developing world.  In an enthusiastic article entitled ―Morocco - 
leaving the others behind,‖ Vanessa Gray (2002) suggests that ―Morocco‘s impressive 
telecommunication breakthrough is an excellent example of today‘s worldwide 
liberalization and transformation process‖ (para. 1); similarly, Sutherland (2007) 
contends that the country is ―one of the telecommunications successes of Africa‖ (p. 8).   
These highly positive assessments adhere, in fact, to a global discourse on technology 
whose ascension to prominence in the last few decades is intrinsically linked to a neo-
liberal economic system.  Fisher (2010) points out a number of aspects that distinguish 
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the articulation between what he calls the ―narrative of the digital discourse‖ and the 
―network of capitalism‖: 
[t]he withdrawal of the state from the planning, management, and regulation of the 
economy and from its welfare obligations; the move from national protective 
economy to a globalized, deregulated, and unitary market; the privatization of 
work; the eradication of work and the working class as viable social categories. 
(p.3) 
The development of the telecommunication sector in Morocco, in fact, spearheaded 
a very aggressive economic liberalization policy, under the supervision of international 
monetary institutions, which saw the privatization of key state-owned companies and 
sectors.  While these policies have led to the fast diffusion and adoption of ICTs such as 
the mobile phone and more recently the Internet, they have also, paradoxically, 
aggravated existing social and economic inequalities between regions, social classes, 
and gender.   
2.3 The Internet’s infrastructure and use. 
The Internet has developed exponentially over the last few years—so much so that 
the country has one of the highest numbers of users in Africa and Middle East.  While 
the Internet in Morocco has been available since 1995, its usage on a wide scale did not 
kick off until a few years ago.  Maroc Telecom (51% of which is owned by Vivendi, and 
the rest by the Moroccan government) is the largest Internet service provider (ISP) in the 
country, with an estimated market share of more than 95% (Open Net Initiative, 2009, 
p.2).  In addition, the company offers wholesale services to other ISPs, the total number 
of which is estimated at 80.  Whilst Morocco‘s national domain name ―.ma‖ was 
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handled before by Maroc Telecom, its has since become the responsibility of the ANRT, 
which declares it is now offering users the possibility of registering their domain names 
in Arabic under the national name of «برغملا» (Morocco) instead of ―.ma‖ (ANRT, 
2008).   
According to the ITU, the number of Internet users in the country has jumped from 
100,000 in 2000, to 10,442,500 million in 2010, representing almost 33% of the 
population (Internet World Stats, Internet Usage Stats for Africa, 2010).  Though 
Internet penetration remains low—only 2.46% of the population—it is developing fast, 
as the country‘s digital subscriber line (DSL) access is one the cheapest in Africa.  
Moreover, the rapid growth in Internet subscription in the last two years is linked to the 
entry into the market of 3G mobile Internet that now represents around 35.4% of total 
subscriptions. 
However, since the ―key variable throughout the world shaping Internet access is 
the telephone penetration rate‖ (Warf & Vincent, 2007, p. 86), the low level of fixed 
telephone penetration in the country means that most people still rely on public points 
for accessing the Internet.  Thus, the main access points for the majority of users remain 
the cybercafés whose number is estimated to be between 2,000 to 3,000, and employing 
some 5,000 people, thus contributing to ―reducing both poverty and illiteracy among the 
youth‖ (Open Arab Net, 2009, Morocco, Internet Café section).  Wheeler (2009) 
contends that cybercafés in North African countries, including Morocco, are playing an 
important role in diffusing IT skills and Internet use, as well as in building civic culture 
and social networks:  
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In most cases, these café users have subsequently taught a friend, family, or 
community member to use the Internet, thus demonstrating a form of civic 
engagement whereby knowledge once attained is shared with others through 
informal networks.  Moreover, many became Internet users to reduce the costs and 
increase the likelihood of staying in touch with friends and family members, 
especially when individuals in their kin and care networks are abroad. (p. 316) 
The Open Arab Net (OAN) reports that there are ―no official restrictions on Internet 
cafés‖ as the law allows any person to apply for an Internet café license, and that ―the 
process is no more complex than the normal process for any other commercial activity‖ 
(OAN, 2009, Morocco, Internet café section).  Moreover, the people using these cafés 
normally enjoy anonymity and no attempt is made to identify the websites they visit.  
However, in the wake of the suicide bombings that occurred in 2007 in Casablanca
9
, 
cybercafés came under the close surveillance of security forces and intelligence, and it is 
believed that the number of visitors at Internet cafés severely diminished during this 
period (OAN, 2009, Morocco).  Moreover, compared to the fast growth in the number of 
cybercafés during the last decade, their rate of development significantly slowed down, 
which the ANRT attributes to the growth of Internet subscriptions through mobile (3G) 
technology and household connections (ANRT, 2008, p. 43).   
Nonetheless, 15 years after the Internet was introduced into the country, Morocco is 
still far from catching up with the global information society to which King Mohamed 
VI aspired.  The Moroccan Ministry of Industry, Trade and New Technologies stated in 
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 The second suicide bombing that hit Casablanca, after those of 2003, took place in March 2007 inside a 
cybercafé located in a poor neighbourhood of the city.  The explosion killed the bomber and injured his 




April 2008 that ―as few as 3.4% of the population had a computer, only 2,000 Moroccan 
schools were equipped with ICTs, and only 10 companies engaged in e-commerce‖ 
(OAN, 2009, Internet in Morocco section).  Moreover, despite the rapid growth in the 
number of Internet users, e-government has not followed suit since the UN e-
government 2010 survey ranked the country 126
th
 in terms of e-government readiness, 
(UN e-government survey, 2010, p. 63).  Additionally, while Morocco has the highest 
number of users per capita in North Africa, high illiteracy rates and low performance in 
human development prevent the country from benefiting from this numerical growth.  
Gray (2009) points out, for instance, that Morocco is in advance of other countries in the 
region in terms of ICT access and use; however, it trails these countries in ICT skills.  
These discrepancies explain, in part, the growing ―digital divides‖ that characterize 
Internet adoption and use between big cities and peripheries, urban centers and rural 
areas, rich and poor, and gender and generations.  As Watson (2006) rightly notes, the 
successes achieved through the liberalization of the telecommunication industry 
constitute ―a one-time phenomena,‖ since revenues achieved from the technology sector 
in Morocco ―continue to represent less than 4% of the annual GDP, making it a 
terrifically small component in the financial stability of the nation‖ (p. 42).   
Equally important, Warf and Vincent (2007) identify a number of problems 
affecting the rapid diffusion and adoption of the Internet in the majority of Arab 
countries, including Morocco: a) a shortage of Arabic content and the Internet 
applications to support it; b) low literacy rates; c) the segregation of women, especially 
in terms of using public Internet access points such as cybercafés; d) the high cost of 
Internet service access; and finally, e) political restrictions on the use of the Internet (pp. 
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86–88).  While some of these factors are shared by the majority of these countries, such 
as a shortage of Arabic content and gender inequalities, other factors weigh more in the 
case of particular countries than others.  As far as Morocco is concerned, the high rate of 
illiteracy and the cost of access are major obstacles to the diffusion of the Internet.  In its 
latest report on the country, the Initiative for an Open Arab Internet (2009) points out, 
for instance, that access to the Internet in Morocco is plagued by many problems such as 
the high cost of asymmetrical digital subscriber line (ADSL) services, and the 
sometimes poor quality of service provided by existing companies, which the report 
attributes to IT companies‘ interest in making quick profits.  Poor quality of service, 
particularly traffic congestion, can also be attributed to the fact that the phenomenal 
growth in the number of users has not been accompanied by parallel development of 
local Internet hosts, which characterize Internet diffusion in the majority of developing 
countries (Baliamoune, 2003).  While women constitute some 30%
10
 of the people using 
cybercafés, a situation that reflects a gradual narrowing of the gender gap in this sphere, 
at the same time, the road ahead to achieving equality between men and women is far 
from complete.   
Despite formidable challenges, the Moroccan government continues to believe that 
investing in ICTs and the popularization of Internet use constitutes the right path 
towards economic development.  In 2005, the Généralization des TIC dans 
L‘Enseignement (GENIE) project was launched to equip schools with IT materials, 
connect them to the Internet, and train teachers to use multimedia in their lessons.  The 
second phase of the project, ―Digital Morocco 2013‖ (Maroc numérique 2013), was 
launched in 2008 and accorded a budget of $5.2 billion MAD (around $700 million 
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 The rate in other Arab countries is put at only 20% (Warf & Vincent, 2007).   
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USD).  The program aims to assist and encourage small and medium business projects 
to use ICTs, to boost high debit Internet use, and develop e-government projects.  The 
new project also aims to increase the ability of young people to have Internet access 
through the establishment of some 400 computer centres in low-income districts and 
remote regions (Touahri, 2009).  Beyond the immediate objective of boosting the use of 
ICTs in education and business, the project aims to achieve four main goals: use the IT 
sector to enhance human development in the country; increase added value and 
productivity for other sectors; render the sector as a pillar of the economy; and position 
Morocco as a regional technological hub (Ministry of Industry, 2008, p. 18).   
2.4 Freedom of speech online. 
Compared to other media, access to and use of the Internet in Morocco has 
benefitted from a considerable margin of freedom, although in the last few years the 
state has tried to control access to particular websites.  Many observers have, in fact, 
noted that Internet users enjoy a level of freedom that is relatively unmatched in most 
Arab countries.  For instance, in its report on Morocco, the Initiative for an Open Arab 
Internet (2009) affirms that ―though in Morocco the Internet is largely free of filtering, 
bloggers and forum participants generally avoid ‗red line‘ topics such as the Western 
Sahara, defamation of the royal authority, and defamation of Islam.  Still, bloggers in the 
kingdom state that they are free to discuss almost anything‖ (p. 3).   
  It is doubtful, however, that the country‘s relative leniency towards online 
expression stems from a policy of freespeech tolerance.  Goldsmith and Wu (2006) 
argue that ―governments can indeed control the Internet at three levels, the level of users 
or recipients, the level of websites, and the level of intermediaries or transmitters‖ (p. 
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49).  The Moroccan state has tried repeatedly to place controls over the Internet by 
selectively blocking ―undesirable‖ sites or IP addresses, but it has failed, since users can 
usually access the same content on other websites.  Moreover, setting up a 
comprehensive and intelligent filtering system, as applied in other countries like China, 
requires many resources that the state cannot afford.  As Sadiki (2004) notes about the 
potential for online free speech and the practice of Internet censorship in Arab countries,  
the capacity to monopolize loyalty [in these countries] is being enfeebled by the 
deluge of multipolar flow of information made possible by the new information 
and communication technologies, such as the [I]nternet, that either defy official 
censorship or cannot be surveilled without imposing an unaffordable burden on 
the public purse. (p. 75) 
Instead of direct censorship, the Moroccan state has resorted recently to persecuting 
Internet users and bloggers deemed to have transgressed the ―red lines,‖ in what seems 
to be a bid not to silence all criticism online, but to increase self-censorship.  In 
September 2008, Moroccan blogger and journalist Mohamed Erraji was convicted of 
―disrespect for the king‖ in an article for Moroccan Arabic-language news website 
Hespress.com and was sentenced to serve two years in prison (Reporters Without 
Borders, 2008).  Another blogger, El Bachir Hazzam, was sentenced to four months in 
prison after he was accused of posting ―false‖ information online about human rights 
abuses in the country (Committee to Protect Bloggers, 2010).  Though the persecution 
of Internet users remains rare, there is no guarantee that it will not augment quickly in 
the coming years as the use of the medium becomes more and more widespread, and as 
heavy repression of free speech in print media increases.   
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3. Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter introduced the multiple structures (social-technological and socio 
economic) that will be debated in the coming chapters.  The chapter also provided a 
summary of the economic and social challenges facing Morocco as a developing 
country, and a brief historical background and a detailed analysis of its political system.  
As it has emerged in the discussion above, the country‘s economic and social 
development indices are still low despite conforming to successive Structural 
Adjustment Programs, which have had dire social consequences for the most vulnerable 
segments of the country‘s population, particularly the poor and women.  The country‘s 
political system has always been characterized by fundamental contradictions and 
inconsistencies that account for the various descriptions attached to it.  Indeed, diverse 
commentators have described Morocco as a ―democracy in transition,‖11 an ―absolute 
monarchy,‖ and an ―authoritarian pluralism.‖  The latter designation is perhaps the best 
description because it captures the internal contradictions of a system hinged between a 
multi-century ―Makhzenian‖ regime, and a weak but resilient and ever-evolving civil 
society that vacillates between an ever-globalized economic and political environment 
and local deeply rooted conservative social and cultural orders and traditions.   
The chapter has also provided a brief overview and background to the development 
of ICTs and, in particular, the Internet in the country.  These new technologies have 
been developing rapidly in the last few years in tandem with sweeping economic 
liberalization policies that have boosted economic growth while greatly aggravated 
social inequalities between classes and regions.  The fact that most of the 
                                                 
11
 According to the Arab Reform Initiative, for instance, Morocco scored second, after scoring first last 
year, in democratic transition reforms in the Arab World (Arab Reform Initiative, 2009). 
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telecommunication sector in the country is controlled now by multinational companies 
demonstrates how ICTs are serving global capitalism to achieve economic expansion.  
However, nobody can deny the positive impact of the new technologies as the mobile 
telephony has allowed millions of people in poor neighborhoods, distant villages, and 
towns in Morocco to benefit, albeit at a high cost, from instant connection and 
networking.  Unlike the mobile phone, the Internet has been slow to develop, while its 
immediate social and economic effects have yet to be proved.  ICTs have been identified 
as being tools of control and emancipation, and economic and social exploitation, and 
growth and development.  Accordingly, to what extent can the Internet enhance the 
capacity of oppositional social movements in Morocco to challenge and affect 
hegemonuous political and social structures in the country?   
The thesis strives to use a holistic approach that foregrounds the roles of structural 
orders and systems, and human agency as well as the multiple interactions and 
articulations between them.  In this manner, this chapter serves as more than mere 
background information; rather, it provides an environment for the analysis and 
discussion of data to follow.  As will be highlighted in further chapters, a major 
variation in the study of social movement phenomena between developed and 
developing countries is that in the case of the latter, more emphasis should be placed on 
the role of the socio-political context within which collective action evolves.  This 
chapter provided such a context, and to enrich it, additional information and details will 
be provided in subsequent chapters as well.  
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
Social Movements and the Internet 
Introduction  
As with the previous chapter, the present one focuses on the two principal themes 
that inform the thesis, namely politics and technology.  The chapter moves from the 
more general to the specific in order to situate these two issues in multiple settings as 
well as within Morocco‘s context as a North-African, Arab, Islamic developing country.  
This gradational organization of the chapter allows for the contextualization of the 
Internet as a socially embedded artifact at the global, regional, and national levels.  
Thus, the first part of the chapter addresses numerous interpretations of the concepts of 
―civil society‖ and ―social movements‖, their origins, and the major theoretical 
paradigms related to them.  Tracing their theoretical conception and development in 
Western settings, this chapter discusses how they were also applied to non-Western 
realities.   
The second part provides an overview of the main theories and seminal scholarly 
works that have dealt with the political role and democratic potential of the Internet, 
either in established democracies or in the context of authoritarian and developing 
countries.  In so doing, the study draws on various disciplines, particularly sociology, 
political science, media studies, and development studies to shed light on the political 
implications of the Internet for social movements from a variety of theoretical angles, 
which I believe is necessary in order to address the type of questions the thesis will raise 
throughout the subsequent chapters.   
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1. Civil Society and Social Movements 
1.1 Civil society: Concept definition. 
The concept of civil society has a ―complex genealogy‖ of meanings that shift 
according to the historical context in which the term is used (Purdue, 2007, p. 1).  The 
term ―civil society‖ has its origins in ancient Greece and, until the eighteenth century, 
was synonymous with the state or ―political society‖ (Kumar, 1993).  Its modern use is 
usually traced back to such Enlightenment philosophers as John Locke, Adam Ferguson, 
and Adam Smith, who emphasized the role of free associations and markets and the 
need to curb the state‘s control over the latter (Sardamov, 2005; Calabrese, 2004).  In 
effect, ―civil society was elaborated as a concept in the eighteenth-century debates about 
despotism and the means to counteract it‖ (Kumar, 1993, p. 377).  Later on, Hegel 
would conceive of civil society as not in dichotomy with the state insofar as it ―cannot 
remain ‗civil‘ unless it is ordered politically, subjected to the ‗higher surveillance of the 
state‘‖ (Hegel as cited in Bratton, 1994, p. 54).  As for Marx, he viewed civil society as 
an arena of bourgeois domination where the human being ―acts as a private individual, 
regards other men as means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes a plaything of 
alien powers‖ (Marx as cited in Foley & Edwards, 1998, p. 7).   
It is, however, Gramsci‘s reading of the concept that most influences the literature.  
Like Marx and Hegel, he was against a dichotomous view of civil society and the state.  
He defines civil society as ―the sphere in which a social group exercises hegemony over 
the entire society, and embod[ies] the ‗ethical content‘ of the state‖ (Bates, 1975, p. 
357).  For Gramsci, the state is composed of both political society and civil society.  
While the former is ―the arena of coercion and domination,‖ civil society is the realm of 
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―consent and direction‖ (Kumar, 1993, p. 382).  The relation between the two is what 
constitutes the hegemony of a ruling class.  It is a definition that Gramsci summarized in 
his famous mathematical-like formula, ―the state = political society + civil society‖ 
(Cox, 1999, p. 7).  Gramsci believes it is through civil society that intellectuals ―perform 
their key function of supplying legitimacy and creating consensus on behalf of the ruling 
groups‖ (Kumar, 1993, p. 382).  Nevertheless, he describes civil society as a site of both 
domination and coercion, and of struggle and resistance.  Because civil society is a ―site 
of struggle for legitimate use of state power,‖ the proletariat has to wage a strategic ―war 
of position‖ (in contrast with a ―war of movement,‖ as in violent revolutions) necessary 
for the ―conquest of civil society and for the transformation of civil society in an 
emancipatory direction‖ (Gramsci as cited in Cox, 1999, p. 8).  The term ―civil society‖, 
however, fell into disuse throughout much of the twentieth century, until it was revived 
in the 1980s and 1990s during the political contestations and dissidence in Eastern 
Europe, and the democratic transitions in Latin America.  Gramsci‘s interpretation of the 
concept became influential during this period, as civil society acquired the connotations 
of resistance and radicalism (Calabrese, 2004).   
From a more liberal perspective, ―civil society‖ has been equated with voluntary 
associational life, a conception connected with the writings of Tocqueville on US 
society in the nineteenth century.  This meaning was revived in the 1990s, particularly 
through the work of Robert Putnam who argues that the ―social capital‖ of mutual trust 
and solidarity produced through associational life ―is likely to have a spill-over effect, 
not only facilitating the development of democratic institutions but also oiling business 
relations and thus spurring economic growth‖ (Sardamov, 2005, p. 382).  Currently, the 
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concept of civil society has become commonly defined as ―the zone of voluntary 
associative life beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state and the 
market‖ (Hawthorne, 2004, p. 5).   
A key notion within the liberal interpretation of civil society is ―civility,‖ defined by 
Edwards Shils (1997) as ―an appreciation of or attachment to the institutions which 
constitute civil society.  It is an attitude of attachment to the whole society, to all its 
strata and sections.  It is an attitude of concern for the good of the entire society‖ (p. 
335).  Political scientists have pointed out that the presence of ―democratic‖ institutions 
and procedures, such as a parliament, a multi-party system, and elections, within a 
country does not automatically equate to democracy if the political culture in society 
fails to promote civility and civic notions like tolerance and basic freedoms of 
expression and thought.  The perceived weakness or absence of such notions in newly 
emerged ―democracies‖ in the post-Cold War era has earned these democracies such 
titles as ―electoral, incomplete, illiberal, broken-back, or delegative democracies or 
the mixed or hybrid regimes of competitive authoritarianism, fleckless pluralism, or 
dominant power politics‖ (Doh Chull, 2006, p. 2).   
Furthermore, in much of the literature, the concept of civil society has a strong 
normative dimension, as it is considered a precondition for democracy and 
democratization (Sardamov, 2005, p. 380).  Many observers claim, however, that civil 
society has failed to live up to its expectations (Calhoun, 1997; Herbert, 2003; 
Sardamov, 2005).  Empirical evidence has shown, for instance, that, contrary to widely 
held assumptions, the opposition movement and alliance against Communism in Poland 
between 1976 and 1986 ―had little to do with the normative concept of civil society for 
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either containing or supporting public discussion‖ (Herbert, 2003, p. 62).  It would 
seem, therefore, that the relationship between civil society and democracy is not self-
evident.  Downey and Fenton (2003) explain that civil society is usually composed of 
different organizations and groups that have diverse organizational structures and 
ideologies:  
Some are traditional and paternalistic.  Others are transparently democratic, 
controlled and operated by participants.  Many voluntary organizations have close 
partnership relationships with the state, often depending on statutory funding for 
survival.  Yet others challenge the state through vigorous social movements … 
that some see as ―a people‘s‖ opposition. (p. 192) 
But rather than abandoning the concept itself, commentators have stressed the need 
to re-conceptualize it in a way that salvages it from unfounded optimism in its 
democratizing potential (Esmail, 2002; Herbert, 2003; Cavatorta, 2005).  Herbert 
(2003), for instance, calls for a critical theory of civil society that distinguishes between 
the empirical and normative dimensions of the concept, while simultaneously 
investigating the ―conditions under which the first becomes the second, to use studies of 
the first to refine the second, and studies the second to critique the first‖ (p. 62). 
1.2 Social Movements. 
1.2.1 Concept definition. 
The theorization of collective action as ―social movements‖ started in the 1960s 
with the appearance of new forms of collective action and protest groups that were 
unaligned with traditional civil society organizations such as trade unions.  In the 
beginning, social movements were mainly associated with feminist, civil rights, anti-war 
56 
 
groups, and student protest groups.  In the decades that followed, other social 
movements emerged on the scene, including human rights groups, anti-racist groups, 
internationalist groups, gay and lesbian rights groups, among many others.  A major 
shift in theorizing social movements took place when collective action changed from 
being viewed as ―pathology of social system‖, (Melucci, 1996, p. 22) or an irrational 
expression of social crisis, to ―movement activities with concrete goals, articulated 
general values and interests, and rational calculations of strategies‖ (Van Stekelenburg 
& Klandermans, 2009, p. 18).   
Consensus over the definition of ―social movement‖ has, however, yet to be reached 
within the existing literature.  As De la Piscina (2007) maintains, ―the wide-ranging 
typologies of social movements that currently exist complicates the ability to offer one 
definition that results in a consensus‖ (p. 65).  Melucci (1996) argues that the notion of 
―social movement‖ is applied to various forms of collective action, which results in ―a 
low and erratic degree of compatibility among various definitions‖ (p. 29).   
Despite conceptual multiplicities, Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004) assert that it is 
possible to organize existing definitions of social movements around five main axes: (1) 
―collective or joint action‖; (2) ―change-oriented goals or claims‖; (3) an ―extra- or non-
institutional collective action‖; (4) a ―degree of organization‖; and (5) and a ―degree of 
temporal continuity‖ (p. 6).  These axes correspond, for instance, to Tarrow‘s (1998) 
definition of social movements, which are, in his view, characterized by ―four empirical 
properties: collective action, common purpose, social solidarity, and sustained 
interaction‖ (pp. 4–5).  Della Porta and Diani (2006) largely concur, emphasizing 
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nonetheless, the major role of collective identity in the development of social 
movements and the constitution of their political agenda.   
Another useful way to sort out existing definitions is by distinguishing between the 
various theoretical perspectives upon which they are premised.  Van de Donk and 
Foederer (2001), for instance, distinguish between five approaches: (1) ―the classical 
(collective behaviour) approach‖; (2) ―the resource mobilization approach‖; (3) ―the 
political opportunity approach‖; (4) ―the approach on the ideologically structured 
action‖; and (5) ―the discourse, ‗framing‘ or social construction approach‖ (p. 158). 
As for Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2009), they differentiate between two 
categories of approaches, namely the classical approaches based on collective behaviour 
perspectives, and contemporary theories that include structural and social constructivist 
approaches.  Diani (2000a), on the other hand, distinguishes between four major ones: 
(1) the collective behaviour perspective; 
(2) resource mobilization theory (RMT);  
(3) the ―political process‖ perspective; and 
(4) ―new social movement‖ theory. (p. 157) 
Diani‘s typology is the most commonly used in the literature. Therefore, it is the one the 
present study will draw on to discuss variations and developments in the 
conceptualization of social movements.   
1.2.2 Major theoretical models. 
The ―collective behaviour‖ perspective, which prevailed in the mid-1950s, viewed 
social movements as a form of collective behaviour that emerges during a time of crisis 
―when significant social and cultural breakdowns‖ happen (Morris, 2000, p. 445).  
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Though important variations exist within the ―collective behaviour‖ perspective, social 
movements were generally considered ―spontaneous, unorganized, and unstructured 
phenomena that were discontinuous with institutional and organizational behaviour‖ (p. 
445).  Movements were conceived of as a form of collective behaviour situated ―outside 
the normal institutions of society,‖ and the notion was applied to different social 
empirical phenomena ―ranging from fads and rumours, to collective enthusiasms, riots, 
movements and revolutions‖ (Tarrow, 1998, p. 14).  Turner and Killian (1987), two key 
figures in this theoretical paradigm, define a social movement as ―a group with 
indefinite and shifting membership and with leadership whose position is determined 
more by informal response of adherents than by formal procedures for legitimising 
authority‖ (p. 223). 
Della Porta and Diani (2006) argue that Despite its shortcomings, social-movement 
theory owes much to collective behaviour perspectives, such as defining collective 
action as ―meaningful acts, driving often necessary and beneficial social change‖ (p. 
13).  However, the limitations of this paradigm, particularly its inability to account for 
social movements that emerged in the 1960s, led to the rise of a new paradigm, namely 
resource mobilization theory (RMT).   
Compared to collective behaviour theory, RMT paid greater attention to institutional 
and organizational factors within collective action.  RMT views social movements as 
―normal, rational, institutionally rooted, political challenges by [an] aggrieved group‖ 
(Buechler, 1993, p. 218).  More importantly, RMT theorists consider grievances as one 
condition among others, as they moved to place more emphasis on the conditions under 
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which grievances are translated into action, and the resources that are needed to sustain 
such action.  As McCarthy and Zald (2003) suggest,  
the resource mobilization approach examines the variety of resources that must be 
mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of 
movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities 
to control or incorporate movements. (p. 16)   
RMT theorists claim that the existence of particular injustices and grievances is not 
enough to explain the development of social movements; in fact, ―control over actual 
and potential resources is a more important determinant of the emergence as well as the 
likely success of collective action‖ (Buechler, 1993, p. 221).  McCarty and Zald (1973) 
have even claimed that ―the definition of grievances will expand to meet the funds and 
support personnel available‖ (p. 13).  The resources that social movements need in order 
to develop and act are not limited to material ones, such as funds; they also include 
access to media and ―institutional centers, preexisting networks, and occupational 
structure and growth‖ (McCarthy & Zald, 2003, p. 20).   
Moreover, RMT theorists make an important distinction between a social movement 
(SM) and a social movement organization (SMO).  On one hand, a social movement is 
―a set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing 
some elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both‖ (McCarthy & 
Zald, 2003 p. 20) and is characterized by multiple SMOs.  An SMO, on the other hand, 
is ―a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of 
a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals‖ (p. 
20).   
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Although it remains the most influential social movement theory in the last few 
decades, RMT has been criticized for numerous shortcomings, mainly for downplaying 
the role of grievances and ideology in the constitution of social movements and 
collective action and mobilization.  It has been noted that RMT could not account for 
identity-based movements like feminism that emerged from existing movements like 
abolitionism, the civil rights movement, and radical-left movements.  In fact, Buechler 
(1993) observes that ―the women's liberation sector of the contemporary women's 
movement did appear to formulate its grievances largely in the context of women's 
participation in parent movements which treated them unequally‖ (p. 221).  Moreover, 
within RMT, ideology was often equated with grievances, and was subsequently 
dismissed with the grievances as ―constant background factors with little explanatory 
relevance‖ (p. 222).  Tarrow (1998) contends that the major problem with RMT is that 
its proponents over-use the language of economics, including the terms of movement 
such as entrepreneurs, industries, and sectors, while ignoring the role of commitment, 
values, and ideology in prompting so many activists to fight against various forms of 
injustice.   
The 1970s witnessed the development of the other structural approaches, namely the 
―political process‖ model.  The term ―political process‖ has been derived from Rule and 
Tilly‘s (1975) article ―Political Process in Revolutionary France, 1830-1832‖ (as 
discussed in McAdam, 2008, p. 175).  This model is also known as the political 
opportunity structure (POS) theory.  It is an approach that can be viewed as ―both an 
alternative and an integration‖ of RMT (Ruggiero & Montagna, 2008, p. 138).  
However, while RMT foregrounds the organizational aspects internal to movements, the 
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political process model deals with external variables such as the political and 
institutional environment in which movements develop and operate (Ruggiero & 
Montagna, 2008, p.139).  The concept of ―political process‖ designates ―the degree of 
openness or closure of a political system in a way that might facilitate or discourage the 
rise of social movements‖ (p. 139).  Instead of focusing on the role of organizational 
resources in generating collective action, the political process model stresses the 
historical context and political environment that can either empower social movements 
to or hinder them from ―getting access to established polity‖ (Diani, 2000a, p. 158).  
From this perspective, social movements can be defined as a ―sustained series of 
interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on 
behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation‖ (Tilly, 1984, p. 303).  By so 
doing, the political process model has contributed to shifting the conception of social 
movements from being marginal and anti-institutional towards a more interactive 
relationship between ―less conventional forms of action and institutionalized systems of 
interest representation‖ (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 16).   
Like RMT, the political process has also been criticized for putting too much 
emphasis on structural factors and paying less attention to cognitive and cultural 
variables, and to the role of agency.  Although a number of theorists have attempted to 
incorporate these last variables, they ―tend to wash the meaning and fluidity out of 
strategy, agency, and culture so that they look like structures‖ (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, 
p. 29).   
Unlike the two previous theoretical models that are strongly structure-oriented, the 
new social movement (NSM) theory belongs to the social constructivist paradigm that 
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emphasizes the role of culture, identity, and lifestyle.  Its development is associated with 
the emergence of collective action movements that are less concerned with class 
struggle and distribution of wealth than with collective identity issues, as is the case 
with the feminist movement.  Accordingly, the theory attempts to address some of the 
major shortcomings within structural approaches by foregrounding the role of identity 
and ideology over organizational and material resources.  NSM theorists believe, in fact, 
that the social construction of collective identity comes logically ―prior to other social 
processes which the RM framework regards as central to collective action‖ (Buechler, 
1993, p. 229).  It is, therefore, associated with post-industrial society, in which conflicts 
arise ―over how to control the production of symbols and redefine roles in society‖ 
(Shigetomi, 2009, p. 4).  Moreover, compared with the other models, NSM theory 
attempts to link social movements to ―large-scale structural and cultural changes‖ 
instead of ―immediate historical environment and institutional politics‖ (Diani, 2000a, p. 
159).   
One of the main theorists of this model is Habermas (2008), who contends that new 
social movements intervene in the public sphere to challenge dominant discourses on 
issues of identity and lifestyle, while simultaneously questioning the legitimacy of 
governments and elites who represent and defend those discourses.  For Habermas 
(2008), the new conflicts are no longer an outcome of a struggle over material resources 
and reproduction.  Instead, they  
arise in areas of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization.  They 
are manifested in sub-institutional, extra-parliamentary forms of protests. … In 
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short, the new conflicts are not sparked by problems of distribution, but concern 
the grammar of forms of life.  (p. 221) 
The ―grammar of forms life‖ concerns grievances and conflict over issues of 
identity, and the production of symbolic meanings that bridge the private and the public.  
New social movements try to politicize these issues and eventually democratize 
everyday life.  This leads to the transformation of the field of social struggle and the 
resources necessary to engage in action, as the potential for the production of action 
becomes increasingly contingent on ―the ability to produce information‖ (Melucci, 
2008, p. 219).  According to Melucci (1994), conflicts now ―tend to arise in those areas 
of the system that are most directly involved in the production of information and 
communicative resources but at the same time subjected to intense pressure of 
integration‖ (p. 101).  Furthermore, it has been noted that structural perspectives fail to 
account for the role of agency or the decisions and actions of individual actors.  For 
instance, people living under similar structural conditions may not all engage in 
collective action.  By stressing the role of identification and emotions in mobilizing 
people into action, NSM has contributed to bridging ―the gap between behaviour and 
meaning, between ‗objective‘ conditions and ‗subjective‘ motives and orientation, 
between ‗structure‘ and ‗agency‘‖ (Melucci, 1996, p. 69).   
Finally, in addition to NSM, another theoretical model attempting to go beyond the 
limitations of structural approaches is associated with Mario Diani‘s work (Diani, 
2000b, 2000c, 2004; Diani & McAdam, 2003; Della Porta & Diani, 2006).  Drawing on 
network theory-related perspectives, Diani‘s model tries to bridge the gap between 
―structure‖ and ―agency‖ and the ―subjective‖ and ―objective‖ to explain the emergence 
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of collective action and the development of social movements.  Diani and McAdam 
(2003) argue that interest in connecting network theory with social movement analysis is 
grounded on ―at least three different intellectual contexts‖, namely a ―renewed interest 
in the meso-level of social analysis and the relation between structure and agency‖; a 
resurgence of interest in ―social mechanisms‖ that are important to the growth of social 
movement action such as ―recruitment, framing, tactical adaptation of action repertoires, 
and of course networking‖; and, finally ―the consolidation of social network analysis as 
a distinct field in social science‖ (p. 4).   
The bulk of the network analysis literature focuses on structural aspects of networks 
(Breiger, 2004).  Inspired mainly by the work of White (1992), however, an alternative 
body of research has resulted in the rethinking of network theory by emphasizing the 
role of culture and cognition (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Breiger, 2004).  White (1992) 
argues that networks are ―phenomenological realities as well as measurement 
constructs,‖ since they can be understood as ―networks of meanings‖ (p. 65).  This latter 
interpretation has paved the way for  
a reflection on the relationship between the social networks and the cognitive 
maps through which actors make sense of and categorize their social environment 
and locate themselves within broader webs of ties and interactions.  (Diani & 
McAdam, 2003, p. 5) 
Two broad types of functions that networks perform in collective action have been 
identified.  One type involves the networks that link individuals to collectives, as is the 
case with organizational links, and social and cultural ties and their density, which play 
a crucial role in recruitment and mobilization.  The second type concerns the nature of 
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social movements themselves as ―complex social systems‖ (Diani, 2004, p. 351).  
According to the latter view, social movements can be defined as ―networks of informal 
relationships between a multiplicity of individuals and organizations, who share a 
distinctive collective identity, and mobilize resources on conflictual issues‖ (Diani, 
2000b, p. 387).   
1.3 Social movement theory in the context of developing countries. 
One common feature shared by the social movement theories is that they have been 
articulated mostly to analyze forms of collective action that emerged in industrial and 
postmodern societies.  Shigetomi (2009) holds that ―few researchers take the context of 
developing countries seriously in an attempt to identify the salient features of and 
approach to social movements‖ (p. 6).  More important, modern theories on social 
movements are founded on ―a subjectivist perspective‖ that emphasizes ―the 
manipulative capability of movement actors‖ and the ―purposive‖ nature of their action, 
whereby social phenomena are explained through ―the choices made by actors who have 
their own goals‖ (p. 5).  New social movement theory, for instance, highlights collective 
identity as an explanation of collective action by assuming actors are ―independent as 
individuals, rather than people whose consciousness is guided by structural elements 
such as formal political positions and socio-economic divisions in society‖ (p. 4).  The 
―subjectivist perspective‖ becomes problematic, however, when applied to the context 
of developing countries where the actors‘ choices are severely curtailed by limited 
resources and hostile political environments (p. 6).   
In the same vein, Ellis and Kessel (2009) point out several aspects distinguishing 
social movements and their environments within developing countries, particularly in 
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Africa, compared to those in developed ones.  The dependence of many social 
movements on foreign aid, the important role of diaspora in sustaining collective action 
in their countries of origin, and the weak status of central governments in many 
countries are some of these distinct dimensions of African social movements and their 
contexts.  This assessment lends credence to Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2009), 
who argue that studying collective action phenomena in developing countries should 
take into account specific national political and social contexts, as well as the supra-
national institutions and structures that are increasingly shaping social movements in 
these countries.   
1.4 Social movement in Muslim/Arab countries. 
Similar to the rest of the developing world, the number of research studies linking 
civil society and social movements to development within Muslim and Arab countries in 
particular has proliferated since the late 1990s.  Until the mid-1990s, studies on civil 
society and public society in the region were rare, while existing literature on public 
opinion and the public sphere in the region often talked in terms of an ―Arab street,‖ an 
epithet that connotes ―passivity, unruliness, or propensity to easy manipulation‖ 
(Eickelman & Anderson, 2003, p. 62).  But the last few years have witnessed a growing 
academic interest in the issue of democratic development and, more specifically, civil 
society and the public sphere in the Arab world.  According to Sadiki (2004), ―the study 
of Arab democracy has recently come into vogue, moving from near occultation to 
prominence‖ (p. 3).  Belying the ―Arab exceptionalism‖ model, large-scale comparative 
studies have concluded that ―Arabs place a high value on democratic governance‖ and 
have even demonstrated that Arabs 
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topped the list of those supporting the statement that ―democracy may have 
problems but it‘s better than any other form of government‖ and expressed the 
highest level of rejection of authoritarian rule.  (Browers, 2006, p. 4)  
Moreover, a number of commentators have argued that, contrary to essentialist 
views of Muslim-majority countries, public dialogues and pluralism have always 
characterized these societies.  Norton (1999) asserts that  
although some leading scholars argue that Muslim society has historically been 
bereft of civil society – a shibboleth of Orientalism – it is nonetheless noteworthy 
that medieval Muslim society was remarkably mobile and autonomous, and a 
ready option of ―exit‖ served to effectively check the capricious exercise of power 
by the ruler.  (p. 5) 
Likewise, Eickelman (1999) contends that ―public dialogues have long held a special 
place in the Muslim world‖ (p. 2).  A number of ―civil‖ bodies existed, indeed, in the 
pre-modern era, including schools of law, the Waqf–Islamic endowment institution– and 
Sufi orders (Eisenstadt, 2002, p. 147).  In the modern era, civil society in the region, 
while much less autonomous and efficient than in the West, ―has sometimes been 
courageously assertive in challenging narrowly-based, unstable regimes‖ (Norton, 2001, 
p. 7).  Still, some commentators argue that the preponderant role played by religion-
oriented groups within civil society in the region constitutes an obstacle to the 
development of democracy.  According to this perspective, ―democracy was not 
occurring in the region precisely because civil society was too vibrant and had an 
authoritarian nature, due in large part to the fact that much of the activism seemed to 
originate from Islamist movements‖  (Cavatorta, 2005, p. 204). 
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This viewpoint has, however, been called into question.  Many commentators argue 
that religion and religious movements can indeed contribute to the establishment of 
democracy inasmuch as they play an important part in the formation of modernity and 
liberal thought itself, a part they still play in so-called secular societies (Haklai, 2009; 
Herbert, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Parekh, 2000; Van der Veer, 2004).  Van der 
Veer (2004), for instance, contends that a non-ideological and more serious engagement 
with the issue reveals that religious institutions and movements ―take part in the 
production of the modern self and continue to play a public, political role in most 
societies even in the so-called secular ones‖ (pp. 13–14).  Sadiki (2004) concurs, 
pointing out that, while freedom and the rule of law are prerequisites for democracy, 
―other democratic Western standard categories, such as secularism, must be rethought in 
societies where pervasive religiosity contradicts with the privatization of religion as in 
the West‖ (p. 54).  Drawing on a large-scale empirical study that compared many 
Muslim countries, Fattah (2006) concludes that Islamic groups rejecting democracy are 
but a minority, while modernist Islamists—along with secularists—constitute the 
majority.  Affirming that in most of the studied countries, ―the absolute majority of 
respondents supported an active role for Islam in politics,‖ Fattah concludes that 
―[w]here democracy does emerge in the Muslim world, it is likely to have a strong 
religious component‖ (pp. 126–7).   
Despite the exponential growth in the literature dealing with collective action in 
majority Muslim societies, the bulk of the analyses have remained remarkably 
descriptive, as only a small set of studies have used social movement theories to analyze 
this social phenomenon.  As Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004) remarks,  
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the study of Islamic activism has, for the most part, remained isolated from the 
plethora of theoretical and conceptual developments that have emerged from 
research on social movements contentious politics.  Instead, most publications on 
Islamic activism are either descriptive analyses of the ideology, structure, and 
goals of various Islamic actors or histories of particular movements. (p. 3)   
One goal of the present project is to contribute to addressing this serious theoretical 
lacuna in the field by drawing on social movement theory to conceptualize the impact of 
the Internet on collective action in Morocco and also to analyze data.   
1.5 Civil society and social movements in Morocco. 
As in the rest of the Arab World, civil institutions in Morocco, such as Waqf
12
 and 
Sufi orders, date back many centuries.  In the modern era, trade unions, which appeared 
during the French Protectorate, participated in the struggle for independence and since 
then have continued to play a vital role in politics, either through direct collective action 
or through political parties with which they are allied.  During the Years of Lead under 
King Hassan II, the associative sector in the country remained very restricted and 
limited.  With the political opening of the late 1980s, the sector expanded rapidly and 
the number of registered (legal) associations is currently estimated to be between 30,000 
and 80,000, ―making the country the regional leader in quantitative terms‖ (Kausch, 
2008, p. 3).   
The term ―civil society‖ only gained currency, however, as a conceptual and 
analytical tool and as a referent to non-governmental associations and organizations in 
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 In Morocco, the term ―Habus‖ is used instead of ―Waqf‖.  
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the late 1980s and early 1990s.  As the ―associative phenomenon‖13 was taking root in 
the country, a number of commentators attempted to explore some of the problematic 
issues it raised, and the validity of applying the concept of ―civil society‖ to the Arab 
and Moroccan context (El-Aoufi, 1992; Ghazali, 1989; Saaf, 1992).  In an article titled 
―The Hypothesis of Civil Society in Morocco,‖ Saaf (1992), for instance, questions the 
possibility of using the concept to describe the associative sphere in the country, because 
he believes that the particularity of Moroccan society 
seems to rebel against the currents of emancipation and hinders the constitution of 
spaces of freedom in its place.  In effect, non-movement and immutability are the 
main features of this social political universe in Morocco.  (as cited in Sater, 2007, 
p. 20) 
Denoeux and Gateau (1995) lend credence to this statement, arguing that the 
associative culture needed for the development of a civil society is absent in the country.  
A large number of analysts disagree with this view, however, since it is inconsistent 
with the presence of a large number of associations and NGOs outside the control of the 
state.  Sater (2007) argues that Saaf, along with some other early commentators, used 
the term ―civil society‖ normatively to designate a society that is successfully resisting 
an authoritative state, and since this is not the case with Morocco, the idea of the 
existence of a viable ―civil society‖ in the country is dismissed.  Sater criticizes these 
positions as lacking a sound theoretical grounding, noting in particular that because they 
were published at an early phase in the development of Moroccan civil society, they 
were ―unable to focus on those groups, which had just started to become active, and 
                                                 
13
 It is the term used by Ahmed Ghazali (1989), who wrote one of the earliest texts on Moroccan civil 
society, ―Contribution a l'analyse du phénomène associatif au Maroc.‖   
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whose existence needed explanation‖ (p. 21).  Similarly, Gandolfi (2003) thinks that the 
associative culture is deeply rooted in local culture, especially in rural areas, despite the 
constant efforts of the Moroccan state or Makhzen to domesticate the emerging ―civil 
society‖.  The normative dimension of the concept remains, however, central to its use 
and understanding within Moroccan context, as it is often ―related to political 
contestation and to the legitimate expression of the Moroccan people in the absence of 
real democratic representation‖ (Sater, 2002, p. 103).   
Sater (2002) also identifies three characteristics of Moroccan civil society: its 
vulnerability, its relationship with political parties, and its relationship with the 
Moroccan state.  Indeed, ―one of the most striking features of Morocco's civil society is 
the state's capacity to participate in its construction‖ (Sater, 2002, p. 212).  As 
mentioned before in Chapter Two, the political sphere in the country, including the civil 
society sector, has always been shaped by a powerful monarchy and patrimonial system, 
as well as by an uneasy and sometimes tragic tendency on the part of political actors to 
appease, and even ally with the Makhzen (Garon, 2003).  Moreover, the growth of 
Moroccan civil society is inextricably linked to that of the political parties from the pre-
independence era onwards.  A number of feminist and human rights NGOs, for instance, 
have been created by militants who were members in leftist parties, and who succeeded 
in consolidating the independence of these organizations from party politics (Sater, 
2007).  Others, however, mainly trade unions, have remained closely connected to the 
parties with which they are affiliated.   
Kausch‘s (2008) interviews with local NGO activists enabled her to identify four 
sets of barriers facing free association in Morocco, namely (1) difficulties related to 
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association registration; (2) access to the public sphere and public media; (3) 
infringement upon liberties and rights, especially after the 2003 Casablanca terrorist 
attacks; and, finally, (4) the lack of an independent judiciary system capable of 
guaranteeing fundamental liberties.  Kausch contends that there is a huge gap between 
the legal framework in the country that guarantees, at least in theory, associative life and 
its application in reality.  On one hand, the country has a ―flourishing and relatively free 
civil society [that] is a great achievement compared to other countries in the region‖ (p. 
3).  The right of association has been guaranteed by the constitution since 1962, and the 
country is one of a few in the region that has adopted the principle of declaration on 
associations (3).  On the other hand, the absence of an independent judiciary and 
efficient law enforcement makes this formal legality and freedom of association 
unobtainable in practice (pp. 2–3).  
In fact, Moroccan associations have to follow a complex and lengthy bureaucratic 
mechanism and can only become legal when they receive a receipt from the Ministry of 
the Interior.  Legality is not always guaranteed, as many groups, mainly Islamic-oriented 
associations, radical left organizations, and Berber and Sahrawi groups, can be outlawed 
for their ―refusal to recognise the spiritual authority and political legitimacy of the King, 
or in the specific case of the Sahrawis, for challenging the territorial integrity of the 
Moroccan monarchy‖ (Dimitrova, 2009, pp. 4–5).  Moreover, the law stipulates that 
public funding to associations be channelled through the Ministry of Social 
Development and Solidarity; however, most of those who receive funding are NGOs 
that are close to the government and the Makhzan network (Dimitrova, 2009, p. 7).  
Although associations and NGOs can receive foreign funding, any subsidy for a single 
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project equal to or more than 50,000 dirhams is subjected to state monitoring and 
supervision (Kausch, 2008).   
Whereas most commentators highlight the quantitative development of Moroccan 
civil society, its dynamism and rootedness in recent and old history, many of them, 
nonetheless, raise questions about its ability to be a counterweight against a dominant 
state and the Makhzenian apparatus, and to contribute to democratic transition in the 
country.  The overwhelming majority of civil society NGOs specializes in the 
development sector covering the fields of health, the promotion of women‘s social and 
economic situations, education, and general development projects in rural areas, in 
addition to a large number of trade unions (Kausch, 2008).  Only a limited number of 
these NGOs are active in direct contentious politics, such as human rights NGOs.   
As far as development associations and NGOs in Morocco are concerned, Dimitrova 
(2009) distinguishes between two types.  First, there are those set up by Islamic social 
movement organizations to provide services and help within areas abandoned by the 
state.  The others are close to the state and were set up to compete for influence with 
Islamic ones.  Ferrier (2004) suggests that Moroccan civil society‘s ability to become 
more politically engaged and effective is contingent on the political opening initiated by 
the state rather than on NGOs themselves.  Dimitrova (2009), in contrast, contends that 
the extensive structures of clientelism and neo-patrimonialism ―impede the development 
of an active and strong civil society‖ in the country (p. 5).   
Similarly to the literature analyzing collective action in Muslim countries, the use of 
social movement theory in the studies focusing on Morocco has remained a marginal 
concern.  Various experts use the term ―movement‖ to describe Islamic SMOs in the 
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country, namely major ones such as Al-Adl Wal Ihsane (Justice and Spirituality) 
(Cavatorta, 2005, 2006; ; Kausch, 2008; Munson, 1986).  However, the term is rarely 
grounded on social movement theory and remains predominantly a descriptive term.  
Munson (1986), one of the first to study Moroccan Islamic movements, talks of the 
social base of Islamic movements in Morocco, but does not use social movement theory 
to address the issue.  In the same vein, Naciri (1998) explores the emergence of the 
Moroccan feminist movement within a male-dominated public sphere, and its 
redefinition of the political space in that country.  Whilst she defines the feminist 
movement as comprising a number of organizations and associations, she uses 
exclusively public sphere theory and fails to draw on social movement theory.   
Only a handful of studies have, so far, attempted to examine Moroccan civil society 
through the lens of social movement theory.  Chenynis (2008) addresses the 
development of the Moroccan ―altermondialist‖ (alter-globalization) movement, and its 
participation in the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2002.  However, this study is 
limited in scope, as it concentrates on a few organizations and does not engage seriously 
enough with the theoretical perspective it uses.  Sidi Hida‘s (2007) doctoral thesis,14 
Social Movement and the Logic of Actors - Development NGOs Facing Globalization 
and the Moroccan State: Moroccan Alter-Globalization, remains one of the rare detailed 
studies in the field to draw on social movement theory.  In it, Sidi Hida examines 
various Moroccan civil society NGOs that are active ―under the label of alter-
globalization within social forums,‖ and part of ―a transnational civil society‖ struggling 
against neoliberal global political and economic agendas (p. 7).  Drawing on new social 
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 Mouvements sociaux et logique d‘acteurs. Les ONGs se développent face à la mondialisation et à l‘état 
au Maroc.  L‘altermondialisme marocain.  
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movement theory (NSM), specifically Touraine‘s work, Sidi Hida argues that one of the 
main objectives of the study is to try to understand alter-globalization in its national and 
local dimensions (p. 8).  Moreover, she contends that using social movement theory 
enables the researcher to understand and analyze the object of study in terms of the 
social links between actors, and to bring together ―a plurality of actors with diverse 
objectives who are connected through diverse and different links‖[my translation] (p. 8).  
Zakia Salime‘s (2005) dissertation on the Moroccan feminist social movement is 
another pioneering work that draws extensively on social movement theory to study the 
articulations between Islamist and secular women‘s movements through their framing of 
the issues of gender, religion, and politics.  These last two studies show that scholars 
have started to challenge dominant discourses that have hitherto failed to apply available 
social movement theories to the analysis of collective action in Muslim societies.  
However, these studies remain limited in number and, for the most part, are unpublished 
dissertations, which calls for further efforts in this important sub-field.   
2. The Political Role of the Internet and Implications for Social Movements  
2.1 Conceptualizing the political role and potential of the Internet. 
The political role and potential of the Internet is integrated within its origins as a US 
Cold War project, called the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
(ARPANET), launched in the 1950s.  As Internet technology became a mass and global 
medium by the mid-1990s, its political potential has been recognized as one of its 
strongest and most important characteristics.  This potential has since been exploited by 
diverse political and social actors, from governments and political institutions to 
individual hackers and terrorist networks.  There are many features intrinsic to the 
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technology explaining why the Internet has come to be viewed as a political medium par 
excellence.  Based on networked hardware and software technologies, the Internet 
allows the production, storage, dissemination, and retrieval of theoretically unlimited 
information at a low cost and a high speed unmatched by any other media.  The 
decentralized architecture of the Internet has oftentimes been viewed as the defining 
feature of the technology that sets it apart from other media, allowing forms of 
communication that transcend geographic boundaries and defy diverse types of 
institutional and societal control.  Reviewing the major implications of the Internet to 
communication, Gibson and Ward (2000) summarize them in five main points:  
1. Volume—far larger quantities of information can be sent compared with 
previous modes of media communication.   
2. Speed—compression of data and more space for communication decrease 
the amount of time it takes to send a message.   
3. Format—the style of the message sent is changed as the combination of 
print and electronic communication allows information to be sent in 
audio, video, and text form.   
4. Direction—the possibilities for two-way and truly interactive or 
synchronous communication are greatly expanded on the Web, given the 
greater space and speed for information transmission.  In addition, 
horizontal or lateral communication between groups and individuals is 
also dramatically enhanced due to the immediacy of hypertext linkage 
between sites.   
77 
 
5. Individual control—given the opening up of control over the direction in 
the sending and receiving of messages, power is decentralized to the 
individual consumer who has the choice of what to view, and also 
perhaps more significantly, what to publish.  (p. 204) 
Commentators have suggested that existing literature on the democratic role of ICTs 
is marked by a sharp polarization (Bentivegna, 2006; Dahlgren, 2005; Katz & Rice, 
2002; Saco, 2002).  Saco (2002), for instance, maintains that scholars are divided 
between what she calls the ―technological utopian position‖ and the ―technological 
dystopian position‖ (p. xv).  The first and more optimistic one puts greater hopes on the 
ability of the technology to bolster a faltering democratic system in the West marked by 
decreasing public interest and participation.  The second position claims that the 
Internet, at best, cannot make a difference within existing political spheres, and, at 
worst, further reinforces existing power relations.  Galston (2004) holds that online 
communities and groups can ―fulfill important emotional and utilitarian needs, but they 
must not be taken as solutions for our current civic ills, let alone as comprehensive 
models of a better future‖ (p. 75), while Norris (2001a) suggests that the Internet tends 
to exacerbate rather than reduce offline inequalities, since ―the rise of the virtual 
political system seems most likely to facilitate further knowledge, interest, and activism 
of those who are already predisposed toward civic engagement, reinforcing patterns of 
political participation‖ (p. 228).  This literature seems to address the key issue of 
―whether these communication practices merely reduce the costs or increase the 
efficiencies of political action, or whether they change the political game itself‖ 
(Bennett, 2003, p. 144).   
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Equally important, Vedel (2003) identifies four major political functions 
characterizing ICTs and the Internet in the literature, namely that these technologies can 
―enhance the information of citizens;‖ promote ―the strategies of communications by 
political factors;‖ ―facilitate the process of political mobilization;‖ and ―improve 
communication within political organizations‖ (pp. 42–44).  Mapping these functions on 
existing political usages of the Internet, Chadwick (2006) identifies four major 
categories, namely e-democracy, e-mobilization, e-campaigning, and e-government.  E-
democracy refers to a variety of Internet uses that might be ―enhancing community 
cohesion, political deliberation, and participation‖ (Chadwick, p. 83).  E-mobilization 
refers to the use of the Internet ―by interest groups and social movements for political 
recruitment, organization, and campaigning‖ (p. 114).  As for e-campaigning, it refers to 
―the impact of the Internet on parties and election campaigning‖ (p. 114).  Finally, e-
government is defined as the ―service delivery, constituency, participation and 
governance‖ through ―technology, the Internet, and new media‖ (Gartner Consulting, as 
cited in Chadwick, 2006, p. 179).   
Dahlberg and Siapera (2007) identify three models of democracy informing current 
theorizations of the political role of the Internet, namely the ―liberal e-democracy,‖ 
―agonistic radical democracy,‖ and ―autonomist models‖ (pp. 2–5).  The liberal e-
democracy model is the most commonly used in the literature and rests on a deliberative 
model of the public sphere.  By enabling dispersed people to form and join ―virtual‖ 
communities at a low cost, the Internet is believed to support offline associations and 
community life, and foster the social capital that is necessary for the functioning of civil 
society and democracy.  As a medium that supports various forms of communication 
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(many-to-many, one-to-many), the Internet can also promote public deliberation and 
discussion over political issues (Budge, 1996; Coleman, Taylor, & Van de Donk, 1999; 
Grossman, 1995; Negroponte, 1995).  Moreover, Dahlgren (2000) posits that the 
political role of the Internet can be better understood by paying attention to its effect on 
enhancing the quality of participation in the public sphere, namely through the 
promotion of civic culture.   
In the same vein, Dahlgren (2005) distinguishes between five domains of Internet-based 
public spheres: the various versions of e-government, the advocacy or activist domain, 
the civic forums, the pre-political or para-political domain that deals with social and 
cultural topics linked to common interests and/or the collective identities, and the 
journalism domain which ―includes everything from major news organizations that have 
gone online‖ to alternative news organizations and blogs (p. 153).  Dahlgren‘s 
interpretation of the public sphere makes it possible to bridge the gap between formal 
and informal types of politics.  It is a model that deals specifically with the Internet as a 
mediating and communication space, and provides practical analytical tools that 
accommodate both the definition of political functions of the Internet highlighted above, 
and the multidisciplinary approach framing the present research.   
2.2 The democratic potential of ICTs in developing countries. 
Research on ICT-for-Development (ICT4DEV) is marked by a sharp polarization 
too.  Zembylas (2009), for instance, identifies two dominant ―development paradigm[s]‖ 
linked to ICTs (pp. 18–19).  On one hand, there is the ―modernization development 
paradigm,‖ maintaining that ICTs are important in development perceived to spread 
from the West to Southern countries.  On the other, according to the ―social injustice 
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development paradigm,‖ ICTs exacerbate existing inequalities, since they benefit those 
who are ―already dominant politically and economically‖ (pp. 18–19).  A vast literature 
has, in fact, highlighted a wide range of possibilities related to the application of ICTs in 
social and economic development projects.  Various commentators, however, have 
questioned the capacity of technology to have a significant effect on realities in many 
parts of the world, pointing out the multiple-level gaps characterizing the global 
diffusion and adoption of technology, particularly the Internet, separating developed and 
developing countries, but also poor and rich and genders in the same country 
(DiMaggio, Hagittai, & Neuman, 2001; Norris, 2001a; Shade, 2002b; Van Dijk, 2006; 
Wilson, 2004).  Criticizing euphoric discourse on network society, Mitter and Ng (2005) 
maintain that the majority of people in Southern countries are ―affected by exclusion 
rather than inclusion‖ (p. 9).   
Equally important, research on the political role of the Internet has been dominated 
by considerations pertaining to the Western historical experience, particularly the search 
for a way to strengthen deliberative and participatory democracy.  From the perspective 
of comparative politics, some commentators have criticized the application of similar 
paradigms to understand the implications of ICTs to politics in the South.  Norris 
(2001a), for instance, points out that the emphasis on the deliberative function of online 
communication is ―an unduly limited, and thereby misleading normative yardstick‖ (p. 
103).  For Norris (2001a), as far as developing countries and emerging democracies are 
concerned, 
the key issue when evaluating the role of digital technologies for democracy is 
how much governments and civil society learn to use the opportunities provided 
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by the new channels of information and communication to promote and strengthen 
the core representative institutions connecting citizens and the state.  (p. 104) 
As an alternative, Norris (2001a) proposes a model in which the emphasis is not so 
much on how the Internet can allow direct and mass participation of citizens in politics, 
as on the way the Internet can strengthen pluralistic competition among political parties, 
consolidate civil and political liberties and civil society institutions, and promote 
transparency and decision-making processes.   
The bulk of research on the political and democratic potential of ICTs in the context 
of the South has been conceptualized, however, through development theory.  The 
ICT4DEV discourse establishes a direct link between the diffusion and use of ICTs and 
the achievement of economic and social progress in the developing world.  For major 
international political and economic institutions, such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations (UN), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and governments 
around the world, ICTs offer unprecedented possibilities for improving the lives of 
people in developing countries, and can even permit developing countries to ―leapfrog 
stages of technological and industrial development‖ (Norris, 2001a, p. 7).  Moreover, 
within this discourse, social and economic development is often framed as being closely 
tied and even contingent upon the achievement of progress in the area of governance.  
While development has always been linked to the notion of governance and the level of 
efficiency of governments in implementing developmental programs, the discourses on 
development, governance, and democracy have never before been more intertwined.   
Thus, in ICT4DEV discourse, new media technologies are viewed as tools for the 
establishment of e-government, e-governance, and e-democracy projects.  The ultimate 
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objective of e-governance is to promote a more effective and transparent interaction 
between government and citizens (G2C), government and business (G2B), and inter-
agency relationships (G2G) (Norris, 2001a).  While the objective of e-government 
projects is to effectively deliver and facilitate access to government services, e-
governance involves a much broader process, since it seeks ―to realize processes and 
structures for harnessing the potentialities of information and communication 
technologies … for the purpose of enhancing Good Governance‖ (Okto-Uma, as cited in 
Ciborra & Navarra, 2005, p. 144).   
The framing of the political role of ICTs through the issues of e-government and e-
governance places technology at the center of projects aiming at establishing synergy 
between governance and business and citizens who are perceived as customers.  More 
important, while this discourse conceives of governance and democracy development as 
projects to be planned and implemented by governments, it pays little attention to how 
the diffusion and appropriation of ICTs are shaped from below, that is at the level of 
ordinary citizens and grassroots civil society actors.  But recent years have seen more 
calls for the implementation of a participatory and inclusive type of e-government in 
which citizens and civil society actors can influence decision making (The Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat [UNDESA], 2007); 
yet, participation in these initiatives is interpreted more often than not as a top-down 
process shaped and conditioned by the parameters set up within e-government projects, 
which largely ignores bottom-up forms of participation that involve citizens and civil 
society actors appropriating the technology in completely new and even subversive 
ways.   
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2.3 Who controls the Internet? Regimes of governance.  
2.3.1 Global governance. 
As Katz and Rice (2002) observe, any discussion of the political or democratic role 
of the Internet remains simplistic if it does not address how the ―Internet itself interacts 
considerably with political, governmental, regulatory, and economic institutions‖ (p. 
113).  Drissel (2006) defines Internet governance as a concept that refers 
not only to the regulatory power of states over online transactions, but also to the 
mosaic of numerous non-governmental and intergovernmental actors involved in 
coordinating the norms, policies, protocols, decision-making, procedures, and 
technical infrastructure of cyberspace.  (p. 106) 
As was the case with many media and communication technologies in the past, the early 
development of the Internet was accompanied by a euphoric belief that it was 
intrinsically built to resist any hierarchic form of control over it, and, therefore, that it 
allowed the generation of horizontal, equal, and democratic relationships between users.  
This perception is partly justified.  Indeed, the Internet was initially conceived as a peer-
to-peer network based on a universal language for computer networks or what is 
generally known as the TCP/IP protocol (Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet 
Protocol).  Subsequent development of the technology has proved, however, that despite 
the open, minimalist, and neutral aspects of the technology, these very features have 
increasingly become fields of power over which battles of control and appropriation are 
fought by governmental, corporate, and community bodies and agencies.   
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2.3.2 Local regimes of control. 
Although the Internet was conceived of originally as an open network that 
transcends geographical borders and government control, this notion proved problematic 
with growing legal, linguistic, and cultural barriers that divide the Internet into regional 
and local communities of users.  Goldsmith and Wu (2006) maintain that ―geographical 
borders first emerged on the Internet not as a result of fiats by national governments, but 
rather organically, from below, because Internet users around the globe demanded 
different Internet experiences that corresponded to geography‖ (p. 49).  But the most 
important factor barricading the Internet remains government censorship and filtration 
measures.  Governments can indeed control the Internet at three levels: the level of users 
or recipients, the level of websites, and the level of intermediaries or transmitters (p. 49).  
However, because governments have authority only over those websites based within 
their territories, most governments exercise control at the levels of users and 
intermediaries, namely through Internet service providers (ISPs).   
Faris and Villeneuve (2008) argue that ―notwithstanding the wide range of topics 
filtered around the world, there are essentially three motives or rationales for Internet 
filtering: politics and power, social norms and morals, and security concerns‖ (p. 9).  In 
some states, filtering is implemented by private ISPs on behalf of the state that provides 
them with authorizing licenses.  In many other countries, including Saudi Arabia and 
China, filtering is a centralized process (Zittrain & Palfrey, 2008).  A case in point is 
Saudi Arabia, which allowed the Internet to develop only when the state became certain 
it had the necessary software to filter all traffic within the country‘s borders, ensuring 
that ―all Internet traffic to and from Saudi citizens had to pass through a single gateway 
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to the outside world‖ (Zittrain & Palfrey, 2008, p. 32).  Saudi Arabia is not the only state 
in the region to censor the Internet, since the ―Middle East and North Africa [is] one of 
the most repressive web environments in the world‖ (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski & 
Zittrain, 2008, p. 208).  China‘s ―Great Firewall,‖ the extensive filtering system the 
Chinese government uses to censor the Internet, is another example of the capacity of 
states to ―harness‖ the emancipating potential of the technology.  These examples 
provide ample evidence that the Internet is capable of being used not as a tool of 
freedom and emancipation only, but also as one of control, surveillance, and state 
propaganda.   
2.4 Conceptualizing the political role of the Internet through social  
movement theory. 
Despite the vast literature on the implications of the Internet for politics, research 
addressing the issue of social movement theory remains limited.  As Stein (2009) 
argues, ―[though] communication scholars have studied some aspects of social 
movement Internet use, social movement scholars have all but ignored this area of 
study‖ (p. 751).  Moreover, existing literature either has concentrated on case studies, 
like the Zapastista movement, or explored how the Internet has shaped transnational 
social movement activism; as a result, this literature ―does not investigate how the 
majority of SMOs utilizes this communication resource or employ methods that produce 
generalizable results‖ (Stein, 2009, pp. 750–1).   
The ―revolutionary‖ transformative implications of ICTs, and the Internet in 
particular, on social movements are stressed by Van de Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht 
(2004), who argue that   
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internal as well as external communication of social movements was 
facilitated—but certainly not revolutionized—by telephones, copy machines, and 
fax machines.  With the most recent information and communication 
technologies… (particularly portable computers, now morphing with mobile 
phones to give easy access information), and their links via the World Wide Web 
(Internet), citizen groups and social movements, like many other organizations 
and institutions, are likely to reach a new level in the ways in which they 
mobilize, build coalitions, inform, lobby, communicate, and campaign.  (p. 1)  
The case of Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), or the Zapatista 
movement)‘s strategic use of the Internet beginning in 1994, and its success in 
mobilizing global support for its cause, has become one of the most discussed success 
stories of ―online‖ activism and counter-hegemonic objectives.  Castells (2004) 
describes the Zapastista movement as ―the first informational guerrilla movement‖ (p. 
82).  Moreover, the global movement against international capitalism and neo-liberalism 
is one of the most prominent examples of the impact of the Internet on social 
movements.  Since the Seattle protests in 1999, commentators have highlighted a large 
number of examples in which the Internet played a key role in building transnational 
networks of movements that have been able to coordinate their actions and widely 
distribute counter-hegemonic discourses (Castells, 2001; 2007; Dahlgren, 2007; 
Downey & Fenton, 2003; Downing, 2001; Kahn & Kellner, 2004).  As Castells (2001) 
points out, ―the anti-globalization movement is not simply a network, it is an electronic 
network, it is an Internet-based movement.  And because the Internet is its home it 
cannot be disorganized or captured.  It swims like fish in the net‖ (pp. 141–2).  The 
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global collective action spun around the Internet gained momentum after September 11, 
2001, as the new medium became ―the base and the basis for an unparalleled worldwide 
anti-war/pro-peace and social justice movement during a time of terrorism, war, and 
intense political struggle‖ (Kahn & Kellner, 2004, p. 88).   
Garrett (2006) provides the most detailed existing review of the literature on the 
issue.  Using the factors of ―mobilizing structures, opportunity structures and framing 
processes‖ as a framework of analysis, she identifies within the literature three types of 
―mechanisms‖ linking the technology to social movements, namely ―reduction of 
participation costs, promotion of collective identity, and creation of community‖ 
(Garrett, 2006, p. 204).  In their discussion of how various social movement theories 
view communication, and particularly the implication of ICTs for social movements, 
Van de Donk et al., (2004) point out that resource mobilization theory (RMT), for 
instance, recognizes the organizational and low-cost significance of the new 
communication technologies within collective action, but ends up reducing 
communication to an instrumental function.  This view fails to consider that 
an instrumental attitude in general and the use of particular techniques of 
mobilization are not neutral approaches but have consequences for the internal 
structure of an SMO and its relationships with adherents, allies, and bystanders  
(p. 9). 
The political opportunity structure (POS) and political process perspectives, Van de 
Donk et al. (2004) further explain, are not more helpful either since, despite their 
emphasis on interaction, they have paid little attention to ―the content means and 
channels of communication of the groups involved‖ (p. 10).   
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Though not dealing specifically with the articulation between the Internet and social 
movements, Carroll‘s and Hackett‘s (2006) discussion of media activism provides 
important insight into the issue.  They argue that RMT provides some useful grounds for 
understanding the implication of alternative media for collective action, as it emphasizes 
the role of resources (costs) in facilitating or hindering mobilization (pp. 90–92).  They 
point out that new communication technologies like the Internet have certainly, in that 
sense, benefitted progressive movements, such as the Independent Media Center 
(Indymedia) and other media projects testify (p. 91).  Instead of the instrumental view of 
RMT, Carroll and Hackett (2006) propose to analyze media activism through the lens of 
new social movement theory (NSM), arguing that democratic media activism (DMA) 
shares with NSM a number of features, since it ―contests not only the ‗codes‘ of 
communication but the entire complex of social relations and practices through which 
the codes are produced and disseminated‖ (p. 95), and that consequently, DMA can 
itself be portrayed as ―an archetypically new social movement: a reflexive form of 
activism that treats communication as simultaneously means and end of struggle‖ (p. 
96).  Fuentes, Straubhaar, & Spence (2003) lend credence to this statement by arguing 
that ―Internet activism can be perceived as a subcategory of contemporary social 
movements in general‖ (p. 2).   
Nevertheless, many commentators are sceptical about the Internet‘s capacity to 
deeply transform collective action politics and social movements.  A key issue 
addressed in the literature is ―whether these communication practices merely reduce the 
costs or increase the efficiencies of political action, or whether they change the political 
game itself‖ (Bennett, 2003, p. 144).  One major criticism levelled at those who believe 
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in the potential of the Internet for collective action is that bonds, alliances, and 
communities are not ―thick‖ enough to support the ―development of stable, long lasting 
movements in the future‖ (Van Aelst & Wolgrave, 2002, p. 466).  The Internet has 
greatly facilitated mobilization and networking between actors and movements, but the 
ease with which members join or leave online networks means that it has become 
difficult for movements ―to control campaigns or to achieve coherent collective identity 
frames‖ (Bennett, 2003, p. 145).  Furthermore, Koch (2005) argues that the use of the 
Internet in politics, in general, dilutes ―commitment to real political space‖ (p. 160), and 
worsens the quality of public discussion because users can easily filter communication 
to interact only with websites with which they share similar views and ideological 
backgrounds (p. 88).   
2.5 The Internet and social movements in Arab/Muslim countries. 
A significant body of research has developed in the last decade on the diffusion and 
applications of ICTs, particularly the Internet, in Arab and Muslim-majority societes.  A 
few of these studies focused on the implications of blogs and blogosphere for the 
enhancement of freedom of expression, the dissemination of alternative content and the 
strengthening of the public sphere in these societies (Douai, 2009; Khiabany & 
Sreberny, 2007; Glaser, 2005; Lynch, 2007; Seib, 2007; Siapera, 2009).  Others mapped 
the geographic echology of the Arab Internet (Warf & Vincent, 2007; Hofheinz, 2007), 
as well as the political economy and infrastructure of the technology and issues of 
digital divides (Allagui, 2009; Allagui & Martin, 2007).  Still few others tackled the use 
of the Internet in political advocacy and democratic transformation in general (Abdulla, 
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2007; Faris, 2008; Howard, 2011; Gonzales-Quijano, 2004; Oweidat et al., 2008; 
Rahimi, 2003).   
The bulk of this literature, however, addresses the use of the Internet by religious 
groups and for religion-oriented discourse (Anderson, 1999, 2003; Borgman, Van Erp, 
& Haker, 2005; Bunt, 2003, 2004, 2005; 2009; Burkhart & Older, 2003; Conway, 2006; 
Echaibi, 2011; El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2009; Hoff, 2005; Kort, 2006; Mandaville, 2002; 
2003; McElwain, 2004; Sands, 2010; Varisco, 2010).  In this literature, commentators 
have explored the role of the Interent in reimagining and reinventing individual and 
collective ―Muslim‖ identities and discourse, as well as in staging struggles over 
religious legitimacy and authority.  Anderson (1999; 2003), for instance, contends that 
one of the major implications of the Internet for Muslim societies is that it has generated 
a large number of new interpreters who are challenging official and dominant discourses 
on religion, thus leading to the ―reshaping of the public sphere of Islam‖ (1999, p. 56).  
Likewise, Kort (2005) argues that the Internet has become ―the most important tool for 
true Islamic reformation, because people can so easily access and share information, 
challenging the religious status quo of thought and practice‖ (p. 380). Along the same 
lines, Bunt (2009) uses the term ―cyber-Islamic environment‖ to analyze how the use of 
the Internet by Muslims challenges ―traditional ‗top-down‘ authority models‖ in favour 
of ―collaborative, horizontal knowledge economy, [which is] reliant on peer-to-peer 
networking‖ (p.2).  In the same vein, Seib highlights the implications of the Internet for 
reimagining a global Muslim identity since the medium ―may be bringing a degree of 
virtual cohesion to the ummah, giving members of the world-wide Islamic population 
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some easily accessible common ground despite the many differences within this global 
community‖ (2007, p. 12).  
  There is no doubt that Islamic-oriented movements and their political discourse in 
Arab/Muslim countries have gained momentum in the last two decades as the main 
source of dissent and oppositional force challenging authoritarian regimes and 
advancing alternative societal projects founded on ‗real‘ Islamic ethics and values.  
Nevertheless, these groups and discourses do not dominate all spheres of civil life and 
expression in these societies, since diverse voices representing all shades of the Right-
Left ideological spectrum have existed and marked polity in these societies for a long 
time.  This also applies to the use of the Internet in these countries.  Hofheinz (2007), for 
instance, points out that ―out of the 100 most frequently visited Arabic [websites], eight 
have a decidedly religious and specifically Islamic character‖ (p. 75).  While Hofheinz 
notes that the above percentage is the highest within the UN official languages (i.e. 
Arabic, Chinese, French, English, Russian and Spanish), he claims that other languages 
have higher percentages of religious content online, in general (p. 75).  Moreover, even 
if 8% reflects a relatively high figure, it does not explain why research would ignore 
92% of Arabic websites.  Indeed, predominant attention to religion and Islamic groups 
in Arab countries is hardly surprising, as it responds to hegemonic discourses in the 
West on Islamic/Arab countries, where religion is widely viewed as regulating every 
sphere of life and obscuring all other domains in society (Said, 1979; 1997).  By 
focusing on Islamic-oriented uses and content, communication and political science 
scholars contribute to the reinforcement of this perception.  What is more, they also 
deprive secular oppositional groups much needed attention that can help shed light on 
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their double struggles against both repressive regimes and conservative and regressive 
cultural and social orders.   
Second, this literature is characterized by theoretical limitations since the majority 
of studies remain either descriptive or draw almost exclusively on Habermas‘s 
interpretation of the public sphere.  While it remains a central theoretical perspective in 
communication studies, as it does in other disciplines, the Habermasian interpretation of 
the public sphere has been contested by a number of commentators who demonstrated 
that refusing to imagine the public sphere as a communicative space built on premises 
other than those of rational dialogue and deliberation tend to ignore key issues of power 
imbalances and exclusion in society (Fraser, 1992; Mouffe, 1999). These concerns 
become even more problematic when using the concept of the public sphere in the 
context of authoritarian states where basic freedoms and civil liberties are routingly 
trampled by arbitrary rule and police violence, as is the case with the majority of 
Muslim and Arab countries. A rare exception to this trend is Khiabany and Sreberny‘s 
(2007) use of the concept of agonistic public sphere to theorize the implications of blogs 
for Iranian public sphere and politics.  Finally, apart from a few exploratory and isolated 
case studies, such as Faris‘(2008) use of network theory to analyze the use of the 
Internet by youth protest movement in Egypt, the research remains overwhelmingly 
descriptive. In fact, it generally provides limited reflective insights into the 
methodological approaches adopted to analyze online communication and web content, 
and concentrates instead on the discursive and ideational aspects of web content at the 
expense of exploring how the Internet as a technology and medium are appropriated in 
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the context of Muslim-majority societies (for a recent example of this trend, see Sands, 
2010).     
2.6 The implications of the Internet for collective action in Morocco. 
Scholarly studies on the use and appropriation of ICTs in Morocco remain very 
limited, and their number is even smaller when it comes to understanding the use of 
these technologies in the political sphere and as tools of advocacy.  The bulk of the 
existing literature has addressed the implications of ICTs for the Moroccan diaspora in 
Europe (Loukili, 2007; Charef, 2009).  Aziz Douai‘s (2009) article on the Arab and 
Moroccan ―blogosphere‖ deals with the implications of blogging for Morocccan and 
Arab societies. Although the article does not deal specifically with the use of the 
Internet by civil society groups or organizations, it highlights some key issues involved 
in the appropriation of blogs as tools of advocacy and dissidence in the Arab world, and 
particularly Morocco.  Despite its importance, however, the paper is too short to deal 
with the full complexities and variables surrounding such an issue.  Likewise, Davis 
(2004) focuses on the use of the Internet in social and economic development, 
particularly in the promotion of women‘s economic participation in rural areas.  
Watson‘s (2006) PhD dissertation, Production of the Public Sphere in Twenty-first 
Century Morocco, discusses the impact of ICTs, particularly the mobile phone, on the 
Moroccan public sphere.  However, because the research was conducted in the field of 
anthropology, the mediated public sphere is only one of the multiple spheres it explores, 
with the focus mainly on interpersonal communication in various social contexts.  
Ibrahine‘s (2005) PhD dissertation, entitled The Internet and Politics in Morocco: The 
Political Use of the Internet by Islam-Oriented Political Movements, so far remains the 
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only existing academic work that studies with some depth the implications of the 
Internet for collective action in the country.  In this respect, it is a pioneering study that 
offers much needed insight into the use of the Internet for the purposes of collective 
action in Morocco and the larger Arab region, as well.  However, like the rest of the 
literature on the subject, the study is predominantly descriptive and does not provide any 
systematic analysis of the studied websites, nor does it draw seriously on political 
communication or social movement theories to conceptualize the political use of the 
Internet within a Muslim majority society.   
2.7 The Internet and the gender divide. 
Though the majority of men and women in developing countries are still excluded 
from the network society through multiple forms of digital divides, women are much 
more affected by gendered inequalities that limit their access to and use of new 
technologies, especially the Internet (Norris, 2001a; Prasad, 2008; Shade, 2002).  
Prasad, for instance, argues that ―if media access in the developing world is among the 
lowest, women are among the most marginalized sections of the population, their media 
exposure is certainly low, and their role as participants or producers is even more 
limited‖ (p. 80).  Several scholars have pointed out that the gendered digital divide 
extends beyond issues of access to and use of wider social contexts shaping the 
development and diffusion of the technology, such as ―the masculine nature of ICTs, the 
patriarchal nature within which ICTs are introduced, feminization of low-skill ICT jobs, 
the unequal gendered access to technological education, and the degradation and 
devaluation of women employed in certain sectors‖ (Mitter & Ng, 2005, p. 10).   
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Although gender divides, including those related to the access to and use of the 
Internet, remain very high in Muslim Arab countries, the issue has not been given its 
due by scholars in the field.  This research gap has been underscored by Bunt who, in 
his 2003 book, Islam in the Digital Age, advances that  
questions which still need to be approached include how Muslim women are 
applying the medium in relation to Islam, and whether typologies of female 
Cyber Islamic Environments are emerging; alternatively, are women being 
―relegated‖ to sections within sites, or being simply content rather than content 
originators[?]  (p. 210) 
Since then, there has been insufficient progress in the field, as the number of studies 
focusing on the issue remains very limited.  It is true several studies have appeared 
lately that explore various dimensions of the gendered use and diffusion of the 
technology (Al-Roomi, 2007; Kort, 2005; Mazrui & Mazrui, 2001; Skalli, 2006; 
Voadanovich, Urquhart & Shakir, 2010; Wheeler, 2006).  However, none of them 
focuses on the use of ICTs or the Internet by feminist groups and women activists.  This 
observation equally applies to existing literature focusing on the situation in Morocco, a 
country where the ICT gender gap is very wide due to economic and social inequalities 
that subjugate women, especially in poor social classes and regions of lower status.  
Taefnout and Timjerdinge‘s (2005) paper on the use of ICTs by feminist NGOs remains 
an exception and provides some insight into the role of new media technologies, 
including the Internet, in enhancing the collective action capabilities of women, 
especially in their fight against gender violence in the country.  Despite its importance, 
the paper is very short and provides limited data on the issue, which indicates that 
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research on the implications of the Internet for women, in general, and feminist action, 
in particular, has yet to be done either in the context of Arab countries or that of 
Morocco specifically.   
3. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the principal theoretical perspectives dealing 
with the notions of civil society social movements and their applications to and use in 
different political and socioeconomic settings.  It has also discussed the 
conceptualization of the political and democratic potential of the Internet in general and 
the implications of the medium for social movements, in particular.  Among the key 
issues raised in the literature and that are of concern to the current thesis are the dialectic 
between social and technological determinism, and between agency and structure, and 
the link between the diffusion of technology and social and political change and 
development. 
But despite the development of a massive literature on social movements on one 
hand, and the political use of the Internet on the other, studies attempting to bring these 
two fields of enquiries together, whether in sociology, political science, or 
communication studies, remain surprisingly limited in quantity and scope.  In the 
context of developing studies, and more particularly Islamic ones, the scarce attention 
paid to this important issue is even more alarming.  The thesis aims to contribute to 
filling this huge gap, and more importantly, to paving the way for more research on the 
subject by proposing and applying the multidisciplinary methodological and conceptual 
approaches discussed in the following chapter.   
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Chapter Four: Theory and Methods 
Multidisciplinarity and Triangulation: Towards a Holistic Approach  
Introduction  
Studying the implications of the Internet for collective action and social movements 
in Morocco raises a number of important questions about the role of technology in social 
change, and the conception of this role in the context of developing countries.  First, how 
can we conceptualize the political role of the Internet in light of its ongoing dichotomous 
conceptualization between utopian and dystopian stances, and between technological and 
social determinism?  Second, to what extent can social movement theory helps us 
understand collective action within developing countries?  How can we assess 
normatively the implications of the Internet for advancing democratic change?  Finally, 
how can we assess the impact of the Internet on social movements, on the one hand, and 
the Internet‘s contribution to social and political change, on the other?   
As is clear from the above questions, the thesis deals with complex and interrelated 
issues spanning multiple fields of inquiry that include political communication, the social 
study of technology (SST), political science, sociology, and development studies, among 
others.  The breadth and scope of this study thus enjoins the use of a multidisciplinary 
approach that can account for the complexity of the studied phenomenon and take into 
consideration numerous factors and variables surrounding it.  Employing a plurality of 
theoretical perspectives can yield satisfactory results only if they can be supported by the 
use of more than one method to probe the studied phenomenon from multiple angles, and 
to generate rich and deep insights into it.   
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1. The Theoretical Framework 
1.1 Studying social movements in the context of developing countries. 
One common characteristic of existing social movement theories is that they have 
been developed as a response to questions and realties proper to Western societies and 
their recent history.  In the case of new social movement (NSM) paradigms, for instance, 
it was the rise of postmodern or post-industrial society and the appearance of new types 
of contention centered on non-class conflicts that prompted theorists to come up with 
new interpretations and conceptualizations of collective action phenomena.  This issue 
raises a question about the extent to which these models can be applied to different 
contexts, especially those of developing countries.  Faced with a similar question, 
Edward Said (2000) asked:  
What happens to [a theory] when, in different circumstances and for new reasons, 
it is used again and, in still more different circumstances, again?  What can this 
tell us about theory itself—its limits, its possibilities, its inherent problems—and 
what can it suggest to us about the relationship between theory and criticism, on 
one hand, and society and culture on the other?  (p. 199) 
As a response to Said‘s queries, a number of commentators have stressed the 
importance of linking social movement studies to the discourse on development and the 
notion of modernity.  For instance, assessing the usefulness of social movement theories 
to the study of collective action in Latin America, Escobar (1992) has observed that 
within developing countries, social movements have emerged largely ―in response to the 
failure of development‖ (p. 63).  Accordingly, social movements in these countries 
should be placed ―within a reinterpreted context of the crisis of development and 
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modernity, [so] it becomes impossible to see them only in economic or political terms‖ 
(p. 64).  In consideration of the situation in Africa, Ellis and Kessel (2009) suggest that 
although it has been criticized, many aspects of development theory, such as dependency 
theory, remain relevant to studying the social movement phenomenon in Africa, 
―provided it is recognized that Africa‘s dependency is the historical consequence of 
action by various parties‖ (p. 7).  As an alternative, and complementing the existing 
theoretical paradigm, Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2009) propose a multidisciplinary 
approach that highlights the ―interaction between structure and action‖ that can ―connect 
the micro level of individual protesters with the meso level of social movements, and 
macro level of national political systems and supranatural processes‖ (p. 36).  Similarly, 
Shigetomi (2009) argues that the study of social movements in developing countries 
should pay extra attention to ―environmental factors‖ affecting collective action (p. 9).  
These factors include ―state-level political structures‖, ―resource endowment and 
institutions‖ for accessing these resources, the ―social embeddedness of actors‖, and the 
―broader historical and social context‖ within which collective action framing takes place 
(p. 10).   
While not dealing specifically with the context of developing countries, Norris‘ 
(2002) multidisciplinary approach provides a very useful framework that accounts for 
macro, meso, and micro dynamics shaping political activism and collective action in the 
postmodern era.  Combining modernization, institutional and agency theories, she 
contends that instead of relying on ―an oversimple monocausal explanation of (…) how 
and why citizens get involved in public affairs‖ (p. 29), it is important to take into 
account various factors and the interactions between them.  Norris proposes a three-level 
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structure that links together these theories, starting from the macro perspective of 
modernization theories to the micro level of individual resources and civic culture (pp. 
20–30).   
1.2 Social movement theory. 
As evident in the above discussion, there is a need to customize dominant 
theorizations of social movements to the realities of collective action in the developing 
world.  One way to do this is through the articulation of multiple theoretical perspectives 
to highlight various aspects and dynamics involved in collective action at the macro, 
meso, and micro levels.  From the perspective of structural paradigms—namely, resource 
mobilization and political process theories—the current study examines the roles of 
socioeconomic and political structures in Morocco in shaping social movements‘ 
appropriation of the Internet and collective action in general.  Such a perspective 
constitutes a departure from dominant research on collective action in Muslim-majority 
societies, which tends towards foregrounding the roles of ideologies and discourses at the 
expense of paying close attention to the roles of resources and organization 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 4).   
In addition to structural paradigms, the research draws on NSM theory to emphasize 
the use of the Internet by oppositional civil society groups to challenge and counter 
dominant interpretations and discourses, and to disseminate collective action frames.  
Commentators in this paradigm have highlighted the extra-institutional dimension of 
social movements, the fluidity of membership within them, and the central roles of 
collective identity, symbols, and values in collective action mobilization.  An important 
distinction can be made between theorists emphasizing political contention and conflict 
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as the basis of social movement action (Touraine, 1981; 1985), and those who have 
stressed the role of cultural identity and transformation as the main field of contention in 
the public sphere, as well as in the private one (Melucci, 1989; Habermas, 1981).  A 
synthesis between these two theoretical models, however, is necessary to study collective 
action in the context of developing countries, where social movements lead both political 
and cultural struggles against multiple forms of injustices—namely, resource 
redistribution inequalities, authoritarian rule, and ethnic and gender discrimination.   
1.3 Social movements and political change. 
Central to the present study is the extent to which the Internet can empower social 
movements to affect dominant political and social orders in Morocco.  Before embarking 
on this main task, it is first necessary to conceptualize the causal link between social 
movements and social change itself.  Commentators have pointed out that the relationship 
between social movements and political change is neither automatic nor linear: ―Social 
movements sometimes fizzle, sometimes make marginal differences to politics as usual, 
but sometimes produce substantial social changes‖ (Giugni, 1998, p. ix).  Moreover, 
theorists have argued that social movements can affect politics and generate change on 
three levels: ―(1) to alter power relations between challengers, authorities, and third 
parties; (2) to force policy change; and (3) to produce broad systemic changes, both at the 
structural (institutional) and cultural level‖ (Giugni, 1998, p. xv).   
The capacity of social movements to affect policy and governance is to a great extent 
contingent upon dominant political opportunity structures (POSs) that can cause social 
movements to fail, make marginal differences in ―politics as usual,‖ or produce 
substantial social changes and ―influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact 
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of social movements on their environment‖ (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 58).  Moreover, Della 
Porta and Diani (2006) identify two main ways through which social movements can 
influence public policy: they can change policy and decisions on specific issues; and they 
can affect the way in which the political system as a whole functions.  Though social 
movements‘ capacity to change policies on single issues is limited, they are more 
effective, however, in affecting the environment surrounding policy-making and 
governance procedures, as they ―demand and, often obtain, decentralization of political 
power, consultation of interested citizens on particular decisions, or appeals procedures 
against decisions of the public administration‖ (pp. 229–233).   
However, despite their importance, the weakness of such typologies, as Giugni 
(1998) notes, is that while they describe social and political realities, they ―do not tell us 
how movements provoke change‖ (p. xv).  Giugni (1998) also proposes an alternative 
model that rests on three processes or steps, incorporation, transformation, and 
democratization: 
Most typically, movements gradually become incorporated in existing structures 
and procedures, yet without transforming the basic rules of the game.  This path 
may lead to institutionalization, but also simply to the integration of the 
movements‘ demands into public agendas and policies.  Sometimes, however, 
they provoke a transformation of some aspects of the existing social and political 
system....  Finally, the process of democratization develops when a transfer of 
power couples with a modification of the mutual rights and obligations between 
the state and its citizens. (p. xv)   
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Giugni‘s conception of the effects of social movements corresponds better to 
undemocratic countries, like Morocco, because it highlights the slow and gradational 
impact of social movements on the political systems in such countries.  Indeed, the ability 
of social movements to influence policy making or procedure in the short term is much 
more difficult in the case of autocratic regimes, since social movements have limited 
opportunities through which they can interact with public policy institutions. 
1.4 Technology and social change: Technological versus social determinism. 
The issue of the political role of the Internet cannot be discussed without placing it in the 
wider debate around the role of technology in social change.  Two paradigms have 
dominated this debate.  On the one hand, there is the scientific and technological 
determinism paradigm, based on the idea that science and technology can cause major 
changes in society, and that ―technological development is autonomous with respect to 
society; it shapes society, but is not reciprocally influenced‖ (Mackay & Gillespie, 1992, 
p. 686).  On the other, there is the social determinism paradigm centered on the idea that 
―science and technology never determine social change in and of themselves or 
independently, but that this change is always already cultural or social‖ (Schroeder, 2007, 
p. 1).  Between these two extreme positions, however, there is a vast spectrum of 
positions ranging from ―hard‖ to ―soft‖ determinisms (Smith & Marx, 1994).   
Mackay and Gillespie (1992) identify two broad approaches dealing with the social 
shaping of technology (SST).  The first one concentrates on ―micro‖ dimensions of the 
issue, and comprises three theories, namely ―social constructivism,‖ the ―systems,‖ and 
the ―actor-network‖ theory (p. 685).  Drawing on the sociology of scientific knowledge 
(SSK), the constructivist approach considers scientific facts as ―social phenomena,‖ and 
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technological artifacts as socially constructed.  The ―systems‖ approach focuses on the 
―system builders—inventors, engineers, managers and financiers—creating and presiding 
over technological systems‖ (p. 686).  As for the ―actor-network‖ theory, it is ―opposed 
to the social constructivist agenda in that it collapses any distinction between the 
‗technical‘ and the ‗social‘—and, for that matter, between these and the ‗scientific,‘ the 
‗economic‘ or the ‗political‘‖ (p. 687).  The second broad approach is the neo-Marxist 
one.  It deals with the ―macro‖ dimensions of the social shaping of technology by 
focusing on the socio-economic factors that ―affect the nature of technological problems 
and solutions‖ (p. 687).   
The critique of technological determinism in the framework of SST has significantly 
contributed to problematizing the relationship between science and technology and 
society.  Nevertheless, a number of commentators have pointed out many shortcomings 
within the SST perspective itself, arguing that the social shaping of technology has either 
ignored many factors, such as the role of social actors in the process, or has gone too far 
in downplaying the transformative effects of science and technology on various domains 
in society.  Mackay and Gillespie (1992), for instance, argue that the social shaping of 
technology has often ignored the way people appropriate the technology, while this 
appropriation in turn plays a prominent part in the social shaping of technology.  
According to them, ―people may reject technologies, redefine their functional purpose, 
customize or even invest idiosyncratic symbolic meanings in them‖ (p. 698).  However, 
they remind us that the appropriation of technology remains, in its turn, shaped by the 
options and limitations that are an integral part of the technical and material possibilities 
of the technology itself.  Hughes (1994) points out that recognizing the dialectic 
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relationship between the social and the technological should not obscure the fact that 
technology, at some point or another in its development, can shape society more than it is 
shaped by it. 
Indeed, technological systems and society can be both cause and effect of one 
another.  However, ―as they grow larger and more complex, technological systems tend 
to be more shaping of society and less shaped by it‖ (Hughes, 1994, p. 112).  In addition, 
Schroeder (2007) criticizes the perspectives subsuming science and technology under 
culture, arguing that 
science and technology must be separated from culture, and at the same time that 
cannot be analyzed independently of their effects; or to put it differently, they 
must always be related to their causes and consequences in the other spheres of 
life.  (p. 122) 
Schroeder, in fact, lambasts the view that denies all deterministic effects of technology.  
He contends that science and technology may not be imposing an ―iron cage‖15 on 
society, but they certainly impose a ―rubber cage‖ or an ―exoskeleton,‖ ―since the 
advance of science and technology also gives us greater power over the environment, 
extending the human footprint‖ (Schroeder, 2007, p. 9).  Comparing the impact of the 
automobile, the telephone, and television broadcasting in American and Swedish 
societies, Schroeder points out there is both ―rationalization (uniformity) and 
culturalization (increasing diversity)‖ in the way these technologies have affected the 
two societies (p. 99).  At the micro-level, technologies are mediated through the social 
life of individuals, which shapes the way technology affects society.  These effects at 
                                                 
15
 Weber used the metaphor to describe the extension of science and technology‘s ―instrumental rationality 
throughout the social world‖ (Schroeder, 2007, p. 9).   
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the micro level, however, aggregate towards more homogenizing effects at the macro 
level, which indicates that technologies ―do shape society‖ (Schroeder, p. 119).  
Schroeder (2007) further argues that science and technology do not only ―reinforce 
existing social or cultural patterns,‖ but also ―create a distinctive disenchanted culture‖ 
(p. 124).   
1.5 Radical democracy and the agonistic public sphere. 
Commentators have observed that in the absence of real democratic representation, 
civil society in Morocco has acquired a facet of contestation insofar as it is deemed to act 
as a counter-power to the hegemony of the state and monarchy over politics and 
governance (Desrues & Moyano, 2001; Sater, 2002; 2007; see more detail in Chapter 
Three).  The present research does not depart from this framework, as it focuses on 
―oppositional‖ social movements that are engaged in conflictual collective action aimed 
at changing social and political orders, and/or promoting alternative identities.  As a 
consequence, the present research uses the concept of an ―agonistic‖ public sphere, as 
conceived by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), and Mouffe (1993, 1999, 2000; 2005).  This 
concept can indeed help explain the Moroccan political system and the relationship 
between the main actors within it.  But specifically, it can shed light on the use of media 
and the Internet by social movements in their struggle with the state and other power 
holders in society.   
Contrary to the deliberative model of democracy, the radical or agonistic perspective 
views politics as intrinsically conflictual and no-consensual, and thus places difference 
and contestation at the heart of the democratic system.  The dominant ontology of 
―consensus‖ within liberal democracy, according to Mouffe (1999) is bound to fail, 
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because ―consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a 
stabilization of power, and … always entails some form of exclusion‖ (p. 756).  Hence, 
building democratic politics on consensus and reconciliation ―is not only conceptually 
mistaken, it is also fraught with political dangers‖ (Mouffe, 2005, p. 2).  For this reason, 
she argues, politicians and theorists should instead aspire to creating ―a vibrant 
‗agonistic‘ public sphere of contestation where different hegemonic political projects can 
be confronted‖ (p. 3).  This requires an approach that places the questions of power, 
antagonism, and adversarial relationships at its very centre.  The role of democracy, 
however, is to turn antagonism into agonism: 
While antagonism is a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who 
do not share any common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the 
conflicting parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to 
their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents.  They are 
adversaries, not enemies. (p. 20)   
1.6 Contribution of the Internet to radical democracy. 
Various commentators have argued that the Internet‘s main contribution to 
democracy has been its promotion of agonistic politics (Atton, 2002; Carroll & Hackett, 
2006; Dahlberg & Siapera, 2007; Downey & Fenton, 2003; Kahn & Kellner, 2005).  
Dahlberg and Siapera (2007) identify in the literature four dimensions linking the Internet 
to radical democracy theory.  First, the Internet is deemed to contribute to the 
development of radical democracy theory itself, as it opens new venues for mediated 
politics. Second, the Internet contributes to the constitution of alternative political 
communities, and creates new possibilities for collective action and radical democratic 
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culture.  Third, the Internet is believed to ―directly strengthen the voice of alternative, 
marginalized, or otherwise oppressed groups‖ (pp. 11–12).  Finally, the Internet 
contributes to the development and actualization of radical democratic culture and 
―imaginaries‖ online. 
In this literature, the public sphere is thus understood as the site of ―agonistic politics 
associated with power and exclusion‖ where diverse ―understandings of identity, 
institutions, and actions‖ compete and battle for power (Dahlberg & Siapera, 2007, p. 
133).  As a cheap, non-hierarchical, and interactive communication medium, the Internet 
has allowed antagonistic politics to mushroom, as diverse groups have been able to voice 
dissentious opinions online.  But the Internet also has the potential to link adversaries 
through webs of hyperlinks, thus facilitating the development of agonistic politics.  
Bennett (2003) concurs, arguing that a network-based communication ―becomes 
potentially transformative when networks spill outside the control of established 
organizations‖ (p. 20), which can contribute to the growth of democratic organizations.  
But the impact of the Internet on collective action and social movements has not been 
unidirectional.  The technology itself has been appropriated by activists, as well as by 
―hacktivists‖ who, through open source and peer-to-peer software, have been contributing 
to the generation of globalization ―from below‖ (Kahn & Kellner, 2004; Jordan, 2002, 
2007).   
1.7 The Internet as an alternative medium. 
Closely connected to the radical democracy perspective, the political and democratic 
potential of the Internet has also been extensively approached in alternative media theory 
(Atton, 2004, 2001; Bennett, 2003; Couldry & Curran, 2003; Carroll & Hackett, 2006; 
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Downing, 2001; Downey & Fenton, 2003).  Commentators have observed that social 
movements make strategic use of mainstream media (MSM) in their action ―to broaden 
the scope of conflict‖ (Gamson & Wolsfeld, 1993, p. 116).  However, because of the 
asymmetrical relationship between MSM and social movements, there is always ―a 
tension in using a hegemonic system for oppositional purposes which poses continuing 
challenges to critical movements‖ (Carroll & Ratner, 1999, p. 2).  That is why social 
movements have to use alternative communication strategies and tools to bypass MSM, 
in order to support their struggles and communicate with actual and potential 
constituents.   
The use of alternative media by progressive and oppositional social movements 
involves two key processes.  On the one hand, these movements use alternative media to 
achieve various objectives in domains outside the mainstream media sector.  On the other 
hand, they endeavour to democratize the media themselves by implementing and 
incorporating non-commercialized and non-professionalized communication practices 
and structures that challenge those of MSM (Carroll & Hackett, 2006).  The 
appropriation of the Internet by social movements over the past decade has deeply 
questioned established distinctions between activism and journalism, and between 
professional and civic and, to use Rodriguez‘ term (2001), citizen media.   
1.8 The social embeddedness of the Internet. 
As mentioned above, studying the implications of the Internet on Moroccan social 
movements touches upon the dialectics between social and technological determinisms, 
and structure/technology and agency.  One possible and convincing alternative to the 
many polemical stances on this issue is the concept of embeddedness (Sassen, 2004).  
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Sassen contends that ―digital networks are embedded in both the technical features and 
standards of the hardware and software, and in actual societal structures and power 
dynamics‖ (p. 78); she also points out that online communication and content are ―deeply 
inflected by the cultures, the material practices, [and] the imaginaries that take place 
outside electronic space‖ (p. 80).  The conception of the Internet as being embedded in 
the social and the material-phenomenological worlds and experience ―allows us to go 
beyond the common duality between utopian and dystopian understandings of the 
Internet and electronic space generally‖ (p. 80).  Gendered cyberspace provides a clear 
example of how the Internet‘s effects are mediated through existing cultural systems.  It 
is a space where women‘s use of the Internet and their presence on the web, characterized 
by both inhibitions and growing opportunities, reflects ―the contradictory features of 
women‘s conditions in [the] larger social world today‖ (p. 88).   
1.9 Re-conceptualizing the digital divide. 
Studying the social embeddedness of the Internet cannot be carried out without 
paying close attention to discrepancies in the diffusion of the medium and the disparities 
marking its use in society, particularly in collective action.  To examine this issue, the 
thesis draws on the notion of ―digital divide‖, a term that ―became popular in the mid-
1990s to describe disparities between those who had access to the Internet and those who 
did not‖ (Shade, 2010, p. 127).  Dominant interpretations of the term ―digital divide‖ 
define it as differences between rich and poor countries, and between people within the 
same country in terms of access to computers and Internet connection.   
Numerous commentators, however, have criticized the dichotomous interpretation of 
the term, pointing out various socio-economic and technical aspects underpinning this 
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type of divide (Clement & Shade, 2000; DiMaggio, Hagittai, & Neuman, 2001; Norris, 
2001a; Shade, 2010; Van Dijk, 2005, 2006; Wilson, 2004).  Pippa Norris (2001), for 
instance, distinguishes between three levels of digital divide, namely the global divide, 
the social divide and the democratic divide: 
The global divide refers to the divergence of Internet access between 
industrialized and developing societies.  The social divide concerns the gap 
between information rich and poor in each nation.  And finally within the online 
community, the democratic divide signifies the difference between those who do, 
and do not, use the panoply of digital resources to engage, mobilize, and 
participate in public life. (p. 4)   
Clement and Shade (2000) provide a more elaborate ―access rainbow model‖ that 
contribute to ―broadening the focus on access beyond narrow digital connectivity issues‖ 
(p. 34).  The model is made up of seven layers highlighting the technical and 
socioeconomic aspects of infrastructures involved in having access to network services: 
(1) Carriage: the facilities that store, serve, or carry information (telephone, 
ADSL, integrated services digital network [ISDN], mobile phones, etc.). 
(2) Devices: the actual physical devices that people operate (workstations, PCs, 
public kiosks, mobile devices, etc.). 
(3) Software tools: the programs that operate the devices and make connections to 
services (Web browser, e-mail program, encryption and other privacy 
enablers).  
(4) Content/services: the actual information and communication services that 
citizens find useful (e-mail, World Wide Web content, e-commerce, etc.).  
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(5) Service providers: the organizations that provide network services and access 
to users. 
(6) Literacy/social facilitation (basic literacy, numeracy, media-savvy skills, 
computer literacy).  
(7) Governance: how decisions are made concerning the design, development, 
operation and policy of ICTs. (pp. 36–45).   
While the thesis draws on these two models above to discuss multiple aspects in the 
digital divide characterizing the appropriation of the Internet by Moroccan social 
movements, it relies more on Van Dijk‘s (2005) model, in which he highlights four stages 
of digital divide: 
(1) motivational access (motivation to use digital technology); 
(2) material or physical access (possession of computers and Internet connections 
or permissions to use them and their contents); 
(3) skill access (possession of digital skills: operational, informational, and 
strategic); and 
(4) usage access (number and diversity of applications, and usage time).  (p. 21) 
These stages are both accumulative and recursive.  First, they follow a successive 
pattern, with motivation to use the technology as the precondition for the others. ―Both 
physical access and adequate digital skills are requirements for a satisfactory use of the 
potential applications of the new media.  Subsequently, the stages are recursive, as they 
return, wholly or partly, with every new technology or innovation‖ (p. 22).  Furthermore, 
Van Dijk (2005) proposes a model explaining the social implications of digital divide 
through five causal points: 
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(1) Categorical inequalities in society produce an unequal distribution of 
resources. 
(2) An unequal distribution of resources causes unequal access to digital 
technologies. 
(3) Unequal access to digital technologies also depends on the characteristics of 
these technologies. 
(4) Unequal access to digital technologies brings about unequal participation in 
society. 
(5) Unequal participation in society reinforces categorical inequalities and 
unequal distributions of resources.  (p. 15)   
Combining these models together will allow the thesis to go beyond a technology-
centered understanding of the digital divide, and to shed light on various articulations 
between technology and the socioeconomic realities of Morocco as a developing country 
that is strongly marked by stark social inequalities between classes, regions, and gender.   
1.10 Community informatics and the question of sustainability. 
While there is a general consensus on the existence of a deep and widening digital 
divide within and between nations, the question of how to address it remains a 
controversial issue.  From the perspective of the dominant discourse in ICT4DEV, the 
digital divide can be bridged principally by providing universal access to hardware and 
Internet connection.  An alternative interpretation has been developed within community 
informatics (CI), a discipline that pays close attention to the contextual use and 
application of technology in a given community: 
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CI is an approach to ICT, which includes a concern for accessibility of the 
hardware, the software, the connectivity, and the information; and for the use and 
user to which the technology is being applied, particularly within the context of 
the user‘s physical community.  Incorporating the user and his community into the 
system design process introduces new elements and new ―stakeholders‖ into an 
extended approach to ICT design, development, and implementation.  (Gurstein, 
2000, p. 6)   
Among the core issues the discipline has dealt with is the question of the 
sustainability of IT projects designed to promote the use of ICTs in various domains, 
including the political sphere.  A principal contribution of CI is its rejection of a 
monocausal approach to promote sustainability, and its adoption of a multifarious 
perspective recognizing the interplay between various factors emphasizing ―the interplay 
between physical infrastructure, soft technologies, social infrastructure, and social capital 
as critical elements in the foundation for effective implementation and sustainability of 
CI initiatives‖ (Simpson, 2005, p. 104).   
2. Methodology 
2.1 Triangulation of methodology. 
The choice of triangulation, which Denzin (1978) defines as ―the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon‖ (p. 291), is based on various 
considerations: the objective of the research, the research questions, and the social 
phenomenon being investigated, in addition to the theoretical perspective and premises 
adopted by the research.  The research deals with the implications of the Internet as a 
techno-sociological phenomenon for social movements.  It tries to highlight the complex 
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and multilayered interconnections between technological innovation and appropriation, 
on one hand, and socioeconomic, cultural, and political processes, on the other. 
Understanding the implications of this interplay necessitates the use of multiple 
methodologies in order to capture, as much as possible, the various levels of articulations 
between the Internet, both as a technology and a practice, and the sociopolitical processes 
within which it is embedded.  Recognizing the complexity of online communication as a 
social and technological phenomenon, Norris (2001a) argued that ―research on the 
Internet needs to integrate research findings drawn from numerous disciplines‖ (p. 35).  
She recommended the use of triangulation because ―no single methodology can hope to 
capture the rich complexities of life on the Internet‖ (p. 36).   
The Internet is a hybrid technology or a ―meta medium‖ comprising various 
protocols and interfaces, such as the World Wide Web, e-mail, and voice-over-Internet 
Protocol (VoiP).  It also combines various forms of communication, such as one-to-
many, many-to-many, and one-to-one communication.  The nature of the Internet as a 
communication technology and medium, combined with its constant evolution, poses 
―challenges for scholars as they seek to develop methodological approaches that permit 
robust examination of [W]eb phenomena‖ (Schneider & Foot, 2004, pp. 114–5). 
Combining methodologies in the investigation of the Internet constitutes an effective 
solution, since triangulation ―can stimulate the creation of inventive methods, new ways 
of capturing a problem to balance with conventional data-collection methods‖ (Jick, 
1979, p. 608).  Furthermore, since all methodologies have both advantages and 
disadvantages, using multiple methodologies can enhance the reliability of the research, 
as the weakness of any single method is offset by the strengths of the others (Sudweeks & 
116 
 
Simoff, 1999, p. 37). Similarly, Brewer and Hunter (1989) argue that different methods 
are not necessarily exclusive alternatives among which the researcher must choose; a 
―diversity of imperfection allows us to combine methods … to compensate for their 
particular faults and imperfections‖ (pp. 16–17).   
The strict separation between quantitative and qualitative methods has been 
questioned by a large number of commentators who argued that both methods can be 
joined together to highlight various aspects of the studied phenomenon (Howe, 1988; 
Hyde, 2000; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).  While quantitative methods ―condense data 
to reveal the big picture‖ (Ragin as cited in Blee & Taylor, 2002, p. 109), qualitative 
analysis, by contrast, can provide a deeper insight into specific cases and experiences that 
cannot be captured statistically.  As such, qualitative methods are aptly described as ―data 
enhancers: they enhance data to make it possible to see aspects of their subjects that 
might otherwise be missed‖ (p. 109).   
2.2. Exploring web platforms: feature analysis. 
Scholars across many disciplines have used a variety of methodologies that range 
from ethnography and focus groups to textual and network analysis, among others, to 
analyze several dimensions of the Internet, such as forums, e-mail, and websites.  As far 
as Web studies are concerned, Schneider and Foot (2004) point out three major 
methodologies that have been used in the literature, namely rhetorical or textual analysis, 
structural or feature analysis, and socio-cultural analysis (p. 116).  The first methodology 
deals mainly with the content of a website, while feature analysis focuses on the structure 
of a site, and socio-cultural analysis on the ―cross-site action on the web‖, to study ―the 
hyperlinked context(s) and situatedness of [websites]‖ (p.117).  Despite the use of a range 
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of diverse methods, content analysis based tools remain the most widely used in political 
communication because they can generate less subjective results about specific 
characteristics of the Internet as a technology and political medium (Weare, & Lin, 2000; 
Gibson & Ward, 2000; Norris, 2001b; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2002; Stein, 2009).   
A principal objective of the thesis is to examine how the Internet as a new tool of 
communication is enhancing the collective action capabilities of Moroccan social 
movements.  This necessitates paying close attention to the technological and structural 
aspects of the Internet, particularly websites, and assessing their potential for political 
activism.  Such a task is best performed through the use of feature analysis, a 
methodology based on both quantitative and qualitative content analysis.  In this manner, 
it is a research tool that allows for the systematic analysis of websites without 
overlooking non-quantifiable dimensions, such as design and efficiency.  The advantage 
of using this method, as Gerodimos (2008) points out, is that it can produce ―formal and 
rigorous data that is comparable across cases, while also allowing for further exploration 
within cases, thus avoiding common pitfalls such as informal or impressionistic 
assessments, as well as an excessive focus on frequencies and numbers‖ (p. 972).  
Moreover, while feature analysis relies on quantitative content analysis, it is also 
qualitative, in that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of features, rather than their 
frequency, is analyzed (George, 2009, p. 144).   
2.3. Studying online texts: framing analysis. 
To complement the structural analysis of the studied social movements‘ websites, 
framing analysis was used to examine their textual content, including linguistic and non-
linguistic data.  The concept of ―framing‖ is traced back to Heider‘s (1959) work on 
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attribution theory.  Recent work on framing links the concept to Goffman‘s work (1974), 
in which the term is used ―to denote schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to 
locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at 
large‖ (as cited in Snow, Rochford, & Worden, 1986, p. 464).  Frames have also been 
defined as ―tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters ....  We 
frame reality in order to negotiate it, imagine it, manage it, comprehend it, and choose 
appropriate repertoires of cognition and action‖ (Giltin, 1980, p. 6).  Framing analysis has 
been used in a variety of fields, including communication studies and social movement 
theory.  A central epistemological basis for the concept and its relevance to social 
movements is the recognition that ―meaning is constructed out of social and political 
interaction with supporters and opponents‖ (Tarrow, 1998, p. 107).   
Accordingly, the main objective of this analysis is to examine the extent to which the 
studied websites are used to communicate alternative and oppositional interpretations, 
discourses, and symbols, and to assess the extent to which Web-based platforms are 
appropriated for collective action mobilization.  While feature analysis seeks to assess the 
extent to which the studied websites draw on the potential of the Internet as a medium of 
communication, framing analysis examines how much of this potential is actually being 
used in collective action mobilization in general, and in the context of specific struggles 
and causes, such as the Israeli attack on Gaza that took place between December 2008 
and January 2010.   
2.3 In-depth interviewing. 
As discussed above, the current study is premised on the belief that the Internet is 
based on hardware and virtual data, as much as it is rooted in social practices, public 
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policies and regulations, and power relations.  This reality means that, notwithstanding 
the insights that can be gained from applying feature and framing analyses to websites, 
such analyses will remain incomplete without probing the deeper part of the iceberg that 
remains submerged in the social conditions of the human experience and historicity.  In-
depth interviewing is thus a methodology that is appropriate for the type of investigation 
in which the researcher has to dig under the surface of social and cultural manifestations 
to discover ―what is usually hidden from ordinary view or reflection or to penetrate to 
more reflective understandings about the nature of that experience‖ (Johnson, 2002, p. 
107). 
This is particularly pertinent to the purposes of the present study.  Blee and Taylor 
(2002) outline a number of benefits for applying in-depth interviewing to the study of 
social movements.  First, it provides an insight into the ―motivations and perspectives of 
a broader and more diverse group of social movement participants than would be 
represented in most documentary sources‖ (Blee & Taylor, p. 94).  Moreover, it allows 
the researcher to grasp the way activists understand their participation and their social 
world, thus giving access ―to such nuanced understandings of social movement outcomes 
as the construction of collective and individual identities‖ (p. 95).  Finally, it is a method 
that ―brings human agency to the centre of movement analysis‖ (p. 96), while allowing 
the researcher to examine the ways in which the messages of social movements are 
received by actual and potential constituents (p. 96).   
Summary and Conclusion 
Grounded in a multidisciplinary approach, the current study seeks to shed light on the 
implications of the Internet for social movements (SMs) and the prospects of political 
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change in Morocco.  From the point of view of social movement, radical democracy, and 
alternative media theories, the study will investigate the extent to which the new 
communication technology has enhanced the capacity of oppositional social movement 
organizations (SMOs) and groups to lead their combats against political, social, and 
cultural injustices.  Drawing upon insights from two complementary streams of 
research—namely, the social shaping of technology (SST) theory, and community 
informatics (CI)—allows the study to highlight many limitations in the diffusion and 
appropriation of the Internet as a political medium, as well as point out key shortcomings 
in the use of the Internet as a tool of political development.  Equally important, a mixture 
of methods will be used in the present study, as triangulation is better suited to the topic 
of the research as an academic field of enquiry, and as a sociological and ontological 
phenomenon.  Triangulation can, therefore, provide a deeper, multi-dimensional insight 
into the complex social and political issues that the present study is addressing. 
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Chapter Five: Feature Analysis 
The Web’s Potential for Collective Action: Usages and Limitations 
Introduction 
While the Internet is a multifaceted medium made up of several technologies and 
platforms, such as the World Wide Web, e-mail, and voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP). 
The Web and, more precisely, websites are the most accessible and visible insofar as they 
can be accessed, at least in theory, by all users, without the need to be members of a 
group or to have special online accounts (as is the case for e-mail and e-lists, for 
instance).  In this manner, websites achieve higher publicity or ―publicness,‖ which is a 
cornerstone of the public sphere in the Habermasian interpretation: ―Only in the light of 
the public sphere did that which existed become revealed, did everything become visible 
to all‖ (Habermas, 1991, p. 4).  Websites are also complex platforms since they can, in 
addition to textual data, incorporate other technologies and software applications, such as 
video, e-mail, and instant chat, which favours horizontal and participatory 
communication, networking, and dissemination of information.  Moreover, because 
websites can support far richer data, both textual and non-textual, they allow for the 
exchange and sharing of a greater amount of information at a low cost, and potentially 
enable social movements to considerably reduce communication costs.  Further, websites 
can be used as platforms from which it is possible to search and retrieve archived 
information, a feature that can enhance the continuity of collective action and discourse, 
and also help members and the group reduce the costs and time associated with storing 
and accessing important information needed for mobilization.   
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Despite the exponential growth in the number of Internet users in Morocco, the 
number of those who use political websites in general remains very low.  According to 
information provided by Alexa Traffic Rank
16
, none of the 100 most-visited websites in 
Morocco belongs to a civil society group or institution.  Moreover, the first website 
among the ones studied here, that of Justice and Spirituality, is ranked 803
rd
.  There are a 
number of reasons for this.  One, despite the rapid growth in the number of Internet users 
in the last few years, the digital divide in the country is so deep that the majority of 
Moroccans do not have access to computers or an Internet connection.  Moreover, with 
the exception of Islamic social movement organizations (SMOs), the majority of civil 
society groups, including political parties, are composed of small constituencies that 
expand and shrink in accordance with political circumstances and contingencies.  Also, 
the younger generations that constitute the majority of Internet users in Morocco are less 
politicized than previous generations were, and their use of the Internet is directed 
towards entertainment and social networking.  Among the top 10 most-visited websites in 
the country are Facebook (first on the list), YouTube, Windows Messenger, koora.com 
(or soccer.com), and a website providing Middle East television programming (Alexa, 
top sites in Morocco).  
These statistics
17
, however, are not surprising.  In fact, collective action has always 
been the domain of a few elite groups of people rather than the majority.  This is not 
particular to Morocco since Alexa‘s statistics about Canada, for instance, reveal similar 
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 The information provided by Alexa.com, though revealing, remains biased.  This is because Alexa, as all 
similar traffic-ranking sites, measures site popularity only among users who have downloaded their Web 
plug-ins or sidebars.  
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 This web ranking was provided upon my access to Alexa.com on July, 2010, and it is subject to change 




trends, with business, social networking, and governmental sites topping the most visited 
websites, as well.  Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven, Internet traffic to 
social movements‘ websites rises and falls in accordance with the visibility or latency of 
the movements themselves and their activities. Furthermore, measuring the contribution 
and importance of alternative media with criteria that typically govern mainstream and 
commercial media, i.e. online traffic or the number of viewers, is inappropriate.  These 
websites principally address the actual and potential members of these movements and 
their needs, and only secondarily the general public.  As alternative media, their main 
value and contribution is not in competing with mainstream media for influence, but in 
creating subaltern public spheres that challenge the dominance of the former over 
communication of frameworks and discourses. Additionally, even in cases when not all 
of a group‘s members are able to access these websites, the Internet is usually used in 
synergy with other communication tools, including those that are face-to-face, that 
complement and reinforce one another (see a discussion of this issue in Chapter Five).   
1. Objectives 
Numerous commentators have attempted to outline the main consequences of the 
Internet, especially web platforms, for social movements.  Edwards (2004), for instance, 
outlines the main uses of the Internet in terms of the following functions:  a) 
mobilization; b) soliciting opinions/opinion polling; c) discussion; d) facilitating contacts 
amongst the organization‘s members; e) service; and f) networking with other 
organizations (p. 187).  Similarly, Stein (2009) summarizes existing literature on the 
subject and points out the Internet‘s six functions for social movements: a) providing 
information; b) assisting action and mobilization; c) promoting interaction and dialog; d) 
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making lateral linkages; e) serving as an outlet for creative expression; and f) promoting 
fundraising and resource generation (p. 757).   
Building on the existing literature, this chapter attempts to answer two main 
questions: First, to what extent are Moroccan social movements and SMOs appropriating 
the potential of the Internet for collective action?  And, second, to what extent is the 
Internet enhancing the capacity of these movements to engage in collective action?  
These questions will be answered by assessing the potential of the studied websites to 
deliver the following key functions: 
(a) providing updated information; 
(b) enhancing internal cohesion and collective identity within movements and SMOs; 
(c) enhancing their capacity to link to other movements and organizations at the 
national, regional, and international levels; 
(d) maximizing their ability to mobilize actual and potential constituents; 
(e) and building participatory communication structures and interactions.  
2. Methodology  
2.1 Sampling. 
 The study combines representative and purposive sampling at various levels in 
the process of selecting websites for analysis.  The study uses representative sampling, a 
method that is considered a more rigorous and ―scientific‖ method, as it allows the 
research results to be generalized.  There are, however, a number of drawbacks to this 
method.  One, applying it exclusively in a study using a small population such as the 
current one will inevitably involve errors and biases (Marshall, 1996, p. 523).  Moreover, 
―for a true random sample to be selected, the characteristics under study of the whole 
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population should be known‖ (p. 523).  This is, however, impossible when studying 
websites, as their number on the World Wide Web increasing continuously.  
Furthermore, while the chapter uses quantitative content analysis, it equally draws on 
qualitative content analysis.  Unlike with purely quantitative research, representative 
sampling is not always needed in qualitative research ―where improved understanding of 
complex human issues is more important than generalizability of results‖ (p. 524).  Also, 
a major obstacle  encountered  at the sampling phase  of this study was finding websites 
that reflect a satisfactory level of usage, as a significant number of websites belonging to 
Moroccan civil society fall into disuse and become stagnant a short time after their 
creation.   
In order to compensate for these limitations, purposeful sampling was also used at 
different stages.  According to Patton (1999), ―the logic and power of purposeful 
sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth.  Information-rich 
cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance 
to the purpose of the research‖ (p. 169).  Two levels of sampling were used to conduct 
this study.  The first level dealt with identifying social movements that were to be the 
subject of study.  Given that social movements can comprise a large number of 
organizations and groups, the second level of sampling dealt with choosing particular 
groups and organizations whose websites would be analyzed.  One core difficulty I 
encountered at this level was the scarcity of literature in the domain, as very few studies 
have examined collective action in Morocco through social movement theory.  Thus, I 
had to find clear parameters for defining and identifying social movements as social and 
political phenomena.  To do this, I drew on Diani‘s (2000) definition of social 
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movements because it synthesizes various interpretations in the literature on the subject: 
―A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of 
individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflict, on the 
basis of collective identity‖ (p. 165).  Applying the above criteria to the plethora of 
groups and organizations active within Moroccan civil society and extensively discussed 
in existing literature on the issue (see Chapter Three), eight social movements were 
identified: 
1) the Islamic-oriented movement; 
2) the alter-globalization movement;  
3) the human rights movement; 
4) the feminist movement; 
5) the Amazigh cultural movement; 
6) the graduate unemployed movement; 
7) the radical left movement;  
8) the trade union movement. 
These movements represent the major ideological paradigms and collective action-
oriented groups constituting Moroccan civil society (see, for instance, Kausch, 2008; 
Sater, 2007; and Sidi Hida, 2007), especially those that follow oppositional agenda, and 
aim at achieving social and political change in the country. 
The next step in sampling was to identify the social movement organizations and 
groups within the identified social movements whose websites would be studied.  Two 
main criteria were employed at this stage.  First, the studied groups were chosen from 
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among groups and social movement organizations that are considered to be the major 
groups in a movement and operate at the national and transnational level.  The use of this 
criterion is motivated by a number of factors.  One, the thesis focuses on social 
movements that have the potential to produce societal change at the national and not just 
the local level.  Two, the thesis aims to examine the impact of the Internet on the capacity 
of SMOs to coordinate action and enhance organizational structure and collective identity 
formation at the translocal level.  Three, a preliminary survey of political websites in the 
country revealed that a limited number of SMOs have been able to set up websites, and 
these groups tend to be the biggest SMOs and operate at the national level.  The other 
criterion concerns whether a SMO has a website, and whether these websites reflect a 
sufficient degree of usage and activity.   
Thus, drawing on existing literature, as well as on media and institutional reports on 
Moroccan civil society, a list of the major social movement organizations within each 
movement was established.  Using this list as a guide, I searched for those that have 
websites.  In a few cases, particularly with regard to the Islamic movement, I found a 
large number of SMOs that had websites, and therefore I opted for the biggest and most 
important Islamic SMOs in the country, namely Justice and Charity, Unity and 
Reconstruction, and Justice and Development.  In other cases, such as that of the feminist 
movement, only one had a functioning website, namely the Democratic Association of 
Moroccan Women (ADFM18).  In addition to the latter, Justice and Charity‘s women 
section, Sisters of Afterlife, was chosen because it also addressed women.  In still others, 
namely the Amazigh cultural movement, I found that the majority of SMOs did not have 
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 The acronyms of SMOs used in the study are based on their French titles, since they are commonly used 
in the literature to identify Moroccan SMOs.   
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websites, while those that did have websites, did not keep them updated.  In contrast to 
institutionalized groups, I noticed that non-institutionalized Amazigh groups and 
individual activists‘ usage of the Internet provided richer and more active examples of the 
use of the Internet in collective action.  The case of the Amazigh cultural movement is a 
good example of a social movement made up of informal network of organizations, 
individuals, and groups as described in Diani‘s definition above.   
Two websites and groups or SMOs were selected from each studied social 
movement.  The only two exceptions to this rule are the Islamic and the Amazigh cultural 
movements, which are represented by three websites and SMOs or groups.  This is meant 
to reflect the superior quantitative online presence of these two movements compared to 
the other ones.  Thus, the following is the list of the studied SMOs and groups and how 
they were selected: 
 The Islamic-oriented movement: The three studied SMOs in the movement 
represent the most powerful ones in the country. 
 The alter-globalization, radical left, trade union and unemployed graduates‘ 
movements: While numerous groups in these movements have websites, those 
selected were found to be the only ones that were regularly updated and active 
during the preliminary survey and observation of social movement‘s websites.   
 The human rights movement: The human rights movement includes a large 
number of local and national SMOs.  However, only three of them had websites, 
among which only the Moroccan Association of Human Rights‘ 24 websites were 
updated.  The websites of Rabat and Essaouira‘s 19 chapters were selected because 
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 A small town in Morocco.  
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they were among the most active in terms of updating, and they provide a ground 
on which to compare the contribution of the Internet for reducing inequalities 
between urban centers, i.e., Rabat, and peripheral regions, namely Essaouira‘s 
chapter.   
 The feminist movement: At the time of sampling, only two websites belonging to 
women‘s or feminist SMOs were available, namely those of the Democratic 
Association of Moroccan Women (ADFM) and the Sisters of Afterlife, which is 
Justice and Charity‘s women‘s section;  
 The Amazigh cultural movement: Sampling from among the Amazigh cultural 
movement‘s websites was more difficult because of their relatively large number, 
and because the majority of websites belong to non-institutionalized groups or 
individual activists.  A list of websites was established by drawing on information 
provided by online directories, blogs, and search engines.  These websites were 
observed, and those that were found to be more frequently updated and to deal 
with explicitly political issues were shortlisted.  Two of the selected websites are 
collective blogs, while the third belongs to an Amazigh SMO.  
In total, 18 websites are studied in this chapter (see table 1).  While the chapter aims 
to provide, as much as possible, a representative overview of the appropriation of the 
Internet by various Moroccan social movements, its aspiration is more to analyze and 
understand the implications of the medium for collective action in general, specifically 
for its capacity to engage in oppositional collective action that can eventually lead to 
political and social change.  Also, some of the selected websites consist of multilingual 
versions.  In these cases, I have opted to concentrate on the Arabic websites, as they are 
130 
 
the ones that were assumed to address the majority of local users, and because, in most 
cases, multilingual versions tend to be identical to one another in structure and design.  
 
Table 1. List of websites and SMOs. 
Movement Organization Website URL 
 
Islamic oriented 1) Justice and Charity 
2) Unity and Reconstruction  







4) AMDH–Rabat  
5) AMDH–Essaouira  
 





6) Democratic Association of 
Moroccan Women  











8) ATTAC–Morocco  
 











10) Amazigh blog–Ageddim  
11) Amazigh–Ameghnass  












13) The Youth Group 




Radical left 15) Democratic Path  








17) Democratic Labour 
Confederation 






Equally important, while political parties are commonly excluded from various 
conceptualizations of civil society and social movements, the thesis argues that such 
exclusion should not be rigidly upheld in every political environment, especially in the 
context of developing countries where the interconnection between these entities is very 
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deep.  In fact, as noted by many commentators (see Chapter Four), one major 
characteristic of Moroccan civil society is that a great number of the major associations 
and NGOs are rooted in political parties with which they continue to share members and 
various resources.  Such interconnectedness has prompted a number of commentators 
either to incorporate the two under the banner of civil society, as Lise Garon (2004) did 
in her study on Morocco, or to question the rigid separation between the two (Cohen & 
Arato, 1992; Diani, 2000).  Diani (2000), for instance argues that  
under certain and specific conditions some political party may feel itself as part of 
a movement and be recognized as such both by other actors in the movement and 
by the general public.  This is likely to be the exception rather than the rule, and to 
be largely restricted to parties originated by social movements, such as the Green 
Parties.  (p. 167)   
In  light of Diani‘s explanation, and while maintaining the distinction between 
political parties and social movements, the current thesis has opted to study three political 
parties because they are rooted in distinct social movements, namely those that are 
Islamic or radical left, have never participated in government, and are clearly adopting 
oppositional agendas and collective action tactics.  Similarly, the thesis studies the case 
of the trade union movement, a category of organizations that is often excluded from the 
social movement literature dealing with the Western context.  Unlike in the West, where 
trade unions mainly defend special interests of members, trade unions in Morocco have 
always been at the fore of political struggle for social justice and democracy that has 
pitted civil society against the Monarchy and the Makhzen (Garon, 2004; Sidi Hida, 




One of the difficulties related to doing research on the Internet is that online data can 
be ephemeral and it is not usually possible to rely on a website‘s existing archives to 
access to past information.  Downloading websites in their original format to analyze 
their structural and functional features is also another challenge.  An important difficulty 
encountered during the current study was finding a reliable software tool that would 
allow websites to be downloaded, stored for easy retrieval, and viewed in their entire and 
original format, including graphics and active hyperlinks.  Moreover, because the current 
analysis included downloading the websites over the course of one month, downloading 
the homepage and the next page separately requires both time and the right software in 
order to limit the volume of data needing to be stored.  Several software programs were 
tried initially, including portable document format (PDF) software, Internet Explorer‘s 
Web page saving option, and HTTrack, but none could perform all the above functions 
effectively and reliably.  Finally, the software tool surfoffline20 was successfully tested 
and used. 
2.3 Unitization. 
A common problem facing research that focuses on the Internet is how to define the 
boundaries of the units to be studied.  Unlike in media, content exists in a non-linear way 
on the Internet via hyperlinks to other textual and non-textual material on the same page 
or website or to external sites. Such issues have raised questions about ―what constitutes 
a webpage, what constitutes a website, and how these elements combine to form 
identifiable messages‖ (Weare & Lin, 2000, p. 281).  For the purpose of the study, I 
opted for a two-step unitization process.  Initially, the website as defined by a URL 
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 The software tool is available at www.surfoffline.com for a one-time fee.  
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address was taken as the first unit.  This strategy is suitable for studies dealing with the 
structural aspects of websites (p. 281).  Since the study also seeks to analyze the textual 
content of these websites, another level of unitization was chosen, namely the homepage 
and a one-level domain page from the homepage.  A number of considerations underlie 
this choice.  First, websites can contain hundreds of pages and thousands of textual and 
multimedia files, so coding entire websites can be ―unrealistically demanding‖ (Weare & 
Lin, p. 282).  Second, the sampled websites for this study include various Web formats, 
namely blogs, wikis, and conventional site formats, which differ in structure and the 
manner of presenting and archiving content.  Thus, focusing on homepages minimizes the 
number of variables that separate these web genres, and enables the researcher to 
concentrate on the same level of websites.  Finally, a homepage constitutes the single 
most important part of a website, considering ―its attention-grabbing and organizational 
roles‖ and given that it is ―likely to contain many central elements of Web design‖ 
(Weare & Lin, p. 281).   
2.4 Categorization.   
Categorization is a major step in conducting content analysis.  Categories should 
follow some basic rules: ―they must reflect the purpose of the research‖ and ―be 
exhaustive‖ and ―mutually exclusive‖ (Holsti, as cited in Mostyn, 1985, p. 135).  








e) information about the movement or SMO; 
f) and how up-to-date the site is (―updatedness‖). 
The majority of the functions above are reflected in the literature under various 
descriptors, mainly mobilization, interactivity, networking, and information providing.  It 
is worth noting that the function ―information providing‖ is represented by two 
categories, namely ―information on the movement or SMO‖ and ―updatedness‖.  In fact, 
each of these categories focuses on a different aspect within the generic function of the 
Internet as a source of information, which will be described in more detail below.  As for 
―user-friendliness,‖ it is more a feature of websites than a function of the Internet.  Its 
importance, however, lies in the fact that it sheds light on the Web structure through 
which all other functions can be delivered effectively.  Despite its importance, only a 
small number of studies in political communication have paid attention to user-
friendliness, perhaps because the bulk of studies on the subject are conducted in various 
other fields, mainly business- and IT-related disciplines.   
2.5 Coding. 
Using the above categories, a preliminary set of codes was derived from both existing 
literature and the data itself.  An initial set of codes was derived mainly from existing 
literature.  This set of codes was then tested in a pilot study on part of the data before it 
was ultimately refined and expanded by adding new codes as coding of data progressed.  
Additional analysis was performed in order to determine the efficiency of the codes and 
their compatibility with the objectives of the present research.  The process of testing and 
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refining the codes was carried out several times until a satisfactory set of codes was 
obtained. 
2.6 Reliability and intercoding.  
The reliability of the coding procedure is considered a key component of 
(quantitative) content analysis, and it is commonly described as ―the extent to which 
independent coders evaluate a characteristic of a message or artifact and reach the same 
conclusion‖ (Neuendorf, 2002; Lombrad Synder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002).  The issue of 
reliability is thus related to the essence of content analysis itself, which Krippendorff 
(1969) defines as the use of a ―replicable and valid method for making specific inferences 
from text to other states or properties of its source‖ (p. 103).  For the purposes of the 
current chapter, three coders were used to code data independently.  The first coder was 
the researcher; the other two were graduate students who were sufficiently trained for 
several hours on using the codes developed for this study.  Several pilot rounds of coding 
were conducted to test the coding scheme and the level of compatibility between the 
coders.  Krippendorff‘s alpha was used to measure intercoder reliability, as this method is 
considered to be conservative and ―allows for any number of coders and is explicitly 
designed to be used for variables at different levels of measurement from nominal to 
ratio‖ (Lombard et al., 2002, p. 592). 
Because the vast majority of codes deal with manifest content or features, they had a 
reliable alpha higher than .90.  The exceptions to this result are the codes analyzing 
―user-friendliness‖ and ―information about SM/SMOs.‖  In the first category, some codes 
that were used initially received less than .60, and therefore, they were replaced or 
discarded.  The three codes used in this feature, namely consistency, navigation and 
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culturability, had received .85, .83, and .71 respectively, while the code in the second 
category had an alpha of .74.   
3. Studied Movements and SMOs: A Brief Background 
While some of the selected movements have been studied extensively, such as the 
Islamic movement and to some extent the feminist movement, others have received scant 
attention, as is the case with more recent movements such as the unemployed graduate 
movement.  Some movements also share an ideological background and premise; the 
alter-globalization, human rights, radical left, and feminist movements, for example, all 
draw, with varying degrees of emphasis and levels of interpretation, on Marxism and 
leftist discourse.  Others share organizational structure, such as professional organizations 
versus grassroots organizations.  As well, many of these movements share not only an 
overarching ideology, but also members and resources.  While analysis will accordingly 
pay attention to their idiosyncrasies, it will still group them together under broad banners, 
such as ―left‖ or ―professional,‖ when appropriate.  
3.1 The Islamic movement. 
The Islamic-oriented (or Islamist) movement is undeniably the largest and most 
influential in Morocco.  The rise of Islamism or a politically-oriented and militant Islamic 
movement in Morocco can be linked to a number of factors.  As with many Arab 
countries, the movement in Morocco developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a 
reaction to failed development policies and to leftist political parties and secular 
movements that gained momentum with Nacirism
21
 (Glennie & Mepham, 2007).  The 
rise of Islamism can also be seen as a direct result of the absence of democracy and 
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 In reference to Jamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt‘s president between 1956 and 1970.   
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political freedoms in Islamic countries where ―Islamic activism becomes a natural vehicle 
for political discontent‖ (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 8).   
The social and political rootedness of Islamism is well explained by Castells (2004), 
who argues that  
for all the efforts of exegesis to root Islamic identity in history and the holy texts, 
Islamists proceeded, for the sake of social resistance and political insurgency, 
with a reconstruction of cultural identity that is in fact hypermodern....  Indeed, 
the explosion of Islamic movements seems to be related to both the disruption of 
traditional societies (including the undermining of the power of traditional 
clergy), and to the failure of the nation-state, created by nationalist movements, to 
accomplish modernization, develop the economy, and/or to distribute the benefits 
of economic growth among the population at large. (p. 17) 
The case of the Moroccan Islamic movement is not an exception.  As Munson (1986) 
points out, ―it would be misleading to characterize this entire movement as 
‗fundamentalist,‘ since the ideological orientation of the most conspicuous groups in it is 
far more reminiscent of ―liberation theology‖ in Latin America than it is of Christian 
fundamentalism in the United States‖ (p. 267).   
Islamic brotherhoods and Sufi orders can be considered early precursors of the 
modern Islamic movement in Morocco (Dialmy, 2000).  However, the first militant 
Islamic group was the Islamic Youth Association (Jamayyat Shabiba Islamiyya), founded 
by Abdessallam Mutti‘a in 1969 as a clandestine and revolutionary organization.  In the 
early 1980s, the group ended its clandestine tactics to become legal under the new title 
Reform and Renovation.  Later on, the group merged with another Islamic organization, 
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leading to the creation of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in 1998.  The party 
participated in two legislative elections in 2002 and 2007, and established itself as the 
main opposition party in parliament.  In parallel with the party, the SMO continued to 
exist as an association with its own structures and leader, ultimately changing its name to 
Unity and Reconstruction.  Unity and Reconstruction focuses on broader social and 
public ―awareness‖ activities through its numerous spirituality services and cultural 
centres while providing support to the PJD party.   
The second major Islamic organization is Justice and Charity (J&C) founded in 
1984 by its charismatic leader Abdessalam Yassine.  Since the early 1970s, Yassine 
challenged King Hassan II publically, which brought him long periods in prison and 
house-arrests.  This SMO advocates the non-violent transformation of society; its 
activities range from public demonstrations and protests to organizing spirituality and 
welfare services.  The exact number of members of the group is not known, but it is 
estimated to be between 50,000 and 600,000 (Cavatorta, 2006).  J&C combines 
charitable activities with advocacy based principally on Yassine‘s writings, which draw 
on Sufist non-violent teachings and call for the establishment of an Islamic state.  
Concurring with Munson‘s assessment of the Moroccan Islamic movement, Ottaway 
and Riley (2006) describe J&C as  
a complex and at times bewildering organization.  In part, it is an organization in 
the mould of Morocco‘s numerous traditional Sufi brotherhoods, nonviolent and 
suffused with a strong current of mysticism, including a belief in the importance 
of dreams.  In part, it is a very political movement, with some of its leaders prone 
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to using the radical language of dependency theory and Third World revolution.  
(pp. 15–16) 
Though the organization has been outlawed since its foundation, J&C was relatively 
well tolerated by the state.  In recent years, however, police and judiciary repression 
against it has significantly intensified.  According to the organization, in two years, more 
than 5,000 members have been incarcerated, of which, 877 were women, while more than 
1,000 were sentenced to various prison terms and a total of $730,000 (USD) in fines were 
imposed (Justice and Charity, 2008).  Moreover, the state banned all the group‘s print 
publications and repeatedly, albeit unsuccessfully, tried to block access to its websites 
too.   
3.2 The feminist movement. 
Although a few pioneer Moroccan feminist associations appeared as early as the 
1940s during the French Protectorate (Naciri, 2006; El-Boudali, 2005), the feminist 
movement remains a recent phenomenon, as the majority of NGOs were established in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Belhabib (2004), for instance, points out that ―87.5% [of feminist 
NGOs were] created in 1980, while 32% started only since 1994‖ (p. 1).  Commentators 
link the evolution of the feminist movement in this period to numerous factors.  First, it is 
a movement that sprang from the progressive development of an elite class of women 
who are well educated and active in the public sphere.  Many of these women were also 
militants in various leftist political parties and radical groups.  Many feminist NGOs 
developed out of women‘s sections in opposition parties, where women had to ―struggle 
with their fellow party members … to be convinced of the appropriateness of 
independent feminist institutions‖ (Eddouada, 2001).  The appearance of the first feminist 
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publications—namely, the monthly newspaper ―8 March‖ in 1983 and ―Kalimat‖ 
[meaning ―words‖] in 1986—contributed to further spreading a militant and critical 
feminist discourse to a larger public of educated women.   
The first major feminist NGO to be established was the Democratic Association of 
Moroccan Women (Association démocratique des femmes du Maroc, or ADFM).  It was 
founded by Amina Lmrini in 1985 from a section of the Moroccan communist party, 
Parti du progrès et du socialisme (PPS).  Since then, hundreds of local, regional, and 
national feminist NGOs and small associations have appeared in the country,
22
 the 
majority of which focus on providing various services and assistance to women in health, 
education, professional training, and judicial counseling, among others.  In addition to 
providing some of these services, major feminist NGOs focus on lobbying the state to 
demand more rights for women through the elimination of all types of discriminations 
against them.   
Moreover, the Moroccan feminist movement has been predominantly associated with 
secular and leftist organizations.  The emergence of many women‘s associations that are 
Islamic-oriented or have a direct link with current Islamic movement organizations raises 
questions about whether they can be considered to be part of the mainstream feminist 
movement, given that the majority of Islamic movements strongly adhere to rigid 
patriarchal interpretations of gender issues that tend to oppress women.  This is true for 
Justice and Charity‘s women‘s section, Sisters of Afterlife, established by Nadia Yassine.  
While some commentators have dubbed religious-oriented women‘s activism as ―Islamic 
feminism,‖ others have warned against an easy dismissal of the contribution of religious-
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 Although exact statistics do not exist, the database on the Tanmia Portal, a major ICT4DEV project in the 
country, has 990 registered women‘s associations.   
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oriented women‘s movements.  In the words of Tohidi (2003), it is necessary to ―avoid 
polarizing a ‗faith position‘ and a ‗secular position‘ with regard to commitment to 
women‘s rights....  To equate the secular or the modern with equality and feminism is as 
naïve and misinformed as equating faith and religion with anti-feminism‖ (p. 137).   
3.3 The human rights movement. 
As in the case of the feminist movement, the origins of the Moroccan human rights 
movement are rooted in party politics and rivalry.  The first human rights SMO, la Ligue 
Marocaine des droits de l‘homme (LMDH), was established in 1971 by activists in the 
nationalist Istiqlal (Independence) party.  The second was the Association Marocaine des 
droits de l‘homme (AMDH), established in 1979 by members of the leftist Union 
socialiste des forces populaires (USFP) party.  In 1983, AMDH broke from the USFP and 
aligned with the Parti d‘avant-garde démocratique et du socialisme [PADS], a radical left 
faction that seceded from the USFP.  AMDH‘s political alignment and highly critical 
stance were deemed too radical by the state, which led to the arrest of many of its 
members and the outlawing of its activities until 1988.  During the same year, a rival 
NGO was established by a group of USFP activists, namely the Organization Marocaine 
des droits de l‘homme (OMDH).  OMDH strived to be less politicized than AMDH and 
more professional in dealing with the issue of human rights (Sater, 2007).  However, 
AMDH‘s defence of broader political and social rights, its challenge of the monarchy and 
its use of direct collective action tactics have gained it greater social capital, and it has 
become the biggest and most respected SMO in the domain.  As defined on its website, 
AMDH is ―a human rights and democratic movement [militating] for the establishment of 
a democratic constitution, a state of rights and law, and a society of dignity and 
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citizenship‖ (AMDH, Presenting the Association, 2010; my translation).  AMDH, which 
slightly modified its name to the Association Marocaine des droits humains, currently 
comprises 91 chapters distributed throughout the country and more than 10,000 registered 
members (AMDH, Presenting the Association, 2010).  In addition to these two main 
NGOs, there is a large number of other human rights NGOs operating at the national, 
regional, and local levels.   
3.4 The alter-globalization movement. 
Compared to other social movements, the alter-globalization movement is a new one 
in Morocco, since it only emerged in 2000.  The first SMO in the movement is ATTAC-
Maroc, the Moroccan section of the Association pour la taxation des transactions 
financières pour l'aide aux citoyens (Association for the Taxation of Financial 
Transactions for the Aid of Citizens), an INGO that originated in France in 1998 to 
protest initially against extra taxation, but which extended its action to militate against 
neo-liberal global capitalism and its social and environmental consequences in developed 
and developing countries.  The INGO is present in 40 countries including Morocco.  
ATTAC-Maroc was founded in 2000 as a reaction against economic liberalization and 
the creation of free trade zones with Europe and the US (Cheynis, 2005).  While present 
in numerous regions of the country, ATTAC is more active in big cities, such as Rabat 
and Casablanca, and has some 500 members distributed over 12 chapters.  Since its 
establishment, the SMO has faced serious problems, particularly state repression and lack 
of formal state recognition, scarcity of resources, and internal conflicts and divisions, 
particularly between the Rabat and Casablanca chapters.  Despite being a small NGO, 
ATTAC benefits from cross-membership, as many of its militants are also active in leftist 
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parties and unions.  The organization also relies on networking and forming short-term 
alliances with other protest groups and leftist-oriented SMOs over particular issues and 
campaigns, forming what has become common in Moroccan activism—―tansikiyyat‖ or 
local coordination committees.   
The second major SMO in the alter-globalization movement is the Forum des 
alternatives Maroc (FMAS) an NGO, founded in 2003 and operating as a coalition of 
associations and groups that militate for various social and political causes.  This is why a 
distinctive characteristic of the SMO is the pluralism marking its identity, derived 
simultaneously ―from the number of its members, [the] diversity of those constituting it, 
their objectives, and the differences in their visions about collective action‖ (Sidi Hida, 
2007, p. 122).  The group declares that one of its main objectives is to establish a strong, 
democratic, and independent social movement sector in the country.  It also aims to 
defend ―economic, political, social, civil, and cultural rights, regardless of racial, ethnic, 
linguistic, or sexual differences‖ (FMAS, 2006, Who We Are link [my translation]).  
Thanks to direct support from INGOs, particularly the Montreal-based Alternatives 
International, FMAS has been able to organize a series of social forums in which activists 
from diverse civil organizations and social movements take part.  The first of these 
forums was held in 2002 prior to the official constitution of FMAS.  Since then, it has 
organized numerous social forums at the regional, national, and international levels, the 
last of which were the Maghreb Social Forum held in 2008 and the International Social 
Forum held in March 2010.  The wiki-portal of E-Joussour (E-Bridges) is another project 
initiated by FMAS in partnership with Oxfam Novib and Alternatives International with 
an aim to allow civil society groups in countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
144 
 
(MENA) to ―benefit from the visibility of the Internet‖ and to enable civil society actors 
and ordinary citizens in the region to have access to alternative information, and to 
produce and publish analyses in Arabic, as well as in French and English (E-Joussour, 
2010, Who We Are link).   
3.5 The Amazigh cultural movement. 
Like the Islamic movement, the Amazigh cultural movement has become one of the 
strongest social movements in the country, given its size, geographical expansion, and 
political influence.  The movement has a strong regional and international dimension, 
extending as it does over most of North Africa and into Western Europe.  Weitzman 
(2006) defines this movement as follows:     
The ―Berber/Amazigh culture movement‖ (mouvement culturel Berbère/Amazigh; 
MCB/MCA) is an amorphous, multifaceted phenomenon with a clear core 
demand: the affirmation by state authorities—in North Africa, first and foremost, 
but also in the Berber diaspora in Western Europe and North America—of the 
existence of the Amazigh people as a collective, and of the Amazighity 
(Berberness) of the land of ―Tamazgha,‖ defined as the area stretching from the 
Siwa Oasis in Egypt‘s Western Desert to the Canary Islands, and as far south as 
the Sahel.  In practical terms, their core demand is for the recognition of 
Tamazight as an official language in the North African states, and for educational, 
social, and economic policies to redress the multitude of injustices said to have 




  While existing throughout the whole North Africa region, the Amazigh cultural 
movement is mostly active in Algeria and Morocco where strong Amazigh-speaking 
minorities live, and also in the diaspora, especially France and the Netherlands.  As far as 
Morocco is concerned, the movement‘s demands center on cultural and linguistic rights 
and rarely on ethnic ones, because the long and close co-existence of Amazigh and Arab 
populations over nearly 1,500 years has produced an ethnic mixture to the point that ―we 
can no longer speak about populations that are purely Amazigh or Arab‖ (Janjar, Naciri, 
& Mouaquit, 2000, p. 51).  Although some Amazigh associations appeared as early as the 
1960s, the emergence of the Amazigh cultural movement as a political movement was 
relatively late—towards the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s—with the 
publication first of the Agadir Chart in 1991, ―in which Amazigh demands were 
formulated for the first time‖ (Sater, 2007, p. 62). 
The Moroccan state has tried to curb the movement either by repression and 
intimidation or co-optation, by providing ―just enough space to prevent the cultural 
Amazigh movement from developing into a political movement‖ (Van Heelsum, 2002, p. 
3).  Under pressure from international actors and Moroccan civil society actors, the 
Moroccan state began to respond to some of the movement‘s demands, first by 
establishing the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture in 2001, and later through the partial 
introduction of the Amazigh language in education and the launching of an Amazigh TV 
channel in 2010.  However, many Amazigh activists and associations find these measures 
to be insufficient and continue to militate for the full recognition of Amazigh culture and 
identity.  Moreover, while some Amazigh groups have shifted their demands from 
identity issues to the socio-economic development of ―Amazigh‖ regions, radical factions 
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in the movement are asking for full regional autonomy, thus leading increasingly to the 
―racialization‖ of the issue and to more divisions within the movement itself (Silverstein, 
2010).   
3.6 The unemployed graduates movement. 
This movement emerged in the beginning of the 1990s in reaction to the worsening 
unemployment situation and the sharp rise in the number of young people with university 
education and diplomas.  While the Moroccan state had been for decades the main 
employer, this situation changed as Morocco entered a deep recession in the 1980s and 
opted for economic readjustment measures that included significant cuts in public 
expenditures and the liberalization of the state.  As a consequence, the number of 
unemployed graduates grew from 84,000 in 1990 to 202,000 in 1997 (Sidi Hida, 2007, p. 
38).  With this, the movement witnessed a steady increase in membership and became 
highly visible, particularly as its members use direct action such as street protests, sit-ins, 
and the occupation of streets and buildings (Emperador, 2008).   
The movement is composed of a large number of loosely connected groups that are 
formed according to the students‘ year of graduation and their geographical origins.  
Moreover, membership in these groups is provisional, since it ends once a person gets a 
job.  Some of these groups cease to exist because all of their members are offered jobs 
through collective agreements with the government.  Although the primary objective of 
all groups in the movement is to get employment, they also link this demand with other 
social and political goals such as the reduction of the disparity between high and low 
incomes, the recognition of the legitimacy of their cause, and respect for freedom of 
speech (Sidi Hida, 2007).  Burton-Rose (1998) estimates that the movement is one of the 
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rare ones that escaped state co-optation, while Sater (2007) affirms that, ―in terms of 
street presence‖ the group has become ―one of the most active‖ in Morocco (p. 94).  Sidi 
Hida (2007) points out that the successful endurance of the group‘s collective action is 
due to many factors—chiefly, its opening towards other movements, especially the 
human rights and trade unions, which provide logistical support such as premises where 
numerous groups can hold their meetings and coordinate action.   
3.7 The trade union movement. 
The trade union movement is one of the oldest social movements in the modern 
history of the country, dating back to the 1930s when Morocco was under the French 
Protectorate.  However, the first Moroccan nationalist union, the Moroccan 
Confederation of Labour (UMT, after its French initials), was set up in 1955 as a 
clandestine organization and played a central role in the nationalist movement that 
militated for the independence of the country in 1956.  Because it was close to the 
nationalist Independence Party (IP), the UMT was also affected by party divisions 
between conservative and socialist factions, which eventually led the IP to found the 
General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM) ―to break up the UMT's monopoly of 
organized labor‖ (Bendorou, 1996, The media and civil society section).  The state also 
tried to weaken the movement by fuelling divisions within it and through extensive use of 
co-optation and violent repression.  In 1978, the Democratic Labour Confederation 
(CDT) was established by militants close to the Union socialite des forces populaires 
(USFP).  The birth of the CDT was a landmark in the development of the trade union 
movement, as it ―offered the possibility of greater union independence from the 
government, a less top-down structure and locally controlled strikes, rather than constant 
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intervention from the confederation‖ (Clement & Paul, 1984, p. 24).  In addition to the 
three central syndical unions above (the UMT, the CDT, and the UGMT), there are a 
large number of professional unions, including the National Union of Labour in Morocco 
(UNTM), which is close to the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), and the 
National Union of Higher Education (SNESUP).  The UMT and the CDT continue to be 
the country‘s major unions, as they include a large number of members and affiliated 
professional unions, such as the Employees‘ Syndical Union.  In the last decade, the 
influence of the trade movement in general has waned due to internal divisions and 
controversial decisions taken by its leaders to appease the government, especially after 
the participation of opposition political parties in successive alternance governments 
since 1998.   
3.8 The radical left movement. 
The radical left movement is rooted in various leftist organizations and political 
parties such as the National Union of Popular Forces political party (UNFP), the 
Moroccan Communist party and, most important, Marxist-Leninist and Maoist SMOs and 
groups such as the ―Movement 23 March,‖ the National Union of Moroccan Students 
(UNEM) and ―Ilal Amam‖ (meaning ―forward‖).  The latter was cofounded and led by 
Abraham Serfati, a Moroccan engineer of Jewish descent, in 1970.  It operated as an 
underground organization and preached revolutionary change to the regime of Hassan II 
during the 1970s.  Ilal Amam, along with other groups, was brutally repressed and many 
of its members, including Serfati, were sentenced in 1974 to decade-long prison periods 
which they spent in the infamous prison of Tazmamart in the south of the country.  Upon 
their release, many of these activists become active in the Moroccan Association of 
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Human Rights (AMDH), along with small political parties such as the Democratic Path, 
The Democratic Socialist Vanguard Party (PADS), and the Unified Socialist Party (PSU).   
The PSU was founded in 2002 out of the fusion between four radical-left groups, the 
most important of which is the Organisation of Popular and Democratic Action founded 
by charismatic leftist leader Bensaid Ait Idder in 1983.  The party changed its name from 
Party of Unified Socialist Left (Parti de la gauche socialiste unifiée) to the Unified 
Socialist Party in 2005, after a radical faction from the central Left party, the Socialist 
Union of the Popular Forces, joined it.  In the 2002 legislative elections, the party 
obtained two seats in parliament.  In 2007, the party allied with the Democratic Socialist 
Vanguard Party (PADS) to participate in the legislative elections, in which they received 
4 seats.  As for the Democratic Path (―La voie démocratique), it was founded in 1995 by 
militants of the radical left, and regards itself as the ―legal‖ version and heir of the Ilal 
Amam organization
23
.  While the Moroccan state tolerates the party, it still refuses to 
recognize it officially because of the party‘s stances on various issues, particularly its 
support of the Popular Liberation Front for the Western Sahara (POLISARIO) front in its 
conflict with Morocco over the Western Sahara.  For this reason, it was only in 2004 that 
the party was able to hold its first general assembly and elect its leaders, many of whom 
are also members in the Moroccan Association of Human Rights.  The party continues to 
refuse to participate in elections on the ground that elections do not guarantee a real 
democratic process.   
                                                 
23
 The Democratic Path‘s website.   
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4. General Information on the Websites in the Study  
4.1 Category of websites. 
Because the Internet is a complex medium involving a bundle of technologies, the 
selected websites reflect this diversity in their use of various interface types, such as 
blogs, wikis, and standard websites.  The distribution of the studied websites along 
interface genres is as follows: 
Table 2.  
Categories of websites. 
 




 Justice and Charity 
 Unity and Reconstruction 
 Justice and Development 
 Democratic Association of Moroccan 
Women 
 Sisters of Afterlife 
 Democratic Path 
 Unified Socialist Party 
 Amazigh Network for Citizenship and 
Culture 
Democratic Labour Confederation 





 Moroccan Association for Human Rights-
Rabat chapter 
 Moroccan Association for Human Rights- 
Essaouira chapter. 
 Amazigh Movement–Ageddim 
 Amazigh Movement–Ameghnas 
 Unemployed Graduates–The Youth Group 
 Unemployed Graduates–Forum Group 
Wikis  ATTAC–Maroc 
 Forum des alternatives Maroc–E-joussour 
4.2 Languages on the websites.  
Morocco is characterized by a great cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
diversity.  At the linguistic level, although the majority of Moroccans speak a dialect 
derived from Standard Arabic, called ―Darija,‖ a minority of Moroccans speak various 
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dialects of Tamazight—the language of the Amazigh or Berbers, the indigenous people 
of North Africa—and consider it to be a native language.  Moreover, while Arabic is the 
official language of the country, French, the language of the former colonizer, has long 
been the primary language in various domains, including public administration, higher 
education, and the worlds of finance and business.  French has also been dominant in 
both print and electronic media.  But with the increased liberalization of the media sector 
over the last few years, the dominance of the French language has declined, as a large 
number of Arabic and, to a lesser extent, Amazigh media
24
 have been established.   
Understandably, then, French has been the dominant language online, with Arabic 
catching up over the last few years.  In fact, the use of Arabic on the Internet has been 
developing very slowly in the late 1990s and in the early twenty-first century.  Technical 
problems related to the use of Arabic script and suitable Web design, IT skills, low access 
to the Internet among users speaking only Arabic (compared to francophone users), and 
the general absence of adequate infrastructure were all barriers that stalled Arabic 
expansion compared with many other languages.  In the last couple of years, however, 
the online use of Arabic has been growing very quickly25, thanks to increased Internet 
access in the region and the appearance of technologies and software that facilitate the 
use of Arabic script.  Still, French continues to enjoy a privileged status online, as it is 
still the primary language of business and government, even when most government 
institutions have websites in both languages.  Bilingual sites are as frequent among civil 
society groups, although French websites are often more up-to-date and professionally 
designed than are Arabic ones. The linguistic division marking Moroccan, and perhaps 
                                                 
24
 There are 280 publications in Arabic, 151 in French, and around 9 Amazigh publications (Ministry of 
Communication, 2009).   
25
  According to Internet World Stats (2010), Arabic ranks seventh among the top 10 languages on the Web.   
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North African, Internet has serious implications for the visibility and impact of Arabic 
websites. As Douai (2009), observes in the case of Arab and Moroccan blogosphere, 
―although many Arab bloggers  tend to write in Arabic, only those who use English, or 
French as in the case of North African bloggers, are more likely to attract the attention of 
the local advocacy rights community‖ (p.147).   
Table 3.  
Languages on websites. 
      
Website  Arabic French Amazigh English Spanish 
Justice and Charity         
Unity and Reconstruction       
Justice and Development       
Sisters of Afterlife       
ADFM         
ATTAC        
AMDH–Essaouira         
AMDH–Rabat        
E-Joussour         
ANFC          
Ageddim blog         
Ameghnas blog          
Youth group       
Forum group       
Democratic Path       
Unified Socialist Party         
D. Labor Confederation       
Employees‘ Syndical U.        
 
Preliminary observation of the studied websites (see table 3) shows that the majority 
(eight websites) have either a website in both languages (Arabic and French), or use 
Arabic and French extensively on the same website.  Four mainly Islamic-oriented sites 
use only Arabic, while two have English websites, and three, belonging to the Amazigh 
cultural movement (ACM), have websites that use limited Amazigh language 
transliterated either in French or Arabic script.  While language was not a criterion for 
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research purposes, the linguistic distribution of the websites reflects, more or less, the 
linguistic mosaic within ―Moroccan‖ civil society.   
4.3 Domain names and server location.  
The Internet is often described, in theory at least, as being based on networks of 
equal nodes.  In reality, however, the Internet‘s infrastructure and network traffic reflect 
deep hierarchical structures where connections from and to servers and Internet provider 
(IP) addresses located in rich countries overwhelmingly dominate global Internet traffic.  
Using the online crawler webhosting.info (http://www.webhosting.info), information 
about the location of the server where each website is hosted was generated.  Results (see 
website 4) revealed that only 5 of the 18 websites have their servers inside Morocco, 
while almost half of the websites are located in the US (8 websites), four in France, and 
one in Canada.  Moreover, only three SMOs (for example, the ADFM) use Morocco‘s 
country code top-level domain (ccTLD) .ma, while the remaining use generic TLD names 
such as .com, .net, and .org. 
These results reflect the global divide in Internet infrastructure and network traffic 
(Clement and Shade, 2000; Norris, 2001a; Shade, 2000) as a few countries host the 
majority of the servers that constitute the backbone of the Internet, as well as the domain 
names that exist on the Web.  The poor quality of IT infrastructure in Morocco, security 
issues, fear of censorship, and lack of resources are all factors that may play a role in 
SMOs‘ preference for hosting their websites in Western countries.  According to 
testspped.com, Morocco‘s average Internet connection speed is 1.59 mega bits per second 
(Mbps)—the highest in Africa, but still very limited compared to Europe (5.6 Mbps) and 
North America (5.53 Mbps).   
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Table 4.  
Domain names and server locations. 




Justice and Charity aljmaa.net USA 2000 
Unity and Reconstruction Alislah.org Morocco 2003 
Justice and Development pjd.ma Morocco 2003 
Sister of Afterlife Mouminate.net USA 2005 
ADFM Adfm.ma Morocco 2008 
ATTAC Attac.org France 1998 
AMDH–Essaouira essaouira-amdh.blogspot.com USA 2007 
AMDH–Rabat amdh-section-de-rabat1.skyrock.com France 2007 
E-Joussour E-joussour.net Canada 2007 
Ageddim blog Ageddim.jeeran.com USA 2006 
Ameghnas blog ameghnas.blogspot.com USA 2007 
ANFC Forumalternative.org Morocco 2007 
Youth group alfatiya.maktoobblog.com USA 2007 
Forum group marocchomeurss.blogspot.com USA 2008 
Democratic Path annahjaddimocrati.org France 2007 
Unified Socialist Party  psu.apinc.org France 2005 
Labour Confederation Cdt.ma  Morocco 2008 
Employees‘ Union  Umt-usf.com  USA 2007 
 
5. Analysis and Discussion  
5.1 User-friendliness.  
Setting up a well-designed or user-friendly website is a key factor in the site‘s 
potential to attract and retain users‘ attention.  In the context of social movement 
collective action, attracting users and establishing credibility can influence a group‘s 
capacity to mobilize actual and potential constituents, and build up support for its cause 
and frames.  The concept of usability has its roots in the research on human computer 
interaction (HCI) ―which has long focused on the need for an understanding of human 
factors to successfully design and implement technological devices‖ (Tisinger, Stroud, 
Meltzer, & Gans, 2005, p. 42).  Usability in Internet studies refers to those features that 
can either facilitate or hinder navigation in and interaction on the Web, such as Web page 
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layout and navigational tools on the site, as well as the aesthetic features of a website that 
help attract and retain users, convey the message more effectively, and provide a 
favorable impression of the group or the institution to which it belongs.   
A number of studies have concluded that the surface appearance and the usability of 
a website are the first factors determining users‘ judgment of a website‘s credibility and 
their decision to return to it or not (Darlington, 2005; Robin & Holmes, 2007; Rosen & 
Purinton, 2004; Wathen & Burkell, 2002; Warnick, 2006; Zhang & von Darn, 2000).  
Robins and Holmes (2007), for instance, argue that ―when the same content is presented 
using different levels of aesthetic treatment, the content with a higher aesthetic treatment 
was judged as having higher credibility.  We call this the amelioration effect of visual 
design and aesthetics on content credibility‖ (p. 397).  In addition, some aspects of 
webdesign have a direct bearing on the processes of collective action mobilization and 
identity construction.  In particular, these include the use of culturally laden symbols, 
colours, and other visual clues that appeal to shared culture, sensibilities, and history.  
The extent to which a website taps into shared cultural values should, therefore, be 
considered part of a social movement‘s frames, through which it interprets the social 
world and the types of relationships within it.   
The present study uses three main categories to assess the user-friendliness of the 
websites under study: consistency, navigation, and culturability.  These categories cover 
the most important aspects of Web usability and design as discussed in the literature 
(Badre & Barber, 2001; Cyr & Trevor-Smith, 2004; Darlington, 2005; Geissler, Zinkhan, 
& Watson, 2006; Rosen & Purinton, 2004, among others).  First, consistency of design 
and layout throughout a website is important because it gives ―confidence to viewers 
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from their familiarity [with] the system, for they know what to expect which makes the 
site easier to use‖ (Darlington, 2005, p. 49).  Consistency can be achieved by avoiding 
using different colours, font styles and sizes, and positions for navigation across the 
pages.   
Second, in the hyperlinked environment of the Web, users can easily lose the sense of 
orientation or location, which is ―a common navigation problem‖ online (Yu & Roh, 
2002, p. 924).  Consequently, optimal navigation on a website is made easy by the use of 
menu bars, navigation bars, back links, clear icons and graphics or text-based aids to help 
users situate themselves, and a ―return home‖ symbol, among other features (Yu & Roh; 
Darlington, 2005). 
Finally, ―culturability‖ refers to the connection between culture and usability in 
Webdesign; usability ―must be re-defined in terms of a cultural context, as what is user-
friendly for one culture can be vastly different for another culture‖ (Barber & Badre, 
2001, p. 22).  Two main models stand out as far as cross-cultural Web-design is 
concerned: the culturaldimensions model and the cultural markers model (Fitzgerald, 
2004).  In the culturaldimensions model, researchers use ―deep‖ cultural markers 
distinguishing one culture from another, such as individualism versus collectivism, power 
relations and feminism versus masculinity, to compare cross-cultural Web design 
(Marcus & Gould, 2000).  As for the cultural markers model, it uses ―surface‖ markers 
corresponding to Web design features, such as colour, spatial organization, icons, and 
metaphors, that are ―prevalent, and possibly preferred, within a particular cultural group‖ 
(Barber & Badre, 2001).  For the purposes of the present research, the second model has 
been applied, as it has been documented to yield the most evidence within the literature.  
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Indeed, it is based on clearer and more measurable criteria than the cultural dimensions 
model, which has been mainly designed for application within the business sector 
(Kondratova & Goldfarb, 2005).   
These features were coded on a scale from 1 to 3, with (1) corresponding to low, (2) 
to medium, and (3) to high.  The overall score of the four categories was then further 
coded on a scale from 1 to 3 to provide a final and comprehensive result on the websites‘ 
user-friendliness.  Analysis of user-friendliness (see table 5 below) demonstrates that half 
of the number of the websites scored ―high‖ while the remaining eight scored ―medium.‖  
Islamic-oriented Unity and Reconstruction, E-Joussour, and Employee Union‘s websites 
are the most user-friendly.  By contrast, websites for the Democratic Path, the 
Democratic Labour Confederation‘s (CDT), and the unemployed graduates‘ Forum are 
the least user-friendly (which mirrors their low scores for the other functions).   
Superficially, the overall results illustrate noticeable progress in web design know-
how and a satisfactory investment of resources on the part of Moroccan SMOs.  In 
reality, however, the majority of leftist-oriented websites that scored either high or 
medium have been set up thanks to the help of INGOs or development agencies.  While 
the E-Joussour website was set up through the direct support of Alternatives International 
and Oxfam, ATTAC‘s was designed and is being hosted and maintained by ATTAC 
International in France.  As for ADFM, the feminist organization benefited from the 
financial support of a number of international development agencies, including the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), to finance the outsourcing of the 
website to a private company.  This support includes the design, maintenance, and 
hosting of websites and, in some cases, the payment of the salaries of the people 
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operating them as well.  By contrast, the Islamic SMOs rely on their own resources, 
particularly through their capacity to mobilize the support of qualified and dedicated 
volunteers inside Morocco and among diaspora constituencies.   
 Access to resources and investment in new technologies are not the only factors 
shaping a website‘s professional design, as a number of blogs are among the websites 
that scored high for this function.  Blogs do, indeed, offer a free and easy-to-maintain 
interface; however, because they are based on a limited number of ready-to-use templates 
offered by the service providers, blogs also impose limitations on the design possibilities 
available to users.  As illustrated by the Amazigh blog ageddim, one dedicated and 
skillful blogger can produce better results than a team in an SMO, which testifies to the 
huge potential of the Internet for collective action and its function as an alternative 
medium.   
Furthermore, all websites scored lower for ―culturability‖ in relation to other 
usability features.  This proves that, despite progress in web design, awareness about the 
importance of customizing the Web medium to accommodate target users‘ cultural biases 
and expectations is still not sufficient.  In general, cultural customization has been 
achieved with more success at the level of webpage layout and the use of colour, and less 
through the use of symbols and hyperlinks.  All sites tried to accommodate the 
particularity of the Arabic language, which is written from right to left, by positioning the 
main menu bar on the right rather than on the left.   
Moreover, with a few exceptions, most websites did well at the level of colour 
choice, with three main colours (blue, green, and white
26
) dominating the majority of 
                                                 
26
 There is a difference between choosing colours that are culturally resonant with the users and using 
colours efficiently on a website.   
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websites.  The choice of these colours resonates well with the cultural expectations of the 
target users, since green is a central colour in Islamic culture, while blue and white are 
strongly associated with faith, truth, and virtue within Arab culture (Russo & Boor, 
1993).  The Ameghnas blog, for instance, uses the colours of the Amazigh flag27 as a 
background for the blog (green, blue, and red; see figure 3).   
 
Figure 3. The Amazigh movement’s Ameghnas blog. 
Leftist-oriented websites, however, fail to use culturally resonant symbols and 
colours.  Websites for ATTAC and the Democratic Path, for instance,incorporate heavy 
use of red and its variants, which are the traditional colours of leftist movements.  
However, the use of red on these websites may appeal to these SMOs‘ members and 
sympathizers, but not necessarily to the general public.  This reflects the difficulty facing 
SMOs when they have to ―balance their appeal to popular culture and their awareness of 
                                                 
27 The tricolour flag was proposed in the Amazigh World Congress in 1997.   
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regional variation in norms and values against the goals and values of the movement 
organization‖ (Johnston & Noakes, 2005, p. 9).   
 
 
Figure 4. Justice and Charity’s website. 
Using pictures of charismatic leaders is another important way various groups have 
tried to customize the Web to targeted users.  Social movement theorists have stressed the 
critical role that social movements‘ leaders play in the development and success of 
collective action.  Morris and Staggenborg (2004) emphasize the strategic importance of 
leaders to social movements, as they can ―inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create 
and recognize opportunities, devise strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes‖ 
(p. 171).  In the same vein, Melucci (1996) asserts that the ―penetration of the movement 
in the society, the loyalty and involvement of its members, and the consensus of different 
social groups all depend upon the leaders‘ actions‖ (p. 332).   
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Figure 5. The Democratic Path party’s website. 
Justice and Charity‘s website, for instance, continuously features a big picture of the 
SMO‘s founder and charismatic leader, Abdessalam Yassine, as well as an excerpt from 
his writings (see figure 4).  It also continually presents other materials about the leader, 
such as audio and video files and a link to his personal website.  The foregrounding of 
leaders is not just limited to Islamic-oriented websites, but also characterizes many 
leftist-oriented ones.  On the Democratic Path‘s website, for instance, the picture of the 
party‘s general secretary is put on the top of every official statement issued by the 
―National Secretariat‖ (see figure 5).  The prominence of charismatic figures on SMOs‘ 
websites can indeed play a unifying and mobilizing role for the SMO‘s adherents and 
sympathizers.  However, in some cases, excessive visibility can also reflect the inability 
of a group to ―reconcile leadership with the requirements of grassroots democracy‖ 





Table 5.  
User-friendliness. 
   
   
Website Con. Nav. Cul. Score Code 
Justice and Charity 3 2 2 7 3 
Unity and Reconstruction 3 3 2 8 3 
Justice and Development 3 1 2 7 3 
Sisters of Afterlife 3 2 1 6 2 
ADFM 2 2 2 6 2 
ATTAC 3 3 1 7 3 
AMDH–Essaouira 2 2 1 5 2 
AMDH–Rabat 3 2 1 6 2 
E-Joussour 3 3 2 8 3 
ANFC 2 3 2 7 3 
Ageddim blog 3 1 2 6 2 
Ameghnas blog 2 3 2 7 3 
Youth Group 1 1 2 4 2 
Forum Group 3 2 2 7 3 
Democratic Path 1 1 2 4 2 
Unified Socialist Party 2 2 1 5 2 
Labour Confederation 1 1 2 4 2 
Employees‘ Union  3 3 2 8 3 
Note. Consistency (Con); navigation (Nav.); culturability (Cul.); Code 1 = low (1–3); code 2 = medium (4–
6); code 3 = high (7–9). 
 
5.2 Information on the social movement or SMO. 
Commentators have pointed out that the rise into prominence and the development of 
social movement collective action depend on a combination of factors—chief among 
them, the success of a group in defining its objectives and collective identity, and how 
these elements demarcate the group in society (Tarrow, 1998; Della Porta & Diani, 
2006).  Clearly articulating the objectives of the group and ―who we are‖ on the website 
can indeed play a crucial role in mobilizing potential adherents and sympathizers by 
addressing affective and intellectual elements that may influence an individual‘s sense of 
connection to a group.  This can also contribute to identity building and enhancement 
among actual constituents by delimiting the boundaries of the movement or SMO, and 
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providing them with key references, codes, and symbols that inform the group‘s master 
frames, as well as its vision and interpretation of the social and political struggles in 
which it is engaged.   
For the purpose of this study, the web feature providing information on the SM or 
SMO was examined by verifying the presence (or absence) of a folder or link for that 
purpose, usually on the vertical or horizontal menu bar of the homepage, under the title of 
―Who we are‖ or ―Information about [name of organization].‖  Analysis involved looking 
for the availability of the following categories of information: the objectives of the group; 
its principles, ideology, and structures; historical background on its development; and 
information about key figures and leaders within it, among other features.  The available 
information was assessed by coding it as having no information = 0, little information = 
1, fairly sufficient information = 2, or extensive information = 3.   
Results show that the majority of the websites (almost 80%) provide either extensive 
or a fairly sufficient amount of information on the SMO and/or SM to which they belong, 
while five websites provide little or no information (see table 6).  Four of the low-scoring 
websites belong to two movements, the Amazigh cultural and the unemployed graduates 
movements.  The two Amazigh blogs do not belong to specific organizations, but are 
individual efforts set up by Amazigh activists (see interview with Mohamed Lakjiri in 
Chapter Seven).  Apart from anonymous e-mail addresses that do not reveal the bloggers‘ 
identities, there is no information as to who maintains the blogs.  Anonymity is used in 
the two blogs as a tactic to protect the bloggers from state persecution, especially since 
the Websites regularly post radical content received from a large number of militant 
groups inside and outside the country.  For instance, in my interview with Mohamed 
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Lakjiri, a blogger and Amazigh cultural movement activist, he pointed out that he 
regularly receives anonymous threatening e-mails, as well as pornographic spam e-mails, 
which he thinks are attempts by the Moroccan secret services to push him to stop 
blogging; he eventually did stop in January 2010.  In the case of the two blogs belonging 
to the unemployed graduates movement, the inadequacy of information in one blog and 
its total absence in the other underscore the limited agenda of the movement and its 
objectives, as well as the ephemeral nature of the groups constituting the movement, as 
they remain active only as long as its members are unemployed.   
Table 6.  
Information on SM/SMOs. 
 
Website/SMO Code  
Justice and Charity 3  
Unity and Reconstruction 3  
Justice and Development 3  
Sisters of Afterlife 2  
ADFM 2  
ATTAC 3  
AMDH–Essaouira 3  
AMDH–Rabat 3  
E-Joussour 2  
Ageddim blog  0  
ANFC 2  
Ameghnas blog 0  
Youth Group 1  
Forum Group 0  
Democratic Path 2  
Unified Socialist Party 2  
Labor Confederation 2  
Employees‘ Union  3  
Note. 0= no information ; 1= little information; 2= fairly sufficient information; 3= extensive information.   
 
5.3 Website updating. 
Studying the freshness of a website (i.e., how often the site is updated and to what 
extent), provides valuable insight into the potential of the website as an information 
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provider and resource, and its ability not only to attract users, but also and more 
significantly to ―encourage them to return‖ (Gibson & Ward, 2000, p. 5).  The effort 
deployed by a group to update a website provides insight into the importance the platform 
plays in the group‘s activities, and the extent to which the Internet in general is used as a 
tool of collective action.  While analyzing many structural aspects of a website, such as 
user-friendliness and interactivity, can provide an idea about the platform‘s potential as a 
tool of communication, studying how up-to-date a site is, or its ―updatedness,‖ reveals 
whether some of this potential is being actualized in practice—what Gibson and Ward 
(2000) describe as the ―delivery‖ of a website (p. 52).  To examine the freshness of the 
websites under study, the textual content was coded for the number of new items added 
and the frequency
28
 of updating during a one-month period, between December 17, 2008 
and January 16 2009.  The frequency of updating was measured using three codes: daily 
updating, weekly updating, and longer-than-weekly updating.  To homogenize results, the 
data was further coded on a scale from (1) to (4), with (1) corresponding to ―very low,‖ 
(2) to ―low,‖ (3) to ―medium,‖ and (4) to ―high.‖   
Results demonstrate that more than half of the websites (nine) scored ―low,‖ as they 
were updated only a few times during one month.  Three websites scored medium, as 
they are updated on a weekly basis, while only six scored high (i.e., they are updated on a 
daily basis).  The majority of medium- and high-scoring websites belong to grassroots 
movements, namely Islamic, Amazigh and, to some extent, alter-globalization 
movements.  Low-scoring websites belong to professional and leftist-oriented SMOs and 
parties, trade union organizations, and included the two blogs belonging to the 
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unemployed graduates‘ movement.  Another key observation about the results is that with 
the exception of the Islamic movement‘s websites, those that scored satisfactorily on this 
function are either wikis or collective blogs, in contrast to low-scoring ones that are 
standard website format maintained by a single organization (see table 7).   
Table 7.  
Website freshness. 
    




Justice and Spirituality  61 daily 3 
Unity and Reconstruction  231 daily 3 
Justice and Development  101 daily 3 
E-Jousour  98 daily 3 
Ageddim blog   180 daily 3 
Ameghnas blog  43 daily 3 
Sister of Afterlife  15 weekly 2 
ATTAC  44 weekly 2 
AMDH–Rabat  24 weekly 2 
ADFM  4 more than a week 1 
AMDH–Essaouira  9 more than a week 1 
ANFC  4 more than a week 1 
Youth Group  17 More than a week 1 
Forum Group  8 More than a week 1 
Democratic Path  3 More than a week 1 
Unified Socialist Party  5 More than a week 1 
Labor Confederation (CDT)  3 More than a week 1 
Employees‘ Union  (USF)  6 More than a week 1 
Note. Code 1 = very low; code 2 = low; code 3 = medium; code 4 = high.   
These results confirm many of the preliminary observations I made while surveying a 
large number of websites for sampling purposes.  The issue of sustainability—i.e., the 
incapacity of most SMOs to continue using and updating websites over significant 
periods of time—is a major problem hindering the appropriation of the Internet in 
collective action, one that emerged from in-depth interviewing of social movements‘ 
activists (see Chapter Seven).   
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Though access to resources and ability to mobilize them can influence the degree of 
efficiency and sustainability in using the Internet, the above results show that these 
factors do not determine this process.  Grassroots movements using collective platforms 
like blogs and wikis, for instance, are able to overcome many of the difficulties facing 
single-organization websites by sharing the effort and resources needed to update a 
website.  This is the case of the Ageddim collective‘s blog that is maintained by one 
person and relies on the contributions of a large number of dispersed activists.   
Furthermore, the infrequent updates on some websites can be attributed to a 
collective action repertoire used by certain social movements, as well as to their 
objectives.  For example, groups constituting the unemployed graduates movement have 
a very limited agenda.  Their use of the blogging tool is, therefore, restricted to one single 
issue, which partly explains the small quantity of items posted on them.  These blogs, in 
fact, are not information-oriented; they function mainly as communication platforms and 
coordination tools for their groups.  Mostly, the use of these blogs intensifies around 
periods when there is offline action or when there is a need to organize national 
assemblies and elections (see Chapter Seven for more discussion of this issue).  This 
behaviour is not particular to this movement, however, as social movements are 
recognized as ―characteristically alternat[ing] between ‗visible‘ and ‗latent‘ phases‖ 
(Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 94).  The website of the Employees‘ Syndical Union may 
not be frequently updated, but its purpose appears to be in providing a large number of 
services for members, mainly documents, forms, and various types of information 
maintained in folders in the sidebars of the website.  Thus, although analysis may provide 
few insights into usage patterns and differences between websites, results should be 
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interpreted in the context of each group‘s organizational structure, collective action 
tactics, and objectives.   
5.4 Direct mobilization.  
The notion of ―mobilization‖ is central to social movement theory.  Mobilization 
refers to the incorporation of various processes in collective action, from access to 
material and non-material resources to the production of frames and symbols that delimit 
a movement‘s collective identity and field of action.  Scholars have argued that the 
Internet favours a wide range of mobilization actions, such as disseminating information 
and symbols, coordinating action and building alliances and solidarity networks (Atton, 
2004; Downey & Fenton, 2003; Downing, 2001).  In this section, ―mobilization‖ is used 
to refer to the use of the Internet to enlist direct support for a movement or a SMO and its 
collective action efforts, such as recruitment of new members, collection of funds, and 
participation in online campaigns.  To analyze this function, eight codes have been used 
to designate various online-based and offline forms of direct mobilization: 1) becoming a 
member or joining; 2) volunteering; 3) donating; 4) boycotting; 5) signing a petition; 6) 
e-mail campaigning; 7) creating urgent alerts; 8) creating an action calendar.   
Analysis was conducted by observing the studied websites for the absence or presence of 
these features, and coding them with either (0) for absence or (1) for presence.  Results 
show that the use of online-based mobilization functions is very limited on the majority 
of the studied websites (see table 8 below).  The most used features are the ―action 
calendar,‖ found on 16 websites, followed by ―urgent alerts,‖ which are found on nine of 
the websites.  However, only five websites have a ―sign up‖ or ―become a member‖ 
feature; two have ―a petition to sign‖ and ―join e-mail-campaign‖ features, while the 
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―boycott‖ feature is present on only one website.  Finally, none of the websites contains 
either the ―donate‖ or ―volunteer‖ features (see figure 6).   











Figure 6. Use of direct mobilization features on the websites. 
 Several observations emerge from the results above.  First, it is clear that the Internet is 
used mainly to support offline mobilization, rather than to create online based ones.  
Many types of digital divides contribute to this; inequalities between members in terms of 
access to and use of the Internet; a general societal digital divide that concerns the bulk of 
people in Morocco; and insufficient access to material and human resources.  Compared 
to offline mobilization, online mobilization-oriented features can be effective only if they 
target the general public and not just adherents and sympathizers.  Online petitions and 
boycotting campaigns, for instance, are significant only if they can enlist a large number 
of people from among actual and potential members, and, especially, general users who 
may not share a movement‘s core values, but who might become motivated by a 
particular issue.  However, the number of Internet users is still low in Morocco and 
awareness about the political applications of the medium is limited among existing users.  
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In many cases, SMOs prefer to use other online tools, such as e-mail lists and social 
networking interfaces such as Facebook, in addition to other ICTs such as mobile phones, 
because they are faster, cheaper, and more secure than websites (see Chapter Seven for 
further discussion of this issue). 
Table 8.  
Direct mobilization features. 
 
Website/SMO Join Vol. Don. Boy. Pet. Cal. Ale. E-mail Total 
 
Justice & Charity 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Unity & Rec. 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 
Justice & Dev. 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Sisters of Afterlife 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
ADFM 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
ATTAC 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
AMDH–Essaouira 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
AMDH–Rabat 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
E-Jousour 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Ageddim blog  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Ameghnas blog 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
ANFC 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Youth group 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Forum group 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Democratic Path 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Unified Socialist Par. 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Labor Confederation 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Employees‘ Union 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Total 6 0 0 1 2 16 9 2 34 
Note. : Code 0 = absent; code 1 = present. Vol.= Volunteer; Don.= Donate; Pet.= Petition; Cal.= Calendar. 
 
Moreover, SMOs, particularly those using radical tactics and espousing contentious 
agendas, remain suspicious vis-à-vis a state that often resorts to both ―legal‖ and 
extrajudicial procedures against them.  It is understandable that these groups avoid 
posting sensitive information about members and membership or action plans that can be 
used against them.  In a country where contentious SMOs are frequently harassed, legally 
pursued, and fined by the sate under various pretexts, open and direct online mobilization 
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strategies are double-edged, and though using them can help bypass the state-monitored 
public sphere, it can also lead to prison terms.  Furthermore, installing recruitment 
features such as personal accounts and sign-up software requires additional human and 
technical resources that are beyond the means of the majority of SMOs struggling to 
secure basic resources for mobilization.  Equally important, because e-commerce has 
only been initiated in the country in the last two years and on a limited scale, the 
―donating money‖ or ―purchasing products‖ features are unthinkable for all SMOs.   
5.5 Permanent hyperlinks and fields of networks.   
Networks and networking have always been central to the structure and collective 
action of social movements.  Often described as being ―networks of networks‖ (Della 
Porta & Mosca, 2005; Diani & McAdam, 2003), social movements are generally based 
on a large and complex web of organizations, groups, and individuals.  Moreover, they 
form alliances with diverse social actors, including SMOs, media, and political parties 
with whom they share common objectives, ideological background, and resources.  As 
noted by many commentators (see literature review in Chapter Three), networking has 
become essential to contemporary social movement collective action, which has been 
immensely facilitated  by ICTs, particularly the mobile phone and the Internet.   
The networking potential of the Internet is commonly associated with its hyperlink 
feature, one of the major characteristics of the Internet (Downes & McMillan, 2000; Holt, 
2004; Killoran, 2001; Liu, 2003; Warnick, 2006).  The hyperlinked structure of the 
Internet is, in fact, what defines it as ―a network of networks‖ (Berners-Lee, 1999; Della 
Porta & Mosca, 2005).  Hyperlinks serve diverse functions such as providing sources of 
information, expressing membership or affiliation in a group or organization, and 
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advertising a product, among many others (Halvais, 2008, p. 45).  Moreover, hyperlinks 
can serve as a tool to boost the visibility of a website on the Internet.   
Achieving visibility (i.e., a higher ranking) on the Internet can be difficult due to the 
nature of online communication, which is characterized by a conflicting pattern: the 
voluminous quantity of online content on the one hand, and short attention span that users 
can devote to viewing such content, on the other (Webster, 2008).  Koopmans and 
Zimmermann (2007) distinguish between two means through which political websites 
can achieve visibility, namely ―vertical, hierarchical selection‖ via search engines, or 
―horizontal, network selection‖ via hyperlinks found on other websites (p. 22).  The 
Google search engine, for instance, ranks Web pages in accordance with their centrality 
within a network of hyperlinks.  Bloggers are known to try to boost the ranking of their 
weblogs by linking them to highly visible websites.  This practice has developed into 
―Google bombing,‖ an attempt to manipulate Web ranking by ―encouraging a large 
number of Web authors to create a hyperlink to a website with anchor text containing a 
specific word or phrase‖ (Halavais, 2008, p. 49).   
The importance of the hyperlink for collective action goes beyond its immediate 
merit of increasing the visibility and ranking of websites.  Commentators have argued 
that one of the strongest impacts of the Internet on social movements resides in its 
facilitation of coordination and networking between groups and organizations on a global 
level, especially as collective action-building involves negotiation and interaction with 
allies, adversaries, and bystanders (Taylor & Whittier, 1993; Melucci, 1996).  
Summarizing these implications for social movements, De La Piscina (2007), points out: 
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Technology transforms the actions of social movements: determines their agenda, 
conditions their modus operandi, and broadens their range of influence.  For this 
effort to obtain the maximum return possible, it must work as a network, in a 
cooperative way, connected to other movements, associations, communities, 
groups, and individuals that have similar concerns and/or similar objectives. (p. 
78)  
As such, studying the use of hyperlinks on SMOs‘ websites can allow us to map out 
the web of relationships and networks in which a SMO is engaged.  It can also help us 
understand how SMOs try to mark off the boundaries of their social relations that include 
affinities and differences with other social actors.  Through hyperlinks, SMOs can 
connect to one another, creating networks of solidarity, which is essential for ―expanding 
the chains of equivalents between different struggles against oppression‖ (Hands, 2007, 
p. 91).  Moreover, by linking sites, texts, sources, and frames that share particular 
interpretations of the world, hyperlinks help establish what White (1992) calls ―networks 
of meanings,‖ thus contributing to the reinforcement of the social movement‘s capacity to 
challenge hegemony (p. 65).  Besides, SMOs may not, in theory, connect only to groups 
and sources with which they share similar ideological backgrounds and objectives, but 
also to those with which they may oppose or disagree, whether partially or entirely.  
Hyperlinks can contribute to establishing an agonistic instead of antagonistic public 
sphere in which different views and ideologies are expressed, come into opposition with 
one another, and yet remain tolerated.   
External hyperlinks (as differentiated from internal ones that refer to text inside the 
website) found on SMOs‘ websites can be divided into two types.  There are permanent 
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links, placed on the homepage or in a special folder containing the preference list of 
connections to the particular SMO.  The other type consists in non-permanent hyperlinks 
provided in the body of text or on the homepage that can be used for diverse reasons, 
such as referring to a source of information or providing a link to a solidarity campaign or 
petition.  For the purposes of the present study, analysis will be limited to permanent 
hyperlinks since they are part of the structural features of any website.  Non-
permanent/textual hyperlinks are discussed in Chapter Six below.  Coding of hyperlinks 
was performed by counting the links that are placed directly in the sidebars or in a special 
folder on the homepage.  After preliminary observation of existing links and their 
categories, hyperlinks were coded into seven categories in accordance with their 
geographical background and most defining characteristics:   
a) affiliated websites (aff.);  
b) national civil society (NCS);  
c) regional civil society (RCS);  
d) international civil society (ICS);  
e) mainstream media (MSM);  
f) alternative media (Alt); 
g) other. 
―Affiliated websites‖ refers to those that belong either to the group/organization itself 
(as is the case with the personal website of Justice and Spirituality‘s leader), or to an 
organization or movement of which the group is a local chapter or member (as is the case 
with ATTAC–Morocco in relation to ATTAC International).  A link in this case is only 
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counted if it has an independent URL address on the Web.  ―Mainstream‖ and 
―alternative‖ media include both national and international media outlets.   
Analysis shows that there are two dominant types of permanent hyperlinks on the 
websites in this study: links to ―affiliated organizations and groups‖ (34%) and links to 
―international civil society groups‖ (20%) (see table 9 below).  In contrast to these two 
categories, results reflect a very low linking to national and regional civil societies‘ 
organizations.  Moreover, results also show that links to mainstream and alternative 
websites are almost equal.  However, these two categories were not equally distributed 
among all types of social movements and SMOs.  Though linkage to affiliated websites is 
high on most of the websites studied, links in this category constitute all the hyperlinks 
found on the four studied Islamic-oriented websites, namely those of Justice and Charity, 
Unity and Construction, Justice and Development, and Sisters of Afterlife, and the 
majority of those belonging to the Amazigh cultural movement.  By contrast, links to 
INGOs are dominant, specifically on leftist-oriented professional SMOs, namely ADFM, 
ATTAC, and E-Joussour.  The majority of links to mainstream media are found on the 
blog belonging to The Youth, one of the unemployed graduate movement groups, and on 
the Democratic Path party‘s website.   
Hyperlinks are a pivotal online feature whose function is to do more than just 
establish a connection between two or more points: they ―can express meanings, they 
betray biases, they invite or suggest inferences, and sometimes they manipulate the 
reader‖ (Burbules & Callister, 2000, p. 84).  Moreover, one major function of hyperlinks 
is to establish the boundaries within which a social movement ―marks the social 
territories of group relations‖ between itself and others (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 433).  
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As far as Moroccan social movements are concerned, results show that hyperlinks are 
used to establish two main types of boundaries: those marking the movement or 
organization as a cohesive group and those linking the movement or group to INGOs and 
agencies (see figure 7).  In between these two boundaries, there remains a significant gap, 
testifying to the fragmentation of the national and regional online public spheres.   
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Figure 7. Distribution of permanent hyperlinks. 
On the one hand, the prevalence of affiliated links in general indicates that this 
function is appropriated by the majority of SMOs and groups, mostly to enhance internal 
communication and cohesion—more than to establish connections with external groups.  
This is particularly relevant for identity-oriented SMOs and SMs that link exclusively or 
predominantly to other websites belonging to the same movement or organization.  As 
such, the networking potential of the Internet is used primarily to promote internal 
cohesion or ―bonding‖ at the expense of networking or ―bridging,‖ to borrow Putnam and 
Goss‘ concept (2002, p. 9).  Moroccan Islamic SMOs are the most self-oriented, which 
proves Tilly and Tarrow (2007) right when they claim that, generally speaking, ―religious 
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movements aim primarily at internal change‖ (p. 6).  But this characteristic also reflects 
and contributes to the balkanization of Moroccan civil society and the online public 
sphere, which hinders the possibility of building large networks that extend beyond 
ideological affiliations.   
On the other hand, professional and leftist-oriented SMOs link predominantly to 
foreign NGOs, development agencies, and institutions at the expense of intra-linking at 
the national and regional levels.  The prevalence of international civil society links on 
many leftist-oriented websites illustrates the multifarious as well as asymmetrical 
relationship between Moroccan leftist SMOs and INGOs, which is characterized by 
cooperation, coordination, and dependence, on the part of Morocco.  The advances in 
civil and human rights in Morocco during the last two decades could only be achieved 
―as a result of coordinated action inside and outside the country,‖ resulting in the 
development of ―transnational human rights networks‖ (Granzer, 1999, pp. 115–116).  
While a large number of Moroccan SMOs depend on INGOs for funds, political support, 
and solidarity, the use of the Internet has intensified this dependence since Moroccan 
organizations need help setting up and maintaining websites, as well as enhancing their 
Web visibility. 
Furthermore, the scarcity of links to Moroccan websites can also be explained by two 
main factors: the low presence of Moroccan SMOs on the Web and the use of other 
online tools, mainly e-mail listserves.  First, while the number of legal associations in the 
country is estimated at more than 40,000 (El-Houdaigui, 2004), the number of those 
operating websites does not exceed a few hundred, most of which are no longer updated a 
short time after their creation.  Second, most SMOs use e-mail lists that function as 
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alternative networking tools at the national level.  Examples are the Press-Maroc and 
PAD-Maroc e-lists used by leftist groups to circulate information and coordinate action at 
the national level (see Chapter Five for more details on this issue).   
Table 9.  
Permanent links on websites. 
Website/SMO Aff. NCS Reg. ICS  MSM Alt Other Total 
Justice & Charity 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Unity & Rec. 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Justice & Dev. 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Sisters of Afterlife 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
ADFM 0 5 0 36 0 0 11 52 
ATTAC 3 0 6 20 2 5 3 39 
AMDH–Essaouira 11 1 0 1 0 0 0 13 
AMDH–Rabat 1 0 0 0 0 20 0 21 
E-Jousour 2 1 5 10 0 0 0 18 
Ageddim blog 12 1 0 0 0 5 0 18 
Ameghnas blog 30 0 0 0 0 3 0 33 
ANFC 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Youth Group 7 0 0 0 31 2 1 41 
Forum Group 8 0 0 1 1 4 0 14 
Democratic path 1 0 13 0 0 6 0 20 
Unified soc. party 0 0 1 1 20 1 0 23 
Labour Con. 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
Employees‘ Union  6 1 0 0 0 2 2 19 
Total 119 9 25 70 54 48 27 350 
Percentage 34 2.57 7.14 20 15.42 13.71 7.71 100 
Note. Aff.: Affiliated websites; NCS: National civil society; RCS: Regional civil society; ICS: International 
civil society (ICS); MSM: mainstream media; Alt.: Alternative media. 
 
5.6 Interactivity. 
Interactivity has widely been described in the literature as ―a key variable for 
studying the uses and effects of new media technologies‖ (Sundar, Kalyanrman, & 
Brown, 2003, p. 32).  As far as computer mediated communication (CMC) is concerned, 
various definitions and conceptualization have been advanced in studying this key notion.  
There are two broad types of interactivity: user-to-user and user-to-technology or -
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medium (Lee, 2000; Stromer-Galley, 2000; Sundar et al., 2003).  Sundar et al. (2003), for 
instance, distinguish between a ―functional,‖ or user-to-medium interactivity, and one 
that is defined as ―contingency‖ or user-to-user (p. 33).  Functional interactivity refers to 
―the interface‘s capacity for conducting a dialogue or information exchange between 
users and the interface‖ (p. 33).  As to contingency interactivity, the definition of which is 
based on the work of Rafaeli (1988), it is a message-based conceptualization of 
interactivity that seeks to analyze levels of reciprocity within exchanges between users.  
Similarly, Warnick (2006) distinguishes between two main conceptualizations of 
interactivity: a user-to-medium and a user-to-user interactivity.  The first view defines 
interactivity in terms of the technological features of the medium, ―such as hyperlinking, 
activating media downloads, filling in feedback forms, and playing online games‖ 
(Warnick, 2006, p. 69).  The second view claims that ―interactivity occurs only when 
messages sustain reciprocal exchanges between communicators‖ (p. 69), via such means 
as e-mail, forums, and chat-rooms.  In addition to these two main conceptualizations, 
some scholars have argued that interactivity may be ―in the eye of the beholder‖—in 
other words, that it should be understood through users‘ experiences and perceptions 
(Lee, 2000; McMillan, 2000; Downes & McMillan, 2000).  Warnick (2006), for example, 
explains that ―the requisite criterion in this framework is that users must actively attend 
and respond to messages in order for there to be interactivity‖ (p. 70).   
From the perspective of social movement theory, we can advance that interactivity on 
websites contributes to various processes, mainly mobilization and collective identity 
formation.  Interactivity is one process through which the Internet contributes to what 
social movement theorists term ―micromobilization‖—i.e., ―the collaborative work 
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individuals do on behalf of a social movement or social movement organization to 
muster, ready, coordinate, use, and reproduce material resources, labor, and ideas for 
collective action‖ (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 483).  In the same vein, Snow, Rochford, 
Worden, and Benford (1986) use micromobilization to refer to ―the various interactive 
and communicative processes that affect frame alignment‖ or ―the linkage of individual 
and SMO activities, goals, and ideology‖ (p. 464).  Using interactive features on 
websites, members and sympathizers thus have the opportunity to contribute to the 
movement or organization‘s action by redistributing material, producing content, and 
sharing ideas and resources.  In doing so, individual users also contribute to consolidating 
affective bonds and connecting themselves and others to common goals, which form the 
core of social movements.   
Interactivity has also been labeled as ―essential to the formation of collective 
meaning and identity among members of social movements‖ (Stein, 2009, p. 760).  The 
collective identity process, as Melucci (1996) argues, refers to ―a network of active 
relationships between actors who interact, communicate, influence each other, negotiate, 
and make decisions‖ (p. 71).  In the same vein, Polletta & Jasper (2001) contend that 
―collective identities are expressed in cultural materials—names, narratives, symbols, 
verbal styles, rituals, clothing, and so on‖ (p. 284).  Accordingly, by allowing users to 
contribute to the movement‘s mobilizing action and efforts, and to interact with leaders 
and with one another, online interactive features contribute to mediated and non-mediated 
communication processes through which collective identity, consciousness, and 
emotional bonds are developed and maintained.  As such, online interaction does not 
supplant offline interaction, nor can it exist without prior social relationships.  Instead, it 
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provides another dimension through which collective identity can be mediated and 
created.   
For the purposes of this research, three types of interactivity are identified and used 
as a guide for the coding system used to analyze interactivity features on the websites 
under study—namely, user-to-document, user-to-system, and user-to-user or 
interpersonal interactivity.  This categorization is one of the most commonly used in the 
literature and covers the major aspects of interactivity, particularly within new media 
studies (Carpentier, 2002; McMillan, 2002; Szuprowicz, 1995).  These types of 
interactivity, McMillan (2006) argues, ―do provide a basic framework for the 
investigation of the past, present, and future of interactivity‖ (p. 209).  Thus, user-to-user 
interactivity deals with the ―ways that individuals interact with each other‖ (p. 209).  
User-to-document interactivity refers to users‘ interaction with documents and their 
creators, which involves ―both perceived interaction with content creators and actual 
creation of content‖ (p. 213).  Finally, user-to-system interaction focuses on the ways that 
―the human communicates directly with computers and other new media systems‖ (p. 
218).   
Interactivity features were coded either as (1), if they are allowed by the website, or 
as (0), if they are absent.  In order to provide results that are as valid as possible, features 
were considered as ―present‖ only when their links were active; features leading to 
broken links were disregarded.  In total, 15 features were coded.  These features are 
distributed within the three categories identified above, namely user-to-content, user-to-
user, and user-to-system.  Table 10 provides a summary of results for all the studied 
websites, while table 11 provides detailed results for each individual website.   
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Results show that the majority of the websites scored highest on user-to-system 
interactivity, medium on user-to-user interactivity, and low on user-to-content 
interactivity (see table 10).  Only eight of the 18 studied websites allow users to comment 
on articles and other content, four websites have the ―contact the author‖ feature, and 
only three invite users to contribute content.  User-to-user interactivity scores slightly 
higher than content-to-user interactivity since five websites have a ―synchronous chat‖ 
feature, and six have discussion boards or forums.  But user-to-system interactivity is 
clearly the dominant type on the majority of websites as four features are found on at 
least half of the studied websites.   
Table 10.  
Interactivity features on all websites. 
Features Frequency Percentage Median 
User-to-content interactivity   5 
Comment on article 8 44.4  
Submit/contribute content 3 16.6  
Contact author/contributor 4 22.2  
User-to-user interactivity   5.25 
Synchronous discussion interface 5 27.7  
Discussion or chat board 7 38.8  
Share article via e-mail 6 33.3  
Share via social media platforms 3 16.6  
User-to-system interactivity   8 
Audio/video material  14 77.7  
Contact Web master 13 72.2  
Newsletter sign up/RSS feed 9 50  
Add to favorites or as homepage 4 22.2  
Download content  7 38.8  
Existence of website plan 2 11.1  
Search website field/archive 14 77.7  
Polls 1 11.1  
Commentators have argued that ―control‖ and ―reciprocal communications‖ are the 
two main variables in interactivity, since ―the degree of interactivity is determined by the 
degree of control, exchange of roles and mutual discourse [that] participants have in a 
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communication process‖ (Williams, Rice, & Rogers, 1988, p. 10).  Rafaeli (1988), a key 
theorist in the field, defines interactivity as ―an expression of the extent that, in a given 
series of communication exchanges, any third (or later) transmission (or message) is 
related to the degree to which previous exchanges referred to even earlier transmissions‖ 
(p. 111).  Thus, Rafaeli provides a gradational taxonomy in which ―full interactivity‖ is 
distinguished from ―non-interactivity‖ and ―quasi-interactivity‖ (p. 111).  Fully 
interactive exchanges or acts of communication are those in which ―all subsequent 
messages were relevant to both the content and meaning of earlier messages‖ (Warnick, 
2006, p. 73).  According to this conceptualization, most interactive features, such as all 
user-to-system and many of the user-to-user types of interactivity, can be labeled as 
quasi-interactive.  McMillan (2006) provides a model that distinguishes between 
―feedback,‖ ―responsive dialogue,‖ and ―mutual dialogue‖ (p. 213), on the basis of the 
degree of control the sender and receiver have over a communication exchange.  She 
notes that while feedback tools, like e-mail, open two-way communication channels, they 
―[provide] the person who is giving the feedback with relatively little control over the 
communication exchange‖ (p. 213).  For McMillan, full interactivity only happens when 
there is a ―mutual dialogue‖ which is not only ―responsive,‖ but ―also gives more 
egalitarian control to all participants so that sender and receiver roles become 
indistinguishable‖ (p. 213), as can occur in chat-rooms.   
According to the analysis, the websites included in the study scored high on quasi-
interactivity and responsive interactivity and very low on full-interactivity or mutual 
dialogue.  While their user-to-system features give users some control over 
communication, particularly by allowing them to customize the way they receive and 
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consume content, these features restrict any control users might want over the production 
of content itself.  Control over user-to-document interactivity observed on the majority of 
the websites under study is not typical of only Moroccan SMs, since various studies done 
on political websites in the context of developed countries have reached similar 
conclusions.  One such study (Warnick, 2006), for instance, advances three reasons: lack 
of resources to respond to users, fear of losing control over discourse, and fear of losing 
―strategic ambiguity‖ (p. 72).  Norris‘ (2003) important study of European political party 
websites found that they function more as vehicles for top-down provision of information 
than for bottom-up interactive communication, even if they provide more interactivity 
than traditional media.  Although these studies were conducted on political parties and 
not on SMOs and SMs, their findings largely match those of the present research.  
While analysis has revealed shared patterns between the studied websites, it also 
highlighted important variations amongst them.  In fact, the results of this initial coding 
were further coded using a scale from (1) to (3) (see table 11).  Analysis reveals that the 
overwhelming majority of professional and leftist websites scored ―low‖, and those that 
did not get a low score still did not score high, which ranks them behind grassroots 
movements‘ websites.  The most interactive websites are those belonging to grassroots 
movements, namely the Islamic movement, in addition to the blogs belonging to the 
Amazigh and unemployed graduates‘ movements.  On the one hand, this illustrates that 
the communication flow in professional organizations‘ websites is predominantly 
downward oriented, establishing a unidirectional relationship between the website/SMO 
Web master, the leaders, and authoritative authors, and the users who are perceived as 
passive consumers.  This conclusion will be further corroborated by the results of the 
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analysis of frame entrepreneurs in Chapter Six.  On the other hand, the results indicate 
that movements relying on extensive grassroots bases, and that are flexibly organized and 
geographically distributed, appropriate the Internet in a way that enhances lateral 
cohesion and communication between members, and between members and their groups.  
What is more, access to material resources is not a guarantee that the Internet potential is 
appropriated effectively, while their absence does not prevent many groups from using 
free software and platforms to maximize their communication capacities, as the example 
of blogs illustrates. 
Table 11.  




















Justice & Charity 0 3 5 8 53.2 
Unity & Rec. 2 3 7 12 80 
Justice & Dev. 0 0 5 5 33.3 
Sisters of Afterlife 0 2 1 3 20 
ADFM 0 1 4 5 33.3 
ATTAC 1 0 4 5 33.3 
AMDH–Essaouira 0 1 1 2 13.3 
AMDH–Rabat 1 2 4 7 46.6 
E-Joussour 1 1 4 6 40 
Ageddim blog 2 2 6 10 66.6 
Ameghnas blog 3 1 4 8 53.2 
ANFC 1 0 4 5 33.3 
Youth Group 2 3 6 11 73.3 
Forum Group 2 1 4 7 46.6 
Democratic path 0 0 3 3 20 
Unified soc. Party 1 1 3 5 33.3 
Labor Con. 0 0 1 1 6.66 
Employees‘ Union  0 2 4 6 40 
Total 16 23 60 109  
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Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter has yielded mixed results about the functions of the websites studied.  
First, analysis of user-friendliness demonstrated that the majority of websites are 
satisfactorily designed to attract users and facilitate communication.  This can be partly 
explained by the fact that many activists and groups have accumulated experience and 
knowledge about the particularity of online communication during the last decade.  The 
sharp decrease in IT service costs, and the availability of free and more sophisticated 
online software can also explain the amelioration of Web design, in general.  Moreover, 
many websites have been set up through financial and technical support from INGOs and 
development agencies.   
Second, as platforms for the dissemination of information, the websites performed 
differently for the two functions used to assess this role, namely ―information on 
SMs/SMOs‖ and ―updatedness‖.  Analysis has shown that while most websites provide 
sufficient or extensive information on the groups to which they belong, nearly 60% of 
them scored low for the second function.  Like user-friendliness, providing information 
about the organization or movement is a one-time job that requires a limited amount of 
sustained work over time.  Updating a website, however, requires a concerted and 
organized effort, from the stage of collecting material and editing information to posting 
and arranging everything on the website.  Moreover, unlike Web design that can be 
outsourced to a private company, updating must be performed by the group‘s members 
on a daily basis, which usually puts severe pressure on the organizational and material 
resources of a group (see discussion of this issue in Chapter Seven).  The chapter has 
confirmed the idea that ―resource-rich groups are more likely to have websites with more 
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content, an attractive layout, and more technical possibilities‖ (Edward, 2004, p. 118).  
However, it also demonstrated that efficiency in using Web potential is not necessarily 
linked to the availability of material resources.  Analysis has demonstrated that a blog 
maintained by one person functions much better than one maintained by an organization.   
Third, another key Web function tested is the use of the Internet to build network 
solidarity and meaning at the local and transnational levels.  Analysis has demonstrated 
that the majority of websites are either inward linking—in other words, connected to 
websites belonging to the same organization or movement—or predominantly linked to 
INGOs and development agencies.  On the one hand, the results of analysis corroborate 
information yielded by in-depth interviewing (see Chapter Seven), which show that local 
groups are increasingly using the Internet to build networks of solidarity, especially with 
Western NGOs, in order to maximize their capacity to influence the local public sphere 
and exercise pressure on the Moroccan state.  By contrast, the studied websites are rarely 
used to establish networks at the national or regional levels, which could be attributed to 
the weak presence of Moroccan SMOs online and to the use of more convenient and 
easier networking tools such as e-mail lists.   
Fourth, the inward-linking orientation of the websites identified above has another 
function, namely that of enhancing internal cohesion and collective identity within the 
SMs.  This is further reinforced by the use of interactive features, which are also central 
characteristics of the Internet as a medium and artifact.  The websites are dominated by 
two types of interactive features: user-to-system and user-to-user.  The first category 
allows users to have some control over the consumption of information and data 
presented on the websites and thus to contribute to mobilization action of the group 
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(micromobilization).  The second enables members to interact with one another and with 
leaders either through one-to-one or one-to-many tools, which also contributes to the 
reinforcement of the group‘s internal cohesion and solidarity as well as its collective 
identity.  User-to-document type of interactivity, however, has very limited use on the 
overwhelming majority of the websites, which shows that users can have control over the 
consumption of discourse, but not over its production.  This casts doubt on the ability of 
the Internet to contribute to genuine participatory communication.  It is true that content 
on many of the websites in the present study is collectively produced by diverse SMOs 
and groups.  Others feature a high number of members who contribute articles (see frame 
analysis in Chapter Six below).  Nonetheless, not allowing users, either members or non-
members of the groups, to comment on content or at least contact authors restricts the 
production of discourse either to SMOs‘ leaders or, at best, to a limited number of elite 
members.   
Finally, analysis has revealed that the majority of websites are used mainly for offline 
direct mobilization and rarely for online mobilization.  This is not surprising, given the 
existing digital divides marking the diffusion of the Internet in a society that restricts the 
possibilities of using the Internet to reach the majority of members, sympathizers, and a 
portion of general users, which is required for successful mobilization.   
These results corroborate to a large extent similar findings in the literature.  For 
example, in her study on US social movements‘ websites, Stein (2009) found that the 
―the majority of national SMOs are not utilizing the web to its full potential‖ (p. 767).  
Stein attributes this to various reasons, such as ―organizational goals, strategies and 
objectives, organizational resources and organizational efforts to share or pool resources 
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made available to movement supporters‖ (p. 767).  While sharing these conclusions, the 
present study has also highlighted many variations that are proper to the context of 
Morocco and social movements there.   
Analysis has shown that websites belonging to grassroots social movements, namely 
the Islamic, Amazigh, alter-globalization, and, to some extent, the unemployed 
graduates‘ movements, are clearly the most successful in terms of exploiting the 
Internet‘s potential for encouraging collective action.  Professional and leftist-oriented 
SMOs‘ websites, by contrast, perform the least well.  Flexibility of organizational 
structure, combining both institutional and anarchist collective action; the ability to 
recruit from among the young and to attract skilful volunteers; and, above all, 
embeddedness and rootedness in local social networks allow these groups to overcome 
some of the major constraints related to the appropriation of the Internet, specifically, the 
scarcity of material and human resources (see table 12 for more details).  While a 
hierarchical structure and professional work have enabled many SMOs, such as the 
human rights and feminist groups, to enhance the efficiency of their action and their 
ability to lobby the state on various issues, it also led to their gradual isolation from their 
social bases that are critical to maintaining the sustainability of Web projects.  Striking a 
balance between professionalism and hierarchical organization and a non-hierarchical 
structure is a delicate task for many groups, as Tarrow (1998) remarks:   
The dilemma of hierarchical movement organizations is that, when they 
permanently internalize their base, they lose their capacity for disruption, but 
when they move in the opposite direction, they lack the infrastructure to maintain 
a sustained interaction with allies, authorities, and supporters.  This suggests a 
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delicate balance between formal organization and autonomy—one that can only be 
bridged by strong, informal, and non-hierarchical connective structures.  (p. 137) 
Among the groups that are best able to achieve this balance are Islamic-oriented SMOs, 
which explains why their websites have scored highest than all the sites studied.  On one 
hand, these SMOs benefit from solid and well-organized institutions; on the other, they 
draw on large grassroots constituencies that are active in a large number of local groups 
and associations inside Morocco and in the diaspora.   
  
Table 12.  
Characteristics of top scoring groups and websites. 





Web 2.0 software 
 




Heavy, but not exclusive, reliance on open 
source and collective platforms 
 
Use mainly radical forms of direct action 
 
Promote inward networking 
Often repressed by government 
 
Promote construction of collective identity as a 
main form of mobilization 
 
Do not rely on print media as main 
communication tool 
 
Use vast number of interactive tools  






To sum up, feature analysis has demonstrated that Moroccan social movements are 
able to tap some—but not the full—potential of the Internet in collective action.  It has 
also illustrated the great variations between and within movements in their appropriation 
of this potential.  These two main conclusions will be further confirmed by other ones 
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highlighted in coming chapters: the impact of the Internet on collective action in the 
country is deeply marked by both the new possibilities offered by the medium, as well as 
the serious limitations resulting from the mediation of the appropriation of the Internet 
through local and global socioeconomic, cultural, and political conditions and structures.   
Despite the usefulness of feature analysis as a research method, however, one of its 
limitations is that it concentrates chiefly on structural aspects and, consequently, does not 
shed light on the content of the websites.  Moreover, it studies websites as having a fixed 
temporal structure, and does not allow for the possibility of seeing how they function 
over a period of time.  To address these limitations, the content of the studied websites 
will be analyzed using framing analysis, which is the main subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Six: Framing Analysis 
The Use of the Internet in Collective Action Framing: The Multifarious Aspects of 
Mobilization 
Introduction 
Despite the relative longevity and size of the literature dealing with collective action 
through social movement theory, the study of collective frames and framing processes 
has acquired a central importance in the literature only in the last two decades.  The 
lacunae in the literature becomes more glaring in regard to the use of the Internet by 
social movements, as existing studies have not examined the content of the websites in 
much detail and did not use framing analysis to evaluate it (see, for instance, Stein, 2009; 
Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004).   
Williams (2004) argues that the most important contribution of framing studies to the 
field is their focus on the ―symbolic‖ dimensions in the action of social movements as 
they ―articulate grievances, generate consensus on the importance and forms of collective 
action to be pursued, and present rationales for their actions and proposed solutions to 
adherents, bystanders, and antagonists‖ (p. 93).  Commentators have maintained that 
social movements‘ framing efforts are the foundation of collective action as a whole, 
because recognizing peculiar situations as unjust precedes the collective action that 
strives to address the injustice (McAdam, 1982, p. 51).   
Additionally, frames may also perform a transformative function in the sense of 
altering the meaning of object(s) of attention and their relationship to the actor(s), 
193 
 
as … in the transformation of routine grievances or misfortunes into injustices or 
mobilizing grievances in the context of collective action (Snow, 2004, p. 384).   
In this manner, social movements‘ framing is not just an anterior process to action; 
the two processes are interdependent, since both the attribution of meanings and the 
action determine the process of collective action and its results (p. 404).  Framing 
analysis has one other key contribution—namely, its capacity to demonstrate how 
individuals become involved in collective action, thus highlighting the interplay between 
agency and structure in the development and action of social movements (Della Porta & 
Diani, 2006; Williams, 2004).  Thus, drawing on social movement theory and framing 
analysis, the current chapter seeks to answer the following key questions:  
(1) What are the most salient frames on the studied websites?   
(2) To what extent are these websites used to convey alternative and oppositional 
frames?   
(3) How did the studied SMs/SMOs frame the Gaza War?   
(4) How can we understand the contribution of this framing process to overall social 
movement mobilization?   
(5) To what extent has the Internet‘s potential as a medium and technology been 
appropriated in framing?   
(6) What do framing processes in the websites communicate about the studied 





In addition to the 18 websites studied in the previous chapter, another website was 
added to the list, namely the tanmia.ma portal.  The Tanmia association (―tanmia‖ means 
―development‖ in Arabic) and its portal are the outcome of cooperation between foreign 
state agencies: the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which is supervised by the 
US Department of State; international organizations, such as the Development Gateway 
Organization; and a private telecommunications consulting firm located in Rabat, called 
Morocco Trade and Development Services (MTDS).  The US Government selected 
MTDS to serve as the senior consultant in the implementation of the Leland Initiative, an 
ambitious project to assist 22 African countries in establishing Internet infrastructure and 
access.  While the Tanmia portal is not affiliated with any Moroccan social movement, it 
was conceived and implemented to provide various services for local civil society groups, 
such as a detailed database on Moroccan associations, information on the association‘s 
laws and regulations, and resources and information on diverse development issues.  The 
portal also acts as a platform that can be used by all civil society groups to publish 
articles, announcements, and statements.  As such, its inclusion in the current study aims 
to assess the extent to which a development-oriented website such as this is used by local 
civil society, especially oppositional social movements, to disseminate and share 
alternative and critical content and information.   
1.2 The case of the Gaza War. 
The studied websites were downloaded within a one-month period, between 
December 17, 2008 and January 16, 2009.  The choice of this period was initially 
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motivated by the fact that, in the previous months, most of the studied social movement 
groups were actively involved in mobilizing support to demand the release of activists 
and citizens who were incarcerated in the wake of various social protests that galvanized 
many regions of the country.  Many of these groups were also active during this period to 
demand the lifting of the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip.  The downloading period also 
coincided with the three-week attack by the Israelis on the Gaza during the winter of 
2008–2009.  In fact, major political crises and upheavals constitute an ideal framework 
for the study of social movements in action.  This explains why ―much of the recent work 
on social movement tactics comes out of what is referred to as ‗protest event‘ research‖ 
(Taylor & Dyke, 2004, p. 267).  Thus, while the chapter deals with the role of the 
websites in political mobilization generally, it focuses on framing and mobilization 
strategies and tactics used by social movements during the Gaza War, especially those 
that can help shed light on the appropriation of the Internet‘s potential for collective 
action.   
1.3 Framing analysis. 
One key observation about the existing literature on social movements‘ use of the 
Internet is that the majority of studies have examined the textual content of websites 
under the category of ―information‖ (see, for instance, Norris, 2001b, and Stein, 2009).  
Analyzing web content production as information is a reductive perspective that fails to 
recognize complex processes involved in social movements‘ collective action efforts.  By 
appreciating the link between social movements‘ frames and mobilization, framing 
analysis provides a basis for bridging the gap between the ideational and symbolic 
dimensions of collective action and direct forms of mobilization.  Moreover, framing 
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analysis provides a suitable framework with which to link online communication with 
offline action, and allows us to better understand how the Internet‘s potential and specific 
characteristics as a technology contribute to social movements‘ mobilization efforts.   
Despite its wide currency in social movement literature, no clear-cut conceptualization of 
framing analysis as a methodology exists, especially with regard to data gathering and 
analysis.  A wide range of methods have been used to study media and collective action 
frames, such as discourse analysis, content analysis, ethnography, surveys, and in-depth 
interviewing.  Moreover, some theorists have pointed out the existence of a conceptual 
blurring with regard to the interchangeable use of framing analysis with other 
approaches, such as discourse analysis (Johnston, 2002; Kitzinger, 2007).  For example, 
Kitzinger (2007) contends that ―for some people, framing analysis is achieved through 
systematic, quantitative content analysis.  For others, however, framing analysis is just 
another word for discourse analysis‖ (p. 14).  Johnston (2002), nonetheless, argues that 
framing analysis should be distinguished from these pre-established methods with which 
it shares many features: 
despite a shared qualitative orientation to texts, there seem to be two key 
differences between frame and discourse studies (…).  Framing studies mostly 
describe collective action frames and their role in movement development.  
Discourse studies treat cultural processes and their effect on what gets talked 
about.  Second, as one might expect, framing studies offer less reference to the 
actual texts on which the frames are based, while discourse studies tend to analyze 
the texts more closely. (Johnston, 2002, p. 72)   
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In order to guarantee a systematic exposition of frame structure within a text, 
Johnston suggests the use of the ―simple tactic that clarifies the textual basis of frame 
analysis (…) [by listing] the lines of the text on which the categories at various levels are 
based‖ (p. 73).  Another strategy is the systematic articulation of the frame content 
through the use of clear categories such as those used by Charlotte Ryan‘s (1991) study 
of media and social movements‘ frames.  Ryan organized her analysis around four 
general themes:  
(1) the key issue in the frame; (2) the responsibility/solution proposed in the 
frame, or its diagnosis and prognosis; (3) the symbols used, especially visual 
images, metaphors, historical examples, stereotypes, and catch phrases; and (4) the 
supporting arguments, especially in terms of the historical roots of the grievance, 
the consequence of the frame‘s success, and appeals and links to broader cultural 
values. (Ryan, as cited in Johnston, pp. 74–75)   
In the same vein, Kitzinger (2007) argues that framing analysis can be carried out 
with ―varying degrees of methodological rigour, sophistication or sensitivity‖ (p. 140).  
She proposes mixing various methods to analyze multiple aspects of texts and to identify 
key cues making up the frames, such as ―images, language, labels and definitions, offered 
explanations, assigned responsibility, proposed solutions, contextualization and links, 
historical associations metaphors, [and] emotional appeals,‖ among others (pp. 141–2).   
The current chapter expands on this literature by drawing on key concepts in social 
movement theory to conduct framing analysis.  First, Gamson‘s (1992) distinction 
between three principal components of collective action frames—namely, (1) injustice, 
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(2) identity, and (3) agency frames—provides a general framework for the analysis of 
data in this chapter. According to him, the  
injustice component refers to the moral indignation expressed in this form of 
political consciousness. This is not merely a cognitive or intellectual judgement 
about what is equitable.... [as it] requires a consciousness of motivated human 
actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and suffering. (p.7) 
  Agency frames refers to the ―consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or 
policies through collective action. Agency frames ―empower people by defining as 
potential agents of their own history‖ (p. 7). As to the identity frame, it refers to ―the 
process of defining this ‗we,‘ typically in opposition to some ‗they‘ who have different 
interests or values‖ (p. 7).   
This conceptual model is reinforced by Benford‘s and Snow‘s (2000) breakdown of 
the core tasks of framing: ―diagnostic framing,‖ ―prognostic framing,‖ and ―motivational 
framing‖ (pp. 615–7).  Diagnostic framing deals primarily with ―problem identification 
and attributions‖ (p. 615), wherein ―injustice frames‖ (i.e., identifying victims and 
amplifying victimhood) constitute the main part of the framing process.  Diagnostic 
framing also pinpoints the ―sources of causality blame and culpable agents‖ (p. 616).  
Prognostic framing involves the ―articulation of a proposed solution to the problem or at 
least a plan of attack and the strategies for carrying out the plan‖ (p. 617).  As for 
motivational framing, it is a ―call to arms‖ of sorts, or the ―rationale for engaging in 
ameliorative collective action, including the construction of appropriate vocabularies and 
motive‖ (p. 617).   
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These two interlinked models are well suited to the objectives and theoretical 
premises of the thesis, which focuses on oppositional social movements‘ uses of the 
Internet, and examines the extent to which the medium contributes to the development of 
agonistic public spheres and politics in the context of Morocco.  Collective action frames 
are, indeed, built around ―injustice frames,‖ insomuch as movements facing oppression 
have to ―develop a new diagnosis and remedy for existing forms of suffering, a diagnosis 
and remedy by which this suffering stands morally condemned‖ (Moore as cited in 
Tarrow, 1998, p. 111).  Moreover, these models synthesize major interpretations of social 
movements and collective action, since they emphasize equally the role of opposition and 
contestation (Touraine, 1981; Tarrow, 1998) with that of collective identity formation 
(Melucci, 1989; 1994).   
Furthermore, the study draws on the concept of ―frame resonance‖ that ―describes the 
relationship between a collective action frame, the aggrieved community that is the target 
of mobilizing efforts, and the broader culture‖ (Noakes & Johnson, 2005, p. 11).  Thus, 
Noakes and Johnson identify three variables that affect a frame‘s resonance: the makers 
of frames or ―entrepreneurs‖; the receivers of a frame or targeted audience; and the frame 
qualities—i.e., their cultural compatibility, consistency, and relevance.  Both quantitative 
and qualitative methods are used as a part of the framing analysis.  Despite the 
widespread use of quantitative methods within framing analysis, especially in media 
studies, Hertog and McLeod (2008) point out that  
one shortcoming of quantitative text analysis methods, however, is that many very 
powerful concepts, central to frames, need not be repeated often to have a great 
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impact.  One or two references may be enough to set the frame for a large amount 
of content [italic added]. (p. 154) 
In the same vein, Kitzinger (2007) notes that frames are often condensed in powerful 
symbols or images, and that ―the whole frame does not have to be spelt out in every detail 
in order to invite readers/viewers to recognize and place the issue within the frame‖ (p. 
141).   
Thus, building on the conceptual framework above, the analysis included four main 
steps.  First, the entirety of the data was analyzed to determine the extent to which the 
studied websites are used to convey the three main collective action frames, namely 
injustice, identity, and agency.  Second, focusing on the data dealing specifically with the 
Gaza War, Benford and Snow‘s (1986, 2000) framing tasks of diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational framing were used to examine how various social movements dealt with the 
issue and the extent to which they drew on the Internet‘s potential to do it.  Third, as a 
part of the process of analyzing frame resonance, makers of frames (i.e., the authors and 
sources on the websites) were studied to see how each group seeks to achieve the 
credibility of the frames communicated through the websites.   
2. Analysis  
2.1 Collective action frames’ salience and patterns. 
In order to examine the extent to which the studied websites are used to communicate 
the key collective action frames of injustice, identity, and agency, a two-step analysis was 
applied.  First, a thematic analysis was used in which an inductive coding was applied to 
a third of the data.  The codes obtained from the pilot study were applied afterwards to 
the rest of the data.  The fact that these codes were only slightly modified at this stage 
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demonstrates their reliability.  Boyatzis (1998) also argues that using inductive analysis 
to generate codes yields more reliable results than using deductive methods:   
Working directly from the raw information enhances appreciation of the 
information, in addition to eliminating intermediaries as potentially contaminating 
factors.  With a complete view of the information available, the researcher can 
appreciate gross (i.e., easily evident) and intricate (i.e., difficult-to-discern) 
aspects of the information.  Previously silenced voices or perspectives inherent in 
the information can be brought forward and recognized.  (p. 30) 
The unit of coding was the article or single post as defined by a number of markers 
that include a distinct hyperlink, a title, and an author or a source when available.  Each 
of the three main collective action frames includes a number of themes and sub-themes 
that are detailed in table 13 below.  It is important to note that in the majority of cases, 
textual units rarely deal with one issue or theme and thus can serve multiple frames.  
Human rights and identity issues, for instance, often converge and overlap on identity-
oriented SM‘s websites such as in the cases of the Amazigh and Islamic movements. 
Equally important, the ―agency‖ frame code does not necessarily describe independent 
units within the data because agency frames are usually interwoven with the other two 
types of frames at various levels on the websites.   For the purposes of this study, agency 
frames were analyzed by paying attention to the use of the Internet to encourage and 
sustain direct mobilization, or what Gamson calls ―affirmative action‖, such as protests, 
sittings, online petitions, among others (p. 69).    
The framing analysis has yielded five principal results (see table 14).  First, the 
majority of the websites are used to convey the three core collective action frames, 
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namely injustice, identity, and, to a lesser extent, agency.  Injustice-oriented frames are 
dominant in the vast majority of websites, with human rights issues constituting the major 
component of these frames; this is followed by identity frames.  There are important 
variations between the studied social movements with regard to the level of emphasis 
they put on each of these core frames.  Identity frames are more salient on the websites 
belonging to the Islamic, Amazigh, and feminist/women‘s SMOs, while injustice frames 
(human rights, social injustice, lack of democracy) are higher in leftist, alter-
globalization, and SMOs‘ websites.  Third, except for the feminist/women‘s websites and 
the Tanmia (development) portal, all others feature a relatively high number of items 
dealing with direct action that constitute the agency frame.  Fourth, the attack on Gaza is 
the most salient issue in the majority of the websites, especially those of the Islamic and 
alter-globalization SMOs (see below for more details).  Finally, attention to gender-













      Description of themes 
 
News about the blockade and the Israeli attack; statements of 
solidarity; news and reports on demonstrations and other 
action taken in support of the Palestinians. 
 Human rights      Police violence against activists and citizens; arrest and 
prison sentencing of activists and citizens; violations of 
freedom of expression and assembly; absence of rule of law 
and accountability; protest and strikes to denounce human 
rights violations; other types of action, such as solidarity 
campaigns and petitions on human rights abuses. 
 Social inequality  Poverty and marginalization of people and regions; 
exploitation of workers and poor people; unequal distribution 
of resources and income. 
 Democracy & 
citizenship 
 Need to develop civic participation; lack of fair elections and 
real representation; governance issues. 
 Gender 
inequalities 
 Gender equality; social and cultural injustices against 
women; legal discrimination against women; general 






 Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. 
―Islamic‖ versus secular identity. 
Amazigh versus Arab identity. 
Celebration of special calendar dates and events; obituaries 
on famous figures; distinction of the Amazigh people and 
culture. 
Amazigh literature and arts; contesting official history and 
national identity; interpretation of religious texts and 
teachings.  
History of past Muslim communities; Islamic education and 
upbringing. 
Role of women in the household. 
Agency frame Direct 
mobilization 
 Action calendar for upcoming strikes,  
Street protests, sittings, hunger strikes and other direct action 
events. 
Reports and news on these events; urgent messages on offline 
action; other forms of mobilization tactics.  
2.1.1 Identity versus injustice frames? 
Benford and Snow (2000) criticized the claim that all social movement frames are 
related to injustice, and maintained that in the case of religious and identity groups, ―it is 
questionable whether a well-elaborated collective action frame need include an injustice 
204 
 
component‖ (p. 615).  The results of the current study corroborated this claim to a great 
extent, but they also proved that injustice frames dominate the way social movements 
perceive and interpret the social and political issues and problems they are trying to 
address.   
Identity and injustice frames emphasize distinct categories of societal inequalities 
rooted in the politics of ―recognition‖ and ―distribution‖ respectively, to borrow Nancy 
Fraser‘s (1995) concepts.  However, both injustice and non-injustice frames can be used 
together in a way that ―connects and assigns some common meaning to experiences of 
collective action dislocated over time and space‖ (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 95).  It is 
rare to find identity frames standing separately from injustice frames, particularly in the 
case of Islamic and Amazigh cultural social movements.  Analysis has demonstrated, 
indeed, that identity frames are frequently interlinked with injustice frames and subtly run 
through different themes, from the celebration of important religious days to obituaries 
for fellow members.  Various tactics are used to articulate a distinction between the two, 
such as the use of allegory and subtle comparisons and symbols, and serve to increase the 
effectiveness of the frames or their ―resonance‖ by linking them to the shared culture and 
consciousness of the targeted users, while at the same time enabling the group to avoid 
censorship or judicial persecution.  From amongst 90 items posted on Justice and 
Charity‘s website during one month, for instance, 10 are obituaries for a founding 
member of the organization, the late Mohammed Sulaymani.  But while these obituaries 
highlighted the life and achievements of the deceased leader, they were also an 
opportunity to reflect on the history of the movement, its particularity, and the hardships 
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it has been facing since its establishment, especially its persecution by the state, all of 
which parallel the life of the late leader.   
Similarly, though an important number of posts on the studied Amazigh websites 
deal with human rights violations and social inequalities, the majority, nonetheless, touch 
upon diverse issues, including the celebration of cultural events, such as the Amazigh 
New Year,
29
 the commemoration of Amazigh art and culture, and announcements about 
Amazigh publications and lectures.  These posts do not deal with human rights issues per 
se, but provide subtle yet conspicuous articulations between the act of identity expression 
and the victimization of the Amazigh movement.  Cultural events, for instance, are 
celebrated under ACM slogans calling for ―freedom‖; musical concerts are organized to 
support the movement‘s activists in prison; and the Amazigh New Year is celebrated to 
counter the official version of the country‘s history.30   
2.1.2 The foundational discourse of human rights. 
The results of the analysis reflect the prevalence of the master frame of ―human 
rights‖ in leftist-oriented websites.  The salience of the human rights frame confirms Sidi 
Hida‘s (2007) conclusion that ―the question of human rights has become the fundamental 
principle of all emerging social movements in Morocco‖ (p. 23), mainly human rights, 
feminist, unemployed graduates, and alter-globalization movements.  The last two 
movements are especially exemplary, since their collective action strategy revolves 
around protesting against economic and social inequalities, namely neo-liberal economic 
policies at the global and local levels, and unemployment.  For instance, the majority of 
                                                 
29
Distinct from the Islamic lunar calendar, the Amazigh calendar dates back to the Roman era in the region 
and has been used ever since to regulate the agricultural seasons.  Today, it is used by the ACM as one of 
the main symbols of Berber identity.   
30
 The official history adopted by the state usually ignores the pre-Islamic era, during which aboriginal 
Amazigh culture and people dominated the region.   
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posts on the websites belonging to the Unemployed Graduates‘ movement and ATTAC 
deal with human rights violations against the movement‘s members, in particular, the 
police‘s excessive use of force to disperse demonstrations and the sentencing of activists 
for different prison terms. 
While these examples highlight the centrality of human rights issues for this 
movement, they also demonstrate the important role the Internet plays in sustaining 
collective action by disseminating alternative information about state repression.  As 
many activists in these movements have indicated (see Chapter Seven), the focus on 
human rights violations by the Moroccan state aims to expose the contradictions 
underlying the state‘s discourse and stance on this issue; this discourse usually praises the 
―big advances‖ achieved in the domain during the last decade.  By focusing on human 
rights issues, the groups aim to rally the support of INGOs in order to pressure the 
Moroccan state to ease its repressive measures against oppositional social movements.  
However, it also sheds light on the high costs involved in collective action and the 
vulnerability of Moroccan social movements, which remain tremendous obstacles 
preventing SMs from transforming political and social structures in any considerable way 
without the support of international civil society.   
2.1.3 The invisibility of women and the gender issue. 
A key observation that has emerged through various stages of the current research 
concerns the huge gender divide marking the diffusion and appropriation of the Internet 
in society, and at the level of Moroccan civil society particularly.  Feature analysis in 
Chapter Five has demonstrated that the two studied women‘s-oriented websites are 
amongst the least interactive and updated.  These results have been further corroborated 
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by framing analysis, which has proved that, excluding the Tanmia.ma development 
portal, these websites are the only ones that do not feature agency frames, thus reflecting 
the passive, or at least less active, role of women as political actors in society.   
Gender-related issues were rarely addressed by the majority of the studied websites, 
thus reinforcing the invisibility of the patriarchy as a social and cultural regime that 
subjects women to a lower status and profile, both offline and online.  The invisibility of 
the gender issue is not limited to male-dominated SMOs, but also to the women‘s section 
of Justice and Charity too.  A comparison of the ADFM and the Sisters of Afterlife‘s 
websites reveals major differences between Islamic-oriented and leftist groups.  On the 
one hand, as a feminist group‘s website, ADFM‘s is the only one that concentrates 
exclusively on gender equality issues that are clearly framed as political, economic, and 
social injustices.  On the other hand, with the exception of the items dealing with the 
Gaza War, the website belonging to the Sisters of Afterlife consists of non-injustice 
frames.   
The dominant frame on the website is that of the role of women as mothers and 
wives, since most of the textual content addresses the role of women in providing an 
―Islamic‖ education to children, their duties towards their families, the ethics of 
relationships in society, and ―inspiring‖ stories from the history of women in Islam.  The 
dominance of this latter frame contrasts with the declared objectives
31
 of the website, 
which claims to seek to contribute to J&C‘s societal and universal mission to redress the 
―illnesses‖ that have befallen the Islamic community or ―ummah‖ by ―renewing its 
Islam.‖   
                                                 
31
 The objectives of the website and JC‘s women‘s section are provided under the file name ―Who we are‖ 
(http://www.mouminate.net/thema/1.htm).   
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In the framework of Justice and Charity‘s ―re-Islamization‖ project, the Sisters of 
Afterlife SMO and its ―communication tool‖ aim to address the ―dangerous deterioration 
of the status of women along[side] the deterioration of the ummah.‖  According to the 
Sisters of Afterlife, this can be done by taking inspiration from women in the early 
Islamic community and the companions of the Prophet who were active in every walk of 
life without neglecting their roles as mothers and wives.  As such, the objective of the 
SMO and its website is to ―transcend shallow handling of the gender issue‖ by 
transforming the role of women from mere caregivers to individuals who are actively 
involved in the wider issues that concern society and the Islamic community worldwide.  
This perspective sees the gender question as an identity issue that can be addressed by 
reviving an imagined ―Islamic‖ model emphasizing the traditional role of women in the 
private sphere, while allocating them some limited roles in the public one.  In the words 
of Belghazi (2004), 
Moroccan Islamism focuses more and more on self-transformation.  It engages its 
struggles in areas previously considered typical of the private sphere.…  This is 
the reason why, despite the contradictions that obtain between the radical and the 
moderate wings of Islamism, we can talk of an Islamist community that partakes 
in a shared attitude towards the traditional patriarchal family considering it as the 
most important element of Morocco's Islamic identity.  (p. 1) 
It is true that compared to other political groups in the country, including political 
parties, the Islamic-oriented SMOs, Justice and Charity and Unity and Reconstruction, 
are the only ones who have set up websites targeting women users.
32
  Additionally, one 
of the few activists who launched a personal website and uses it as a tool of activism is 
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, a founder of the Sisters of Afterlife.  In the same vein, more than 20% 
of all individual authors found on Unity and Reconstruction‘s websites are women34, 
which constitutes by far the highest rate amongst all the studied websites.  While some of 
these women do express political opinions on the website, none of them deal with gender 
inequalities and some of them even express their disapproval of the king‘s statements 
regarding his approval of lifting existing reservations on the Committee on the 
Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  These websites thus 
contribute to increasing content produced by and destined for women, and alleviate the 
male dominance over online content production.  However, as Shade (2003) argues, it is 
essential to distinguish between ―the feminization of the Internet versus feminist uses of 
the Internet‖ (p. 49), since the latter involves the production of critical discourse 
challenging the patriarchy in all its forms.   
2.1.3 Development without contestation. 
Another important observation about the results concerns the Tanmia.ma portal, an 
ICT4DEV project that provides various services for Moroccan civil society 
organizations, including the possibility of publishing content on the portal.  Arguably, all 
civil society groups can use the website to share content that must be filtered first by the 
portal‘s staff before it can be posted.  Framing analysis, however, has demonstrated that 
there is a low presence of the three analyzed collective action frames (injustice, identity, 
and agency), as the vast majority of content on the portal deals with broad economic and 
societal development issues.  Moreover, none of the studied oppositional social 
movements are amongst those who published content on the portal.  These results show 
                                                 
33
The website can be retrieved from http://www.nadiayassine.net/fr/.   
34
 See the section on frame entrepreneurs below.   
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that the portal promotes a type of civil society that is perceived mainly as a partner to the 
state rather than as its political rival, and where society is perceived to be ―free of social 
tensions of oppressive inequalities‖ (Sarmadov, 2005, p. 396).  The following statement 
posted on the portal by a local development NGO, Assader, summarizes such a view: 
On the basis of the participative study performed by the association in the region, 
[the association] took these problems into consideration [in order to] to find 
appropriate solutions to end the isolation of the region.  The association addressed 
a request to the Ministry of Social Development and Solidarity to receive funding 
for the project … on the basis of which the ministry agreed to support it [my 
translation]
35
.   
Supported by international development agencies such as the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
such a vision seeks to enhance the role of local NGOs with an aim to ―decrease 
opportunities for corruption, stabilize state finances, create entrepreneurial opportunities, 
attract foreign investment, increase public participation, and ultimately foster political 
stability and sustainable economic growth‖ (Sardamov, 2005, pp. 394–5).  Such a view of 
civil society, however, has only increased the dependence of local NGOs on foreign aid, 
while failing to promote accountability, rule of law, and real participative governance in 
society.   
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Table 14.  
Main frames on the websites. 
                                Injustice Frames 
    





    
  No.     % No.     %  No.    %  No.   % No.    % No.    % No.     % 
 
Islamic  241   57    10     2.42 13     3.14 55   16.47 19    4.60 9      2.17 59     14.2  
 
Human rights  16     48.4 13    39.3  0       0           0      0 0       0 0      0 14     42.4 
     
Radical left 
 




81     40.7 55   27.63 39     19.5 11    5.52  25    12.5 4      2.1 57     28.6 
 
Amazigh 22     8.6 51   19.31 
 




12      37.5 0      0   
 




2          8     
 
12    48 4      16  0      0    0       0  0       0   3      12 
Development 1       1.47 1       1.47 4      5.88 
 
 0      0    5      7.35   5     7.35    0      0 
Note. HR (Human Rights); SJ (Social Justice); Dem. (Democracy); Gen. (Gender). 
2.2 Framing the Gaza War. 
As stated above, social movements‘ collective action typically alternates between 
long periods of latency and short intervals of high visibility.  The bulk of literature on 
social movements‘ use of media deals with the latter periods because they provide rich 
environments and conjunctures in which to examine social movements‘ communication 
strategies. The shortness of the visibility periods also permits researchers to concentrate 
on a limited body of data both, and thus allows them to determine the impact of media on 
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social movements‘ action and causes. In this sense, the 2008–2009 Gaza War offers an 
―ideal‖ context in which to analyze and compare online framing strategies and tactics 
used by the studied SM/SMOs.  It is an issue that has immense mobilization potential 
because it draws on deeply ingrained symbolic values, beliefs, and ideologies for all 
involved parties.  The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is of unique significance within the 
Arab and Islamic worlds.  It is also one of the most mediated conflicts internationally, 
particularly during times of war and tension.  In Morocco, as in the other Arab countries, 
very few issues have the power to draw a quasi-general public consensus, mobilize 
support, and, most importantly, send people into the streets to protest, as the ―Palestinian 
cause‖ does.36  This explains why concerned sides, including Arab police regimes, 
political parties, civil society organizations, and outlawed radical groups all show support 
for ―the Palestinian cause,‖ either out of genuine solidarity or from mere political 
opportunism, and try to score points against political adversaries, both inside and outside 
these countries.  It is, in fact, the only conflict in which Islamic, leftist, and liberal groups 
can be seen marching together in the streets to express solidarity for the Palestinians.  For 
many radical movements and groups that are targeted by police repression, highly 
symbolic and mobilizing issues like the ―Palestinian cause‖ constitute an opportunity to 
challenge censorship and control by demonstrating their mobilization capabilities and 
openly attacking dictatorship and rulers.   
As discussed above, there are important variations in the degree of salience of this 
issue on the websites covered by the study (see table 14).  Islamic-oriented SMO‘s 
websites are at the top of the chart with almost 60% of all posts allocated to this issue 
which is, by contrast, least visible on the Tanmia portal, with only 1.47% of posts 
                                                 
36
 This is the term commonly used by Arab media to refer to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
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dedicated to it.  This is primarily due to the level of freshness characterizing each 
website, as several, including ADFM‘s, were scarcely updated during the war.  The 
variations also result from the collective action strategies of each movement; some of 
them concentrate on a single issue, as is the case with the Unemployed Graduates 
movement.  Therefore, while analysis of the framing of the Gaza War will try to cover 
the majority of the studied SMOs/SMs, it will concentrate on those whose websites 
provide rich data on the issue.   
Benford and Snow‘s three main tasks of framing (1986, 2000) are analyzed, namely 
diagnostic, prognostic, and mobilization framing.  In addition to these main tasks, the 
study will explore other framing strategies used to increase the ―frame resonance‖ that 
―describes the relationship between the collective action frame, the aggrieved community 
that is the target of mobilizing efforts, and the broader culture‖ (Noakes & Johnston, 
2005, p. 11).  Though a large number of frame resonance strategies have been discussed 
in the literature, this chapter focuses on those that can shed light on the use of the Internet 
as a medium in the case of Gaza, namely ―frame amplification,‖ ―frame articulation‖ or 
―bridging,‖ and the ―credibility of the ‗frame‘s promoters‘‖ (p. 11).  While the study of 
frame salience and distribution on the websites above concentrates on textual data only, 
the study of the framing of the Gaza War examines textual and non-textual data alike, 
including graphs, symbols and hyperlinks, to determine whether Internet-specific tools 
and functions have been appropriated to frame the war.   
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2.2.1 Diagnostic framing. 
 
Figure 8. The “War on Islam” frame. 
As mentioned earlier, diagnostic framing defines the boundaries of a problem or injustice, 
―telling what is wrong and why‖ (Noakes & Johnson, 2005, p. 5); it also identifies the 
victims and the parties to blame for this injustice.  Analysis of diagnostic framing was 
done by going through the data to identify ―master frames‖—i.e., those that are specific 
to the movement and play an organizational role in it (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 219), 
and the sub-frames derived from the master or primary ones.  Various interpretations 
about the war on each website were organized in a chart to establish the link between 
them and identify the primary frame from which other interpretations are derived.   
Information about victims and parties to blame for the problem was also noted.  
Though the data shows that all groups share the belief that the Gaza War was part of a 
continuing injustice against the Palestinian people perpetrated by the state of Israel, it 
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also reveals important variations in the way these groups interpret the attack and the 
causes behind it.  Two master or primary frames have emerged from the data: the ―war on 
Islam‖ frame, and the ―imperialist war‖ frame (see figures 8 and 9 below).   
Islamic-oriented websites largely subscribed to ―the war on Islam‖ frame.  Thus, the 
Gaza War was interpreted mainly as a war on Islam launched by a Judeo-Christian 
coalition and abetted by collaborative Arab/Muslim undemocratic governments.  The 
attack was in fact considered just the latest chapter in a hundred-year-long victimization 
of Muslims at the hands of Christians, in coalition now with the Zionist ―enemy‖.  While 
this worldview has existed since the early days of the conflict, it has gained 
unprecedented support in the last decade with the ―war on terror‖.  More importantly, the 
last war in Gaza is specifically viewed as a war, not only against the Palestinian people in 
general, but also and especially against Hamas, an Islamic movement that was 
democratically elected in Gaza. 
 
Figure 9. The “Imperialist war” frame. 
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The ―global imperialism‖ frame was dominant on the leftist-oriented websites that 
include alter-globalization and human rights SMOs, as well as the Amazigh cultural 
movement and radical Left parties.  According to this frame, the Gaza War and, in 
general, the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, are perceived to be an integral part of global 
imperialist wars and dominance all over the world, but especially in the Middle East.  
Equally, Arab regimes are blamed for being ―lackeys‖ of imperialism, which imposes 
them against the will of the people of the region.  The ―imperialist‖ and the ―war on 
Islam‖ frames share many features, particularly their focus on the international character 
of the Gaza War, Israel‘s link to the West or imperial powers, and the role of 
undemocratic local regimes in supporting the war, either overtly and covertly, and in 
oppressing the region‘s people.  However, while Islamic-oriented SMOs view that 
religious and cultural ―differences‖ are the main factors behind the war, leftist-oriented 
movements attribute it to relentless expansionism of capitalism and neo-imperialism.   
2.2.2 Frame articulation. 
Frame articulation involves ―the connection and alignment of events and experiences 
so that they can hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion‖ (Benford & 
Snow, 2000 p. 622).  This is achieved by assembling, collating, and packaging different 
perspectives on various events and experiences, which result in the creation of new 
frames and interpretations.  Analysis of the two main frames used to describe the Gaza 
attack shows that they both articulate various components, as all groups try to produce 
frames that can mobilize actual and potential constituencies.  However, identity-oriented 
movements, such as the Islamic and Amazigh cultural movements, were more able to 
draw on the local cultural context to frame the issue.  As Tarrow (1998) argues, ―it is the 
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combination of new frames embedded within a cultural matrix that produces explosive 
collective action frames‖ (p. 122).  A telling example is provided by the framing of the 
issue on the websites belonging to the Amazigh cultural movement.  Because the blogs 
are collective and used by diverse Amazigh groups, a multitude of interpretations and 
opinions added up to form a complex frame that runs through a large number of posts.  
While the conflict was generally perceived in the Muslim/Arab world as an aggression 
perpetrated by Israel and the US against the Palestinians, a large number of posts about 
the Gaza War ascribed the responsibility of the suffering and victimhood of Palestinians 
almost equally to the Israeli‘s aggression and to ―Arab‖ treason and collaboration.  The 
title of one post on the Ageddim blog, for instance, reads ―Gaza is dying and the 
collaborators are silent,‖ while another one reads ―death for traitors, both Arab and 
Zionist.‖  A number of other posts questioned the wide solidarity with Gaza of 
Moroccans, especially in Amazigh majority regions, arguing that it smacks of Pan-Arab 
Nationalism, which the ACM militates against.  While they expressed solidarity with 
Gaza, they explained they were doing it ―only from a human rights perspective‖ and not 
out of ethnic or religious sympathies.  These framing tactics serve to define not only the 
boundaries of the conflict, but also those outlining solidarity with the victims, and the 
possibilities and limits of action that can be taken to address the injustice.   
Frame articulation can also be done through the use of non-textual tools, especially 
hyperlinks.  This function provides an easy and efficient way to link ideas and texts on 
multiple and different websites, offering users more control over the construction of 
frames by allowing them to choose to follow the provided links or not.  Hyperlinking also 
creates a non-linear relationship between various sets of frames.  Analysis of this function 
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has been carried out by paying particular attention to the use of hyperlinks within textual 
data, as compared to the use of permanent hyperlinks discussed in the previous chapter.  
Analysis has demonstrated that the use of in-text hyperlinks remained very limited, as 
only four websites, namely the Arabic and French E-Joussour websites and the ACM–
Ameghnas and Ageddim blogs use hyperlinks.  The majority of these links, however, are 
not embedded within texts themselves, but are provided at the end of texts as references 
to the sources of the texts and their authors.   
2.2.3 Frame amplification. 
Frame amplification involves ―accenting and highlighting some issues, events, or 
beliefs as being more salient than others‖ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623).  Analysis has 
demonstrated that amplification of the Gaza injustice frames has been achieved primarily 
through the tremendous attention paid to the issue by the majority of social movements.  
Amplification of the issue was also accomplished via the large number of multimedia 
tools permitted by the Internet.  Compared to frame articulation, the majority of websites 
drew extensively on non-linguistic tools, especially graphics for the purpose of frame 
amplification.   
The use of graphics on the studied websites was analyzed by observing and 
measuring the extent to which textual items on the homepage and second page are 
reinforced with graphics items such as pictures, slideshow photos, flashing images, 
caricatures, and other types of illustrations.  It is worth noting that this chapter draws on 
the same units of analysis used in the previous one, whereby separate paragraphs or titles 
on the homepage functioning as hyperlinks to larger texts or articles are considered as the 
basic units for analysis.  Moreover, a differentiation was made between two levels of 
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graphics: those used on the homepage, and those used on the second-level pages.  The 
results obtained were then coded in a scale between 0 and 3 to provide a synthesis of the 
use of graphics on both the first- and second-level pages (see table 15).   
Table 15.  
Use of graphics on websites. 






Islamic-oriented 60.3 50.6 3 
Human rights 73.2 0 2 
Alter-globalization 18.7 1.5 1 
Amazigh 67 40.3 3 
Feminist/women 36.6 55.2 2 
Unemployed graduates 0 61.3 2 
Radical left parties 11.4 5.6 1 
Tanmia/Development 21 1.33 1 
Median 36.02 26.97  
N.B.: 0 (absent); 1 (low 1 > 25 ); 2 (medium 36 > 50); 3 (high 50% >).   
Analysis has shown that, with the exception of trade unions and radical lefts, the 
majority of websites drew heavily on graphics, mainly photos and pictures, and to a less 
extent caricatures and slide photos.  Islamic-oriented SMOs‘ websites, followed by the 
Amazigh cultural movement‘s blogs, are the richest in terms of the use of graphic 
material on the homepage and the second-level pages.  Justice and Charity‘s website 
featured a Flash photo slide show with pictures of victims, specifically children, endorsed 
by the expression ―Gaza: from siege to extermination‖ or ―a new Zionist holocaust‖ in 
big red font which starts streaming like blood.  Drawing parallels between the Holocaust 
and Israel‘s attack on Gaza as a tactic to magnify the suffering of Palestinians is shared 
by the majority of websites, but it is more frequently used on Islamic-oriented ones.   
Moreover, the website made use of Flash slides showing pictures of marches and 
protests in solidarity with Gaza, and a scrolling news bar that provided news and updates 
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about the event.  It also used flashing ad banners inviting users to participate in an 
instantaneous discussion with the movement‘s leader on the theme of ―how we can 
support Gaza.‖  Likewise, the Unity and Reconstruction website drew heavily on Web 
tools such as Flash photo slides showing Gaza victims and making solidarity statements.  
On the main top banner of the website, which normally only features the logo of the 
movement and its leader‘s picture, Flash slides were used, urging users to send their 
suggestions about how to help Gaza, and presenting pictures of Palestinian children 
crying (see figure 10).   
 
Figure 10. The Gaza War on Unity and Reconstruction’s website. 
The majority of websites feature pictures and illustrations that borrowed from other 
websites or that are circulated widely by e-mail.  In addition to pictures of victims, many 
websites featured caricatures, as is the case with the caricature on the Amazigh blog 
―Ageddim‖ that makes fun of Islamic countries‘ armies and their inability to help 






Figure 11. The use of caricature on the Amazigh blog “Ageddim”. 
   
2.2.3 Prognostic and motivational framing. 
In theory, diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing describe distinct 
processes— namely, identifying the injustice, proposing a solution, and motivating 
constituencies to take action.  In practice, however, they are most of the time 
interconnected through multiple framing and discursive tactics.  While the ―War on 
Islam‖ frame was used on Islamic-oriented SMOs‘ websites to provide a diagnosis or 
interpretation of the Gaza War, for instance, it also served to mobilize constituencies into 
action by tapping on collective memory, religious beliefs, and shared culture.  Moreover, 
by linking the victimization of the Palestinians to that of the people in the region—and at 
the same time, equating the responsibility of the West and Israel with that of the 
authoritarian Arab regimes—diagnostic framing serves to identify not only the roots of 
the injustice, but also what can be done to address it, particularly by establishing 
democracy in these countries.  Gamson‘s (1992) study, for instance, highlighted many 
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levels of agency that range from pro-action discourse in activists‘ conversations to the 
media‘s focus on social movements‘ protests (pp. 61–8).  
Similarly, as far the studied websites are concerned, multiple solutions and strategies 
of action were proposed by various social movements, from forming Islamic alliances 
against ―new crusades‖ to the need to establish democracy in Arab societies, thereby 
allowing people to participate more actively in supporting the Palestinians.  For the 
purposes of this study, prognostic and motivational framing were analyzed by paying 
attention to the use of the Internet‘s characteristics as a technology and medium in 
collective action.  Accordingly, three mobilization aspects have been distinguished in the 
data on Gaza: a) news and reports about action taken; b) an action calendar and call for 
participation in upcoming offline action, such as protests, sittings, information on how to 
donate money; and c) online-based action.   
Results (see table 16) show that the bulk of motivational framing on the studied 
websites focuses on reporting past actions such as news of protests and sittings.  Only 
half of the websites, namely those belonging to Islamic, human rights, Amazigh, and 
alter-globalization movements, provide an action calendar or other types of calls for 
future action.  Finally, online-based action was found only on one website, namely Unity 




Table 16.  
Prognostic and motivational framing. 
Social movements Action news & reports 
 
% 







Islamic-oriented 42 9.8 1.5 
Human rights 87.5 25 0 
Alter-globalization 53.25 35.3 0 
Amazigh 61.2 7.2 0 
Feminist/women 20 0 0 










Median 61.99 11.04 0.21 
 
A significant aspect of the data on the Gaza War issue was limited to solidarity 
statements and action reports in the form of text, photo, and video files documenting 
protests, marches, and various other solidarity activities.  Highlighting the action taken by 
a group has a direct mobilization effect, in that it provides actual and potential 
constituents with clear and tangible examples of ―what to do,‖ and encourages them to 
join in future street protests.  Gamson (1992) argues that mobilizing people into direct 
action is a daunting task because of ―structural impediment to collective action‖ that can 
be reinforced by ―a political culture that operates to produce quiescence and passivity‖ (p. 
60).  Street protests and demonstrations were the first level of a ―visually affirmative 
action‖ used by civil right movements in the United States, while its reporting by the 
media, especially television, is another level of this visualized action (pp. 60–1).  Further, 
explaining the role of communication about action in expanding collective action 
opportunities, Tarrow (1998) asserts that 
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by communicating information about what they do, once formed, movements 
create opportunities—for their own supporters, for others, for parties, and elites.  
They do this by diffusing collective action and displaying the possibility of 
coalitions, by creating political space for kindred movements and counter 
movements, and by producing incentives for elites and third parties to respond to.  
(p. 88)   
Thus, highlighting action taken by state harassed groups, such as the Justice and Charity 
and ATTAC SMOs, provides these groups with a rare opportunity to showcase their 
mobilization and organization abilities, and thus to send information to potential 
members and adversaries alike.   
Technical and bandwidth limitations imposed restrictions on the number of photos 
and other multimedia files that can be posted on the websites.  As a solution, a number of 
groups posted links to additional photo and video files that can be accessed and viewed 
on social networking sites such as flickr (www.flickr.com), as well as video sharing 
platforms (mainly YouTube).  This use testifies to the synergy between multiple 
platforms and media, and to the many possibilities offered by the Internet to bypass the 
resource, technical, and political barriers in order to achieve better results.   
Whereas a large number of groups posted video clips about demonstrations and other 
types of action, Islamic-oriented SMOs were the ones to use video files more extensively, 
as the case of Justice and Charity, which has many channels on YouTube and hundreds of 
video clips on them (see figure 12).  As a hugely popular
37
 and mainly visual platform, 
YouTube and other video sharing tools allowed by the Internet are used by these 
                                                 
37




movements to foil state censorship and to reach different and larger segments of users 
beyond the limited circles of constituencies and sympathizers (see interview with an 
activist with Justice and Charity, Hasssan Bennajah, in Chapter Seven).   
 
Figure 12. Justice and Charity’s channel on YouTube. 
Equally important, although nearly half of the studied websites provide information 
about future (offline) action, only the Islamic movements‘ websites used multimedia 
fetures to call for action and, more importantly, allowed users to take action online.  On 
the J&C website, horizontal menu bars invited users to participate in the movement‘s 
online forums to express their solidarity, announce future marches, and, encourage people 
to stage public protests.  Likewise, Flash slides called on users to participate in 
instantaneous discussions with the movement‘s leaders about how to support Gaza, and 
to download files containing a large number of pictures of the sittings and marches in 
which the movement members participated around the country.   
226 
 
Similarly, as soon as the war started, Unity and Reconstruction‘s website invited 
users to send their suggestions on how to help Gaza.  Justice and Development‘s website 
was the only one to use a video call by the party‘s secretary general, Abdelilah Benkiran, 
in which he urged members to participate massively in protests and to support 
Palestinians.  Referring to the biggest rally that took place in Casablanca in support of 
Gaza, one Flash image on the top menu bar read: ―After the one-million march: Al-Islah 
(Reconstruction) website welcomes your suggestions.‖  This example shows how online 
action enhances and promotes offline action to keep constituencies alert and ready for 
further activities.   
One reason for the low level of online-based mobilization is the lack of technical, 
human, and hardware resources needed to set up and follow up on such online functions 
as petitions and fund raising.  The lack of resources, however, encourages some groups to 
resort to ―bricolage,‖ as illustrated by the handwritten petition above (see figure 13 
below) calling for popular marches on the Ageddim blog, and accompanied by a poster 
taken from the Web to achieve better mobilization results.  
 
Figure 13. Mobilization for Gaza on the Ageddim blog: Handwritten petition. 
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2.2.4 Frame entrepreneurs and credibility. 
Social movement theorists agree that within SM collective action, the credibility of a 
frame depends greatly on the credibility of the makers of the frame, their authority, and 
their professional credentials and status (Benford & Snow, 2000; Camzon, 1992; Noakes 
& Johnston, 2005; Wathen & Burkell, 2002).  Identifying frame entrepreneurs is an 
integral part of frame analysis, because ―diagnosing a problem always entails identifying 
the actors who are entitled to have [an] opinion on it….  It is through symbolic conflict 
that certain actors succeed in being recognized as entitled to speak in the name of certain 
interests and tendencies‖ (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 75).  In the same vein, Benford 
and Snow (2000) claim that ―it is a well-established fact in the social psychology of 
communication that speakers who are regarded as more credible are generally more 
persuasive‖ (p. 621).  Similarly, Wathen and Burkell (2002) maintain that the factors 
influencing credibility at the level of the source are the authors‘ and sources‘ expertise 
and knowledge, their trustworthiness, credentials, attractiveness, and homogeneity with 
the receiver‘s beliefs and context.   
An assessment of the credibility of frame makers, however, must take into 
consideration the specificity of the medium and the way users interact with it.  The 
Internet is often described as challenging established authorship conventions constructed 
around the notion of an individual author or writer.  The Internet is ―largely composed of 
texts produced through corporate authorship, constantly revised, often borrowed, and 
frequently parasitic on other texts to which they are linked,‖ and that is why ―the Web 
text is more like an organism than like a work‖ (Warnick, 2004, p. 258).  A number of 
studies have concluded that in the absence of filtering and gate-keeping systems 
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guaranteeing credibility, as in other media, Web users tend to resort to other markers, 
such as Web design, the website‘s domain, and the author‘s credentials and institutional 
affiliations (Rieh & Belkin, 1998; Rieh, 2002; Taraborelli, 2008).  Equally important, in 
his study of how users evaluate credibility on the Web, Rieh (2002) advances that 
determining authority on the Internet can be based on ―whether two parties belong to the 
same, or different reference groups‖ (pp. 155–56), since credibility is based not only on 
characteristics of information and sources, but also on users‘ expectations.   
To study frame entrepreneurs, 10 categories were coded and the authors of the textual 
items in the data observed accordingly:  
(1) the organization: text units that are signed either by a collective title/name of a 
group or by the group‘s leader(s); or, in the case of a collective website, by the 
webmaster; 
(2) activists: individual authors were considered to be ―activists‖ of the group 
itself unless information is provided otherwise; 
(3) affiliated groups (aff.):  SMOs that belong to the social movement of the group 
under study; 
(4) mainstream media (MSM); 
(5) alternative media (AM); 
(6) national civil society (nat.); 
(7) regional civil society (reg.): NGOs and social movements in the Middle East 
and North Africa;  
(8) international civil society (int.); 
(9) anonymous (ano.); 
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(10) official (off.):  includes governmental and semi-governmental institutions 
and agencies, as well as international financial institutions, such as the IMF.   
 Analysis was performed by identifying and counting the authors in each category.  
The results were first turned into percentage values that were afterwards coded using a 
scale from 0 (absent) to 3 (high).  Results (see table 17 below) reflect distinct 
communication patterns that run along ideological, organizational, and collective action 
strategy variations.   
First, websites belonging to leftist SMOs are the most downward-oriented, with the 
majority of posts authored by central committees or SMO leaders.  The hierarchical flow 
of communication on these websites is mitigated only by the significant number of 
anonymous posts on them that ―suggests an aversion to the professionalization of 
intellectual activity based on personality and reputation‖ (Atton, 2001, p. 120).  In 
comparison, Islamic-oriented ones are among the least downward-oriented, with a 
significant number of posts either signed by individual activists or derived from 
alternative media websites.  While the results show that women-oriented websites feature 
a high number of articles signed by individual activists too, this characteristic applies 
chiefly to the website of Justice and Charity‘s Women‘s section, rather than to that of 
secular ADFM.   
Unity and Reconstruction‘s website, for instance, draws heavily on alternative 
sources that belong to Islamic-oriented websites, such as the very popular ―Islam online,‖ 
―Islam today,‖ ―Ikhwan online,‖ and the personal website of Yusuf Qaradawi, the 
charismatic and popular religious scholar.  In addition to Islamic-oriented websites, 
U&R‘s website draws heavily on alternative news websites, such as Al-Jazeera online 
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and other online Arabic newspapers.  Thus, U&R‘s Website demonstrates how the 
Internet is used to create networks of meanings and fields of discourse through heavy 
borrowing, cutting and pasting, and exchanging, while at the same time keeping 
discourse and authorship under control by not using direct links to external sources, and 
limiting borrowing to those sources with which the movement shares the same ideology 
or worldview.  It also demonstrates an effort on U&R‘s part to enhance the credibility of 
its discourse on the Gaza issue by drawing on highly popular and influential figures and 
organizations.   
These results largely support those obtained through the feature analysis of the 
websites (see the previous chapter)—mainly, that Islamic-oriented websites allow greater 
user-to-user and user-to-system types of interactivity, thus enhancing horizontal 
information and communication flow without relinquishing control over discourse itself.  
Correlation between the results of both website feature and frame analyses is very 
important, as it highlights their mutual validity and reliability.  
Second, the alter-globalization movement‘s websites, specifically E-Joussour‘s 
wikis, feature a large number of articles posted by SMOs from several countries in the 
region, especially Egypt.  On the one hand, the results reflect the strategy of Moroccan 
and international alternative groups that aim to enhance the interlinking between social 
movements in the region.  On the other, the dominance of Moroccan and Egyptian SMOs 
in the wikis shows that the project is far from achieving its objectives.   
Third, the overwhelming majority of authors on Amazigh cultural movement blogs 
belong to groups and SMOs that are members of the movement itself, at the national, 
regional, and international levels.  Among the 152 posts on the Ageddim blog, for 
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instance, almost 70% are authored by local Amazigh groups, and 10% by Amazigh 
groups in the diaspora.  Many of those who post on the blog are affiliated with other 
movements too, particularly the Unemployed Graduates movement.  All of them, 
however, are located in Amazigh majority regions in the north and south of the country.  
Given the geographic dispersion of the movement and its lack of resources, sharing 
―symbolic resources‖ through participatory structures helps various groups address these 
disadvantages.  Moreover, the distribution of authorship on the Amazigh blogs confirms 
Weitzman‘s (2006) remark about the important role the Internet now plays in 
constructing collective identity among activists in the Amazigh cultural movement:  
[The Internet] has become an additional important tool in the construction of a 
―landscape of group identity,‖ i.e., the building of an ―imagined‖ Amazigh 
community worldwide ... making possible the dissemination of information and 
images, often in real time, as well as stimulating discussion and contacts between 
activists worldwide.  (p. 72) 
Finally, articles taken directly from mainstream media constitute more than a third of the 
content found on the blog belonging to the Unemployed Graduates movement.  This 
corroborates the results of feature analysis (see previous chapter), which demonstrated 
the dominance of linking to MSM in these websites.  With a limited agenda that focuses 
on getting jobs for members, the collective action strategy of the movement concentrates 
on getting media and policy makers‘ attention for their demands.  Staging protests in 
front of highly symbolic sites, such as Parliament, serves to galvanize the attention of 
MSM, both nationally and internationally.  Collective action can thus be seen as 
involving public ―performance‖ tactics (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 1998), 
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in which both online and offline tactics complement one another.  The need for MSM 
spotlights to amplify their voices and increase the visibility of their struggles is best 
illustrated by the main top banner of the Youthful blog (see figure 14 below) that features 
a clichéd picture of a group of photographers scrambling for a shot of a celebrity.  
Posting MSM articles covering the movement‘s actions serves both to further disseminate 
this information and to encourage members to continue their support and action. 
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Notes:  Org.: Organization; Act.: Activists; Aff.: Affiliated; MSM: Mainstream media; AM:  Alternative 
media; Nat.: National civil society; Reg.: Regional civil society; Int.: International civil society; Gov.: 
Government and official institutions.   
To sum up, analysis of frame entrepreneurs or authorship on the websites has 
highlighted many differences between social movements in terms of the 
communication practices and tactics they use to construct the credibility of their 
collective action frames.  However, existing differences and variations affect more 
the style and format than the substance of the framing process, as all the studied 
organizations and groups rely primarily on sources from within their groups or 
movements, thus reflecting the ―preaching to the converted‖ function of political 
websites noted by various analysts (Norris, 2001b). A summary of the distribution of 
frame makers and sources on the webstites shows that, in addition to alternative 
media, the two other major sources of content are the social movement organization 
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itself and international civil society NGOs (see figure 15). This finding strongly 
corroaborates the conclusions reached through feature analysis in Chapter Six, and 
which underscore the appropriation of web platforms to enhance liaison with 
international civil actors at the expense of building networks with national and 
regional civil society. Indeed, despite the potential and promises of the Internet as a 
medium that can promote dialogical discourse and an agonistic public sphere, the 
appropriation of the medium is shaped primarily by social movements‘ need to 
address the expectations of their constituencies.  This is because ―message sources 
chosen to match audience attitudes and context lead to higher perceived credibility 
and better recall of the information‖ (Wathen & Burkell, 2002, p. 136).  Some 
SMOs, mainly those that are Islamic-oriented, attempt to achieve this objective more 
effectively by conveying a sense of diversity and employing a less top-down 
communication, without compromising the homogeneity of their discourse. 






















Figure 15. Frame entrepreneurs: A summary. 
Note. The values in the chart are built on the median results displayed in table 17. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the role of the studied websites in conveying collective 
action frames.  Analysis has demonstrated that the Internet has become an alternative 
platform and public sphere for oppositional and competing discourses and views.  It has 
shown that most websites convey, albeit with important variations, the three main 
framing tasks of injustice, identity, and agency.  Because ―the story of movements is … 
the story of their members‘ ability to impose certain images of themselves, and counter 
attempts by dominant groups to denigrate their aspirations to be recognized as different,‖ 
(Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 106), the Internet has become in this sense one medium, 
among many others, that has enhanced the capacity of Moroccan social movements to tell 
their stories.   
Furthermore, several forms of mobilization have been identified in the studied websites:  
(1) Providing relevant information about a conflict or social struggle, namely by 
distinguishing between victims and adversaries/villains, and pinpointing the 
problem/conflict;  
(2) Supporting offline collective action by providing information on strikes and 
meetings, and by coordinating various collective action efforts;  
(3) Highlighting past actions to expand the repertoire of collective action by 
encouraging constituencies to join, defining tactics, and inspiring other groups to 
continue the struggle;  
(4) Building collective action and consciousness, both a precondition for the 
development of the social movement and a collective action objective;  
(5) Serving as platforms for online-based action, such as online campaigns.   
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Analysis of the framing of the Gaza conflict has shown that the majority of the 
websites contribute, in differing degrees, to the last four forms of mobilization, and only 
minimally to online-based action.  This last conclusion corroborates other similar ones 
confirmed by feature analysis in the previous chapter, and reflects the many limitations 
on the appropriation of the Internet in collective action that will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter.   
Direct action, however, is only one type of mobilization conveyed by collective 
action frames.  A central role of the injustice and identity frames communicated on the 
studied websites is not to encourage actual and potential constituents to participate in 
street demonstrations and protests, but rather to provide them with interpretations, 
symbols, and meanings that help them connect to a common cause, a group, and an 
identity, all of which forms the basis of social movements.  Without a shared identity, and 
a vision of society and the world, collective action cannot become a socially embedded 
movement capable of sustaining oppositional action over time.  It is true that social 
movements draw on diverse forms of communication, including interpersonal ones (see 
in-depth interviewing in Chapter Seven below) to build collective consciousness and 
identity.  However, for many social movements that are geographically dispersed, 
politically persecuted, or/and socially and economically disadvantaged, the Internet is 
increasingly playing a central role in constructing the necessary bonds and affiliations at 
the local and translocal levels, and thus contributing to their survival and ability to affect 
dominant orders in society.  In the words of Diani (2000), computer-mediated 
communication makes it easier ―to transform sets of geographically dispersed aggrieved 
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individuals into a densely connected aggrieved population, thus solving one key problem 
of mobilisation‖ (p. 388).   
In addition to the restricted use of the websites for Web-based mobilization, the 
chapter has highlighted two other limitations related to gender and ICT4DEV.  Analysis 
has confirmed that the majority of these websites give short shrift to gender issues.  This 
holds true even when the website is by women and for women, as in the case of the 
Sisters of Afterlife‘s website.  These sites, instead of contesting prevalent patriarchal 
values and traditional gender roles, ground these values and traditions in a religious 
discourse in order to imbue them with more legitimacy.  However, instead of being a 
characteristic of religious movements‘ online communication practices, as Barzilai-
Nahon and Barzilai (2005) claim, frame analysis has revealed that the patriarchy is 
reinforced by both Islamic-oriented and secular/leftist movements, either by reinforcing 
the invisibility of women‘s and gender issues or by reproducing gender power relations.  
Finally, the chapter has shed light on the self-limitedness of the ―Tanmia‖ development 
portal and of ICT4DEV‘s interpretation of the notion of ―civil society‖ and its role in 
development. 
The insights gained by applying framing analysis to the websites will be further 
enriched through interview analysis in the next chapter.  As argued above, because of the 
embeddedness of the Internet and its mediation through multiple social and cultural 
practices and structures, the use of in-depth interviewing is necessary to go beyond text-
based analysis towards probing deeper into various articulatory connections between 
technology, social actors, and their environments.   
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Chapter Seven: In-depth Interview Analysis 
The Narratives of Technology and Social Change: Empowerment Through Divides  
Introduction 
The last two chapters addressed the use of the Internet by Moroccan social 
movements and examined the extent to which these groups appropriate the potential of 
the web in their mobilization activities.  Limiting the study to online platforms, however, 
cannot provide sufficient insight into all aspects of the Internet‘s role in collective action 
and its social embeddedness as a technology and a media practice.  Online practices are 
only the tip of the iceberg of a much more complex interaction and interrelatedness 
between technologies and media, on the one hand, and their social context and the 
communication practices of social actors, on the other.  Using in-depth interview 
analysis, the current chapter examines various levels of interconnectedness between the 
technological and the social, and how the multilevel articulations between the two 
condition and shape the impact of the Internet on social movements. 
Corroborating as well as complementing many key findings in the previous chapters, 
this chapter underlines, first, the many communication practices and forms through which 
the Internet is empowering Moroccan social movements.  It demonstrates how various 
groups are using the medium to surmount different structural barriers marking Moroccan 
civil society—notably, the scarcity of material resources, the difficulty of accessing 
public media, and state restrictions on basic freedoms.  In doing so, the chapter 
emphasizes the interrelatedness and complementariness of the Internet and diverse forms 
of communication, as well as of professional and radical journalism.  Second, the current 
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chapter demonstrates that the empowering role of the Internet is marked by serious 
limitations resulting from multiple types of divides, which significantly restrict the 
impact SM groups have when using the medium to protest the dominant political and 
social orders.  While the roles of the divides regarding access, skill, and usage are 
highlighted, the chapter places more emphasis on gender and motivational divides as the 
most complex and enduring forms of divide hindering the political role of the Internet in 
the country.  Finally, by comparing two distinct ICT4DEV projects targeting Moroccan 
civil society, the chapter sheds light on the limitations of the dominant discourse 
regarding the role of technology in development, particularly in terms of how to achieve 
sustainability, and points out possible ways whereby these projects can learn from 
existing experiences in the field.   
2. Doing In-depth Interviews: Concepts and Contexts 
2.1 Responsive interviewing. 
This research draws on ―responsive interviewing‖ as a general guide for the planning, 
execution, and analysis of interviews.  Responsive interviewing is a model that is based 
on interpretive constructionist philosophy and ―emphasizes that the interviewer and 
interviewee are human beings, not recording machines, and that they form a relationship 
during the interview that generates ethical obligations for the interviewer‖ (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2005, p. 30).  It also highlights reflexivity as a key element in orienting the work 
of researchers by inducing them ―to continually examine and question their biases, 
understandings, and reactions during various stages of their research‖ (p. 31).  
Accordingly, discussing the macro- and micro-social settings of the interviews—and 
trying to understand interviewees‘ and interviewer‘s reactions, expectations, and 
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behavior—must be an integral part of the research itself and its findings, that not only 
sheds light on the circumstances in which the interviews were conducted, but also 
contributes to answering the research questions stated above.   
2.2 Participatory interviewing. 
Interviewing is generally viewed as an asymmetrical process whereby an interviewer 
seeks to obtain information from an ―informant‖ who passively responds to the 
interviewer‘s questions.  However, as Gubrium and Holstein (2002) argue, ―from the 
time a researcher identifies a research topic, through respondent selection, questioning 
and answering, and finally the interpretation of responses, interviewing is a concerted 
interactional project‖ (p. 15).  A case in point is my attempt to convince members of the 
Islamic-oriented SMO, Unity and Reconstruction, and its newspaper Attajdid 
(Renewal)
38
, to participate in the research.  Despite the many promises made by some 
senior members in the movement and the newspaper, the interviews were always 
postponed.  In order to overcome their reluctance and resistance, I sent my questions in 
advance, met with a potential interviewee several times over a few weeks. Still, I was 
asked to allow the intervention of a prominent intellectual and writer to assure them of 
my good intentions.  I was ―interviewed,‖ in turn, though informally of course, by my 
potential interviewee, who was trying to probe my ideological sympathies.  Eventually, I 
obtained an appointment with my interviewee, but when I was on my way to meet him in 
his office, he contacted me and asked me to join him in the big tent that the Justice and 
Development party
39
 set up in downtown Rabat, where he was participating in a political 
rally publicizing the party‘s next general congress.  There, I was introduced to other party 
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members, and given membership brochures and an invitation to attend the opening 
session of the congress.  This experience taught me that preparing an interview and 
conducting it is never a one-way process in which the interviewer is in full control; 
rather, it is a cooperative task that usually involves negotiation and interaction between 
equal participants (interviewer and interviewee), during which interviewees may try to 
impose their own agendas in order to achieve specific objectives. Moreover, a number of 
my requests to conduct interviews with activists in Islamic SMOs were refused or 
remained unanswered. 
Compared to Islamic-oriented SMOs, those that are leftist were generally more open 
and willing to participate in interviews.  For instance, one contact in the Moroccan 
Association of Human Rights (AMDH) willingly and unhesitatingly introduced me to 
many other members and activists in the association and allowed me to join the 
association‘s e-mail list.  Rooted in the long experience of the radical left movement that 
marked the country‘s politics for decades, the openness of the association reflects the 
strong traditions and practices of networking alliances both within and outside the 
country, as well as the self-confidence the association has in dealing with people from 
outside its immediate circles.  For instance, activists at the AMDH are accustomed to 
cooperating closely with INGOs and development agencies, and often deal with Western 
media.  I had little trouble establishing a closer relationship with them because they 
assumed from the beginning that I would sympathize with their activities and share their 
―global‖ human rights discourse, and so they engaged with me in a more forthcoming 
way.  This, however, created a problem of a different kind: since I felt I could identify 
with the members of this group more than with the Islamic-oriented SMOs, I had to 
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ensure I kept a necessary distance.  Describing the situation in which a researcher has to 
tread carefully between personal involvement and bias, Rubin and Rubin (2005) point 
out: 
Personal involvement is a great strength of the responsive interviewing model, 
because empathy encourages people to talk, and yet active involvement in the 
interview can also create problems, as your own emotions and biases can 
influence what you ask and how your interviewee responds.  (p. 31) 
Taking a reflexive and critical stance on interview questions and doing preliminary 
analysis of interview transcripts are some of the strategies I used to reduce personal bias 
while conducting interviews. Since I had the opportunity to meet and interview members 
of these SMOs several times during my stay in Morocco, I was able to reflect upon my 
list of questions, and cover points and areas I thought I had overlooked in the initial 
interviews, as well as adopt a more critical stance toward participants‘ interpretations and 
explanations.  Thus, after finishing interviews that I had deemed not very successful, I 
listened to their recordings and reflected upon the points I had covered and the ones I had 
missed, as well as upon the questions that needed refocusing and structuring, which 
allowed me to refine my interviewing techniques.  Despite this diligence, the fact that I 
was able to interview only two activists who are members of Islamic-oriented SMOs is 
bound to produce a level of bias toward secular social movements in the study.  I tried to 
address this quantitative imbalance by emphasizing the testimonies of the latter category 
of participants and comparing them with those produced by other groups‘ members.   
A number of commentators have argued that the interviewer has to share power with 
participants by encouraging them, for instance, to ask questions and direct the interview 
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(Gubrium & Holsten, 2002, p. 20).  It has also been observed that interviewing can be 
―wonderfully unpredictable‖ when interviewees ―take control of the interview and change 
the subject, guide the tempo, or indicate the interviewer was asking the wrong questions‖ 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 12).  This certainly applies to my interview with activists from 
the AMDH‘s chapter in the small town of Al-Hoceima on Morocco‘s north coast.  When 
I went to their office, I was expecting to meet the person I contacted for the interview, 
who was the chapter‘s president.  To my surprise, I found that all the section‘s bureau 
members were there.  Apparently, knowing that I was doing research at a Canadian 
university, they considered the interview an opportunity to talk about their activities and 
bring their voices to an international audience.  I tried to keep the interview under control 
and within the scope of my research, but I failed because their numbers were large and I 
was not prepared to deal with a group of activists who were more determined to talk 
about their experiences than to answer my questions.  Eventually, I had to abandon my 
prepared list of questions and, instead, discuss with them the issues they deemed most 
urgent for our conversation.  Though anecdotal, this example illustrates how power 
relations between interviewer and interviewees are neither stable nor linear, but can 
constantly shift at any stage of the interviewing process.   
2.3 Time and resource constraints. 
In-depth interviewing is an effective methodology, but it is also time-consuming.  
Because of time and resource constraints, I had to conduct most of the interviews in a 
period of 10 weeks between June and September 2008.  One of the most difficult parts of 
this type of research is to find suitable participants willing to share their experiences and 
thoughts, although the degree of difficulty varies considerably from one case to another.  
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In some cases, it took me almost two months to convince and arrange for an interview 
with a politician or a member of parliament; in some others, it took only a short 
conversation, a phone call, or a single e-mail to do soInitially, I tried to arrange all 
interviews prior to traveling to Morocco, by using mainly e-mail.  However, to the more 
than 25 e-mails I sent, I only received three replies.  Once I arrived in Morocco, I was 
able to schedule some preliminary meetings with potential interviewees through personal 
networks of family and friends.  Afterwards, the whole process became easier thanks to a 
―snowballing‖ effect, whereby the first interviewees either recommended me to or 
provided me with contacts of other possible interviewees.  Moreover, I realized that 
people trusted me more when I contacted them directly or called them from inside the 
country than when I contacted them from Montreal by e-mail or telephone.  Furthermore, 
because the key SMOs I wanted to cover in the study were located in various cities, 
particularly in Rabat and Casablanca (the political and the economic capitals 
respectively), I had to shuttle frequently between the two, which was time-consuming.  In 
some cases, I had to travel to other cities—for example, when I attended the First 
Maghreb Social Forum held in the city of El-Jadida in July 2008.  A large number of 
associations and movements participated in the event, making it an excellent opportunity 
for me to have direct contact with many activists.  
2.4 Gendered interviewing. 
Like the other variables of class, ethnicity, age, and religion—among others—gender 
is an important factor with a strong bearing on interviewing and research, in general.  
Only one third of my interviewees were women.  This was due to a number of factors, the 
most important of which is that civil society groups and organizations are male-
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dominated, despite the huge progress Moroccan women have achieved in the last few 
decades.  The number of female interviewees reflects, thus, the gendered power relations 
still generally dominant in society.  Moreover, the mere fact that I am a male interviewer 
imposed several limitations on the number of female participants I was able to approach.  
First, there were strong constraints on the times and places where I could meet female 
interviewees.  The clientele of coffee shops, for instance, is still largely male-
dominated.
40
  It is also unconventional to call at the house of a woman to whom one is 
not related; and because not all female activists have access to offices where they can 
receive a researcher, the matter is complicated further.  In one case, for instance, I had to 
meet a participant in the office of a relative who offered help.  In another case, I was able 
to meet a female party member at my friends‘ house because she knew them well.  
However, two interviews were cancelled because interviewees declined to meet me at 
coffee shops.  These constraints illustrate how qualitative or in-depth interviewing needs 
to ―develop and build on intimacy‖ in order to be effective and useful (Johnson, 2002, p. 
104), and how the gender of participants can significantly affect the amount of intimacy 
that can be built between the interviewer and interviewee.  As a male researcher, building 
intimacy or even a close trust with potential female interviewees was not always easy, 
and affected the amount and depth of experience these participants were ready to share 
with me, especially in regard to issues related to gender and technology.  Moreover, I was 
not able to arrange interviews with any female members of Islamic-oriented SMOs; the 
difficulty of approaching this type of group was further complicated by the gender factor.  
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2.5 Cultural barriers: Trust and face-saving. 
Getting interviewees to share openly their experiences can be shaped not only by the 
gender identity of participants, but also by general cultural and social dynamics.  In high-
context cultures like that of Morocco, ―people try to avoid direct confrontation to 
maintain social harmony and intimate bonds between people‖ (Kim, Pang, & Park, 1998, 
p. 511).  In such cultures, face-saving is an important mechanism through which people 
try to maintain social harmony; self-expression is relatively restricted, and people find it 
very difficult to speak about themselves on a personal level or avoid it altogether.  That is 
why I encountered difficulties either convincing some people to sit for interviews or 
making them respond to my questions spontaneously.  In fact, many participants reflected 
a high level of ―computer anxiety‖ and felt intimidated by the topics of the interviews, as 
the majority of them have limited or basic computer skills.  Though I often tried to 
address their anxieties by providing them with examples of the questions I would ask, 
and by assuring them that no special knowledge was needed to participate in the 
interview, many of them, even during interviews, were continually apologetic about their 
computer and Internet skills and knowledge, and offered to recommend me to more 
experienced people.  
I also encountered difficulties in getting participants to talk spontaneously about their 
specific experiences with Internet usage, since they usually preferred to focus on general 
statements about the technology and its use in society.  In other cases, respondents often 
claimed first that they knew a great deal about the technology, but when more trust was 
built between us, they became more open about their limited knowledge and skills.  To 
overcome these types of barriers, I tried to make the interviews as informal as possible; 
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and, before starting them, I engaged participants in informal discussions about broad 
issues to show them I understood their experiences and background without making them 
believe I necessarily shared their views and ideological stances.  Treading this zone 
between building confidence and sympathizing on one hand, and avoiding full 
connivance and identification on the other, involves sensitivity—a position that is 
difficult, though necessary, to maintain.  Despite my initial difficulties at establishing a 
trusting relationship between interviewer and participants, my efforts to overcome their 
reticence and cautiousness were fruitful, since most of the interviews were very 
successful and engaging.  The fact that all participants agreed to my using their real 
names instead of pseudonyms as I had expected at the start testifies to the level of trust 
that emerged out of this cooperative project.  
3. Method 
3.1 Sampling. 
A combination of sampling methods was employed to locate respondents, namely 
representative, purposive, and snowball sampling.  First, representative sampling was 
used to identify respondents who were members in the various studied social movements 
outlined in Chapter Five.  The representative aspect of the population sample remains 
relative, given that respondents were not evenly distributed amongst all movements due 
to the various constraints outlined above.  The quantitative imbalances between the 
studied movements in terms of the number of members interviewed were, however, 
compensated for through qualitative accentuation of the testimonies from groups 
underrepresented in the population sample.  Second, purposive sampling was employed 
to locate, as much as possible, activists who act as webmasters or supervise online 
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projects of the SMOs to which they belong.  Finally, snowball sampling was used to 
overcome various difficulties linked to locating appropriate respondents and convincing 
them to sit for interviews.  Thus, the initial list of potential participants included some of 
the most visible civil society groups in the country, such as the Moroccan Association of 
Human Rights (AMDH), and the Islamic-oriented organization Unity and 
Reconstruction.  Because of the difficulties I encountered in pre-arranging interviews 
from Montreal, I eventually decided to wait until I was in Morocco to start arranging 
interviews by means of a snowball process—i.e., a sampling method that is suitable 
―when working with populations that are not easily identified or accessed‖ (O‘Leary, 
2004, p. 110).   
As I proceeded with the interviews, I became aware of the need to expand my 
enquiry beyond SMOs in order to include social actors and groups whose activities are 
closely linked to and often interlinked with SMOs, such as independent newspapers and 
development institutions, namely the Tanmia association (see Chapter Five above and 
section 3.6 below for more information about the association).  In total, 38 individuals 
were interviewed, of whom only 31 are cited in thesis
41
.  Most of the respondents are 
members in 16 social movement organizations or institutions (see table 18).  35 of them 
were interviewed face-to-face in Morocco, while two were interviewed in Montreal and 
one online.   
3.2 Semi-structured interviews. 
The interviews were semi-structured; that is, though the interviews covered broadly 
similar themes, the questions were not structured nor worded in an identical way.  This 
provided participants with a great deal of freedom to engage in a conversation-like form 
                                                 
41
 See appendix A for a complete list of interviewees.  
249 
 
of speech, and to contribute to defining the boundaries of interviews themselves, by 
raising issues and questions they deemed more relevant to the topic at hand.  It also 
allowed the researcher to adapt the set of questions to various participants with diverse 
educational, ideological, and professional backgrounds.  Finally, using semi-structured 
interviews permitted the researcher, particularly during the first interviews, to test 
preliminary hypotheses, as well as questions and their usefulness in generating rich 
conversations, on the basis of which question plans were refined for subsequent 
interviews.   
Table 18.  
Distribution of respondents over the studied SMs. 
Movement/category SMO/institution Number of 
respondents  
   
Feminist  Union d‘action feminine 4 
 Association démocratique des 
femmes du Maroc 
2 
 Ligue démocratique des droits 
des Femmes 
3 
Islamic oriented Justice and Charity 1 
 Unity and Reconstruction 1 
Unemployed graduates La ligue nationale des cadres 
supérieures au chômage 
1 
Amazigh cultural movement - 1 
Human rights Association Marocain des 
droits humains 
4 
 Organisation Marocain des 
droits humains  
1 
Alter-globalization Action Jeunesse 1 
 Forum des alternatives Maroc                               2 
 ATTAC–Maroc 3 
   
Development association Tanmia.ma 2 
Left parties Partie socialite unifié 1 
Independent newspapers Almassae  2 
 Le Journal Hebdomadaire 2 
Total  31 
Men  20 
Women  11 
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3.3 Recording interviews and consent of participants. 
In accordance with Concordia University‘s code of ethics, all interviewees were duly 
notified of the goal and purpose of the research, first by being read the Oral Consent 
Script
42
, then by asking them to state orally if they agreed to it.  At the end of each 
interview, participants were asked again if they still wanted to proceed with their 
participation and whether they preferred if I assigned pseudonyms to them instead of 
using their real names.  All these procedures were recorded in my digital recorder as a 
part of the interview files.   
3.3 Analyzing interview transcripts. 
Analyzing in-depth interviews is an ―ongoing process ... [that] requires researchers to 
begin analyzing data as it is being collected, and these initial analyses may provoke 
changes in the study‖ (Blee & Taylor, 2002, p. 110).  The same holds true for this study, 
as the preliminary interpretation of the first interviews helped refine the questions and 
focus more on the issues discussed with other participants in subsequent interviews.  
Interviews were, first, translated from Arabic and French into English.  Afterwards, open 
coding was used to analyze the data.  In open coding, events/actions/interactions are 
compared with others for similarities and differences.  They are also given conceptual 
labels.  In this way, conceptually similar events/actions/interactions are grouped together 
to form categories and subcategories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 12).  They were then 
categorized into semantic excerpts or passages, which were then given preliminary labels 
or concepts that identified their main ideas and linked them provisionally to key concepts 
in the theoretical framework.  As analysis proceeded, emerging excerpts were organized 
into preliminary threads and patterns in order to constitute main themes.  At this stage, it 
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is always important to ―keep labels tentative.  Locking in categories too early can lead to 
dead ends‖ (Seidman, 1998, p. 108).  The coding and categorization had to be repeated to 
situate specific themes within interviews and their contexts.  This is necessary in order to 
avoid the over-categorization of data or what Morse and Mitcham (2002) call ―conceptual 
tunnel vision‖—i.e., ―assigning more data to one category than actually belongs, or 
seeing or justifying most things as being related to, or considered examples of, the 
concept being investigated‖ (p. 30).  Keeping one‘s mind open to the interpretive 
relationship between data and the concepts used to describe the data is a key component 
of qualitative analysis, even if it entails refining the research hypotheses and conceptual 
premises.   
4. Analysis and Discussion 
4.1 From civil society to social movement: A self-reflexive perspective. 
Before analyzing the implications of the Internet for social movements in Morocco, it 
is necessary first to examine how members in these groups conceptualize and interpret 
civil society in the country.  While an important body of literature exists that documents 
various aspects of Moroccan civil society, no study has tried to examine how activists 
themselves conceptualize and understand such a society.  To fill in this gap, I tried to 
solicit the opinion of my interviewees regarding their own interpretations of the notion of 
―civil society‖ and how they situate themselves and their struggles within it.  A principal 
issue emphasized by a large number of respondents is the distinction between several 
categories of collective action groups and organizations distinguished by four key factors: 
the degree of independence from the state and its networks; the link to political parties; 
the organization‘s internal structure; and collective action strategies employed by a 
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group.  As Hamouda Soubhi, an activist of the Alternative Social Forums (FMAS) and 
the coordinator of the E-Joussour portal project points out:  
In Morocco, there are two civil societies….  There is the society that is supported 
by the state.  The state creates associations, for instance.  What we see in Morocco 
is that there are 40,000 associations registered with [official] receipts, and many 
are created every day....  When we speak about civil society, we have to go to 
Marxism and its stance on civil society that [includes] political parties, trade 
unions, and associations.  Civil society is used to refer to associations, while 
political parties and unions are excluded.  We include all these groups; others 
don‘t want to hear about political parties....  It is not clear.  [The term] social 
movement is vague.  What is a social movement?  There are too many terms.
43
   
Soubhi‘s understanding of ―civil society‖ corroborates many commentators‘ 
interpretation of this notion in the context of Morocco, where the term has a strong 
normative meaning, since it is associated with civil organizations that oppose the state‘s 
hegemony over politics (see Chapter Three above).  Moreover, unlike dominant 
interpretations that exclude political parties, Moroccan civil society has always been 
marked by the central role of political parties in creating parallel associations and trade 
unions, and in playing the main opposition against the monarchy and its network of 
power, or the Makhzen.  The participation of the main former opposition parties in the 
government of Alternance
44
 since 1998, and the appearance of new forms of collective 
action have led to much confusion about the definition of ―civil society‖ and its 
boundaries.   
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In fact, some participants questioned a simple distinction between state versus 
independent civil societies by highlighting the distinction between institutionalized 
organizations on one hand and, on the other, non-institutionalized collective action or 
social movements that operate at the grassroots level and employ radical forms of protest 
and civil obedience.  In an interview during the first Maghreb Social Forum in the city of 
El-Jadida held between 25 and 27 July, 2008, in which his SMO, ATTAC–Maroc, 
participated, Jawad Mostaqbal, a civil engineer and ATTAC-Maroc‘s webmaster, 
explained that he was glad the forum could be organized.  He was not, however, satisfied 
with its representatives, since organizers failed to invite the ―real‖ representatives of civil 
society, the social movements:  
Mostaqbal: The first social movement was that of Puerto Alegre in 2000.  We 
were fascinated by the idea.  Finally, we adopted it; we wanted to do something 
here in Morocco and we backed the idea....  We told ourselves that things would 
continue to retain their militant and real social character.  Because when you have 
a social forum, real social movements should participate in it....  If I had to 
organise a forum now, I would invite the people of Bouarfa, the people of Sidi 
Ifni, and the people of Talsint.
45
  What is the objective of a social forum?  It is to 
gather these movements so they can speak about their experiences and their 
perspectives of cooperation....  If not, what‘s the use of forums.  It is a civil 
movement that is filtered by us, the social movements.   
Ben Moussa: How do you distinguish between a civil movement and a social 
movement? 
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 These are towns and regions in Morocco where ordinary citizens, miners, and unemployed students 
protested against various forms of injustices and witnessed serious violations of human rights.  
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Mostaqbal: Social movements are the ones that are very close to the populations 
and their problems; [civil ones] are elitist.... The problem is when a term is 
overused by the media and so you have to change in order to distinguish yourself.  
It is not a problem of terms.
46
   
Mostaqbal‘s understanding of ―civil society‖ further confirms the normative 
interpretation of the concept that is shared by all participants.  It is an interpretation that 
can become an ideological stance when it is used to exclude groups who are deemed too 
accommodating of state cooptation.  Mostaqbal‘s perception draws attention to the need 
to distinguish between ―traditional‖ civil society associations and organizations that are 
based on formal organizations, structure, and small elite constituencies on one hand and, 
on the other, newer forms of collective action involving large but loosely connected 
groups of citizens and activists who are mobilized around specific social issues rather 
than around ideologies, and use mainly direct forms of action such as protests and civil 
obedience.  This type of SM action has intensified in the last few years, sometimes taking 
the form of quasi-spontaneous civil disobedience; in some other cases, it took the form of 
well-organized protests against unemployment, marginalization, and social injustices.  
Talking to the veteran journalist Khaled Jamaï
47
 at his home in Rabat,
48
 I asked him about 
the future of Moroccan civil society in light of the continuing weakening of traditional 
political opposition.  Jamaï affirms:   
The first thing to note is that there is a new thing taking place at the national level.  
Political protest and action comes no longer from the center, but from the 
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periphery.  It‘s not Rabat that is moving, not Casablanca, not Marrakesh.  It is 
Sefrou that is moving, it is Sidi Ifni that is acting, it is Bouarfa that is acting, it is 
Larashe—it is the periphery.  The center is not moving.  It is the periphery that‘s 
leading contestation against power now.  This is something new.  The second 
thing: this contestation of the periphery is a popular one.  It is not partisan, it is the 
people who take control into their hands.  I am not sure if you watched those CDs 
on the movement in Tata; it is the people who protest in the streets.  Women with 
their children drumming  saucepans and marching with candles at 3:00 am; it is 
the people who decided to take control of the situation, given that political parties 
are not playing their roles, unions are not playing their roles—they don‘t trust 
them, they don‘t trust the Makhzan.   
Concurring with many interviewed activists who pointed out the important role that 
oppositional SMOs play to support spontaneous popular protests and workers‘ strikes, 
Jamaï adds:  
Inside these movements, we find groups like ATTAC, PADS, and AMDH that 
provide them with activists to organize these protests, so that they don‘t get out of 
hand.  For instance, during the events of Ifni, there were confrontations with the 
police, but no protester smashed the window of a store, set a fire, or destroyed a 
telephone cable or booth, which is extraordinary.  It was the police and 
gendarmerie who vandalized, ransacked, etc.  Things were reversed, you 
understand.  Why?  Because the activists of PADS, ATTAC, and AMDH were 
able to make sure that things didn‘t get out of hand.  This is something new, 
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something we have never witnessed—what I call, when I write about it, Intifada.49  
Morocco has become a country of ―Intifadas.‖   
In fact, in the face of the rapidly ebbing political clout of historical political parties such 
as Union socialiste des forces populaires (USFP), oppositional collective action is carried 
out by new social movements, particularly Islamic-oriented, Amazigh, feminist, and 
alter-globalization movements, in addition to small radical Left parties such as La voie 
démocratique, Le parti de l'avant-garde démocratique et socialiste (PADS), and Parti 
socialist unifié (PSU).  With the exception of the Islamic-oriented SMOs, however, most 
of these groups are based on small constituencies, and their impact on internal policy 
remains limited, unless they enter into large coalitions
50
 or their action becomes 
embedded within popular, informal social collective action, as in the cases described by 
Jamaï above.  These SMOs often have members who belong to local communities in 
peripheral regions, and can provide the support needed to turn spontaneous protests into 
organized and non-violent collective action.   
Thus, the participants agree on that the field of collective action has metamorphosed 
in recent years: from institutionalized action to informal organization, from coalitions 
based on ideological affiliations to broad ones grouped around specific issues and goals, 
and from organizational structures based on large constituencies to professional and small 
groups of activists embedded in local communities.  These new forms of collective action 
can be broadly subsumed under the term ―new social movements‖ to distinguish them 
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from ―older‖ forms of collective action.  But while new social movements in post-
industrial societies mark ―a shift from conflicts over material well-being to conflicts over 
cultural fulfillment‖ (Habermas, 2008, p. 193), conflict in Moroccan society has shifted 
from being predominantly class-related to one in which material and cultural fulfillments 
are increasingly seen as intrinsically interconnected and fused, and in which the 
achievement of one does not occur without the attainment of the other.  This can be 
clearly discerned in the discourse generated around the social protests of Sidi Ifni, Sefrou, 
and the Amazigh cultural movement, in which slogans and demands clearly link 
economic marginalization and class exploitation to cultural and ethnic identities.
51
   
Equally important, most of the participants from the leftist SMOs whom I talked to 
indicated that they either categorically refuse to cooperate with Islamic-oriented SMOs, 
or said that these groups cannot be considered as a part of civil society itself.  In 
Morocco, like most Muslim-majority countries, there is a sharp polarization over the 
issue of whether or not to legalize and include Islamic-oriented groups in formal political 
life.  The participation of the Islamic-oriented Justice and Development party in the last 
legislative elections in 2007 was seen by many as a landmark in Moroccan political 
history.  Controversy remains very strong over whether it is possible to accommodate the 
more radical Justice and Charity SMO, or even to consider it as part of civil society.  
Commenting on why Islamic-oriented SMOs were not invited to the Maghreb Social 
Forum, Michel Lambert, the General Director of Montreal-based Alternatives 
International, argues:  
You have to be inclusive, but you have to know what to include.  Many issues are 
at stake here in the case of Morocco with fundamentalists.  There are those who 
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say that there are moderate fundamentalists, and there are those who say there are 
not.  There is a whole debate on the issue in North Africa.  We allowed in 
Nairoubi‘s social forum for Christians—not fundamentalists, because there are no 
Christian fundamentalists [in Morocco], of course—to participate....  There was a 
debate, because you have to talk with these people.  Here, it is not the same issue; 
there is a need for a debate, but we cannot summarize the issue now.
52
   
Lambert‘s opinion clearly reflects a strong bias against Islamic-oriented groups that 
dominates not only in the West, but also within leftist and secular circles in Muslim-
dominated countries.  This radical stance often lumps together all types of Islamic-
oriented discourses and groups, which benefit the state and the monarchy more than any 
other group.  While the continuation of polarization inside civil society is a guarantee that 
the ―enemies‖ of the state will not unite against it, the monarchy presents itself as a 
guarantor of a delicate balance between traditions and modernism, and the protector of 
moderate Islam against radical Left and Islamic groups alike.  In contrast with this view, 
Aboubakre Jamaï,
53
 co-founder of the francophone Journal magazine and outspoken 
critic of the monarchy, asserts: 
The problem is not in the Islamists, but in the progressive people in the country.  
They are socially and politically weak and their weakness comes from the 
contradictions within their discourse.  You cannot tell me that you are fighting for 
democracy, openness, and the rights of women and [then] when the state kidnaps 
Islamists on accusations of terrorism and tortures them in Temara, you applaud it 
or you keep silent and look elsewhere.  Your credibility ends there and you 
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become inaudible.  We tried to say that you must be coherent—your discourse 
must be coherent....  I think that part of the Islamists‘ discourse, like that of the 
PJD, is a modernist one.  I don‘t call it an Islamist party, I call it a conservative 
party....  When you find an ―Islamic‖ party that works closely with people and 
tries to provide them with social services ... [and] publishes reports on what they 
achieved—when they try to be honest, and although I don‘t share their vision of 
society, I call this political modernism.  I don‘t agree with their vision of society 
that remains conservative, but I agree with their political style.  The main 
argument used against them is that if you open the door of democracy for them 
and they accede, they will turn against democracy itself.  There is some legitimacy 
for this argument, but we don‘t know, of course.  My experience with 
―Islamists54‖, through my interaction with them, not only PJD but also Justice and 
Charity, is that when these groups operate in an open context, it leads to the 
reinforcement of moderate elements inside them.  When there is an attitude of 
rejection and marginalization, we end by encouraging the radicals inside them.
55
   
Thus, the definition and boundaries of civil society remain a very controversial issue.  
Regardless of how they may define it, the majority of interviewees have expressed a firm 
conviction that civil society, and new social movements in particular, have become key 
political problems in society that are increasingly taking an active part in shaping 
governance and public life in the country.  In the words of Soubhi: 
I am sure it is an irresistible force.  I don‘t want to compare, but people are 
increasingly listening.  Before, they said, it‘s just an association.  Now they no 
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longer say this, because associations mobilize people.  When people died from 
cold in this village near Khenifra, if the associations hadn‘t mobilized people, the 
king would have never visited the region.  If the associations had not mobilized 
after the earthquake of El-Hoceima, people would have been left to suffer there for 
a long time....  If we take the example of the women‘s movement, for instance, 
and their campaign to amend the personal status law—everybody was laughing at 
them first.  [But] they were able to form a coalition of 260 associations and collect 
one million signatures throughout the country that were submitted to the king….  
If women had never started this process, there would have never been a change.   
4.2 Impact of the Internet on social movements. 
4.2.1 An economic tool of communication. 
Commentators have argued that the success of collective action in mobilizing support 
and countering hegemonic discourses and orders depends largely on the size and the type 
of resources that groups can mobilize at various levels.  According to this view, 
mobilization itself can be defined as ―the process by which a group secures collective 
control over the resources needed for collective action‖ (Jenkins, 2008, p. 121).  
Moreover, Marwell and Oliver (1993) argue that ―the most prominent and convincing 
evidence of a group‘s efficacy is probably the group‘s size and command over resources‖ 
(p. 10).  More importantly, it has been pointed out that with the advance of network and 
information society, mobilization and conflict are increasingly contingent upon the 
production of information (Melucci, 1994; 1996).   
In Morocco, however, civil society groups—especially those who strive to remain 
independent from the state—have little access to public funds, media, and other 
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resources.  In the neo-patrimonial regime of the country, the Makhzan uses the patronage 
system whereby it tries to keep all political actors, including civil society, inside its 
patron-client networks.  In addition to creating its own set of associations to counter the 
weight of ―independent‖ civil society and recruit elites into its sphere, the state also tries 
to use its material resources and coercive power to neutralize groups and SMOs that may 
challenge its hegemony.  Describing how public funds are allocated in this system, 
Halima Bennaoui, the coordinator of the Rabat chapter of La ligue démocratique des 
droits des femmes (LDDF), explains:  
The state does not help us.  It helps only those associations that rotate around it, 
but not the independent ones….  They don‘t tell you anything; but if you don‘t 
have cliental relations with them and you have no means by which to protest or to 
speak about it, [you get nothing].  Associative work in Morocco is very difficult, 
especially if you want to be independent.
56
   
In the same vein, Mohamed Lakjiri, an activist in the Amazigh cultural movement 
(ACM) and the webmaster of the collective Amazigh blog ―Ageddim,‖ argues: 
There is a dialectic relationship between the [Amazigh] movement and its use of 
the media.  [The movement] relies on voluntary work and self-funding, since it 
does not receive any type of support, especially from the state.  It suffers from 
scarcity of material and human resources; there are only a few [Amazigh] print 
publications and only three in print that work in very harsh conditions....  It is a 
very difficult situation
57
.   
                                                 
56
 The interview was conducted on July 17
th
, 2008.   
57
 The interview was conducted online on March 7
th
, 2009.  
262 
 
In an environment where oppositional social movements find it extremely difficult to 
compete with state and mainstream media over the production of information and the 
frames necessary to build and sustain collective action, ICTs are providing new 
possibilities that are empowering these groups at many levels.  In fact, most interviewees 
pointed out that one of the central contributions of the Internet to collective action is that 
it is a far cheaper and more efficient tool for mobilization and information dissemination.   
Many respondents have therefore indicated that the Internet is being used as an 
alternative to the telephone or the fax, especially to communicate with chapters and 
activists belonging to the same NGO.  The Internet is also being used to reduce the costs 
of transportation when it is necessary to coordinate action or hold meetings between 
members who live in towns and cities far from one another.  Naima Tirerovine and 
Jamila Garmouma, activists at LDDP, discussing the Injad centres (Injad means 
―rescuing‖ in Arabic)—a network operated by the NGO that documents cases of violence 
against women and provides victims with legal and psychological assistance—stated that 
[The League‘s Injad centers] use the Internet for filing and distributing reports.  
For instance, all centers hold monthly meetings and do reports and training.  Now 
these centers hold fewer meetings because they can use the Internet to 
communicate.  So the Internet saves you the cost of the telephone and also of the 
meetings.  For instance, somebody who would have had to come from Ouerzazate 
to headquarters in Casablanca to discuss certain points can now [attend the 
meeting] via the Internet.
58
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Similarly, Abderrezak Idrissi, the webmaster and editor of the AMDH website and 
print newspaper, explains how this medium radically transformed the way AMDH 
activists share information nationally and internationally:   
The Internet is economical, it is fast, it enables you to do comprehensive coverage, 
and it is easy to use.  Before, we used to write a statement and send it by post, 
which would take 15 days to reach its destination.  Then came the fax.  It was 
marvelous.  I used to walk by [the association‘s office] and find an activist or 
employee sending faxes to many numbers one after another.  But it was very 
costly at all levels.  With the Internet, you send a message with one click on Press-
Maroc and it is received by some 4,000 members that include journalists and 
politicians in Morocco and outside it, in the countryside and in cities.  We could 
not imagine that we could do something like that.
59
   
Indeed, by using free and easy to use tools such as e-mail and e-mail listserves, SMOs are 
now able to share information and coordinate action in ways only the state, corporate 
institutions, and mainstream media could afford before.  In the words of Jawad 
Mostaqbal: 
[sending] information to everyone in Morocco was not possible.  Only the state 
had the luxury to do so through television, radio, and other media.  Now, we have 
this extraordinary tool of the Internet.  It is true that sometimes it is abused, but I 
prefer this situation, though.  We use e-mails, but there are other tools such as 
Facebook and blogs. 
Many commentators have warned against growing corporate dominance over the 
Internet that jeopardizes its use as a free tool of communication and civic participation 
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(Barratt & Shade, 2007; Frischmann, 2001; Grimes & Shade, 2005; Simpson, 2004).  As 
a response to this threat, various activists and groups have developed free and open-
source software that allows users and civil society organizations to both reduce 
communication costs and establish democratic and participatory forms of 
communication.  Jawad Mostaqbal, for instance, explains how ATTAC‘s use of open-
source software developed through time: 
We developed alongside the progress of the technology.  In the beginning, we 
used JavaScript.  Then, we added effects so our website would be active and 
attractive.  Recently, we switched to a version of Joomla for many reasons: to 
facilitate updating the website, as it enables other comrades to intervene to add 
information; and because it is open-source, which perfectly fits our ideas and our 
[approach to] action.   
Similarly, Caroline Tagny, project officer of youth programs at Alternative International, 
explains the choice of open-source software in the design of the E-Joussour website: 
The tools we use in general are open software ... because they allow websites to be 
updated by people who are not experts in computer programming ... and because 
of the values behind these software [tools] that correspond to our organizational 
values and those of the organizations with whom we work—that is, transparency, 
openness, sharing, etc.  In the case of E-Jousssor, the tool we used was 
―drurpal60‖; it was chosen, especially in the Maghreb context, because it is a tool 
that allows translation or the option of having a multilingual website, which is 
easy to program, especially with Arabic.   
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4.2.2 Participatory communication. 
In parallel with their use of open software tools, most SMOs rely on Web 2.0 
platforms, such as wikis, blogs, and e-lists, because they are free and easy to maintain 
and use.  In fact, the majority of respondents stated that their groups are facing problems 
with properly setting up or regularly updating conventional websites because they require 
significant material and human resources.  In comparison, respondents stressed the 
central role of e-mail lists in facilitating internal communication, as well as interaction 
with other SMOs.  There are two major e-lists used by leftist associations and groups, 
namely PAD-Maroc and Press-Maroc, both of which are based on Yahoo Group e-mail 
software and service thousands of subscribers.  Any person can subscribe to the two lists, 
but approval of the automatic subscription is required from the lists‘ moderators.  In my 
interview with Idrissi, who is also one of three moderators of the Press-Maroc e-list, he 
shared numerous insights into the potential and limits of e-lists to the civil groups using 
them:  
Idrissi: [The list] is considered like a press agency, and a free one.  It takes little of 
your time to organize things, to have an eye for important messages that you 
acquire through time, to sort out the messages that you won‘t read, those you will 
delete—these things are necessary.   
Ben Moussa: Are you the only person supervising Press-Maroc?   
Idrissi: No, four of us are doing it.   
Ben Moussa: And they belong all to AMDH?   
Idrissi: They belong to various associations and bodies, but they are all linked to 
AMDH in one way or another.  One of them lives in a remote place near Tawnat, 
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but in reality he does not work much on it; two of us are in Rabat and the other in 
Khmissat
61
.... The moderators have the right to refuse any contribution and have 
the right to reconsider the posting of contributions—for instance, double postings.   
As Idrissi contends above, the use of e-lists not only allows for the horizontal 
networking of civil society groups, but also contributes to redressing the imbalance 
between big, central urban centres and marginal regions in the country.  Indeed, because 
within a network, the ―distance between nodes tends to be zero‖ (Castells, 2004, p. 4), the 
use of social network technologies like the e-list leads to the elimination, at least online, 
of the distance between centres and margins, thus sometimes permitting activists in 
remote places to take the initiative and be at the centre of a local and transnational 
collective action network.  This observation is further confirmed in the following 
conversation with Abdelilah Mansouri, a teacher of philosophy and member of the 
central committee of the Unified Socialist Party (PSU): 
A militant from our party was the one to launch Pad-Maroc.  [The list] is 
supervised by Mohamed Awni and Mohamed Khoya, both of whom are militants 
at the PSU, although they both live in remote parts far from the centers in 
Ouerzazate
62
....  PAD played a principal role in communication between the 
political elites in our country, particularly those from the Left, and also in 
covering a large number of events.  It has now become one of the main sources of 
news for Moroccan newspapers, and also for communicating with militants 
outside the country....  PAD played a very important role in many events and 
created problems for the state, either in Sefrou or Sidi Ifni, by mobilizing support 
                                                 
61
 A city in the Middle Atlas Mountains in Morocco.   
62
 A city in the south of Morocco. 
267 
 
and solidarity; an event that happens in Rabat will draw solidarity in remote places 
in marginalized Morocco.  We can say that it has greater influence than many 
daily newspapers in Morocco and is a source of national and international news.  
It also presents coverage of national newspapers, Algerian newspapers, as well as 
Spanish and French ones.
63
   
In addition to these two national lists, many SMOs have their own internal lists.  
Because shared membership is a key characteristic of Moroccan civil society, many 
activists who are members in various groups end up receiving a huge number of e-mails 
that may have repetitive content.  A key problem with e-lists that many participants have 
identified is that they significantly augment the workload because of the time needed to 
process the huge numbers of e-mail received.  Consequently, SMOs try to exercise 
control over this tool by setting restrictions on the subscription to internal lists in order to 
maximize their utility and the quality of the discussion that takes place on them.  Jawad 
Moustaqbal explains the case for ATTAC: 
Our internal list functions well, but we limit the number of adherents—not 
everybody can join, which allows us to concentrate on our struggles and 
discussions and not get diverted by other issues.   
This testimony reflects the limitations of participatory media and the notion of direct 
democracy and universal public sphere.  In theory, the Internet has the potential—more 
than any other electronic medium—to sustain the development of a truly participative and 
egalitarian public sphere.  However, open participation produces a lot of ―noise‖ that 
affects the quality of discussion and communication because of the time and cognitive 
capabilities needed to process a huge number of messages.  Yet, e-lists are amongst the 
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most important online applications used by social movements.  In parallel with their 
ability to disseminate information widely and effectively, they play a major role in 
linking SMOs together and creating quasi-permanent networks of solidarity between 
them.  Feature analysis above has demonstrated the low rate of the use of SMOs‘ 
websites in interlinking at the national level.  E-lists, thus, help address this gap—further 
demonstrating that diverse online platforms are used to perform various goals that 
complement one another.   
4.2.3 The networking role of the Internet. 
The interlinking potential of the Internet is often described as the most defining 
characteristic of the medium, since it is inscribed into how the technology was built and 
is  used (see a more detailed discussion in Chapter Six, section 2.6).  This potential has 
immense implications for collective action because it can enable individuals and groups 
to build alliances that are crucial to the success and effectiveness of mobilization, 
resistance, and contestation.  The regional and international networking potential of the 
Internet is transforming the nature of collective action itself, by multiplying the capacity 
of SMOs to disseminate information and mobilize support.  According to Castells (2001), 
the Internet ―fits with the basic features of the kind of social movements emerging in the 
Information Age ....  The Internet is not simply a technology: it is a communication 
media, and it is the material infrastructure of a given organizational form: the network‖ 
(pp. 135–6).  Moroccan social movements have become more sensible to this potential, as 




Civil society has progressed along the development of the strategy of struggle.  
It‘s no longer about writing an article.  It‘s the system of the network, and it is 
functioning incredibly.  We have relay points in Paris, London—everywhere.  Any 
time we write something, it is redistributed by our activists, which gives it another 
dimension as a snowball.   
Jamaï‘s remark draws attention to the dialectic between collective action and repertoires 
as they shape one another and define their mutual limits.  As Tilly and Tarrow (2007) 
discuss, ―[r]epertoires vary from place to place, time to time, and pair to pair.  But on the 
whole, when people make collective claims, they innovate within limits set by the 
repertoire already established for their place, time, and pair‖ (p. 16).  By boosting the 
capacity of social movements to construct networks of solidarity across national borders, 
the Internet has not only empowered them to act against injustices, but transformed their 
own perceptions and interpretations of collective action as well.  
This is especially important in issues and causes that require consolidated effort and a 
higher level of coordination transnationally, as is the case with the campaign aiming to 
lobby Arab governments to lift all reservations on the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discriminations against Women (CEDAW).  Explaining her role in the 
campaign, Wafaa Amdaw, a volunteer activist at the Association démocratique des 
femmes du Maroc (ADFM), points out: 
I work on the regional campaign for the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Discriminations Against Women [CEDAW]; I supervise the electronic 
campaign....  We at the ADFM coordinate the campaign.  That is, we have here 
the ―tansikiya‖ or the coordination [committee].  We have an online petition and a 
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blog.  This is the electronic campaign that I help with.  Why do we call this a 
regional campaign?  Because at the level of each country, there is a national 
campaign where civil societies try to convince governments to withdraw their 
reservations about the convention; the regional campaign is at the level of the 
Arab World.  We went to all the most visited websites in the Arab World and we 
sent them our communiqué.  We explained our mission and what we wanted to do 
about this issue.  They published it on their websites.  That is how many people 
became aware of our work.  Otherwise, there are people among us who participate 
in forums and meetings, and take with them reports we did on the subject.  We 
target all the people who visit these websites.  We explain to them what the 
convention is, the reservations Arab countries have in regard to it, our campaign, 
the URL address of our blog, and the petition if they want to sign it.  We send all 
this information by e-mail to these websites that are the most visited in the Arab 
World.  And of course we focus on those who defend human rights and the rights 
of women.
64
   
Faced with stiff resistance from powerful conservative circles in Arab societies over 
the issue of CEDAW, many feminist NGOs in these countries, including Morocco, found 
themselves isolated and politically vulnerable.  In this context, ADFM spearheaded a 
regional campaign about the issue, which succeeded in drawing media and public 
attention, as well as in soliciting international support to the cause.  As a result, the king 
of Morocco stated his support for lifting, albeit partially, some of the reservations on the 
convention.  The Internet, thus, is allowing diverse groups to form national and 
transnational networks, which has enhanced the efficiency of their lobbying and 
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pressurizing tactics.  Jawad Mostaqbal, for instance, explains the role of the Internet in a 
national campaign to free political prisoners:   
We use the Internet to gather support and do petitions ... and in the case of the first 
of May prisoners
65
 and of Mohamed Bougrine
66
, [the petitions] worked well.  We 
had between 2,000 and 2,500 signatures, and we sent [the petitions] to embassies 
etc....  People recognize the effort of our network to free the prisoners.  There is 
direct action and there is pressure.  When you have a petition that is signed by 
thousands of militants from around the world, it is also a form of pressure on the 
regime and its image, because the state spends thousands and thousands of 
Dirhams to enhance its international image.   
The liberalization of the Moroccan economy and its integration in global capitalism 
has made the Moroccan state keener to project an image of modernity and stability in 
order to attract international capital; as a consequence, it has become susceptible to the 
global flow of negative representations of and news about the country.  Various SM 
groups try to exploit this relative vulnerability by using the Internet to circulate pictures, 
videos, and articles on human rights violations and social injustices that can mobilize 
INGOs and other associations for their causes.  Invoking this strategy, Said Rahmouni, an 
activist of La ligue nationale des cadres supérieures au chômage—a member group of the 
Unemployed Graduates movement—states that  
[o]ne of the objectives of the blog is to communicate with human rights 
organizations to provide information about our case and to make known the 
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human rights violations we are subjected to.…  They read [the blog] and I have e-
mail contacts on it, so they can use them.  We receive solidarity statements and 
letters, etc.  Thanks to the blog, our movement has become known worldwide.  If 
you go to France, for instance, and you mention the unemployed graduates, they 
will tell you they are protesting in the streets of Rabat….  Media pressure 
constitutes a pressure on and embarrassment for the state.
67
   
Lending credence to Rahmouni, Abderrezak Idrissi explains how the role of INGOs and 
other international bodies are crucial to successfully pressuring the Moroccan state, 
though this success is contingent on various other factors:  
As a human rights association, we cannot put pressure on the state alone without 
international bodies, especially that state officials sometimes—and I say 
sometimes because it is not systematic—take into consideration Amnesty 
International or Human Rights Watch, or some other body concerned with human 
rights, such as the European Union or the UN.  You find then that there is an 
effect.   
These testimonies corroborate the findings of the feature analysis above that proved 
that most of the hyperlinks found on the majority of the studied websites link to INGOs.  
However, while the role of technology in establishing these forms of transnational 
solidarity networks is significant, it is not the sole factor, nor is it sufficient to guarantee 
positive outcomes.  First, not all issues receive equal attention from INGOs and civil 
society in Western countries.  The widespread silence within international civil society 
over the arrests of thousands of people after the Casablanca bombing in 2003, for 
instance, shows how ideological stances and biases can define the boundaries and 
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possibilities of solidarity.  Moreover, as Idrissi remarked, the Moroccan state is not easily 
amenable to international criticism and bad publicity, since forcing policy change 
requires prolonged pressure, which may not always be possible due to competition 
among a large number of issues on the media‘s agenda.   
4.2.4 The local and global dynamics of online public spheres. 
The testimonies above provide strong support for the findings discussed in Chapter 
Five about the tendency of SMOs—especially professional leftist-oriented ones—to link 
to INGOs and institutions.  These findings illustrate what Samhat and Payne (2006) 
define as a ―global public sphere‖ (p. 252), which is distinguished from a domestic and 
international public sphere by virtue of its trans-boundary network of communication and 
organization, and by the nature of its membership.   
Although forming transnational networks of solidarity and activism is not a recent 
phenomenon, the diffusion of new media, particularly the Internet, has phenomenally 
boosted the capacity of social movements in Morocco to draw on them through global 
―micro public spheres‖ (Volkmer, 2003, p. 13), that arise around single issues, as is the 
case in the campaign aiming to free the political prisoners described above.  The 
intensification of linkages between local and global spheres manifests itself in diverse 
articulations characterizing social movements and their use of the Internet.  In the case of 
the alter-globalization movement, translocal interconnectedness informs not only 
collective action tactics, but also the movement‘s own identity and objectives, as Michel 
Lambert, Alternative International‘s General Director, explains:  
Without going into all the details, we think that this region is the epicentre of a 
global war.  It is important for progressive people to militate for a better society, 
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one that has the capacity to resist the war.  We are struggling now to hold the next 
social forum in Palestine, and we want activists from around the world that are 
concerned about a number of issues, like the environment, to pay attention to this 
region that needs to live in peace.  The other thing is that problems are becoming 
global and international.  But they affect everyone in a different way; and for the 
solutions to be efficient, they have to be globalized and internationalized too.  This 
is the real challenge.   
This vision underlies the project of the E-Joussour portal launched by Alternatives 
International and Forum des Alternatives Maroc (FMAS) to act as an online hub to 
connect the eastern and western parts of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  It is 
a project that is based on both existing social networks, as well as on collective action 
strategies adopted by Moroccan and international alter-globalization SMOs.  As 
Hammouda, the portal‘s coordinator, points out:  
It‘s a virtual network, but the basis of the project is to support the dynamic that 
exists in the region….  We work with trade unions in the region and E-Joussour 
has permitted unions in Morocco, Algeria, and Palestine to see one another and to 
participate in social forums—not necessarily virtually, but physically.  They all 
militate for social rights in the Maghreb-Mashreq region.   
Similar to the E-Joussour project, the Internet also plays a central role in linking 
ATTAC–Maroc with ATTAC–International and the rest of the alter-globalization 
movement.  In the words of Jawad Mostaqbal: 
I think ATTAC-International does not exist like an international institution or 
organization.  There is an ATTAC network.  We do not have an international 
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congress, as in the case of Transparency International.  We are not a chapter of 
ATTAC.  We are ATTAC–Morocco, and we are part of the alter-globalization 
movement.  At the organizational level, the only thing that links ATTAC 
associations is the website of ATTAC–International.   
The articulation between local and translocal public spheres operates on various 
levels other than solidarity and common objectives.  A number of participants, 
particularly those belonging to leftist-oriented SMOs, have indicated that significant 
portions of users who visit their websites are located outside the country.  ATTAC is a 
telling example: only 3% of visitors to its website are located in Morocco, according to 
Jawad Mostaqbal: 
Ben Moussa: Can you tell me where users of your website come from?  
Mostaqbal: Yes, of course.  I will surprise you by telling you that 97% of visitors 
come from outside Morocco.  France comes out on top, with 60 to 87% .  The rest 
come from Canada, Saudi Arabia, and from all over the world.   
Ben Moussa:  Just 3% from Morocco.  Don‘t you think this is too little for a 
Moroccan association?   
Mostaqbal:  You have to link the number to that of Internet users, too.  In France, I 
don‘t know how many users there are, [but] certainly over 40 million.  Everybody 
uses it.  This is not the case in Morocco….  But of course, we have to exert more 
effort to make the website known, because [now] it is limited to the closed circle 
of militants....  It is not the circle of young people, of employees, etc.  But ATTAC 
is not a mass popular SMO.  We aspire to become one, but we are not thousands.  
We are a minority; we cannot pretend the contrary.   
276 
 
The case of ATTAC applies to many leftist SMOs that rely on limited constituencies 
formed from hardcore members and sympathizers.  Moreover, because they rely on 
extensive cross-membership, their constituencies expand or shrink according to the type 
of struggle or issue at a particular moment, and the category of alliances and coalitions 
formed during a period of visible mobilization.  Furthermore, while quantitative data 
shows that the number of Internet users in the country is relatively high, most of these 
users, however, have very limited and irregular access to the Internet (for more details, 
see Chapter Two).  In addition, it is normal that most visitors of SMOs‘ website are 
located in France and other European countries, given the size of the Moroccan 
diasporas, which are more affluent and have better access to the Internet.  This is 
particularly important for Islamic-oriented SMOs that have a great number of followers 
among Moroccan diasporas in Europe.  As Hassan Bennajah, secretary general of Justice 
and Charity‘s youth section, and former webmaster of the SMO‘s website, said: 
There is a daily increase in the number of people who consider the Internet their 
main source of information; the number in Morocco is not satisfactory, but it is 
much greater than before.  If we consider the number of visitors to the website, we 
should be more than satisfied ... [but] I can‘t give you their number.  We receive 
visitors from inside and outside the country; and this is important, because we 
have a great number of members outside the country in various [other] countries.  
But we are satisfied if we speak with numbers.
68
   
Virtual networks and representations are inseparable from the physical hardware 
upon which they are based and the offline existence of the users who produce and are 
affected by them.  That is why ―virtual networks operate at their best when they are 
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backed by real social linkages in specifically localized communities‖ (Della Porta & 
Diani, 2006, p. 133).   
4.2.5 Online and off-line networks. 
While the Internet is a relatively cheap, flexible, and effective tool of 
communication, it is largely insufficient in a country where almost half of the population, 
most of which are women, are illiterate and live where access to the Internet is very 
limited.  This is illustrated by the case of the Democratic League of Women‘s Rights 
(LDDF), whose members have to use, in addition to the Internet, different tools in their 
information and mobilization campaigns (especially for interpersonal communication), in 
order to reach the largest possible number of women.  As Halima Bennaoui explains: 
So our work developed greatly and we used the caravans as we moved to remote 
regions in Morocco in order to work in close contact, to listen to women, to know 
their problems and not be elitist women speaking just from our own perspectives.  
So this enabled us to develop other forms of work, but from the start we have 
always worked as a movement, and we act in various spaces.…  We could not 
cover all of the country and so we had to cooperate with teachers in schools—so 
we cooperated with the Ministry of National Education to provide training for 
teachers on these themes so that they, in turn, can teach them to others.   
Though the feminist SMO has significantly benefited from the Internet, which is used 
to coordinate work, reduce communication costs, and create an accessible online 
database, the LDDF has to rely on interpersonal communication and offline social 
networks— namely schools and teachers—to deliver their messages and get through to 
women in remote or poor regions and neighborhoods.  Preexisting social networks thus 
278 
 
play a central role in mobilization and in securing the continuation of collective action 
over time, for ―embeddeness in social networks not only matters for recruitment; it also 
works as an antidote to leaving, and as a support to continued participation‖ (Della Porta 
& Diani, 2006, p. 118).  The experience of Youth Action (Action Jeunesse), an 
association supported by Alternative International concentrating on the empowerment of 
young people, best illustrates this idea. Ghassan Garmouni, a student and activist in the 
association, explains in the following exchange:  
Ghassan Carmouni
69
:  At the national level, we have been able to organize six 
regional forums since 2005, and one general forum.  We were able to organize 
these forums through the assistance of local associations like ―Intilaqua,‖ 
―Ashoala,‖ ―Amish,‖ and the local chapters of the Moroccan Association of 
Human Rights.  In these forums, militants of Youth Action were able to meet 
other young people, to explain our projects [and] provide analysis of the situation.  
And so we were able to mobilize other young people who are active in other 
regional and national associations, and who constituted regional chapters of Youth 
Action.   
Ben Moussa: What are the communication tools you use most to coordinate these 
activities? Do you use ICTs in your work?   
Carmouni: The first tool of communication is interpersonal contacts.  Each 
member of Youth Action is a member in a network that he can try to mobilize.  It 
is this informal level that plays an important role in our mobilization capacity.  
Then, there is a second level that is more formal; it is all our organizational 
                                                 
69
 The interview was conducted on June 18, 2008.   
279 
 
communication made up of two forms: the semester bulletins we publish and our 
website.  Our site is our façade and our window on the world.   
For Carmouni, the use of the Youth Action‘s website is limited to a supporting role, i.e. 
communicating and sharing the outcome of a long process of mobilization that draws 
mainly on interpersonal communication and existing offline networks.   
The embeddedness of online networks within those that are offline is manifest in the 
case of grassroots movements that rely on dense social networks and cultural bonds, such 
as the Islamicones.  Benefitting from a wide network of disciplined and dedicated 
members and sympathizers, the Justice and Charity SMO, for instance, combines the use 
of alternative media, particularly the Internet; small media, such as cassettes and CDs; 
and interpersonal communication to customize its discourse for various types of members 
and potential adherents, and to cover the remotest parts of the country.  In the words of 
Hassan Bennajah:  
There is something that we are disciplined about: the fact that everyone of us 
should be an individual, mobile medium of information.  Every member in the 
movement has to become a media body in which there is communication, politics, 
exhortation, and everything.… This is the most widespread means, since everyone 
has a number of people with whom he meets on a daily and regular basis—his 
family, his neighbors—and so because the movement is present in most of the 
country‘s regions, and it can reach regions that even the state is unable to reach.  
We reach people in these regions that are forgotten and left out of state policies—
and in many cases, you will find that they know news about J&C through these 
alternative tools.   
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Communication becomes, therefore, a religious duty as much as political activism.  
Moreover, the case of J&C shows that networks are the outcome of the participation and 
work occurring at the micro or individual level, before they are the result of interactions 
between individuals.  To build efficient networks, movements need much more than 
technical and organizational infrastructure, for the motivation of individuals 
using/forming networks is a precondition to the networks themselves.  Consequently, 
grassroots movements that are identity-oriented are better placed to form more solid and 
effective networks.  This allows them to customize their communication tactics according 
to the category of audiences they target.   
 4.2.6 Synergy between online platforms and media. 
The synergy between online and offline networks highlighted above is further 
enhanced by the complex interplay between various online platforms on the one hand, 
and between the Internet and other media on the other.  Though the majority of 
interviewees stressed the centrality of the e-mail list as a tool of mobilization and 
information dissemination, many indicated that websites possess greater potential for 
collective action.  E-mail-listserves are a fast and effective means of sharing and 
disseminating information; however, their diffusion is limited to their members, which 
limits their impact and reach, as Idrissi discussed in the following interview: 
Ben Moussa: In comparison to your website, there is a great deal of dynamism in 
your use of the e-mail-lists—do they make up for the weakness of the site?   
Idrissi: They complement one another, I think.  [But] the website has a greater 
importance than the group e-mail.  The website is visited by people that are not on 
those lists.  That‘s why it should be dynamic and active similarly to what you see 
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on the e-mail list.  The e-mail list is an easy thing—anyone can send a message 
through it.  Updating the site needs a lot of editing and so on.  There is 
complementarity; but in my opinion, the website is better.   
In fact, despite their effectiveness, e-mail-lists can reinforce the isolation of ―radical 
ghettos‖ (Downey & Fenton, 2003, p. 190), leading to more fragmentation of the public 
sphere.  In comparison, websites have the potential to reach actual and potential 
constituents, as well as the large public constituted of the ―bystanders.‖  A website helps 
situate a group in the national and international shared arena, providing it with social 
capital and recognition, as Bennaoui explains in the case of La Ligue démocratique pour 
les droits des femmes (LDDF): 
Ben Moussa:  But do you really need the website?  What will it add to your work?   
Bennaoui:  So that many other people know about our experience.  We don‘t want 
our experience to remain only for us, we want other associations to know about it 
and benefit from it, both inside and outside of Morocco.  We want our publication 
to reach people and our experiences to reach people.  More than that, OXFAM is 
undertaking a project to learn more about experiences like ours.  Many 
associations that are in the project want to know the details of our work and to 
publish it so other associations can benefit from it.   
It is worth noting here that Bennaoui defines recognition mainly in an international 
context rather than a national one, which further illustrates the asymmetrical relationship 
between local and global NGOs and civil society actors.  Moreover, the LDDF engages in 
both lobbying and development activities, as the organization seeks to improve women‘s 
economic and social conditions through awareness and training campaigns.  The 
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organization uses multiple sets of media, such as print material, including brochures, 
books and pamphlets, CDs, and cassette tapes, in addition to collective visits (caravans) 
to remote villages in the country and to diasporic communities in Europe.   
A common problem facing these SMOs is the daunting obstacle of illiteracy that 
pushes them to find alternative media that rely on oral and visual communication, such as 
tapes and CDs.  Naima Tirerovine and Jamila Garmouma, two volunteers at the LDDP, 
pointed out to me:  
We issue a lot of print materials, such as books.  We use various means to get to 
different types of people.  But we cannot give these things to an illiterate woman.  
―Read it and you will understand violence.‖  We used audio tapes, and we were 
the first ones to use them, after the new Personal Status Code
70
 was adopted, 
during the 2000 caravan, I think, so that women could understand it.  We did a 
simplified recording on the Personal Status Code in Moroccan Arabic dialect; we 
did it in Berber, French, and Spanish, too, so as to get to people.  So when we 
went to Spain, we took [the Spanish] ones for women and girls there.   
However, because these media are destined for individual consumption, they have 
limited publicity and visibility beyond the people who use them.  Indeed, Halima 
Bennaoui and other activists in the LDDF explained to me when I visited their offices, 
that many of these materials are lost especially because the Union has limited space to 
store them.  An online platform is one possible solution, since it can be used to archive 
materials online, provide easy access to them, and share them on a large scale.  Despite 
the effectiveness of other media as tools of communication and mobilization, the majority 
of respondents, like Bennoui above, highlighted the uniqueness of the Internet as a 
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medium that can give greater visibility.  Soufiane Ladham, from the Democratic 
Association of Moroccan Women, shares this opinion: 
We concentrate on lobbying.  It involves a lot of communication and images.  
When we send faxes and e-mails to journalists and newspapers, it does not lead to 
great publicity.... But when we post information on the website, it is visited by 
more people and each day the number will increase.  If you search for information 
on Google, it will lead you to our website.  We need more visibility, and using the 
Internet helps us a lot in this [goal]....  Now, we can say that if you don‘t have a 
website, it is as if you don‘t exist.   
Ladham‘s statement reflects some exaggeration about the impact of the website, most 
probably because ADFM was just launching its new website at the time, and was hoping 
it would greatly help to achieve the group‘s mission.  Nonetheless, his testimony shows 
how social actors understand the role of the medium and situate it in relation to other 
tools of communication, including web-based ones.  In most cases, different platforms 
can be used simultaneously or consecutively, as Mohamed Lakjiri explains:   
When I joined the Amazigh cultural movement, I was receiving a lot of e-mail that 
concerned issues and new events in the movement.  Each day, I was receiving 
between 15 and 20 statements, communiqués, [or] ads concerning ACM.  I wanted 
to make those e-mails public....  I received some through PAD–Maroc and Press–
Maroc, but I also received e-mail through my personal address.  I have a 
relationship with many activists in the ACM who send me their statements and 
communiqués.  I wanted everybody to benefit from them.  Through these e-mail 
messages, I received [information about] many issues I didn‘t find in local 
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newspapers, Amazigh websites, or national ones.  So, I thought of setting up a 
website for this purpose.   
Lakjiri‘s media intervention sheds light on the confluence between mobilization 
processes at the micro and meso levels as the blog project draws on material borrowed 
from personal e-mail and collective e-lists, as well as on private connections and 
collective action networks (see Chapter Five for a definition of micromobilization).  The 
project further illustrates how Web-based platforms can provide a higher level of 
―publicity‖ that cannot be attained through other interfaces.  Sharing the same data on 
various platforms serves a number of purposes beyond their immediate informative 
functions. While a statement shared through an e-mail list provides information for other 
activists upon which they can further act, its posting on a blog acquires an added value—
namely, accessibility; at least theoretically, it is available to members and adversaries 
alike, contributing to building a dynamic public sphere where opposing frames and 
interpretations counterbalance and sometimes integrate one another.   
Moreover, as a technology, the Internet is based upon and incorporated into an 
extensive range of ICTs, such as computers, mobile phones, and digital cameras, which 
are increasingly being used seamlessly.  For instance, mobile phones are used to capture 
photos and videos that are made available for downloading and sharing on the Internet, 
while PCs have made it easy to share multimedia information not just on the Internet, but 
also on DVDs and CDs.  Upon attending the First Maghreb Social Forum in the city of 
El-Jadida, for instance, I noticed that most participant groups were distributing and 
displaying video CDs featuring street actions, protests, and documentations of police 
brutality against members, which helps them mobilize sympathizers and receive 
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donations and contributions.  This observation confirms many commentators‘ assertions 
that new media like the Internet are unlikely to render older ones obsolete, since ―digital 
networks will be increasingly interwoven with other networks in complex and mutually 
redefining ways‖ (Clement & Shade, 2000, p. 34).   
Furthermore, as the case of the Unified Socialist Party below illustrates, during 
events that require quick mobilization, some SMOs may use the Internet to post detailed 
information and action calendars.  However, mobile phones are often more convenient, as 
they allow faster mobilization, especially because not all members and adherents have 
easy access to the Internet:   
Manssouri:  We use the Internet and we send faxes to the offices that have [fax 
machines].  We use [short message service] SMS [to mobilize] protest and 
marches.  For instance, during events protesting some crime related to the war in 
Iraq or to Palestine, we were able to mobilize militants and the general public to 
protest in front of the American consulate here in Casablanca [and] the embassy in 
Rabat.  The incident happened in the morning and we were able to mobilize the 
protest in the afternoon, in which hundreds of militants and the general public 
were able to participate.   
Ben Moussa:  How do you reach all these people at once?   
Manssouri:  We ask every militant to send the message to five or ten people he 
knows, and thus it spreads quickly.  Sometimes SMS is quicker; and when there is 
something urgent, we send messages to militants here in Casablanca.  And so 
SMS plays an important role in this domain.   
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The Internet is, therefore, used alongside other media to deliver information to and to 
mobilize various types of users (horizontal integration), or to share information and 
materials that are retransmitted and redistributed through other media (vertical 
integration).   
4.2.7 The organizational role of the Internet. 
Analysts who studied the political appropriation of the Internet by SMOs have 
overwhelmingly concentrated on its use for direct mobilization, networking, and 
dissemination of alternative information, and only very little on its use for internal 
organizational purposes.  Our data, however, confirm that this function is a central aspect 
of these groups‘ use of the Internet, and is even sometimes the main one.   
As stated above, a major factor in the Internet‘s growing adoption by Moroccan civil 
society groups is its low cost as a tool of communication.  With chapters and centers 
dispersed over a vast geographical area, and with meager financial resources, many 
associations and NGOs are relying on the Internet to reduce the costs associated with 
communicating by telephone, as well as with transportation when face-to-face 
communication is needed.  Tirerovine and Garmouma point out that this is true of 
LDDF‘s help centers for women:  
The league‘s Injad centers71 use the Internet to file and distribute reports.  For 
instance, all centers hold monthly meetings and do reports and training.  Now 
these centers hold fewer meetings because they can use the Internet to 
communicate.  So the Internet saves you the cost of the telephone and also of the 
meetings.  For instance, [it‘s no longer necessary] for somebody to come from 
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Ouerzazate to headquarters in Casablanca to discuss certain points—they can do it 
via the Internet....  So if we have to meet, we will only discuss the main issues and 
results; we will not meet every month or every two weeks to discuss all the 
points—especially [because] we receive large numbers of women, and the centers 
have to file monthly reports.  So the Internet can alleviate the work load and 
reduce the costs for us.   
In addition to using e-mail to communicate and intranet networks to link databases 
and sections, civil society groups post information and action calendars online to keep 
militants—particularly those living in remote areas—informed and updated, which 
contributes to the cohesion and effectiveness of both organization and action.  
Furthermore, social movements‘ collective action alternates between short and ephemeral 
periods of high visibility, as they ―become visible only where a field of public conflict 
arises,‖ and long period of ―latency‖ (Melucci, 1989, p. 71).  The Internet can play a 
significant role in maintaining the continuation of mobilization and action through online 
communication and interaction.  In some cases, the Internet, and website interfaces in 
particular, plays a big role in imparting a sense of unity, cohesion, and continuity to 
movements or groups that are threatened either by internal divisions or external 
repression.  This applies specifically to groups that lack strong organizational structures, 
are geographically dispersed, and/or lack other media outlets, as Jawad Moustaqbal 
points out in the case of ATTAC–Maroc:   
The website plays this role of internal communication between ATTAC militants 
from various countries and between sympathisers.  It is the only platform that 
guarantees the continuation of information sharing at the level of ATTAC, 
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because print edition and bulletins are not sufficient….  There are some moments 
when we are very active and we issue a lot of brochures … and there are other 
moments where activity is low, when we don‘t do many things.  The website does 
not cost us a lot and we can do the updating.  You don‘t need to print things to do 
it.  In fact, one of the reasons for the continuation of ATTAC in Morocco is the 
Internet.  It has allowed us to stay in contact with one another, to have a tool of 
communication that link us with sympathisers even during the most difficult 
moments—because when we were not able to walk in the street, we were still able 
to post our ideas on the website.  I am convinced that this is important [in regard 
to] all the organizational problems I talked about—the fact that there are two 
factions of ATTAC, the problems after the first congress: the continuity was the 
website.   
  Rodriguez (2001) reminds us that alternative or citizen media may function through 
―short life cycles,‖ which does not mean that they are inconsequential, but simply that 
they contract and expand according to their ―own very vital rhythms‖ (p. 22).  In the 
same vein, Garcia (1992) argues that  
the submerged network (that is, the ―latent‖ part of the movement) becomes 
manifest in localized and ephemeral periods of mobilization.  But it must be 
emphasized that the network itself is constructed day-by-day, through solidarity 
and new social practices that attempt to open up spaces for cultural innovation and 
the creation of new ecological understandings.  (p. 162)   
The dialectic between the ―visibility‖ and ―latency‖ of social movements and their use of 
the Internet also has important implications for the visibility of the websites themselves, 
289 
 
as the latter receive more attention during periods of crisis or high mobilization.  In the 
words of Jawad Mostaqbal: 
If you do nothing, what are you going to post on your website?  When I said we 
receive 2,600 visits per day, it is not consistent.  There are peak moments, like 
during the Rosamor
72
 fires, for instance.  We went there immediately when it 
happened; and in Morocco, there is a need for information, and there is [media] 
opacity of tragedies like these, so we had the chance to transmit the information 
via our website.  Like in the case of Sidi Ifni [and] Rosamor—people searched for 
information and did not find it anywhere.  In the case of Sidi Ifni, we sent a fact-
finding committee to the scene and we [posted] a report with pictures, and this 
raised sharply the number of visitors to our website.  We did not do it to augment 
the number of visitors on our website, but it was an opportunity where we could 
express our solidarity.   
While social movements‘ websites receive less attention during ―latency‖ periods, these 
platforms continue to play an important role for these groups and their core members, 
providing them with the resources needed to enhance their collective consciousness, and 
sustaining their readiness and potential for collective action until the next mobilization 
opportunity arises.   
Many respondents indicated that the organizational value and effectiveness of the 
Internet is mostly evident during special events such as elections and conventions, when 
it is used to reduce costs and time, and to enhance the transparency of transactions and 
the distribution of tasks and benefits, as is the case with the Unemployed Graduates 
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movement.  Each group within the movement has a point system, whereby militants are 
ranked according to their contribution to and participation in protests and other forms of 
action.  This system is used to identify a list of members who will be first to benefit from 
employment openings once opportunities arise through negotiation with the government 
and with regional state institutions.  Explaining the role of the Internet in the functioning 
of the movement, Said Rahmouni, of the Unemployed Graduates movement, asserts:  
We use e-mail and other means.  The Internet is the means that provides members 
with new information, changes on some course of action, or paper contributions.  
We do it for the sake of credibility and transparency with regard to the 
unemployed graduates who elected us in the executive council.  Before we launch 
anything, we post the new information online….  Before you can hold a general 
assembly, you need to provide people with the program and agenda so that you 
can have a constructive discussion and come out with conclusions.   
Zakaria Sahnoun, a journalist supervising the online version of the newspaper 
―Attajdid‖ (Renewal), the mouthpiece of the SMO Unity and Reconstruction (U&R) and 
an activist in the Justice and Development Party (PJD, the political arm of the U&R), too 
stresses the value of websites in providing the necessary information and documents for 
members during elections and congresses.  Discussing the last national congress of the 
Justice and Development Party (PJD), the political arm of the Unity and Reconstruction 
movement, he states: 
Websites have two functions: communication and archiving.  But there is also the 
financial factor, since running a website demands only one or two people....  I will 
give you a vivid example of this:  the sixth National Congress of the party will be 
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held on July 19th, and you are invited to attend the opening session or some other 
sessions to get an idea of the election campaign.  In terms of what concerns the 
congress, all the documents have been posted online, so the members and the 
general public can access them.   
By facilitating access to these documents, the Internet contributes to the enhancement of 
the quality of political participation and discussions, as well as to the development of 
transparency and accountability within SMOs.   
4.2.8 Professionalism versus volunteerism. 
Social movements in this study differ significantly in terms of their organizational 
structure, size, political influence, and access to resources.  These differences affect 
considerably the degree to which they rely on professional staff or volunteerism to carry 
out a variety of tasks, including using information technology and the Internet.  Interview 
participants distinguished between two types of voluntary work: the first one is based on 
the participation of activists who are members of the SMOs themselves; the second one 
involves non-member volunteers.  Moreover, by analyzing the data, it was possible to 
discern a significant discrepancy between SMOs that are able to mobilize adequate 
numbers of qualified volunteers from among their constituencies, and those who have 
had to rely on help from outside the group.  In the first category, we find mainly Islamic-
oriented SMOs that have a large number of adherents and sympathizers inside and 
outside the country, particularly from the younger generation, and can rely on the 
voluntary services of a significant number of them who are motivated, and well 
disciplined and educated.  I asked Bennajah whether Justice and Spirituality has recourse 
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to a private company to design the SMO‘s numerous websites.  He replied in the 
following words:   
The main work on the website is done by volunteers from the movement—by its 
IT professionals inside or outside the country.  It is rare that there is recourse to 
parties outside the movement…. We are different from the other groups.  The 
reason is clear—for the majority of these websites do not address the needs of the 
Moroccan citizen; they are not professional; they don‘t have dedicated staff; the 
majority are not updated frequently, [either] daily or more [often] than daily—and 
it is natural, as there is competition from other Websites that cover news instantly.   
It is important to note that the term ―dedicated staff‖ used by Bennajah does not mean 
that the SMO employs full-time staff, but rather that these volunteers work on a regular 
basis.  Islamic movement organizations were among the first to adopt new media and 
ICTs for political ends within Islamic countries (see Chapter Five for a discussion of this 
issue).  They have also been the ones to use these technologies more effectively and 
seamlessly with other forms of activism, since many of their adherents are IT experts and 
because of the high level of militant culture among their members, which explains why a 
movement like J&S finds it much easier than other groups to recruit a sufficient number 
of qualified volunteers to assist in various e-projects.  Zakaria Sahnoun, from Islamic-
oriented Unity and Reconstruction, further elaborates on this idea:   
The one thing that distinguishes our work is the militant culture.  This sense of 
militant culture had an impact on the normal life of the movement, and therefore 
militants undertake many initiatives that do not necessarily stem from clear 
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communication strategies.  This explains why we have benefited more from new 
technologies and not just the Internet.   
The majority of institutionalized SMOs, however, combine volunteerism with 
professionalism by employing fulltime staff and outsourcing many tasks to private 
companies.  However, a lack of sufficient funding limits the capacity of these 
organizations to employ adequate staff.  At the same time, many of them are unable to 
mobilize sufficient numbers of qualified volunteers to perform tasks that require some 
kind of special training, such as designing or maintaining a website.  Ladham relates the 
experience of the Democratic Association for Moroccan Women (ADFM) with relying 
on volunteerism to design a website for the association:  
The current website is the most recent one.  We started with a trial version before 
that was set up by a trainee student.  We were disappointed because the final 
product was not satisfying.  You have to work with professionals, and you need 
money to do that.  After that, we received some funds from an international donor 
and put out a call for tender in which the best-known IT companies in the country 
participated.  We chose a company and it started to work on [the website].   
While the majority of respondents from professional and leftist SMOs indicated they 
have a shortage of qualified volunteers, those belonging to feminist SMOs stress more the 
difficulties they are encountering in trying to secure high enough numbers of 
professionals and volunteers in their action.  As Halima Bennoui explains in the case of 
LLDP:  
We have a big workload; and most of those who work for us are volunteers.  But 
here we still don‘t have this tradition of volunteerism.  Just in Rabat, we have a 
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big project, but we have only two employees, while what we do requires the work 
of thirty people.  We don‘t have enough human resources, and our volunteers are 
starting to get tired.   
The scarcity of both material and qualified human resources is a daunting obstacle 
shaping the appropriation of the Internet for collective action in the country.  
Nonetheless, as the example of the Islamic movement testifies, it is a problem that can be 
mitigated through the use of radical forms of communication and media, and from the 
availability of sufficient numbers of dedicated and qualified volunteers.  In some cases, 
individual activists with very little means can bypass many of the hurdles facing 
professional SMOs; one example is the Amazigh blog Ageddim, which is maintained by 
one person—Mohamed Lakjiri.  However, relying completely on voluntary work has its 
limits, since after three years of existence, the Ageddim blog stopped being updated.  I 
asked Lakjiri about the reasons for this, and he explained in the following words:   
I am a student at the university and have a thesis to finish, which takes much time 
from me.  And there are other problems, tpp....  I have other responsibilities.  The 
blog sometimes takes five hours a day, and sometimes I stay up late in the night 
working on it.  This is done at the expense of communication with my family, my 
friends, because you want to publish new things on the blog.  My mind is always 
busy with that, and my thoughts are always hooked into the virtual world.  Even 
when I am with friends, I am thinking about the blog and what I am going to do 
with it.  How I am going to divide my time between studies and that?  Even when 
I go to the university, I try to work the afternoon on the letters to be published at 
night.  The main problem is time.   
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The comparison between institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of 
collective action and appropriation of the Internet illustrates the dilemma facing social 
movements.  They have to strike a balance between organized and structured action, and 
flexibility and resourcefulness of radical activism and media, as Tarrow (1998) argues:  
The dilemma of hierarchical movement organizations is that when they 
permanently internalize their base, they lose their capacity for disruption; but 
when they move in the opposite direction, they lack the infrastructure to maintain 
a sustained interaction with allies, authorities, and supporters.  This suggests a 
delicate balance between formal organization and autonomy—one that can only be 
bridged by strong, informal, and non-hierarchical connective structures.  (p. 137) 
One reason explaining Islamic-oriented SMOs‘ effective appropriation of the potential of 
the Internet is their success in maintaining this balance between institutionalized 
collective action and loose networking, a balance that other social movements have failed 
to achieve.  
4.2.9 Professional versus radical journalism. 
Though the bulk of the testimonies above lead us to perceive volunteerism and 
professionalism as dichotomous notions, other examples from the data question any easy 
division between the two.  In fact, social movements hold a complex and asymmetrical 
relationship with mainstream media (MSM).  On the one hand, social movements have to 
use alternative media to challenge more powerful and resourceful competitors whose 
framing of issues and struggles can shape public opinion and influence decision-making.  
Paradoxically, however, social movements also need MSM to disseminate their mandates 
beyond the closed circles of their constituencies.   
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In the context of Morocco, the distinction between professional journalism and 
militancy can become blurred; this is especially the case for the publishers of independent 
newspapers and magazines, who often find themselves at the front line of the long 
struggle between the state and civil society.  Because they are actively engaged in 
transgressing ―permissible‖ limits of free speech and are constantly challenging 
hegemonic discourses and static political and social orders, they defy conventional 
definitions of ―alternative media,‖ as well as any boundary between political activism and 
professional journalism.  Describing the pioneering experience of the weekly 
francophone magazine Le Journal and how it tried to strike a balance between activism 
and professional journalism, Aboubaker Jamaï states that  
the regime adapted by sophisticating its method of repression and by launching 
economic attacks on independent media....  We knew that by our editorial line we 
were going to antagonize a party of the businessmen, but we could survive 
through the remaining part....  We did not want to [be involved in] militant 
journalism on all levels.  Because, before us, there were good newspapers and 
journalists who had credibility ... but the problem was the economic structure … 
because this journalist has to do this job and was paid a meagre salary, because the 
company that employs him didn‘t have the means and survived only because of 
contributions from militants.  We wanted to break down this model.  You need to 
have a journalist who is well paid ... etc.  It was necessary to find the right 
economic model.  Le Journal was created on this hope that Morocco has evolved 
enough to allow a press company to prosper while doing its task of journalism.   
297 
 
However, the experience of Le Journal, which had pioneered a very audacious and 
critical type of journalism in the country since 1997, ended in January 2010 after it was 
pushed into bankruptcy by denying it advertising revenues and successive ―legal‖ 
persecutions—thus signaling the end of another cycle of openness initiated by King 
Hassan II in the last years of his reign and continued, albeit with a lot of hesitation, by his 
son Mohamed VI in the first years of his reign.  Many journalists have been held in 
prison, banned from writing, intimidated into silence, or compelled to tone down their 
criticisms for fear of reprisals.  Describing the Makhzen‘s treatment of the press, Khaled 
Jamaï asserts:  
We are trying to do what we can with the small means we have.  It is between 
activism and journalism; it‘s not clear.  Now in this press called independent, we 
have become compelled to do something that is not our business, since we have 
become the opposition.  Because of the void, the space is empty, there are no 
[oppositional] parties—we have become the opposition….  There are four or five 
[independent] newspapers and magazines in the country and the state considers 
them as though they were the radical leftist opposition.  We are just journalists.   
The boundary between journalism and activism is flouted and transgressed, not only 
by professional journalists and newspapers, but also by human rights association activists 
who often play the role of professional reporters.  Most newspapers and magazines, 
particularly independent ones, do not have the resources to employ full-time reporters or 
dispatch them to every corner of the country, particularly in times of crisis when fast and 
reliable information is urgently needed.  On the other hand, some SMOs, like the AMDH, 
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have a wide network of activists operating in local sections throughout the country—from 
which many print newspapers try to benefit, as Idrissi testifies in the following passage:   
Idrissi: An event can happen anywhere in Morocco, in Rabat, Bouarfa or in Tiznit; 
we will receive a call from a journalist asking for information about what 
happened in the mountains of Anfkou near Khnifra.  We tell him to contact the 
AMDH section in Khnifra so he can get information from the field.  It is like you 
have a network [of reporters] belonging to the AMDH.  So the network of 
reporters get news that are precise and have credibility.   
Ben Moussa:  Do you train your people in journalism, since they are mainly 
political activists?  
Idrissi:  We give the training—I mean it is journalistic, but at the AMDH we don‘t 
call it so.  It is training in learning how to monitor violations of human rights.  
Any activist has to cover the violations that happen in the region where he lives, 
so [on a practical level], he has to know what notes to take, to collect information 
from the victims, [and] from those who caused it.  He should normally have a 
camera, a voice recorder.  It is field work.   
Recently, however, with the popularization of social media like blogs and YouTube, 
more radical forms of journalism have appeared, practiced by ordinary citizens who are 
not necessarily members in any civil society group and are using various strategies, from 
quasi-spontaneous resistance action during social protests and civil obedience, to 
insurgency tactics involving ―camera-snipers‖ who carefully plan and take enormous 
risks to film security agents carrying out human rights violations or ―routine‖ acts of 
corruption.  This is best illustrated by ―the sniper of Targist,‖ the pseudonym of an 
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anonymous individual who posted a series of video clips on YouTube showing 
Gendarmerie Royale agents taking bribes from merchandise traffickers in the region of 
Targist, a small town in the mountainous Rif region of Morocco.  The videos became 
very popular inside and outside Morocco and received considerable attention from 
national and international media.  Describing the impact of this type of ―journalism,‖ and 
how independent media may use it as an important source of news, Taoufik Bouashrine
73
, 
co-founder and former editor of the Arabic daily Al-Massae says:   
You have heard of the sniper of Targist.  This is a person who used his camera to 
record gendarmerie officers taking bribes, [which he then] broadcast.  We put this 
piece of news on our front page immediately after he put it on YouTube and it 
raised a widespread discussion in the country.  We all knew that gendarmerie 
officers were taking bribes; but it is a different thing to document it with an 
image.  The Royal Gendarmerie opened an investigation with the people who 
appeared in the videos and it made a big impact, and all the newspapers reported 
it.  If YouTube were not available, it wouldn‘t have been possible … to the degree 
that it now terrifies the gendarmerie, at a time [when] they always terrified 
people.  They became afraid
74
.   
In the same vein, Khalid Jamaï contends that this type of radical media and political 
activism has achieved more results in terms of resisting and provoking hegemonic orders 
than the rest of civil society could achieve over many years:  
Now, the state or any other person cannot stop the Internet.  The definition of a 
journalist has changed today.  You just have to own a mobile phone and have 
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 Bouashrine resigned from Al-Massae in December 2008 to launch  another Arabic daily, Akbar AlYoum.  
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 The interview was conducted in Bouashrine‘s Al-Massae office on June 15, 2008.  
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access to the Internet to publish on YouTube.  This is what I call [being] a citizen 
journalist.  Take for instance the issue of corruption and bribing.  We got tired of 
talking about it, until that sniper of Targist took us all by surprise.  The impact of 
what he did was better than the entire civil society‘s action.  The way our activists 
in Sidi Ifni used YouTube makes our work, in comparison, appear insignificant.  
This is the real fundamental revolution.   
Radical journalism as a form of political action and media resistance has gained 
unprecedented importance, both in the media and popular awareness due in no small part 
to the events of Sidi Ifni.  Over a few days, activists and citizens alike used their mobile 
phones to document the offenses committed by security forces and post hundreds of 
video clips on social sharing interfaces like YouTube and Dailymotion, thus contributing 
decisively to countering official media and government discourse on these events and 
compelling them to make a U-turn on their previous positions.  A large number of 
participants, in fact, identified the events in Sidi Ifni as a landmark in the development of 
collective action in Morocco, and an instance of when spontaneous and informal social 
protest drew on organized collective action and radical journalism to stage effective 
offline and online resistance.  Telling the story of the interplay between these three forms 
of collective action, Manssouri points out:   
Compared to the distorted coverage of the official media ....YouTube played a 
central role in the events when they just started, when the state was closing Sidi- 
Ifni—and before the state allowed even Al Jazeera to cover it because of existing 
conflict between the channel and the government
75
. YouTube was the first to tell 
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 The government has repeatedly accused the channel of deliberately buffing up its reports on social and 
political problems in the country, and refused to renew the license for its Rabat bureau.   
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the truth about what happened….  We were among the main people who created 
this intifada of Ifni either by participating in the protests, organizing them, or 
providing logistic support to them; and our office there was used by everybody 
because two parties were pressured to leave town.  So the meetings of the local 
secretariat of Tansikiat were all held in the local office of the PSU.  All the 
associations like ATTAC, AMDH, etc., held their meetings in our office.   
There are, however, drawbacks linked to radical journalism.  As the boundaries 
between activism and journalism are blurred, there are always risks that the principles of 
authenticity and veracity of reported fact may be sacrificed by militants who seek to 
mobilize support for a cause or an issue.  A case in point is that of Al-Jazeera‘s Arabic 
channel quoting local activists in Sidi Ifni who claimed that six people died during the 
confrontations between local citizens and police forces.  However, the information could 
not be verified afterwards, and the Moroccan state took it as an opportunity to defame the 
news channel and sue its office manager in Rabat.  Recognizing the nuances of radical 
journalism and its implications for professional journalism, Bouashrine contends:  
The Internet is the open space that reveals society as it is.  However—and I don‘t 
have statistics but am talking from my experience—I can tell that young people 
are the ones who use the new technologies the most, [those] between 15 and 32 
years … they are a very important segment of society.  They are the majority and 
the future.  Many times, we take subjects from blogs and forums and rewrite them 
in a more professional way.  You know there are things on the Internet we cannot 
do.  These people don‘t respect laws, sometimes they cite names, and talk about 
the personal life of people, [make] accusations.  But apart from these things, we 
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try to filter.  These sites give you an idea of Moroccan society.  What interactions, 
thoughts, what problems and trends in music, in clothes, their positions on power, 
even their opinion on symbols of the state; they write about the king, things they 
cannot say openly.  We benefit from these things.   
Attacks against freedom of speech have intensified in the country in the last few 
years, and it has become very clear that the Moroccan regime is determined to tighten its 
grip over the public sphere, as it has been doing for decades.  As the model of an 
independent and professional journalism in the country—heralded by the publication of 
Le Journal—came to an end, the Internet is becoming more than ever a vital tool for free 
speech and expression.  Framing analysis of many websites used by various SMs has 
demonstrated that the Internet is indeed used to disseminate oppositional discourse and 
frames, particularly by grassroots groups.  Corroborating these findings, interview 
analysis, too, has revealed that the Internet is playing a critical role in the promulgation of 
free speech.   
4.2.10 Alternative public spheres. 
A number of commentators have indicated that freedom of expression in Morocco is 
neither stable nor clearly defined or institutionalized, since its boundaries, definitions, 
and laws are intentionally kept broad and contingent upon the state‘s interpretation and 
interests (see Chapters Two and Three).  The degree of tolerance the state permits 
fluctuates and depends on the identity and medium of the speakers.  After subscribing to 
the national mail-list, Press-Maroc, which is used by thousands of members from various 
leftist movements and groups in the country, I noticed that some of the messages 
circulating on it advocate armed insurgency, which prompted me to ask Idrissi about it: 
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Ben Moussa: I noticed that some messages on the list are very radical—for 
instance, calling for the secession of certain regions and armed revolution.  Does 
this not place responsibility on you in case the state decides to pursue you? 
Idrissi: I prefer that messages of this type and statements of this type get posted 
and seen, and that it be known that a citizen who lives in El Hoceima calls for a 
republic in the Rif region.  Whether he is right or wrong, people have the right to 
know about his opinion, because there are citizens who think like him.  This is 
information—maybe not good [information], but it has to reach people.   
Ben Moussa:  In accordance with freedom of expression?   
Idrissi:  Yes, maybe it can be seen from that angle, but it is also a case of people‘s 
right to get information.  As a citizen, I have the right to know how people in 
some regions think.  And I can agree with them or not.  So it is the right to [free] 
expression, but also the right to get information and news.  Why should we 
prevent somebody who thinks that the problems facing the country can only be 
faced in this way?  Why prevent the message from getting through?   
Compared to other media, access to and use of the Internet in Morocco has benefitted 
from a considerable margin of freedom, although in the last few years, the state has tried 
to control access to particular websites.  Many observers have, in fact, noted that the 
Internet enjoys a level of freedom that is relatively unmatched in most Arab countries 
(Open Net Initiative, 2009).  It is doubtful, however, that the country‘s relative leniency 
towards online expression stems from a liberal policy towards basic freedoms.  
Goldsmith and Wu (2006) argue that ―governments can indeed control the Internet at 
three levels: the level of users or recipients, the level of websites, and the level of 
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intermediaries or transmitters‖ (p. 49).  The Moroccan state has tried repeatedly to 
control expression and information on the Internet by selectively blocking undesired sites 
or Internet provider (IP) addresses, but it has failed since users can usually access the 
same content on other websites.  Instead of direct censorship, the Moroccan state has 
recently resorted to persecuting Internet users and bloggers deemed to have transgressed 
the ―red lines,‖ in what seems to be a bid not to silence all criticism online, but to 
increase self-censorship.   
Self-censorship remains more widespread among civil society groups, particularly 
those striving to operate in the boundaries of existing regulations and laws.  In fact, the 
state uses its enormous resources to try to co-opt oppositional groups by granting them 
privileges and linking them to its network of satellite organizations and institutions.  The 
Internet, however, has permitted more radical groups to defy state control and to play the 
role of watchdog over other civil groups that may be tempted to transgress rules of 
independence and integrity required from militants within a social movement.  Mohamed 
Lakjiri, a blogger and activist, discusses this in regard to the Amazigh cultural movement 
(ACM):  
I think since 2006 or 2007 [the blog] has contributed to raising awareness about 
the Amazigh cause, about human rights.  It has made known issues [that are] 
absent from national, official, and even independent media, in newspapers and 
even on those websites that claim they are independent.  They don‘t publish them.  
I don‘t know why....  It contributed to revealing many measures taken by the state 
against the Amazigh movement, and it also pushed many Amazigh associations 
and groups to be more transparent for fear of being revealed on the Internet—
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because in print newspapers, there is no such criticism or close watch over the 
Amazigh movement.  These blogs have made militants and groups abide by 
collective action conventions and rules because they fear being exposed; and I 
noticed in many cases that this is effective in many places.   
Ben Moussa: Can you give an example of this?   
Lakjiri: There are many examples.  [One is] the alliance which the Amazigh 
league formed with the PAM party movement‘s action for all democrats.76  This 
was against the movement‘s principles.  There are other examples like this that 
can be called acts of treason—those suspicious relationships.  They do it [even if] 
they have to do it in secrecy.   
Equally important, in a society where women have to fight against many forms of 
discrimination and injustice that prevent them from fully fulfilling their roles as citizens, 
ICTs, including the Internet, can empower them to challenge restrictions on accessing the 
public sphere and making their voices heard.  In many of the testimonies of the women I 
interviewed, personal experiences of empowerment are linked to the use of various ICT 
media such as mobile phones, computers, and the Internet.  A number of female 
respondents have indicated that ICTs have empowered them as individuals to express 
themselves more freely and independently in a male-dominated public sphere.  The story 
of Amina el-Rbou, a volunteer at the Women‘s Labor Action, is very telling; she was a 
victim of conjugal violence for a long time and had to give up her job to concentrate on 
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 Authenticity and Modernity Party (Parti d‘authenticité et modernité, or PAM) is the new political party 
established by Ali Himma, a former minister of the Interior and close aid to King Mohamed VI.  In the last 
communal elections held in 2009, the party won the largest number of seats and is now bracing to win the 
next legislative elections in 2012.   
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her struggle to get a divorce from her abusive husband.  Later on, she decided to publish 
a newspaper in order to share her experience and her view of the world:  
The time I thought about divorcing him, I hated my job and everything, and left 
[it] all.…  I lost 18 years of my life to him and did not benefit from the 
experience....  When I resigned [from my job], I tried to publish a newspaper and I 
called it Moroccan Resistance.  I meant resistance in its general sense, resistance 
in everyday life, what happens to us, to survive.  And I struggled to print one issue 
in Arabic and French.  I told myself, I have to tell people about my experience, but 
if I started talking about it myself, people will say I am a mad person.  I told 
myself, perhaps through this newspaper.  But after the first issue, I was 
overwhelmed—because you know the difficulty in Morocco.   
Ben Moussa:  Did you use the Internet to search for content and information for 
your newspaper?   
Amina el-Rbou:  No, at that time I was not using it.  I wish I had known; it would 
have made my work a lot easier....  At the time, I had a little money from the 
settlement with my job, and I spent some of it on my divorce and the rest on this 
project.  Before, it was very difficult to do such a thing, because it required many 
people and hardware.  Now you can do it on a PC using a desktop publisher.  I did 
it all with a desktop publisher.
77
   
El-Rbou‘s experience with publishing a newspaper, though a short lived one, has 
certainly helped her to acquire confidence in herself as a person and a woman, and regain 
control of her life.  Sharing her experience with others, however limited their number, is 
an act that defies many social and cultural codes that restrict women‘s access to the 
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public sphere in the name of morality and ―decorum.‖  El-Rbou‘s story is similar to many 
highlighted by other studies conducted in other developing countries where scholars 
identified the implications of accessing and appropriating ICTs by women for the ―self-
esteem and renewed self-confidence to change their own lives‖ (Garrido & Roman, 2006, 
p. 170).   
Publishing a newspaper, however, is a daunting task for one woman with limited 
means.  Seen against this background, the use of the Internet as a tool of expression 
requires fewer resources, as is the case with creating a blog.  In fact, the use of blogs by 
feminist activists for personal purposes and activism objectives makes it easy to develop 
trans-boundary realms and networks articulated on blending the personal and private with 
the public.  For instance, Samira Kinani, a member of the Moroccan Association of 
Human Rights‘ (AMDH) central committee and a high school teacher, points out how 
writing in her blog liberates her from the rigid, institutionalized, and official discourse of 
activism and, therefore, gives her the ability to advocate her identity as a woman and an 
individual person in addition to her identity as an activist.  Kinani‘s identity as a woman, 
a feminist, and a citizen are intertwined in her position as a human rights activist; her 
blog becomes a communicative node where these multiple ―selves‖ and voices interact, 
and even fuse into the act of blogging:  
It has become like this; it has become personal.  I write what I like, I don‘t control 
myself a lot.  There, [on the Internet,] I am Kinani, not the militant, with my pains 
and drawbacks.  I am what I am.  Because when you are at the AMDH, you have 
to use your legal discourse; the other [blog] allows me to remain the person I am.  
You don‘t want to remain the militant and [write that] International conventions 
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say this or that.  It is my private space....  For instance, there was this Moroccan 
athletics champion of the year 1973, and I met her; she was living in a shantytown 
house, and I talked about her in my blog.  What happened is there was a lot of 
solidarity with her.  There were people who wrote to the ministry [of sport] or who 
proposed to help her.  You see, [blogging] can serve something.  I was writing 
only for myself, but there are people who read and become involved.  Perhaps 
because I am an activist at the AMDH, and I am in contact with a lot of people 
and know about many things around us.
78
   
 The Internet has undoubtedly enhanced Moroccan SMs‘ capacities for collective 
action at multiple levels.  Indeed, various groups and SMOs have benefitted from the 
medium to establish alternative public spheres where critical and radical discourse are 
exchanged; to save communication costs; to build alliances and solidarity networks at the 
local and trans-local levels; to enhance internal cohesion; and to increase organizational 
efficiency.  However, participants‘ narratives about the role of ICTs and the Internet in 
their groups‘ activities also reveal huge variations, as well as contradictions pertaining to 
the impact of the Internet and the capacity of each group to take advantage of its potential 
for collective action.  These contradictions can be better conceptualized and analyzed by 
distinguishing between the multilevel divides that shape the diffusion and use of the 
medium in Morocco.   
4.3 Multiple digital divides. 
Dominant discourses on the diffusion and innovation of ICTs proclaim that digital 
divides will disappear over time as a result of market dynamics.  Though statistics on the 
growth of Internet use in Morocco partly confirm this hypothesis, the respondents‘ 
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statements have revealed that material access to computers and Internet connections are 
far from being the only forms of digital divide affecting the diffusion of the technology, 
particularly in collective action.  Other forms of divides, such as gender and motivational 
ones, are deeply intertwined with socioeconomic inequalities and cultural orders that 
make them more persisting even when the material access divide is bridged.  
4.3.1 Access divide. 
The physical access divide—i.e., disparities in accessing computers and Internet 
connections—is the most highlighted type of divide in the literature regarding the 
diffusion of the Internet worldwide, but more particularly in the developing world.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the vast majority of people in Morocco are still excluded from 
the ―information society‖ despite the spectacular growth in the number of Internet users 
over the last five years.  This is bound to be reflected in the way the medium is 
appropriated in collective action.  In fact, social movements are not homogeneous, 
because they often reflect contradictions and disparities existing in society.  In addition to 
digital divides between dominant metropolises and peripheral regions, there are 
disparities between headquarters and chapters in small towns and villages, as well as 
between activists themselves in terms of their training, access to hardware, and the 
Internet.  Responding to my question about the accessibility of the Internet for activists in 
the Union of Women‘s Action (Union de l‘action féminine), Fatima Maghnawi stated:  
Yes, a small number [of activists use the Internet at the UAF].  But they cannot 
use it at home.  For instance, I have access at the UAF office, but I don‘t have 
Internet at home.  We used to use cybercafés.  We would send somebody to get 
the messages from there.  Most of the militants are poor.  We didn‘t even have the 
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telephone or a fax [machine].  And now, all this is linked to financing.  I am 
talking only about the main office in Rabat.  Don‘t imagine that this is the case for 
other chapters.  There are even those that don‘t have a fax [machine] or telephone.  
If I want to contact them, I will send a fax to [them at] the public telephone store.  
I will call the activist and ask her to go fetch it from there.   
Maghnawi‘s statement illustrates the multilevel access divides between the minority of 
activists who have access to the Internet at home, and those, like herself, who can access 
it only from a semi-private place like the office; between those who have limited access 
and those who have no access at all, or have to use public access points like cybercafés; 
and finally, between those who have access to various ICTs and those who do not have a 
telephone.  This forces us to rethink the concept of ―divide‖ from being a ―bipolar 
division between the haves and the have-nots, the connected and the disconnected‖ to an 
interpretation that sees it as ―continuum‖ split with many shades to it (Warschauer, 2003, 
p. 297).  It is true that the Internet has empowered many activists to address some of the 
imbalances between peripheral regions and urban centers, and between grassroots 
constituencies and elites.  But in general, the medium has reinforced many of these 
inequalities and, in the process, the democratic divide (Norris, 2001a) as it has widened 
the gap between those who have the resources to participate actively in collective action 
and those lacking them.   
These divisions have a direct bearing on the capacity of social movements to use the 
Internet in offline and online mobilization.  In such a context, digital chasms at the micro 
and meso levels reinforce differences between activists in their capacity to access 
information; to connect with others within and outside the movement; to express their 
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views and opinions; and, consequently, to build needed social capital to acquire higher 
status in the movement and society.  These digital chasms can only reinforce divisions 
and hierarchical relationships that exist offline between the haves and have-nots.   
Though the access divide touches all SMOs, it affects them differently.  In general, 
professional SMOs are more capable of bridging existing divisions between activists and 
chapters.  There are a couple of reasons for this: their constituencies are not very large; 
the majority of their activists tend to be university educated and have stable jobs; and 
many of them receive funds from INGOs and development agencies toward the purchase 
of ICT equipment.  Abderezzak Idrissi, for instance, points out that despite existing 
disparities between AMDH‘s chapters, most of them are getting access to the Internet:   
Material equipment is available not only to headquarters, but also to the AMDH 
sections around Morocco, [things] like computers and other equipment; but there 
are also discrepancies between regions.  There are some regions that don‘t have an 
office, [while] others have offices and equipment, a fact that is linked to the 
activities of the section.   
Similarly, many participants indicated that disparities related to the access divide 
inside their SMOs are slowly disappearing, as computers and Internet access become 
more affordable, and because of growing awareness among leaders about the need to 
bridge the digital gap between activists to enhance the efficiency of mobilization.  This 
applies particularly to groups that rely more on the Internet in their collective action, such 
as ATTAC–Morocco.  In the words of Jawad Mostaqbal:  
The schism between members still exists, but it has diminished because we 
provided training to militants.  The minimum is that everyone should have an e-
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mail account and know how to use it.  I think that those who can‘t do it are 
illiterate and we should not remain illiterate.  I think that 90% of militants master 
this at least.  But we are [an] elite [group].  Most of [us] have a university degree.   
On the other hand, the access divide within grassroots social movements that recruit 
from among the poorest and marginalized segments of society remains large and harder 
to bridge, as Zakaria Sahnoun explains in relation to the Islamic movement:   
There is a shortage [in the level of access to technology] and the use of the 
Internet by members, [which] reflects its [diffusion] in the country in general.  If 
we take 140 members, we will find only 50 of them use the technology, for many 
of them are traders and craftsmen, and this category of people seldom has access 
to the Internet.  Students, too—they have to pay for public access, so the users are 
among the civil servants, teachers, and others…. You know [that] to subscribe to 
the Internet, you have to pay at least 300 dirhams per month.
79
  This is a real 
challenge to all of society and not just to political parties and associations.   
Moreover, unlike professional SMOs whose collective action tactics centers around 
lobbying and pressuring the state and government, grassroots movements such as the 
Islamic and Amazigh movements seek to transform or reinforce the collective identity of 
part or all of Moroccan society.  Societal digital divides, therefore, have a greater effect 
on the collective action tactics of these groups, and shape their choice and use of 
available media to mobilize potential and actual members.  Responding to a question 
about the impact of digital gaps among the militants of Justice and Spirituality, Hassan 
Bennajah explains:   
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First, 50% of Moroccans are illiterate, so whether you publish a print or an 
electronic publication, it wouldn‘t matter to them.  So you have to rely on other 
communication media.  And these—we master them in the movement.  We don‘t 
have only print or electronic media.  There is the illiterate category or those living 
on top of the mountain—even if they are literate, you don‘t have the means to get 
the newspaper or the Internet to reach them.  This needs a different network and 
organization.   
Though the majority of men and women in developing countries like Morocco are 
still excluded from network society because of multiple forms of digital divides, women 
are much more affected by gendered digital divides than men.  Prasad (2008), for 
instance, argues that ―if media access in the developing world is among the lowest, 
women are among the most marginalized sections of the population, their media exposure 
is certainly low, and their role as participants or producers is even more limited‖ (p. 80).  
My data seems to corroborate this observation, since—though all participants pointed out 
various obstacles affecting their use of the Internet—women interviewees‘ testimonies in 
particular clearly reflect that the issue of gender is one of the most important factors 
shaping the diffusion of the medium in society and its use in collective action.   
4.3.2 The gender divide. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the gender digital divide deeply 
characterizes the diffusion and use of ICTs around the world, including in the developed 
world (Cooper & Weaver, 2003; Prasad, 2008; Mitter & Ng, 2005; Shade, 2002a, 2003).  
Contrary to optimistic views about these technologies and their prospects to achieve 
gender equality, commentators have argued that ICTs and especially the Internet are, in 
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many cases, reinforcing inequalities between men and women rather than removing them.  
As Marcelle (2005) argues, 
women, rendered invisible throughout history, have remained and seem destined 
to remain in anonymity most of their lives, in the different fields of family, school, 
university, science, and technology.  By their historical and cultural position, men 
keep their essential image of hunters, who, in search of their prey, remain on the 
lookout for further opportunities.  The scheme is no different with the Internet.  (p. 
212) 
Various types of data discussed in this study have confirmed this claim.  The 
invisibility of women is most noticeable in the scarcity of feminist or even women‘s 
websites in Morocco.  Such invisibility is reinforced by the near-absence of gender-
related issues in most of the analyzed websites in the current study (see Chapter Five).  
Likewise, feminist activists who use national e-mail lists, particularly Press–Maroc and 
PAD–Maroc, are also very few.  This is equally true of internal e-lists such as the one 
belonging to the Moroccan Association of Human Rights.  In fact, of the more than 600 
e-mails I received during one month of my subscription to the list, only 26 messages were 
sent by women, the bulk of which belonged to only one person, namely blogger Samira 
Kinani.  I raised the point to Fatima Maghnawi, a co-founder of the Democratic League 
for Women, who replied:  
I didn‘t know about the Press–Maroc [mail list] before....  But don‘t forget [about] 
the burden that is on us as women.  I am a mother and have children, and I am the 
one who has access in the office or at home; I only have time for it at night.  With 
the hardships of life, with concerns over the education of your children, etc., I will 
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not sit and use it for a long time.  I will access the information very quickly.  I will 
not make that effort to enter websites and everything.  You see … with 
technological advances, a man can take his laptop, go to a café or a public place, 
and use the Wi-Fi to connect.  Don‘t forget that there is no security in public 
spaces, there is violence and aggression … etc., so even if I have these means, I 
don‘t [experience] the same conditions as a man.   
Maghnawi‘s testimony summarizes how the adoption and appropriation of 
technology is deeply gender inflected even among elite groups such as feminist activists.  
Moreover, women constitute only 30% of users at cybercafés (Warf & Vincent, 2007), 
which is partly due to restrictions on their access to these places, especially in poor 
neighbourhoods.  But the major obstacle to the use of the Internet remains related to skills 
and the traditional patriarchal divisions of housework and tasks.  In the course of 
conducting these interviews, I discovered that the level of IT training and general 
knowledge among women activists appeared to be relatively low compared to that of 
men.  I raised the issue with Halima Bennoui, who had this to say:  
Don‘t forget that illiteracy is higher among women.  Women spend the whole day 
outside working and when they get home—and I am one of them—they have to 
spend with the children, and cannot stay awake late.  I have had Internet at home 
for a long time, but I can‘t spend time on the computer so I don‘t use it.  But in 
general, women don‘t use it much at home because there are many constraints.  
Because we still have these divisions of work.  When you get home, the husband 
goes to read a newspaper whatever his educational level, and the wife goes to the 
kitchen to cook, except from a minority.   
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Concurring with her, Rachid Benmessaoud
80
, member of the national committee of 
the Moroccan Organization of Human Rights, and former president of Creative Women 
Association, highlights the gendered use of the Internet within civil society in the 
following statement:  
The obstacles hindering communication within associative work or political 
parties are the same for men and women, though these constraints acquire 
different shapes for the two sexes....  But it is more difficult for women than men.  
Because to use these technologies, you need to spend time [with them]; since 
when you sit to work on a computer you don‘t feel the time passing, and since 
women have many other tasks, [using these communication technologies is always 
at the expense of these tasks].  I can tell you that this is true even for the feminist 
groups who have their own websites and women who use e-mail, because they 
[too] are governed by these constraints.  These Websites are not used efficiently 
and many feminist activists do not open their e-mails for days or more.  So there is 
an absence of continuity and follow up.  But I also know women who have great 
skills in using the technology for communication; but their number is limited
81
.   
Bennaoui‘s and Benmessaoud‘s testimonies shed light on the complexity of a gender 
divide that rests on access, skill, and usage digital divides.  Women have more difficulties 
accessing the Internet either outside or inside the home.  This is bound to affect their 
capacity to develop enough skills to use the technology even when it is available. Formal 
training in IT is one area where women are underprivileged all over the world.  Cooper 
and Weaver (2003) pointed out that in the United States, ―women are conspicuously 
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underrepresented in basic computer science education courses from a young age, and 
their lack of representation becomes more pronounced as they move through school‖ (p. 
5).  If this is the case in an advanced and high-tech society, the situation can only be 
worse in the developing world.  According to one study, female students represented only 
28% of the total number of students in engineering sciences between 2003 and 2004 in 
Morocco (Bourquia & Abdourabi, 2005, p. 25).  But a lack of skills does not come from 
absence of formal training alone.  The majority of users acquire skills through informal 
contacts and usage, either by learning from friends, family members, or other users, or 
through self-education by using the Internet on a regular basis for extended periods of 
time.  However, women have considerably less time at home or outside compared to 
men. 
Furthermore, the absence of sufficient content online that addresses the needs of 
women, offers women little incentive to use the Internet, whether for general purposes or 
in collective action.  Indeed, as Shade (2002b) argues, ―the central role of ICTs is to 
facilitate access to a wide range of information and communication services that people 
find valuable in their daily lives as citizens, producers, consumers, and caregivers‖ (p. 2).  
The lack of suitable and varied content addressing the needs of women in general and 
feminists in particular constitutes a key dimension defining access to the Internet and the 
digital divide in general (Clement & Shade 2000; Shade, 2010).   
Besides, women in the country are facing multiple forms of inequalities predicated 
on the unequal distribution of resources and a lack of recognition of the gender divides.  
Women constitute the largest category of illiterate people in the country, and are 
economically and socially disadvantaged.  These factors automatically exclude the 
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overwhelming majority of Moroccan women from accessing the Internet.  In addition, 
dominant patriarchal orders governing public spaces and the public sphere put limits on 
the ability of women to access the Internet at public access points, such as cybercafés and 
in the workplace.  These orders extend to the private sphere, where patriarchal housework 
divisions considerably limit the ability of women to use the Internet, even when access is 
available at home.   
Finally, women are also disadvantaged in that even when they can access and use the 
Internet, they are far less able to optimally use it in collective action. Van Dijk (2005) 
distinguishes between three levels of digital skills: ―(a) the skill to operate computers and 
network connection...; (b) the skill to search, select, process, and apply information from 
a superabundance of sources; and (c) the ability to strategically use this information to 
improve one‘s position in society‖ (p. 21).  Thus, while some women activists have 
managed to acquire the two first levels of skills, they are generally unable to use the 
Internet strategically to advance the feminist cause.  As many feminist activists indicated, 
their appropriation of the Internet remains limited to basic usage, which prevents their 
voices from becoming more audible in the online public sphere.   
The majority of activists in feminist organizations are middle-aged women who have 
been involved from a young age in the feminist cause.  By publishing the first feminist 
newspapers in the history of the country, namely 8 March and Kalima, these pioneering 
feminists contributed enormously to the dissemination of new frames on gender issues 
that challenged dominant patriarchal discourses and structures in society.  Over a decade 
after the publication of the first feminist newspaper, the diffusion of the Internet has 
broadened the scope of the collective action repertoire available for the feminist 
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movement.  But it has also required a whole new range of skills that many feminist 
activists lack.  The majority of members in these NGOs ―belong to the social intellectual 
sphere‖ as they are mainly ―professors, teachers, senior executives, lawyers, doctors, and 
civil servants in public administration‖ (Belhabib, 2004, p. 2).  While these activists 
moved on in life and took on multiple responsibilities, both in the private and 
professional spheres, most of them were unable to follow the rapid pace of technological 
innovations, particularly in the IT sector.  Aicha Lekhmas‘ experience exemplifies this 
situation.  Secretary General of the Union of Women‘s Action, she is also a lawyer and a 
leader in the political party, Union Socialite des Forces Populaires (USFP).  Referring to 
her experience with the publication of 8 March, Lekhmas indicates that she cannot repeat 
this experience now, since the conditions shaping collective action in the country have 
changed:  
It is a period that ended and cannot be repeated.  History does not repeat itself.  
Morocco has changed and the press has greatly evolved, too.  You cannot do it 
now through volunteerism.  This type of work needs professionalism and time.  
We have grown up and have other tasks to do, and I think the new generation has 
more skills.  We are thinking in reissuing it in a new way, a more attractive way, a 
magazine, a newspaper and, at the same time, an electronic version.  We need to 
find a way to communicate with people.….  We want to [reach] the largest 
number of readers.   
A key problem facing these SMOs is that most of them are professional NGOs 
specializing in lobbying the government and other decision-making circles, with thin or 
non-existing grassroots bases from which to recruit new members and volunteers.  As 
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Lekhmas rightly observes, even the recruitment of a full-time employee to do the IT job 
may not be sufficient if this person has no experience in collective action or no particular 
interest in the feminist cause.  Internet users are mostly young people who, unlike 
previous generations, are less politicised and much less engaged in collective action.  
Establishing a balance between professionalism and volunteerism is a major problem 
facing many social movements as they seek to reduce the financial costs while enhancing 
the effectiveness of their action.   
Physical access, usage, and skill divides are not the sole barriers facing women 
activists appropriating the Internet for collective action.  There is also resistance to 
women‘s intervention in the public sphere, especially when they attempt to challenge 
patriarchal orders and stereotypes in society.  Kinani, for example, has this to say about 
the type of comments she receives on her blog and from her comrades inside AMDH:   
There are those who insult me and tell me, ―Why are you [blogging], you are just 
a woman‖….  I receive all sorts of abuses like these.  But in any case, I say what I 
say.  I don‘t care.  I write it, and I can‘t take it back.  There are people who say 
they need to express themselves, because in most cases, women in Morocco suffer 
from this thing—when I agree with you, I am your comrade, but when I disagree 
with you, you are a whore.  In general, women don‘t express it, they suppress it.  I 
write this and give vent to it....  And even with the comrades, a woman is a 
woman.  You are not expected to have ideas of your own.  You are supposed to 
follow others, attach a communiqué to the wall….  A mentality does not change 
quickly—―We are the men and you are the women.‖  We talk only about the 
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conservatives; but this is not true, it is even here [within AMDH].  You have to 
fight to get heard.   
Kinani illuminates some of the contradictions within Moroccan society, and social 
movements in particular, with regard to gender.  Though the feminist movement has 
achieved considerable progress in its struggle to establish gender equalities during the last 
few decades—for instance, the current president of AMDH, to which Kinani belongs, is a 
woman, namely Khadija Riyadi—patriarchal orders are still influential, even within the 
most progressive civil society groups.  Kinani‘s blog is being resisted, her experience 
shows; nonetheless, the Internet is empowering her as a woman to intervene more 
forcefully and actively in the public sphere.  These seemingly contradictory results only 
confirm the many paradoxical implications of the Internet for feminist groups and women 
activists at many levels.   
Though feminist participants provide a bleak assessment of the gendered inequalities 
of ICTs in society and within civil society itself, they nonetheless agree that the gender 
gap is not a fatality and that it is narrowing, albeit very slowly.  Lekhmas, for instance, 
asserts that despite existing disparities between men and women, there are no restrictions 
on women to opt for training or education in the IT field:  
The door is open for those (women) who want to learn this.  I find that using the 
[Internet] is very suitable to their mentality.  It is an enchanting world, and when I 
use it, I feel I am drawn into it.  You are drawn little by little.  It [offers] good 
things.  It provides a democracy of information to know things and people you 
wouldn‘t have known.   
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Furthermore, Kinani contends that the Internet is empowering women specifically in 
a patriarchal society, because they are increasingly using it to circumvent restrictions on 
their movement in the public sphere and space, and to challenge and disrupt dominant 
social and cultural codes and systems:  
I have the impression that women are getting involved in great numbers because 
they can use avatars [and] aliases, and therefore they can express themselves more 
freely.  The other day, my students showed me—because they‘re the ones to 
discover such things—a very bold forum where they participate.  They may meet 
outside and never speak to one another.  It is a means of expression, particularly 
for young girls.   
Kinani‘s statement confirms various analysts‘ views that ―the technology promises to 
[enable and empower] educated women in politically and religiously constrained 
environments‖ (Skalli, 2006, p. 51).  Despite this optimism, gender inequalities in access 
to and use of the Internet will continue in the foreseeable future, as the new technology 
will reinforce existing chasms in the level of access to various resources in society.   
Equally important, one of the main descriptions that has surfaced in the interviews is 
that Moroccan civil society is elitist because of the limited constituency many 
professional organizations draw on, and because of the chasms that separate the relatively 
advanced and rich experience of many social movement organizations (particularly 
secular ones) and the rest of society.  This observation applies particularly to the feminist 
movement because of the huge economic and social divides between elite groups of 
feminist activists and the rest of women.  Talking about the experience of the Union of 
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Women‘s Action and the feminist movement in the country, Aicha Lekhmas points out 
that  
the changes that have been introduced by feminist organizations are badly needed 
by women in society; but only an elite group of women who were active in 
political, trade, and student movements were able to formulate those demands and 
establish feminist organizations that provide new services to women in society 
through awareness-raising, education, and health.  But these very women were 
mobilized recently to vote for parties that worked against the involvement of 
women in development projects
82
.  So these demands are not formulated and 
adopted by women in general, but by feminist organizations only through 
lobbying and the mobilization of active sectors in society.   
Instead of empowering the feminist movement to address this situation, the Internet 
has in many ways exacerbated existing divides between a) the minority of women who 
are socioeconomically privileged in society and can use it, and the majority of women 
who are illiterate and poor, and b) between men and women in general.  The gender 
digital divide illustrates perfectly what Norris (2002) has qualified as the ―democratic 
divide‖ between those who do, and do not, use digital media to participate in public life 
(p. 4).  The gender digital divide will continue to grow, unless it is addressed in the wider 
context of social and cultural inequalities befalling women in the country.  The last report 
on global gender equality stated that the country‘s world ranking had receded from 105th 
place in 2006 to 127
th
 in 2010 (Hausmaan, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2010), which shows that the 
situation of women in the country is, in fact, deteriorating rather than improving.   
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4.3.3 The motivational divide. 
While access to computers and the Internet, as well as skill and usage opportunities 
are preconditions for the appropriation of the Internet in collective action, they do not 
necessarily guarantee an optimal appropriation of the medium in collective action.  In 
fact, people can have access to the Internet or the means to do so, but still prefer not to 
use it, or refuse to invest money or time to acquire the necessary skills to use the 
technology (Van Dijk, 2006).  This lack of motivation to use the technology can be 
linked to the psychological, social, and cultural preferences and needs of individuals and 
groups.  According to the ―uses-and-gratifications‖ paradigm, for instance, ―people are 
motivated by a desire to fulfil certain needs.  So rather than asking how media use 
influences users, a uses-and-gratifications perspective asks how users‘ basic needs 
influence users‘ media choices‖ (Cho, De Zuniga, Rojas, & Shah, 2003, p. 48).  
Moreover, from the point of view of the diffusion of technology theory perspective, 
many non-ICT users are ―excluded‖ from the information society because they do 
not see that this technology is relevant to them.  It is what the technology can do 
that makes ICT interesting to people—be it pursuing an existing hobby on the 
Internet, or communicating with distant family by e-mail.  (Faulkner & Lie, 2007, 
p. 161)   
In the context of social movements, a key factor that can motivate a group to use a 
particular medium is its cost compared to the level of benefits they will get from using it 
in collective action.  Marwell and Oliver (2008) argue that because social movements 
usually operate in conditions of scarcity, ―they have to make choices about how they 
allocate their time and money, and we believe they will somehow attempt to weigh costs 
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and benefits‖ (p. 132).  Existing digital divides, particularly divides of access and skills 
that affect the use and diffusion of the Internet in civil society and in the country, in 
general, can thus have a strong bearing on the decision of many SMOs to invest 
important resources in the use of technology.   
Media, however, fulfil diverse types of objectives and needs other than purely 
functional ones such as collective action mobilization.  People use media for diverse 
purposes that Katz, Gurevitch, and Haas (as cited in Cho et al., 2003, p. 49) summarize as 
follows: 
 affective needs—for aesthetic, pleasurable, and emotional experiences;  
 personal integrative needs—for credibility, confidence, stability, and personal 
status;  
 social integrative needs—for contact with family, friends, and the world;  
 and escapist needs—for escape, diversion, and tension release.   
In the same vein, Van Dijk (2005, pp. 35–38) points to a number of factors 
underlying people‘s decision to use or not use the Internet.  In addition to the lack of 
material resources (access) and cognitive resources (skills and intelligence), there is also 
the role of emotional resources, such as the lack of confidence in using computers, as 
well as personal and cultural aptitudes, such as lifestyle, interests, affinities, and status.  
The research data has shown that difficulties linked to access and skill divides are key 
factors shaping social movements‘ use of the Internet, but it also demonstrated that the 
decision to invest more resources in this medium is motivated by an amalgam of other 
factors, such as the generation gap and cultural predisposition.  When I asked Abderrezak 
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Idrissi why AMDH‘s website looked unprofessional and was not updated, for instance, he 
was very reluctant to answer the question.  However, when pressed, he pointed out:  
There isn‘t a great awareness about the issue.  The website is a personal work.  
Not a professional [one].  The website is hosted by Ittisalat83 for free.  To tell you 
the truth, there is no rationality in the whole issue.  I was discussing this with my 
colleagues about organizing this work and we found that the costs will rise 
sharply.  So to answer your question about updating the website, there is a big 
output from AMDH at the headquarters and chapters, and so there should be a 
group who takes charge of it; but we don‘t have [one].   
Though Idrissi was, in fact, trying to avoid directly criticizing his colleagues in 
AMDH, his answer shows that underlying the hesitation of the association to invest in 
more resources to improve the website, there are practical considerations such as costs 
and benefits; but there is also a certain bias against the medium, which he qualifies as a 
lack of ―awareness‖ and ―rationality.‖  The analysis above has demonstrated that social 
movements use a wide range of media tools in order to be able to address various 
categories of people, the majority of which are still unable to use the Internet.  It also 
highlighted how the Internet is integrated into complex media practices that are used in 
parallel or in synergy with each other in order to maximize their efficiency and reach.   
A number of respondents indicated that existing limitations on the use of the medium in 
collective action is also linked to reluctance on the part of older generations of activists to 
use the new medium.  If younger generations are quick and natural adopters of the 
technology, older generations, who form the majority of activists within many SMOs 
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(specifically leftist and feminist ones), are more conservative in the way they view and 
appropriate the technology.  As Samira Kinani observes,   
We use the Internet more and more in the country.  We have discussion forums.  
We provided training to the comrades.  But for blogging, [activists] are more 
serious than I am ....  It is rare to find a person of my age blogging.  Because we 
have this education, and we are afraid of coming forward and expressing 
ourselves.  We always want to give an image about ourselves. We have not been 
taught to express ourselves.  We are not forthcoming.   
In fact, Kinani explained that she became interested in the Internet and blogging mainly 
because of her interactions with her son and students:  
I started using the Internet a little late, not until 2005 or 2006, because I did not 
know how to use a keyboard; I was afraid.  It was my son who taught me.  After 
that, I was working a lot with students in human rights clubs.  I noticed that all 
students used the Internet to communicate with each another.  They started 
chatting about MSN [and] their blogs, and they spend a lot of time on the Internet.  
They asked me, ―Why don‘t you start your own blog?‖   
Similarly, upon being questioned about the unprofessional design of the Unified 
Socialist Party‘s website, Abdelilah Mansouri, a young leader in the Unified Socialist 
Party, blamed the older generation of leaders for the organizations‘ inefficient 
appropriation of the Internet:  
The website is being used but not in an ideal way, not to its full capacity….  This 
is mainly due to our current mentality, which is closer to a traditional mentality 
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that hasn‘t been able to exploit all the capacities provided to us by information and 
communication technologies.   
A common characteristic of Moroccan civil society is the rigid hierarchical structure 
of most SMOs, in which leaders, like the kings and presidents in the region, seek to 
remain in power for life.  As a result, there are wide chasms between the older generation 
of leaders, some of whom have been in their positions since Morocco‘s independence, 
and younger constituencies at the grassroots level; and between civil society as a whole 
and the rest of the people.  These leaders are more accustomed and attached to print 
media, which were, until the early 1990s when satellite television appeared, the major 
source of alternative information in the country.  This explains in part why new social 
movements, such as Islamic, Amazigh, and alter-globalization movements that recruit 
mainly among younger generations, are more successful at using the potential of the 
Internet.  This conclusion is confirmed by Della Porta and Mosca (2005) who state that 
―organisations with a longer history would be more reluctant to adopt CMC or, even 
when they do, they continue to use it similarly to the old media of communication 
without exploiting many of its more innovative aspects such as interactivity‖ (p. 169).   
Moreover, negative perceptions of and attitudes toward the Internet can be developed 
after an initial experiment with the technology: ―computer anxiety is not only a precursor 
of computer experience but also a consequence.  Computer frustration is a matter of bad 
experience with computers failing to do what people want them to do‖ (Van Dijk, 2005, 
p. 41).  Explaining her personal preference for print media over the Internet, Rachida 
Benmessaoud points out:   
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One has to know how to exploit this tool, but also to be cautious about its negative 
side....  I am talking about relationships that become fixed and daily rituals, like 
entering [chat sites] and talking to this or that person.  This process exhausts me 
and puts more pressure on me.  I prefer face-to-face contact....  It is perhaps a 
cultural disposition; I feel more at ease with pen and paper, and with face-to-face 
contact.  Perhaps, I don‘t have the patience to sit for a long time to talk to 
somebody whose general features I don‘t even know.  There is this psychological 
factor.    
In many cases, SMOs invest considerable resources in continuing to publish 
newspapers that suffer from low readership and poor circulation, as is true of the 
Moroccan Association of Human Rights and the Unified Socialist Party.  Mansouri, for 
instance, denies that the issue of resources is the main reason behind the low investment 
in the party‘s website, since the party is spending much more to maintain the party‘s print 
newspaper:  
The newspaper costs us a lot, around 40,000 to 45,000 dollars a year.  Our 
resources are limited, since we don‘t get funding from the state.  It is true that we, 
as militants on the Left, should think of saving the party‘s resources, but 
unfortunately a traditionalist mentality is dominating.  For the electronic website, 
we already have three full-time employees in the main office….  So they will take 
charge of updating the website.  It won‘t cost us more.  So the main costs for us 
will be, in the beginning, in designing the website, which will cost us around 
3,000 dollars.   
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Mansouri‘s analysis is shared by Ladham, an IT professional working at the 
Moroccan Democratic Association of Women (ADFM), who thinks that the decision to 
invest resources in the Internet is contingent upon a readiness and disposition to use the 
medium:   
Awareness is more important.  We say the Internet is good, but we don‘t have 
money, so there is no need for it.  But when you say that it is very important, and 
you do a project and you say you need this tool of communication, there are 
funding agencies that will give you money to do it.  Associations make brochures 
and flyers, and if you do only 3,000 to 4,000 copies, it costs you 30,000 dirhams,
84
 
while a website would cost you no more than 6,000 dirhams.  So, it is a question 
of conviction.   
Consequently, motivational divide is one of the most significant barriers hindering 
the use of the Internet in collective action in the country.  Like the gender divide, it is a 
complex one that rests on all other types of divides—namely, access, skill, and usage—in 
addition to the gap between younger and older generations in general, and within civil 
society particularly.  This type of divide is rooted in both rational and pragmatic 
considerations, as well as on personal and cultural predispositions.  These factors are 
theoretically distinct, but are closely interlinked in practice, since they can feed on one 
another.  Pragmatic considerations can dissuade leaders and activists from spending 
needed funds on new technology, while excessive prudence and personal bias may 
hamper the use of the Internet as a tool of collective action.   
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Arguably, the continual spread of the Internet and the decrease of its cost will reduce 
the motivational divide.  However, as with the issue of gender, this type of divide will 
remain a major factor shaping the use of the Internet in the foreseeable future, mainly 
because the generation gap continues to define resource distribution and political 
participation in society.  The generation gap in the context of Morocco clearly challenges 
a linear and mechanic conceptualization of the digital divide, whereby lack of access to 
the technology will necessarily result in social, political, and economic exclusion 
(Cammaerts, Audenhove, Nulens, & Pauwels, 2003).  Although young people constitute 
the majority of the country‘s population and the bulk of its Internet users, they are, 
alongside women, the most disadvantaged demographic group in society.  The Internet 
has certainly empowered young people to express themselves much more than before and 
enabled them to overstep much of the older generations‘ political, cultural, and social 
conservatism.  However, this form of online empowerment has yet to be translated into 
the kind of political influence and social capital that can empower young people offline.  
The comparison between the implications of the Internet for women and young people 
confirms that the impact of the Internet, or lack thereof, is neither inevitable nor uniform.  
To put it simply, while the Internet opens a myriad of possibilities for collective action 
and political contestation, these possibilities only materialize to the extent allowed by 
pre-existing political and social structures.  Indeed, the social embeddedness of the 
Internet makes its impact on the political and social orders very contextual and contingent 
(Sassen, 2004).   
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4.4 ICT4DEV: Empowerment and development of dependency. 
4.4.1 The question of sustainability. 
A primary issue underlying all the types of divides described above is the question of 
the continuity or sustainability of the online projects undertaken by SMOs and activists.  
The majority of the interviewed groups indicated that a principal problem affecting their 
efforts in using the Internet is their inability to maintain websites over time, even when 
they receive help from development agencies or other NGOs.  The failure of Alternative 
International in Morocco‘s first attempt to help local associations acquire and use 
websites illustrates the difficulties that information and communication technologies for 
development (ICT4DEV) projects can face.  Summarizing the objectives of the project 
and its fate, Hamouda Soubhi explains:  
The project worked to a certain extent, until the day when the associations waited 
for us to do the updating for them.  We used to call them to ask them to do it, [to] 
post at least something on the website.  They had received some training, they had 
the website and were happy with it, but the site did not change for two years; [it 
had] the same information.  So we told ourselves, [this tactic] is not working; we 
have to do it differently.   
As this example clearly shows, Alternative International and its local partners were too 
optimistic about their ability to make the project succeed, relying on many assumptions 
dominant in the ICT4DEV discourse that often reduce the digital divide to a lack of 
physical access to technology and, at best, basic training to initiate users in how to use the 




the underlying infrastructure does not meet end-user requirements; the community 
is unable to maintain a critical mass of users consistently over time; there is 
insufficient social capital to support significant contributions by community 
members; or, as typically happens with funded community computing initiatives, 
financial and human resources become constrained or even unavailable to 
adequately maintain the infrastructure.  (Farooq, Schank, Harris, Fusco, & 
Schlage., 2007, p. 398)   
Hearn et al. (2005) add other factors to this list—namely, the failure to ―specify and 
address local and cultural impediments and opportunities;‖ not taking into account ―the 
dynamics of the global ICT industry;‖ being ―overoptimistic‖ about the impact of ICTs, 
in addition to overlooking ―the importance of content per se‖ (p. 27).  The focus on the 
issue of access to technology at the expense of many other factors not only results in the 
failure of sustainable ICT projects, but also prolongs the dependence of SMOs on foreign 
aid.   
―Sustainability,‖ as Farooq et al. (2007) explain, ―is centered on how people in 
community computing settings can best achieve their goals consistently over time‖ (p. 
398).  Sustainability is central to the success of social movements in general, because 
without it, the impact of mobilization and collective action will remain ephemeral and 
superficial.  Achieving sustainability reflects the stability of a group, its organizational 
efficiency, and its ability to mobilize the various resources that are central to the success 
of collective action (McCarthy & Zald, 2003).   
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4.4.2 Sustainability and the development of dependence. 
Sustainability is also needed to end dependence on foreign aid for survival.  
However, with the exception of a few participants, particularly those belonging to Islamic 
SMOs, the Unemployed Graduates movement, and the Amazigh cultural movement, the 
majority indicated that their groups depended significantly on various donors to buy 
equipment and hire full-time staff.  Feminist participants highlighted more than other 
groups their associations‘ total dependence on foreign funding.  According to Maghnawi, 
for instance, the UFA was only able to prolong the life of the newspaper 8 March and, 
more importantly, to acquire the necessary infrastructure to survive so far, through 
foreign funding:  
So unfortunately, the newspaper stopped after intermittent attempts that lasted 
from 1983 until 1987; and from then till 1995, in the wake of the World Summit 
on Women in Beijing....  From 1995, we obtained financing through a French 
organization, which allowed us to rent an office and introduce the new 
technologies of communication, but it was simple financing that included the rent 
and a Macintosh [computer], which helped us with our effort to keep publishing 
the newspaper—and we were able for the first time to produce leaflets, flyers.  
[After that], we received financing from the Movement of Peace, Disarmament, 
and Liberty (MPDL) in Madrid, Spain, which enabled us to buy the office where 
we are now, as well as important equipment, including computers.  As I told you, 
we were working with primitive tools; we didn‘t have a fax [machine] or a 
telephone.  With foreign financing, we have been able to start as an institution ... 
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and thanks to this financing, we are going to make our website for the first time, 
because we had never been able to do it [before].   
Like UAF, ADFM has been unable to set up a functioning and professional website 
because of the lack of funding.  In August 2008, around the time when I was conducting 
my interview with the organization, ADFM launched its new website with the help of 
European donors such as Oxfam International and Comunidad de Madrid.  The 
dependence on INGOs extends from matters of funding to technical and human resource 
assistance.  Because they do not have trained staff to work on their website, or use other 
Internet tools, the LDDF was relying on volunteers provided by Oxfam who worked 
temporarily at the LDDF office.  Responding to my question as to why the LDDF‘s 
website is not updated in spite of the volunteers, Halima Bennaoui indicated that non-
member volunteers helped maintain and update the website for a limited period, but work 
on it stopped when they left:  
They were members of Oxfam.  The first one also trained our staff for a little 
while, and the second one stayed with us for four months.  But as soon as they left, 
work stopped.  So there is no updating, no activation on a daily basis.  We don‘t 
know how to do it.  The members we have cannot do it.  They don‘t have the 
proper training.  We do extensive work or hold a big event, and we cannot publish 
it online because we don‘t know how to do it.  But in this field, this field of 
technology, we still need a lot of things.  Not anyone can do the follow up of that 
work.  We are doing extensive work, though.   
In addition to their dependence on foreign financial and human resource help, many 
groups rely on foreign technological assistance and resources.  Despite the phenomenal 
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development of Internet use in the country, IT infrastructure has not followed suit, as the 
speed of Internet connections remains very low, especially in comparison to the standards 
of Western countries (see Chapter Two for more details).  When asked why the E-
Joussour website is hosted by Alternatives Canada in Montreal, Sobhi explained:   
If you put the server in Morocco, the bandwidth is very low and [it is] slow to 
download and add content.  Even if you have your own server, the bandwidth 
remains slow. We decided to have the website in Montreal for security reasons, 
since they have experts who concentrate on protecting the site against hackers and 
things like that.  We could have hosted it in Italy, or in England with Green Net; 
we had the choice between the three.  But because we work with Alternatives 
Canada, we preferred to host it [with them]—and also because they are doing it 
for free.  This is important, among the other things....  We pay for our IP here with 
Ittisalat, but the server is located in Montreal.   
The majority of the participants I talked to indicated that their associations‘ and 
organizations‘ websites are hosted by servers located either in Europe or North America, 
although they have domain names registered with local ISPs (see Chapter Five for more 
details on this issue).  In addition to the problem of bandwidth, there are other factors, 
such as the security of servers and data, and the fear that state censorship can lead to loss 
of data.  The reliance on foreign servers and maintenance has its price, though: in some 
cases, these groups lose control over the website, and the success of their projects can be 
severely hampered if the servers hosting their websites break down.  Jawad Mostaqbal 
explains:   
337 
 
There are two people responsible for ATTAC France‘s website, which is very 
active, and hosts the websites of other ATTAC chapters....  There was a crash 
recently and we spent two months trying to retrieve the data—and it coincided 
with the time when we launched a petition to demand the freedom of the 1
st
 of 
May prisoners.  It was fatal for us.  We had to start from the beginning and 
improvise something....  As a solution, I proposed that we do two images of the 
site, and have a domain name here using ―ma‖85; and that we leave the other with 
ATTAC France for fear of censorship.  If we leave the site with Ittitsalat, there is 
the possibility that it will be blocked, as has happened to other websites.   
ATTAC‘s experience illustrates the dilemma facing many SMOs that are caught 
between a scarcity of resources and a hostile political environment, on one hand, and the 
costs originating from having to depend on foreign assistance and infrastructure, on the 
other.  It also shows that though the Internet has enhanced the collective capacities of 
Moroccan SMOs, this empowerment remains very fragile and constrained by many 
factors, among which is the incapacity of these groups to have control over the use and 
appropriation of the Internet in collective action.  Lack of control over the resources 
needed for collective action reflects the inability of these groups to mobilize support, a 
situation that reinforces their dependence on foreign help.  Hudock (1999) rightly points 
out that when southern NGOs rely on northern NGOs for resources, it can lead them to 
―lose touch entirely with their client groups, spending all their time in the office on 
administrative tasks required to maintain northern NGO‘s support‖ (p. 9).   
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4.4.3 Sustainability and ICT4DEV: The cases of Tanmia.ma and E-Joussour. 
A number of commentators have maintained that if ICT4DEV projects are to 
succeed, groups must take into consideration various factors underlying the use of 
technology in a particular social context.  Prasad (2000) points out, for instance, that 
projects that seek to empower feminist groups ―without rethinking structural and social 
inequalities in gender relations [render] women passive agents of projects conceived by 
developed countries‖ (p. 87).  Moreover, it has been noted that the sustainability of 
ICT4DEV projects can be achieved only if the targeted community or group has control 
over technology:  
Control over technology involves a group‘s ability to use technology to address 
problems that they think are important.  On a broader level, control also involves a 
more long-term approach to managing technology use, planning, and learning, 
taking into account the challenges (e.g., lack of financial resources, few staff 
members, shifting volunteer base) inherent to community computing settings.  
(Merkel, 2005, p. 161)   
A comparison between two online projects that aim to empower Moroccan civil 
society illustrates important variations in the conception, planning, and execution of 
ICT4DEV projects.  These two projects are the most important existing Web portals 
targeting Moroccan civil society, namely www.tanmia.ma and www.e-Joussour.net.  The 
association of Tanmia (meaning ―development‖ in Arabic) and its portal are the outcome 
of cooperation between foreign state agencies: the Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI), which is supervised by the US Department of State; international organizations, 
such as the Development Gateway Organization; and a telecommunication consulting 
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private firm located in Rabat, the Morocco Trade and Development Services (MTDS).
86
  
Explaining the origins as well as the main idea behind setting up tanmia.ma, the 
executive manager of the project, Mourad Gourouhi, points out:  
The beginning was in 2004, but the idea and reflection started before that, within 
associations situated at the intermediary level.  They are not associations of 
proximity that work directly with people and they are not donors who give money.  
But they are situated between the two, capable of mobilizing but mobilizing other 
local associations; they are capable of reinforcing the capabilities of local 
associations and not acting on their behalf.  All this ... gave birth to the idea of 
Tanmia,ma that seeks to bring answers to the question of how we can reinforce the 
capacity [of local associations] by exploiting the potential of ICTs.
87
   
The Tanmia portal provides various resources for local civil society groups, such as a 
detailed database of associations in the country, information about associative law and 
regulations, a forum for discussion and information, and a large number of articles about 
diverse issues related to development and society.  Moreover, apart from the portal, the 
association has two other projects.  The first one aims to equip and train local activists 
and associations on using video cameras to produce podcasts that are posted on the 
Tanmia portal.  The other one consists of establishing IT or ―community‖ centers that 
provide access to the Internet, as well as meeting places for associations.  So far, two of 
these centers have been opened in popular neighborhoods in the capital city Rabat and the 
                                                 
86 The US Government selected MTDS to serve as a senior consultant in the implementation of the Leland 
Initiative, an ambitious project to assist 22 African countries in establishing Internet infrastructure and 
access.   
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 The interview was conducted on June 15, 2008.  
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nearby city of Sale.  Explaining the objectives of the projects and how they can be 
situated within the mission of Tanmia, Gourouhi asserts:  
The mission of Tanmia is not only to generalize the use of ICTs, but also to 
[encourage] production of content that we are going to share through ICTs; how to 
produce, how to encourage more liberty of expression through new technologies, 
how to develop community media and radio, for instance....  After all, we are just 
a small association and not a multinational firm that can take care of hundreds of 
associations; [we can] only organize some discussions on the issue, to make some 
content available for everyone online.  What we try to do is to raise awareness 
about development..., it is everyone‘s duty.  In this way, the cost will be shared by 
everyone.   
Upon visiting and interviewing Mohamed Ait Bahlim, the supervisor
88
 of the Bettana 
community centre in the city of Sale, I learned that all the services they provide are not 
free.  In fact, while the fee for access to the Internet is slightly lower than that charged by 
commercial cybercafés, other services like using photocopiers and printers are at market 
price, and associations have to rent the DataShow audio-visual equipment to use in their 
meetings.  Thus, while an hour of Internet access costs between 5 or 6 dirhams  in 
commercial cybercafés, it costs only 4 dirhams in the centers.  As for renting the room 
with DataShow for meetings, the cost is around $8.00 USD.  Training in the center is also 
offered for a fee and costs up to $20 USD per module, or $40 USD per month, which is 
lower than the cost of a similar course in professional schools.  However, when I visited 
the center in June 2008, only one trainee was enrolled for the month, which may have 
been because people prefer professional schools that provide recognized certificates and 
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are better equipped and maintained.  In fact, during my visit, only four PCs were 
functioning, while the meeting room where training takes place was in bad condition, 
with damp walls and peeling paint.  According to Gourouhi, Tanmia generates up to 15% 
of its budget; and the objective of providing paid services in these centers is to make 
them financially independent.   
These centres may be offering some ICT services for prices lower than those in the 
private sector; the difference in price, nonetheless, may not be enough to compensate for 
the lower quality of their services and facilities.  This raises the issue of how to manage 
ICT4DEV projects and balance the quality of the services with their cost.  The 
substandard maintenance and low number of clients at the center clearly illustrate how 
the limited involvement of the local community in the conception, implementation, and 
management of these projects can lead to their failure.  The example also sheds light on 
the pitfalls of the dominant discourse in ICT4DEV that limits the digital divide to being 
simply a problem of physical access to the technology.  As Walsham and Sahay point 
out, ―it is one thing to set up a telecentre with subsidies from the government or various 
NGOs; it is quite another to create a self-sustaining long-term facility‖ (2006, p. 17).   
Furthermore, though most of the material published on the Tanmia portal comes from 
the contributions of diverse organizations and individuals, all submissions are filtered by 
Tanmia staff before they are posted online.  Framing analysis of the portal has 
demonstrated (see Chapter Six) that the bulk of content on the website deals with non-
injustice frames and very rarely with political issues.  Moreover, while the portal is 
supposed to act as an online platform for all civil society actors, including oppositional 
social movements, only associations with issues dealing purely with development have 
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published content on it.  It is true that the portal provides some important material and 
resources on development that may be very helpful to local civil society.  However, 
development cannot take place without linking to the issue of governance and the 
question of resource distribution in society, which cannot be seriously addressed without 
genuine democratization.   
In addition to filtration of content, another obstacle that hinders the portal from 
fulfilling its objectives is its link to the United States government, with which many 
SMOs, especially leftist-oriented ones, refuse to deal, or with international agencies 
linked to it.  Recognizing the sensitivity of this issue in the Moroccan context, 
tanmia.ma‘s executive manager, Gourouhi points out:  
There is no 100-percent innocent financing.  We know very well that it is a 
political debate that Tanmia does not have to address.  It is up to the public actors 
and all of the network [to do it].  It is also important to take a position and answer 
this question.  It is sometimes a game of diplomacy, taking sides, and refusing.  I 
remember the movement that was started sometime ago to boycott American 
financing when the US launched the war against Iraq.  They said no, no to this 
schizophrenia—because there, you are killing Iraqi children and here, you are 
supporting the rights of children....  We can‘t say that all associations that are 
active in Morocco are aware of all the implications of these issues; and this is the 
responsibility of these associations.   
Foreign aid remains a sensitive issue because it touches upon the image of an 
organization as an independent and credible group.  Many respondents were keen on 
maintaining that they are independent from state control and co-option, as well as from 
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potentially compromising foreign aid, particularly from the US government and state 
agencies.  Whenever I raised the question of foreign assistance, interviewees instantly 
asserted that their groups refuse any funds from the US government or its agencies, 
although they do not reject dealing with American independent civil society NGOs.  
However, a quick look at the websites of these groups shows that they do cooperate with 
European Union (EU) agencies, in addition to other intermediate NGOs that are funded 
by Western governments.  For many SMOs, accepting or refusing funding or cooperation 
with foreign agencies is contingent upon complex conditions that are linked to the type of 
funding and how it is channeled, and on political circumstances at specific historical 
conjunctures.   
The E-Joussour portal, on the other hand, is the outcome of close coordination 
between Forum des Alternatives Maroc (FMAS) and Montreal-based Alternatives 
International.  Comparing the wiki to tanmia.com‘s portal,89 Hamouda Soubhi asserts that  
[t]he thing that separates us from Tanmia is that we allow everybody to post their 
messages.  In Tanmia, you have to send the content to them first and they take 
care of it, whereas we function as open software.  You can say whatever you 
want; but you have to be responsible about what you say.  If you say something 
racist, something Islamist—well, fundamentalist, something like this—we are 
going to eliminate it.  Associations can directly post their messages, but for 
individuals, we do it in a two-step process.  It is not censorship but auto-
censorship, because if you want to publish something you have to think a little so 
as not to go into things like racism and all that.   
Caroline Tagny further explains how the editorial policy of the website was adopted:  
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 See information on this in Chapter Six.   
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It was important to have consultations with partners [and] have the members meet 
to decide upon editorial policies—who is going to regulate the content and how to 
do it, what do we accept and what we don‘t accept on the website.  This has to be 
done through physical meetings, although you can communicate by e-mail.   
Analysis of the content posted on the wiki (see Chapter Six) confirms to a large 
extent Soubhi‘s and Tagny‘s statements, as it demonstrated that, contrary to tanmia.ma, 
E-Joussour features mainly critical interpretations and opinions about problems facing the 
region—notably social injustice, violations of basic freedoms, and lack of democracy in 
the region.  The variations between the two websites reflects different ICT4DEV 
approaches, since the second project was conceived and implemented in close 
collaboration with local associations and actors who retain a considerable level of control 
over its management.  It also reflects a different conceptualization of development and 
how to achieve it, since E-Joussour is clearly associated with empowering local civil 
society to contest various inequalities and injustices.  These differences emanate from the 
identity of the international actors involved in the project—i.e., governmental and semi-
governmental agencies in the case of tanmia.ma, and an alter-globalization INGO in the 
case of E-Joussour‘s wiki.   
Equally important, in the case of tanmia.ma, empowerment is mainly centered on 
technology because the portal is the main tool used to enhance civil society groups‘ 
ability to act and express themselves collectively.  ICTs, in the case of the E-Joussour 
project, however, are used as one tool among others, in particular, direct contact through 
social forums
90
 and meetings between actors—thus reinforcing more horizontal 
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interaction and networking between these actors.  These objectives are often formulated 
by local groups in coordination with the INGO.  I asked Michel Lambert if their focus on 
empowering civil society comes from decisions made by Alternatives International.  He 
answered in the following words:   
The mission of Alternatives is to reinforce the actors and civil society in various 
countries, so that they can play a political role and lobby for social justice on 
many levels.  In some countries, our partners work on the issue of education; in 
others, they work on environment.  Our partners have priorities, and our work is to 
support them so they can achieve political victories—not necessarily in the sense 
of taking power, but in the sense of changing national policies on different themes.  
In Morocco—with FMAS, which is our partner there—we work with young 
people.  We started the work by giving a budget to young people, to engage in 
consultations and lobby for education and integration, [and] to fight against 
unemployment.  Our mission is to assist FMAS to become more efficient on these 
levels.   
Similarly, Soubhi points out that FMAS and other local associations refuse to work 
with agencies and organizations such as USAID and NDI because they try to impose their 
vision and will on local associations, while these local civil groups deal selectively with 
other agencies depending on the issues:   
We made a decision not to take money from the Americans at all costs.  [Not] the 
American government or USAID.  The National Democratic Institute (NDI)
91
 is 
comprised of people who take money from American Foreign Affairs to finance 
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projects here in Morocco.  They involve you without your having the capacity to 
decide.  They bring their programs and they decide where they are going to 
transfer them.  The Canadians are different.  They set up projects in cooperation 
between Canada and Morocco; the Europeans, too... .We have a European donor, 
NOVIB;
92
 [this organization is] Dutch and very flexible.  You can apply for 
whatever you like.  Not anything—but whatever you are doing, I mean. We rely 
on volunteer work, but you also need funding.   
The E-Joussour wiki project has its own limitations, too.  In fact, Hamouda Soubhi‘s 
statement above about who can be included and who should be excluded from posting on 
the website raises a very contentious issue: it considers racism and Islamic-oriented 
discourses as equally unacceptable.  While censorship in the case of racism is 
understandable, censorship of Islamic content is based on a clear ideological stance that 
reflects the divisions between leftist and secular movements and Islamic-oriented ones 
that are polarizing Moroccan civil society.  Moreover, framing analysis has demonstrated 
that content dealing with gender equality issues constitutes a marginal percentage on the 
wiki, and that no feminist associations are among those posting on it.  Thus, despite its 
progressive orientation and its functioning as an open online platform, the use of the wiki 
and its appropriation in collective action are shaped by divisions and inequalities existing 
in society, which the wiki may only reinforce online.   
Apart from this, a key feature distinguishing the E-Joussour and tanmia.ma projects 
is that the former not only addresses Moroccan civil society, but also aims to strengthen 
coordination and networking between social movements in the whole region of North 
Africa and the Middle East.  Such an ambitious objective subscribes to the alter-
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globalization movement‘s political vision and collective action strategy defined by 
Michel Lambert above (see section 4.2.4).  However, since the project covers a vast 
geographic area characterized by huge social and political heterogeneity, this a goal can 
be too difficult to achieve.  The coordinator of the wiki, Hamouda Soubhi, denies that this 
strategy was imposed by Alternatives International:  
[The idea] comes from us.  We have accumulated work, and we started here in 
Morocco.  In relation to what happens in the Middle East, people don‘t know 
much about what is happening in Algeria, Tunisia, or Morocco.  We are like the 
others.  This gave rise to a reflection that started in 2000.  The idea of E-Joussour 
is to build a bridge between the Mashrek and the Maghreb, so our experiences 
converge.   
Both Alternatives International and Forum des Alternatives Maroc-Sud (FMAS) may 
have contributed to setting up the strategy and objectives of the E-Joussour project.  In all 
cases, however, this strategy remains rooted in the alter-globalization movement‘s vision 
and priorities for collective action, and may be shared by other social movements in 
Morocco and within each country in the region.  Social movements in the region may be 
facing common challenges, but they are also deeply informed and shaped by political and 
social structures and histories at the national level.  There are huge discrepancies between 
the structure and level of development of civil society in each country.  Whereas political 
multiplicity has marked Moroccan polity since before its independence, such a 
phenomenon is only very recent in neighbouring Algeria, for instance, where a one-party 
system dominated the country for decades.   
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According to the results of framing analysis of the e-Joussour websites, most of the 
groups that posted content on the wiki come from Morocco, while the majority of the 
other groups are from Egypt.  This confirms that collective action and Internet 
communication in the region remain strongly conducted within national borders.  In this 
respect, Caroline Tagny, project officer of the youth programs at Alternative 
International, has this to say:  
It is normal that those who participate come from few countries, because we have 
not done training in all countries.  The idea is to reinforce a partnership between 
the two original participants in the project, which are Morocco and Egypt.  We 
sent trainees there who have to meet with members of different organizations and 
train them.  We are waiting for more Egyptian and Algerian organizations to 
participate.
93
   
Regardless of the issue of training, it is doubtful that many SMOs in the region share the 
alter-globalization movement‘s activists‘ strong enthusiasm for building effective 
regional networks to shape public policies at the national level.  As the experience of the 
alter-globalization movement itself testifies, transnational advocacy networks also require 
the social actors to meet physically and sometimes join in offline forms of collective 
action.  However, such a possibility is very difficult for the majority of SMOs in the 
region, either because of a lack of resources or because of political restrictions and 
divisions.   
In addition, despite its relative success in serving as a regional online public sphere, 
the E-Joussour wiki is still facing formidable obstacles, since participation in it is 
significantly limited by the digital divides highlighted above.  While Alternatives 
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International and its partners in Morocco have certainly learned from their failed 
experience with the project that aimed to build separate websites for a large number of 
local associations, the current project is only surviving because of a concerted and 
continued effort to encourage the targeted groups to post content on the wiki.  In the 
words of Tagny:   
It is a project that requires a lot of training, because we ask associations and 
organizations to provide content for the website.  Like everywhere in the world, as 
in Quebec, too, people in organizations with professional Web knowledge are few, 
so you have to provide basic training; and sometime you have to start from how 
you turn on a computer and start browsing the Internet....  This is a very important 
part of the project and if you don‘t do it, it does not function...  Because it is often 
the case, these organizations do not recognize the importance of doing it and of 
participating in local, regional, and international forums, etc.  To [secure] the 
updating of the website, and with the financing we have, we are paying a person 
who is doing the follow up by contacting organizations to remind them to add 
content on the site and to ask them if they have something to add, to support them 
to do it.  She is paid to do this.  She does only this job.   
Tagny‘s last statement confirms one of the main findings of the current study—that the 
motivational divide is a major problem facing the appropriation of the Internet in 
collective action.  Van Dijik (2005, p. 31) argues that ―one of the biggest mistakes in 
digital divide research is the assumption that users of digital technology are either in or 
out, included or excluded‖.  It is possible, however, to distinguish between various 
categories of practices and interactions with technology.  In addition to those who are 
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―truly unconnected,‖ there are intermittent users, dropouts, or ―people who have more or 
less permanently lost connection to the Internet, voluntary or not‖ (Van Dijik, p. 33), and 
evaders, those who have access to the Internet but prefer not to use it.   
The first project of Alternatives International aimed at helping civil society groups 
acquire and use websites failed, as Hamouda explained above; and it is clear that INGOs 
have tried to learn from this by setting up a wiki that can be updated collectively.  
Although content analysis of the wiki shows that this project is more successful than the 
previous one, this relative success has not yet overcome the reticence or hesitation of 
civil actors to use the new medium, since a full-time employee is needed to pressure them 
to participate in the project.  As Van Dijk (2005) pointed out above, people may develop 
a type of computer anxiety after a bad experience with technology, which can lead to 
intermittent usage or even dropping out.   
That is why overcoming the motivational divide in all its dimensions is a daunting 
task facing development agencies and INGOs.  Such an obstacle requires more than 
providing hardware, an Internet connection, and basic training.  Merkel (2005) argues 
that empowering people through technology involves more than providing these basics: 
The value of a training course goes beyond just teaching technical skills.  A 
training course can help organizations think through some of the long-term costs 
involved in maintaining a website, like keeping the information on the site up-to-
date or managing training in the organization so that they are not dependent on 
one person to make changes.  This may also involve helping the groups make 
more informed choices about where to devote their efforts when putting 
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information online and the trade-offs involved when implementing more dynamic 
features on a website.  (p. 168)   
Such training can prepare social actors to better face inevitable problems linked to 
scarce resources and possible disenchantment with the technology when tangible results 
fail to materialize.  Other issues concern how to involve the targeted communities or 
groups in defining their needs and controlling the implementation of ICT4DEV projects.  
Reflecting on his experience, Merkel (2005) concludes that developing projects around 
joint or shared activities yield better results:  
Shared activities create a space where stakeholders can think through the ways 
that technology might help a group achieve its mission and how it might achieve 
these goals in a way that is sustainable across the lifespan of the organization.  (p. 
175)   
The feature and framing analyses of social movements‘ websites above have 
demonstrated that collaborative platforms function better than single organization 
websites.  A comparison of the tanmia.ma and E-Joussour projects further corroborate 
such results.  Because it shares the same political values and objectives with the local 
SMOs it seeks to empower, Alternatives International often uses the E-Joussour wiki to 
post articles and statements, thus creating a space that it shares equally with local groups.  
Despite the importance of this project, however, it is too early to draw final conclusions.  
The current study needs to be supported by additional research that spans longer periods 
of time to examine whether this project has survived, and to what extent it has achieved 
its objectives.   
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Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter confirmed many of the findings of the two previous chapters, and 
provided deeper insights into the articulations between technology and its appropriation 
in the specific social and political contexts of Morocco.  By and large, the Internet has 
undoubtedly contributed considerably to the enhancement of social movements‘ 
capacities at various levels.  It has been used by various groups to save communication 
costs, build alliances and solidarity networks, increase organizational structures and 
efficiency, and disseminate alternative information and frames nationally and globally—
thus challenging the monopoly that the state and mainstream media have over the public 
sphere.   
The Internet is usually embedded in the actors‘ social practices and networks, and it 
is often used in synergy with diverse media and communication tools in ways that may 
mean its effect on political participation and structures is often not measurable as an 
independent variable.  Rather than examining the impact of the Internet on the political 
system and social change per se, it is more interesting and rewarding to understand how 
the use and potential of the Internet are mediated through the diverse practices and 
structures shaping them.  As such, the study has highlighted the role of the Internet in 
creating and reinforcing various levels of interconnections and amalgams between 
journalism and activism, local and translocal public spheres, and online and offline social 
networks, in addition to integration between communication tools and platforms.   
The appropriation of the Internet in the sphere of collective action, however, remains 
shaped by multidimensional digital divides mediated through social, political, and 
cultural structures that significantly limit the potential of the medium to change existing 
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power relations, and that may, in some cases, even reinforce these power relations.  
Despite rapid growth rates in Internet usage and penetration over the last few years, 
material access and skill divides are significantly shaping the extent to which the medium 
can be used as a tool of mobilization.  A significant part of constituencies—especially 
within grassroots movements—as well as the majority of the people in society are 
excluded from the ―information‖ society.  As such, the Internet has exacerbated existing 
divisions between the ―haves‖ and ―have-nots‖ within social movements and in society, 
at large.  It is true that material access is bound to increase in the coming years with the 
decrease of hardware and connection costs.  However, this will only affect those who 
already enjoy some level of education and income, thus reinforcing the status of millions 
of illiterates, poor people, and women as second- or third-class citizens.   
Finally, by comparing the two ICT4DEV projects—the tanmia.ma portal and the E-
Joussour wiki—the chapter provided much needed evidence regarding the limitations of 
the discourse underpinning such projects and the technology-centered conceptualization 
of development.  The major obstacle hindering the implementation of ICT-based 
development programs is sustainability, which is rooted in various types of digital 
divides, including access, skill, usage, gender, generation, and motivation.  Analysis has 
demonstrated that while access and skill divides can be overcome through material 
support and training, other types of divides are much more difficult to conquer, since they 
are deeply entrenched in social injustices and inequalities, as well as cultural and 
generational attitudes and preferences.  Overcoming these divides requires a complex 
strategy that involves socioeconomic and human development as an integral part of 
technology-based projects.  Such projects need to be based on participatory practices and 
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culture that go beyond short-term donor-recipient relationships to ones based on shared 
control and long-term backing and involvement. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
1. Summary 
The main objective of the thesis has been to examine the implications of the Internet 
for social movements in Morocco, and the extent to which it has empowered them to 
engage in contentious collective action against multiple forms of injustice.  The thesis has 
found inconsistent, sometimes even contradicting, data on the role of the medium.  On 
one hand, there is some clear and strong evidence suggesting that the Internet has 
enhanced the capabilities of SMs and SMOs on more than one level, albeit to varying 
degrees.  On the other hand, the research has brought out severe limitations in the 
appropriation of the Internet for collective action objectives.   
Overall, the thesis confirmed preliminary observations (see Chapter One) about the 
role of the Internet in enriching and expanding the collective action repertoire available 
for Moroccan social movements and, in some cases, in transforming the scope and nature 
of their claims, particularly by facilitating linkages between dispersed constituencies and 
translocal public spheres.  At the same time, however, data demonstrated that the Internet 
cannot have a radical impact on political and social orders in society because its 
implications and potential are shaped by and mediated through the existing power 
relations and structural limitations that characterize Moroccan society and social 
movements themselves.   
Thus, Chapter Five examined the structural features of SMs‘ and SMOs‘ websites 
and highlighted two broad categories of usages predicated on two types of organizational 
structures— grassroots and/or non-institutionalized groups versus professional and 
institutionalized SMOs.  The chapter demonstrated that SM groups and organizations that 
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are largely based on grassroots and dispersed constituencies, as well as on informal and 
non-institutionalized structures, are much more effectively drawing on the potential of the 
Internet as a technology and political medium.  The chapter also underscored a number of 
limitations shared by all the studied websites, notably their failure to benefit from a range 
of interactive features allowed by the Internet and their low interlinking with websites 
belonging to other Moroccan civil society groups.   
Chapter Six examined the use of the websites for framing purposes, and looked at the 
extent to which the web‘s potential was exploited to frame Israel‘s attack on Gaza 
between December 2008 and January 2009.  It corroborated some of the core findings of 
the previous chapter, and emphasized many inconsistencies and also variations between 
the two types of SM group mentioned above.  The chapter highlighted the use of websites 
as both antagonistic and agonistic public spheres to disseminate alternative frames and 
interpretations and, at the same time, confirmed the limited use of the Internet in direct 
online-based forms of mobilization.  A key contribution of the chapter is that it shed light 
on the role of the Internet in building and sustaining translocal public spheres, collective 
identities, and affective bonds that benefit mainly Amazigh and Islamic social 
movements.   
Drawing on in-depth interview analysis, Chapter Seven complemented the findings 
of the previous two chapters by emphasizing the role of other forms of online usages and 
platforms, such as e-mail lists and YouTube, while providing deeper insight into the 
social embeddedness of the Internet in the context of Morocco.  The chapter has 
illuminated important aspects through which the Internet has enhanced social 
movements‘ capabilities, and highlighted the synergy and convergence between various 
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media, as well as the interconnection between online practices and social networks and 
action.  One of the key contributions of the chapter to the thesis is that it provided deep 
insights into multiform digital divides underpinning the use of the Internet in collective 
action, as well as into the constraints impacting online-based development projects—
notably, the problem of sustainability.   
2. Answering the Research Questions 
2.1 The Internet’s implications for Moroccan social movements. 
Whereas the thesis identified a large number of areas where the Internet has empowered 
Moroccan SMs and SMOs, it pinpointed three aspects as the clearest and most tangibly 
positive effects of the medium.  First, the Internet plays a vital role in reducing the costs 
of communication, thus enhancing the coordination and mobilization efforts deployed by 
social movements.  According to Marwell and Oliver (2008, p. 131), mobilization can be 
interpreted as the process whereby a group takes control of the resources needed for 
collective action, which is considered ―the most prominent and convincing evidence of a 
group‘s efficacy‖.  As pointed out by most commentators (see Chapters Two and Three), 
oppositional groups‘ inability to access public funds and media is a major obstacle to 
their mobilization capabilities.  As a multifarious medium based on multiple 
technologies, the Internet has allowed social movements to save the costs associated with 
the use of telephone, fax, regular mail and transportation, and to reduce their dependence 
on mainstream and print media to get access to the public sphere.  In doing so, the 
Internet has also enabled social movements to circumvent censorship and establish 
radical public spheres where critical discourse and alternative interpretations and frames 
are circulated and shared.  
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Second, the Internet plays an increasingly central role in various forms of 
mobilization that benefit social movements, be it during periods of latency or of 
visibility.  During periods of visible action, including street protests and strikes, the 
Internet is used to coordinate action, mobilize members and sympathizers to participate in 
offline action and pressurize the state.  It is also used to demonstrate, through reports and 
information posted online, the capacity of SMOs to act and challenge state repression. 
The cycles of high visibility are very short in comparison with the long periods of latency 
within SMs‘ collective action. As argued before, the Internet plays no less important role 
during these periods, especially by keeping activists connected and informed, and by 
enhancing collective identity.      
Third, the Internet has greatly enhanced the capacities of SMs to create and reinforce 
networks of solidarity across geographical and national borders.  While the study found 
limited evidence on the use of hyperlinks on the studied websites, it highlighted the role 
of other strategies, such as the use of emails, e-mail lists, petitions, and video-sharing 
platforms to mobilize the support of regional and international NGOs and agencies, and 
attract the attention of alternative and mainstream media, alike.  In addition to these 
strategies, the thesis brought out the heavy borrowing and exchange of information and 
material between groups, which generates networks of meaning and discourse in the local 
and translocal public spheres.   
Finally, the thesis found that the Internet also favours collective identity formation 
and enhancement through a variety of features and platforms, such as networking, 
interactivity, direct mobilization, and exchange of content.  This role is particularly 
important for SMs that are geographically dispersed and identity-oriented, such as such 
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as the Amazigh and the Islamic social movements.  Analysis of ―frame entrepreneurs‖ on 
the websites, for instance, shows how Amazigh collective blogs favour linkages and 
interaction between loosely connected individuals and groups at the national and 
transnational levels, supporting, thus, the formation of a shared Amazigh identity and 
furthering the common cause of an imagined unified community.   
These positive effects, however, are countered by important shortcomings that 
significantly constraint the capacity of technology alone to alter political and social 
injustices.  Indeed, the thesis identified three interconnected sets of problems impacting 
the use of the medium in collective action: fundamental differentiations in the capacity of 
SMs and SMOs to draw on the potential of the Internet, lack of sustainability, and the 
existence of multiform digital divides underlying the use of the Internet.  These 
limitations put into question technology-centered perspectives on the role of ICTs in 
social change, as they testify to the social embeddedness of the medium and its mediation 
through local and global regimes that are particular to Morocco as a developing and semi-
authoritarian country.  On the surface, the above results reveal contradictory patterns that 
are difficult to reconcile; at a deeper level, however, they reflect the diverging and 
converging tendencies in the diffusion and adoption of technology across countries and 
social settings.  Indeed, the thesis demonstrated that while the Internet has in-built 
characteristics and the potential to produce similar effects regardless of geographical, 
cultural, or political boundaries, the scale and the implications of these effects vary 
tremendously from one social setting to another, as they are mediated through and shaped 
by social actors‘ practices and socio-economic structures and orders.   
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2.2 The appropriation of the Internet’s potential in collective action. 
Although the Internet has built-in potential and traits, this characteristic does not 
guarantee successful exploitation by different social actors and groups.  One of the 
important contributions of the thesis is that it deconstructed the notion of empowerment 
that literature generally attributes to the Internet, by pinpointing the multiplicity of ways 
whereby the Internet‘s potential is appropriated for collective action purposes.  The 
Internet‘s hyperlink function, for instance, is used by leftist SMOs to connect mainly with 
INGOs and development agencies, while it is used by identity-oriented SMs to connect 
with affiliated groups.  The same holds true for the Internet‘s key feature, interactivity, 
which distinguishes it from other media.  The thesis argues that web interactivity 
contributes to micromobilization, as well as to the enhancement of internal cohesion and 
bonding, rather than to building dialogic communication online.  Moreover, the active 
customization of the Internet‘s potential shows that empowerment itself is usually the 
outcome of interaction between social actors‘ choices and practices, and structural 
features and processes.   
The contribution of the Internet to collective action cannot be sufficiently accounted 
for without paying attention to various forms of synergy between multiple online 
platforms and usages, and to the convergence between different media.  For instance, 
different online technologies are used to complement one another or to compensate for 
the limitations in the appropriation of specific platforms.  Conventional websites, blogs 
and wikis, for instance, are often used to serve as a ―window‖ on the world, a metaphor 
that was interestingly employed by many interviewees to describe the main function of 
their group‘s websites (i.e., increasing the group‘s visibility in the local and transnational 
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public spheres).  E-mail and e-lists, on the other hand, are used more to share information 
quickly and to coordinate action within a single group or between several groups.  At the 
same time, websites can be used to post or ―display‖ information received via e-mail, 
thereby publicizing the information and making it accessible to users beyond the closed 
circle of the movement. 
Moreover, whereas e-mail lists and social media platforms can be used for rapid 
mobilization, websites are used to display images and information about group action, 
which serves to encourage actual or potential constituencies to participate in future 
action.  Thus, while analysis of many leftist SMOs‘ websites brought out their low 
quality because of their failure to draw on various key Web functions, interview analysis 
showed that these groups use e-mail lists extensively.  Although the latter do not replace 
the important role strong websites play, they still help compensate for the websites‘ poor 
performance and technical standards.  Besides, the Internet is rarely used separately from 
other media, including new media such as the mobile phone and more traditional media 
like satellite television. The convergence between these media has intensified in the last 
few years with the development of new online software and platforms that allow the 
uploading and sharing of multimedia files, and with the sharp decrease in the cost of 
electronic tools, such as digital cameras and 3G mobile phones.    
Regardless of the Internet‘s general potential, all social movements try to exploit it 
selectively to further their goals without losing control over discourse and 
communication flow.  A case in point is the Internet‘s capacity to allow for a non-linear 
construction of discourse and a high level of intertexuality through hyperlinks.  The 
majority of the groups in the current study, for instance avoid using hyperlinks as a 
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dynamic feature because it can threaten their control over discourse.  Hyperlinks are, 
therefore, mainly used as a strategy to mark off the boundaries of a movement and its 
allies, and by extension, its adversaries.  Certainly, analysis of the information and the 
communication flow on the websites covered by this study reveals a constant competition 
between control and participation, which is generally a characteristic of alternative media 
(Atton, 2001).  However, the majority of the groups fail to establish a balance between 
the two, and lean more often towards control rather than towards a genuine participatory 
communication structure.   
Three levels of networking have been identified from the various online 
communication practices of the SMs studied.  First, networking is achieved through the 
use of hyperlinks, specifically the use of permanent links on Web sites.  Second, 
networking is achieved more efficiently with e-mail lists and other social networking 
platforms.  The third aspect of networking to which the Internet contributes is the 
facilitation of access to and dissemination of texts, frames, and interpretations at the 
national and supranational levels.  Through various practices, such as cutting and pasting, 
collage, borrowing, re-transmitting/relaying, and exchanging resources, the SMs/SMOs 
manage to create what White (1992) dubs ―networks of meanings‖ online (p. 92).  All 
three types of networking, however, arise within parochial circles that promote rather 
than bridge ideological and political differences.   
To sum up, the Internet‘s potential for collective action is built on a wide range of 
technical capabilities.  However, the extent to which social movements can activate and 
benefit from this potential depends on internal as well as external factors, such as 
organizational structure, ideology, access to resources, political opportunity structure at 
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the national level, and collective action strategies and objectives.  Though they do not 
completely determine the impact of technology, these factors strongly shape the extent to 
which the Internet does empower Moroccan social movements in general.   
2.3 The embeddedness of the Internet and its use. 
2.3.1 Organizational structure and appropriation of the Internet’s potential. 
The potential of the Internet for collective action is not tapped into equally by all 
SMs, as there are important variations within and among the groups covered by the study.  
These differences run along a number of variables that characterize SMs/SMOs, mainly 
their organizational structure, ideology, objectives, access to resources, and capacity to 
mobilize, among others.   
Variations in organizational structures constitute one major factor shaping the use 
and appropriation of the Internet in collective action.  One of the key findings of the 
research is that grassroots movements use the Internet more efficiently and effectively 
than professional SMOs.  The appropriation of the Internet by these groups is indeed 
strongly marked by collaborative usage, participatory and horizontal communication 
flows and structures, radical content, all underlaid by dense social networks and strong 
voluntary resources and culture.  This finding is generally shared by other commentators 
who have also pointed out the significant role of organizational structure in shaping the 
use of the Internet by and its impact on social movements.  Van de Donk et al. (2004), for 
instance, claim that the ―Internet is used particularly by two kinds of movement 
structures: (a) informal networks with large geographical reach, and (b) big, powerful and 
more centralized social movement organizations‖ (p. 18).  In the same vein, Della Porta 
and Diani (2006) contend that 
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in some cases, computer-mediated communication simply expands the capacity to 
act of already solid organizations such as Greenpeace or Oxfam; in other cases, 
however, it brings together networks of activists with very informal organization 
structures, if any (…).  In still other cases, specific organizations are created that 
would not exist without the Internet.  (p. 156)   
The study corroborated the above statements to a great extent, but it also brought 
more depth and nuance to the literature on the subject insofar as it underscored the role of 
other variables that better account for the particularities of SMs‘ and SMOs‘ 
organizational structure in the context of a developing and Muslim majority country.  The 
study demonstrated, for instance, that Islamic-oriented SMOs are among those that draw 
the most extensively and the most effectively on the potential of the Internet.   In 
addition, Islamic-oriented movements mix informal networks and centralized structure, 
which greatly undermines the dichotomous distinction between the two characteristics 
dominant in the existing literature and defies any easy and ready categorization of these 
groups.  
Some commentators highlighted the role of SMs‘ ideologies in defining online 
communication structure and usage.  Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai (2005), for instance, 
argued that religious-oriented groups‘ use of the Internet is marked by four principal 
dimensions: ―hierarchy, patriarchy, discipline, and seclusion‖ (p. 26).  While the thesis 
demonstrated that Islamic-oriented SMOs‘ use of the Internet is distinctly characterized 
by patriarchy, discipline and seclusion, it revealed that these groups‘ websites are among 
the most interactive, and, thus, less hierarchical than the majority of the websites covered 
by the study.  Analysis also revealed that upholding patriarchal values is not limited to 
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Islamic SMO‘s websites.  Leftist-oriented SMO‘ sites promoted very little gender 
equality, too.   
In addition, the thesis substantiated, in part, Della Porta‘s and Diani‘s (2006) claim 
above; however, it accentuated different patterns that are particular to the Moroccan 
context.  On the one hand, the study confirmed the pivotal role of the Internet in 
supporting the construction of collective identity in the case of the Amazigh cultural 
movement, whose constituencies are dispersed over many countries.  On the other, it 
demonstrated that for the vast majority of the studied SMs and SMOs, the Internet plays a 
supporting rather than a central role in collective action.  The nature of this role cannot be 
attributed solely to the strength of SMOs, as the two authors claim.  Rather, the 
dissertation shows that Internet‘s appropriation by SMs in Morocco is contingent upon a 
large number of variables that are proper to this developing and undemocratic country—
specifically, the various forms of digital divides, the degree of censorship and political 
persecution of particular groups, and the support and aid received from INGOs and 
development agencies.  As an illustration, the Internet plays a greater role for the Justice 
and Charity Islamic SMO than it does for its rival Unity and Reconstruction.  While both 
enjoy a strong structure and a large number of followers, the former relies much more on 
the Internet, as all its print media have been banned by the Moroccan state.  For many 
other organizations, limited use of the Internet can be explained mainly by the access, 
skill, and motivational divides that characterize SMs‘use of the Internet and the diffusion 
of the medium in society, rather than by issues of strength or weakness.   
In addition, for the majority of SMs and SMOs, the Internet has been found to be 
expanding rather than supplanting the existing collective action repertoire, insofar as 
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social movements always rely on a combination of resources, media, networks, and 
action tactics.  This has serious implications for understanding the ―effect‖ of technology 
on society, since this effect is the result of the articulation between the in-built/inherent 
potential of the technology, its synergy with other media, and its mediation through social 
practices and processes.   
2.3.2 Sustainability of use: The inconsistency of the Internet’s impact. 
Sustainability is one of the biggest obstacles facing the use of the Internet in 
collective action in Morocco.  Even during the sampling phase of the current project, 
preliminary observation of a large number of online social movements‘ platforms 
revealed that the vast majority of these platforms stop being updated or used shortly after 
their creation.  Feature and framing analyses confirmed this observation by pinpointing 
the shortcomings of a significant number of the studied websites resulting from their 
being scarcely or insufficiently updated.  In-depth interviewing shed further light on the 
issue of sustainability by revealing that many online projects failed or are facing huge 
difficulties because SMOs are unable to use or maintain their websites.  Sustainability is 
also a major issue for ICT4DEV projects, since financial and technical support, along 
with limited training, do not guarantee the continuation of online-based projects over 
long periods of time.  This absence of sustainability is seriously limiting the medium‘s 
contribution to SMs‘ efforts to produce political and social change.  Drawing on the 
findings of a triangulated study of social movements‘ appropriation of the Internet, as 
well as of two online-based development projects, the thesis has demonstrated that 
sustainability is better achieved through collective and collaborative projects that pay 
more attention to the co-production of content, and that are based on grassroots voluntary 
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participation and contribution through the various stages of the project‘s implementation.  
More importantly, lack of sustainability appeared to be interlinked with multiple digital 
divides that are rooted in various forms of inequalities and underpinned by different 
demographic factors that need to be simultaneously addressed.   
2.3.3 Digital divides: The limits of technological empowerment. 
  A major contribution of the thesis is that it has underscored the extent to which 
Internet‘s use in collective action is rooted in a multifaceted digital divide that 
significantly reduces its empowering potential for Moroccan SMs.  Drawing on various 
interpretations of this notion (Clement & Shade, 2000; Shade, 2010; Norris, 2001; Van 
Dijk, 2005), the thesis  emphasized several types of access and divide at the levels of 
infrastructure, content, physical access to hardware, skill, usage, and motivation that 
substantially limit the impact of the technology on SMs.  Although access to computers 
and Internet connection remains a major obstacle to SMs‘ use of the Internet in collective 
action, other categories of divides emerged to have a great impact, sometimes as 
crippling as the unavailability of computers or of Internet connection..   
Physical access to computers and the Internet continues to exclude the majority of the 
country‘s population, which significantly limits the ability of SMs to reach potential 
constituencies and the population at large, and to directly mobilize people through the 
medium.  Moreover, the access divide affects SMs themselves, especially grassroots 
movements, albeit in varying degrees.  As a consequence, the Internet has exacerbated 
existing divisions between the ―haves‖ and ―have-nots‖ within society, providing social 
and political elites with more tools to participate in the public sphere and acquire more 
material and symbolic capital.  While restrictions on material access are bound to 
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diminish in the coming years with the decrease of hardware and connection costs; this 
will only affect those who already enjoy some level of education and income, which will, 
in fact, reinforce the status of millions of illiterates and poor people as second- or third-
class citizens.   
However, the study revealed that even if access divides were to be bridged, there are 
more enduring forms of divides that strongly and negatively affect the use of the Internet 
by social movements.  Skill and usage divides are among the most widespread forms of 
Internet-related inequalities affecting the use of the medium in collective action.  The 
skill divide goes beyond the appropriation of the Internet for basic uses, to the ability of 
activists to use the medium strategically in the advancement of the SM‘s or the SMO‘s 
cause and claims.  This divide largely overlaps with a gender gap.  The diffusion of the 
Internet has only deepened the significant inequalities between men and women in 
Moroccan society, as the latter find themselves at the intersection of diverse forms of 
economic and social discrimination.  The gender digital divide will continue to grow 
unless women manage to achieve economic, social, political, and cultural equality in both 
the public and the private spheres.  Men‘s ability to accede to and use the Internet more 
than women strengthens their discursive power and boosts their control over the public 
sphere, both online and offline, which results in a democratic divide that will, in turn, 
further exacerbate socioeconomic disparities between men and women in the Moroccan 
society.   
Likewise, the thesis highlighted the presence of a motivational divide as one of the 
main factors behind the slow and intermittent appropriation of the Internet in collective 
action.  The motivational divide is very complex insofar as it is underpinned by multiple 
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variables, mainly the generation gap.  According to Van Dijk (2005), the motivational 
divide is the first obstacle in the process of adopting new technologies in society, since 
disposition to use the technology paves the way for spending the necessary money and 
effort to do it.  The thesis only partially corroborates this claim since motivation-related 
issues proved to surge at any stage in the process of appropriating the Internet in 
collective action.   
The motivational divide is better explained through the notion of sustainability, as the 
latter provides deeper insight into the process of diffusing a technology in a developing 
country.  Thus, many activists and groups become enthusiastic about the potential of the 
Internet in collective action.  After overcoming access and skill divides, they attempt to 
use the technology strategically to advance their causes.  However, in the majority of 
cases, the use of the Internet starts to falter or comes to a complete halt after a short time, 
and projects have to be redone from scratch, starting from the need to again find the 
motivation and incentive to justify spending already scarce resources on using the 
medium.  Two major factors affecting sustainability are the lack of sufficient and suitable 
content, and the paucity of wider literacy, including digital literacy, at the societal level.  
Another major factor is the existence of significant discrepancies inside groups and 
movements that are beset with social class and generation divides.   
Discussion of the motivational divide has two distinct implications.  On one hand, it 
sheds light on the cultural, psychological, and individual factors shaping the use of the 
Internet in collective action.  On the other, this type of divide clearly challenges a 
mechanic conceptualization of the digital divide, whereby lack of access to the 
technology will necessarily result in social, political, and economic exclusion.  Some 
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commentators have criticized a linear understanding of the digital divide claiming that 
access to the technology necessarily ensures more social, political and economic power 
(Cammaerts & Audenhove, 2003, p. 10).  Indeed, whereas younger generations are the 
largest and most adept users of the Internet in Morocco and within SMs, they are, aside 
from women, the most disadvantaged demographic groups in society.  The Internet has 
certainly empowered young people to express themselves much more than before, and 
enabled them to overstep the older generations‘ political, cultural, and social 
conservatism.  However, this form of online empowerment has yet to be translated into 
the political influence and social capital that can empower young people offline.  The 
comparison between the implications of the Internet for women and young people 
confirms that the impact of the Internet or lack thereof is neither inevitable nor uniform.  
To put it simply, while the Internet opens a myriad of possibilities for collective action 
and political contestation, these possibilities only materialize if and when pre-existing 
political and social structures allow it.  Internet‘s social embeddedness makes its impact 
on the political and social orders very contextual and contingent.   
2.3.4 Can the Internet contribute to social and political change in Morocco? 
The main research question of the thesis is rooted in a search for two interlinked 
levels of Internet‘s potential effects.  At the first level, it is the impact of the Internet on 
Moroccan social movements themselves that is assessed; at the second, the thesis sought 
to study the implications of this impact on SMs‘ capacity to produce social and political 
change in Morocco.  While the first level deals with a type of effect that can be verified 
by examining SMs‘ usages of the Internet and activists‘ narratives on their interaction 
with the technology, the latter type of effect deals with a much more difficult issue since 
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the assessment of ―social movements‘ consequences are notoriously hard to define‖ (Earl, 
2004, p. 509).   
The thesis has highlighted two principal types of impact the Internet can have on 
political structures and policy making.  On the one hand, the Internet plays sometimes a 
pivotal role in confrontational and subversive forms of collective action, which can 
directly affect policy and decision-making processes.  This is the case when the Internet 
is appropriated by social movements that are engaged in direct forms of mobilization 
such as street protests, civil disobedience, strikes and uprisings.  During the Sidi Ifni 
events, for instance, the Internet, specifically blogs and video-sharing platforms like 
YouTube, played an instrumental role in forcing the state to admit police violence against 
the residents of the town, and in convincing opposition parties in Parliament to rally with 
human rights NGOs to create fact-finding committees that demand disclosure of 
information.  However, cases like Sidi Ifni, in which the Internet has a direct impact on 
public policy, have been rare so far and, when they happen, have short-term effects.  
  On the other, the Internet‘s impact on policy making and political structures is rather 
gradational and indirect.  Giugni‘s (1998) conceptualization of the process by which SMs 
can produce change (see Chapter Four), namely through the stages of incorporation, 
transformation, and democratization, provides a basis for shedding light on this issue.  
Sater (2007) points out that the hegemony of the Moroccan state over the public sphere is 
always threatened by the actions of new groups whose claims are ―sensitive,‖ such as the 
women‘s and Amazigh movements, or ―subversive,‖ such as human rights and Islamic 
groups (p. 163).  By creating divisions within the public sphere, these groups force the 
state—especially when there is unanimity among civil society groups—into assimilating 
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the disruptive discourses in order to ―re-legitimize‖ itself in particular areas, such as 
human rights, or to compensate for a loss of legitimacy elsewhere, as in its inability to 
provide jobs for young graduates.   
Thus, building on Giugni‘s model and Sater‘s observations on the Moroccan public 
sphere, we can argue that the Internet‘s main contribution to political change is 
characterized by a transformation that is rather slow and gradational than spectacular and 
rapid.  The Internet contributes to SMs‘ efforts to resist the state‘s double strategy of 
repression and co-optation, to keep their claims alive and vibrant, to support offline and 
online forms of mobilization, and to enhance internal cohesion and collective identities 
across geographical barriers.  Both types of effects, however, are interlinked and 
interdependent.  The development of social movements, and their capacity to become 
more visible and resourceful encourage them to engage in direct forms of mobilization 
and collective action.  While direct forms of action open new possibilities for social 
movements and widen the scope of their claims and political environment, and, thus, 
empower them to play more visible and effective role in the public and political spheres.      
Some commentators have questioned the capacity of the Internet to have any deep 
impact on existing power relations ―because not only social movements but also their 
opponents profit from ICT‘s advantages, [and therefore] we do not assume that the 
existing constellation of powers is fundamentally changed as long as all actors use ICTs 
to similar degrees‖ (Van de Donk et al., 2004, p. 19). The current study has corroborated 
this claim to some extent, but it also emphasized that this issue, too, remains context-
specific.  In the context of undemocratic and developing countries where SMs are facing 
hostile conditions of oppression and material scarcity, the notions of empowerment and 
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change should be interpreted in relative terms, since oppositional groups‘ ability to 
survive against the odds and to maintain public claims within local and translocal public 
spheres is a sign of progress and positive outcome.   
Positioning the claims of a given social movement in the public sphere and resisting 
repression may not be enough to produce a significant change, however.  In order to be 
incorporated in public and policy discourse, claims need to be disseminated widely 
beyond core constituencies.  They also need to be sustained over an extensive period of 
time.  So far, very few SMs have been able to achieve sustainability in their online 
projects.  The current study has corroborated the findings of other studies regarding the 
ability of Islamic-oriented movements to draw more effectively on the potential of the 
Internet for collective action (Anderson, 2003; Bunt, 2004; Ibrahine, 2005).  Accordingly, 
the Internet is only reflecting existing power relations while contributing to the 
consolidation of Islamism as the major cultural and political social movement in the 
country and the region, at the expense of secular movements.  The thesis has revealed, 
nonetheless, that Islamic movements do not control the online public sphere, nor are they 
the only political groups that have extensively benefitted from the new medium, as 
illustrated by the examples of the Amazigh cultural movement and the alter-globalization 
movement.   
In summary, although Moroccan SMs have made considerable gains as a result of 
various applications of the Internet in collective action, this appropriation has not 
maximized their capabilities in such a way as to significantly and clearly change 
dominant power relations, nor has it determined the outcome of the various struggles 
these movements are leading against multiple forms of injustice.  Moreover, while the 
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Internet has empowered various SMs, it has done so unevenly, thus reflecting internal 
discrepancies between and within movements, as well as reinforcing existing imbalances 
between secular versus religious movements, and between male and female users.   
3. Implications of the Research Findings 
The findings of the current research have a variety of important implications and 
practical applications in a number of domains.  Within academia, the current study 
contributes to a small body of research dealing with the theorization and analysis of the 
implications of the Internet for political communication and collective action from the 
perspective of social movement theory.  The study underscores the value of using such a 
perspective as it was able to bring out the multiple articulations and inter-dependencies 
between the technological and social, and between structure and agency.  Such a 
perspective also provided a multicausal explanation of the implications of the Internet for 
SMs by emphasizing the role of material resources, political opportunity structure, 
organizational structure, culture, and identity, as well as media practices at the 
micro/individual level.  Moreover, using social movement theory allowed the study to 
move beyond narrow interpretations of the notion of ―mobilization‖, prevalent in the 
literature, and that narrow the meaning of this notion to the use of the Internet to 
coordinate and build support for offline action.  From the perspective of social movement 
theory, the thesis emphasized a variety of practices and processes that contribute to and 
are even an integral part of mobilization—from micromobilization at the level of 
individual activists, to collective identity building.   
Equally important, the current study contributes to understanding political and social 
realities and conflicts within Muslim-majority society, and the role of the Internet in 
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political and social processes. The thesis was able to foreground the dynamics, divisions, 
and complexity of Moroccan civil society and the challenges facing it—mainly the issues 
of democracy, social and cultural equality, the opposition between Islamic-oriented and 
secular SMs, and the extent to which new technology can play an influential role in 
defining the outcomes of these struggles and challenges.  The information and evidence 
provided by this study resist dominant representations and writings both in the 
mainstream media and academia, according to which Islamic countries are dominated 
almost exclusively by religious-oriented political groups and ideologies (Said, 1981; 
Karim, 2003).  They help better appreciate differences and commonalities between the 
various SMs that form Moroccan civil society, which dispels some of the stereotypes 
about Islamic-oriented groups that are often portrayed to be fundamentally different from 
and opposed to secular social movements.  These insights are very useful not only for 
researchers, but also for civil society actors and policy makers who are interested in 
understanding the political and social transformations in the Arab world, in general, and 
in apprehending the role of new technologies in these transformations—especially their 
implications for increased interconnectedness between local, regional, and global public 
spheres.   
Furthermore, the main findings of the study are of great value for local SMs, INGOs, 
and development agencies.  First, the thesis provides Moroccan civil society actors and 
SMs with reflexive insights into their own actions and communication practices, and 
more specifically, into their appropriation of the Internet in collective action.  This can 
assist them in develop more critical stances towards the potential and limitations of the 
medium, and contribute to the enhancement of their communication strategies in the 
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future.  Second, the findings have important implications and practical applications for 
INGOs and agencies aiming to empower civil societies and promote democracy in 
developing countries through the use of ICTs.  The thesis offers these international actors 
important background information and insights into the complexities and intricacies 
characterizing collective action in developing countries like Morocco.  By identifying the 
major obstacles to the appropriation of the Internet in collective action—namely the 
various digital divides and the problem of sustainability—the current study can help 
INGOs and development institutions to reconsider their priorities and objectives, and 
reconstruct the planning and implementation of their projects in order to achieve better 
results, and to save important and much needed resources. 
Finally, the study contributes to a better understanding and analysis of the role of the 
Internet in the uprisings, protests and revolutions that have been shaking the Arab world 
over the past few months.  As stated above, Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions have been 
labelled by mainstream media pundits as ―Facebook‖ and ―Twitter‖ revolutions.  These 
hyperbolic designations are more obstacles than helpful descriptions in any attempt to 
apprehend the full complexity of these events and the role of media in the way they are 
unfolding.  Notwithstanding the prominent part of social media platforms in these events, 
the claim that they have engendered these revolutions subscribes to a clear deterministic 
view of technology.  Criticising the overzealous praise of the role of these technologies, 
Harvard professor Tarak Barkawi (2011, para.1) pointed out that these grotesque claims 
smack of eurocentricism because they credit the revolutions to ―Western‖ technology 
rather than to the peoples of Egypt and Tunisia: ―To listen to the hype about social 
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networking websites and the Egyptian revolution, one would think it was Silicon Valley 
and not the Egyptian people who overthrew Mubarak‖.  
The new technology has indeed boosted the capacity of Arab people‘s to mobilize 
against despotism.  However, it is an amalgam of different, but interrelated, factors that 
has fuelled the ongoing political upheavals.  That the first revolutions erupted in Tunisia 
and Egypt and not in other Arab countries, and that civil society and youth movements in 
these two countries were able to lead successful and mainly peaceful uprisings against 
dictatorship is no coincidence, nor is it directly linked to the surge in the use of social 
media.  According to sociologist and historian Emmanuel Todd (2011), the revolution in 
Tunisia is underpinned by deep transformations within Tunisian society, mainly the sharp 
drop in the levels of fecundity and endogamy, high levels of literacy, and absence of 
petrol that favours the development of rent regimes and economies.  Todd foresaw that 
Egypt would be the next domino piece to fall because Egyptian society has evolved in a 
similar way to the Tunisian one, even if literacy rates remain inferior to those in Tunisia.  
According to him, ―there is a link between endogamy and political structure: the 
imperviousness of the family group leads social groups to shut on themselves and results 
in the rigidity of the institutions‖ (2011, para. 1 [my translation]). 
Emanuel Todd‘s observations above have been vindicated by subsequent 
developments in the Arab ―democratic spring‖ uprisings.  In the Gulf rich countries, 
mainly Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, demonstrations were quelled either by repression or 
massive distribution of petro-dollar subsidies, or by both.  In Libya, where civil society 
institutions are absent and the regime and society have a clear tribal character, the 
uprising quickly escalated into a civil war.  The Libyan model may also repeat itself in 
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Yemen and Syria, two countries with deep tribal, regional and sectarian divisions.  Thus, 
societal and political structures specific to each country in the region are likely to 
determine the course and outcome of the uprisings, much more so than any new 
communication technology.  In fact, that the spread of revolutions to countries where 
there is low level of Internet penetration, such as Yemen and Libya, rules out the Internet 
as the main catalyst in today‘s Arab revolutions. 
Equally important, the role of social media in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions 
was limited to early stages and was not substantial throughout the events.  In fact, 
notwithstanding the importance of their role, social media were not stand-alone tools; 
rather, they were only effective because they operated in synergy with other media.  As a 
consequence, even when the Internet service in these countries was completely shut down 
or severely curtailed, the revolutions continued as people resorted to other more 
conventional media, as well as to offline societal networks and interpersonal 
communication.  Moreover, state surveillance of social media platforms compelled 
activists to use alternative media and tools of communication. During the Egyptian 
uprising, for instance, activists resorted to distributing leaflets asking ―recipients to 
redistribute it by email and photocopy, but not to use social media such as Facebook and 
Twitter, which are being monitored by the security forces‖ (The Guardian, 2011, para. 4).  
In addition to the role of interpersonal communication, leaflets, mobile phones and digital 
cameras, traditional media, mainly satellite television such as Al-Jazeera played a critical 
role in the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions.  Al-Jazeera‘s 24 hours 
coverage of Tahrir Square in Egypt provided a loophole into the media blackout imposed 
by Mubarak‘s regime, and, perhaps, enabled the revolution to escape a brutal repression 
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by the army.  More importantl, Al jazeera‘s highly supportive coverage of the Tunisian 
and Egyptian revolutions has clearly galvanized Arab audiences across the region and in 
diaspora, and contributed to building and maintaining the dynamics behind the ―Arab 
spring‖.   
Despite their preliminary nature, these observations confirm a number of key 
conclusions advanced by the thesis. Indeed, while not dealing specifically with the use of 
social media in collective action, this study has argued that communication and 
information technologies (ICTs) in general have significantly expanded social 
movements‘ repertoire, as well as the possibilities and horizons of their claims and 
action.  Stressing the role of the Internet in this process, the study has also brought out the 
significance of other factors, including the synergy between various media and online 
platforms, the role of offline social networks, the intertwinement between citizen and 
professional journalism, the demographics of Internet access and use, and the political 
opportunity structures dominant in society.  By highlighting various forms and levels of 
appropriations of the medium by social movements, the research provided strong 
evidence about the social embeddedness of the Internet as well as online activism in 
general.  
One of the valuable findings of the thesis is that the appropriation of the Internet in 
collective action is more effective when it involves the use of collaborative online 
platforms.  The research also pointed out that the Internet favours groups that are 
geographically dispersed and/or combining institutional organization and non-
hierarchical mobilization strategies.  In this sense, the study‘s results and insights shed 
much needed light on the social embeddedness of the Internet and the rootedness of 
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online activism in the social life, in general, and in social movements‘ offline practices 
and networks, in particular.  Using social movement theory and perspective to analyze 
the role of the Internet in the current events can enhance the researchers‘ ability not only 
to understand the social and political roots of the so called ―Facebook‖ revolutions, but 
also to better deal with ongoing and coming revolutions and counter-revolutions that will 
shape the future of the Arab world in the coming months and years.       
4. Epilogue 
The thesis focused on various online platforms and tools used by SMs, namely 
conventional websites, blogs, wikis, e-lists and, to a lesser extent, video sharing platforms 
such as YouTube.  As with any research project, the present one has its own 
shortcomings, the major one being that it provided little data on the use of social media 
platforms, mainly Facebook.  The number of Moroccan Internet users who have 
Facebook accounts has reached around 2.5 million (Internet World Stat, Africa, 2010).  
Nonetheless, the use of this platform for collective action purposes had, until very 
recently, remained very restricted both in number and in scope.  
This situation has considerably changed in the last three months with the eruption of 
the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions.  Inspired by these events and encouraged by the 
dynamics they created, a number of groups appeared on Facebook calling for radical 
reforms that can bring the country genuine democratic transition and social justice.  
These groups coordinated action and called for public protests that took place all over the 
country on February 20
th
.  The protests drew thousands of Moroccans, and sent clear 
messages to those who hold power that the country is not an exception and will not be 
exempt from unrest.  Although the ―February 20‖ movement was not able to maintain the 
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momentum of mobilization after the first round of protests, official reaction to the events 
did not take long to come.  In a bid to respond to the demands of the protestors, King 
Mohamed VI delivered a speech on March 9 in which he promised vast political reforms 
that included the amendment of the constitution to enhance the role of the legislative, 
judicial and executive powers.  While many have welcomed the royal speech, many 
others have remained sceptical, claiming that there are no real guarantees that these 
constitutional changes will in effect be applied.  So far, other public demonstrations, 
albeit smaller in size, have been staged in various cities, while a major rally was 
scheduled for March the 20
th
. This last rally was equally successful as it drew thousands 
across the country, and was characterized by heavy use of the Internet for mobilization 
purposes and for sharing videos and photos of the protests. Further similar rallies are 
scheduled on the 20
th
 of each month, along with local and smaller protests in between, to 
maintain pressure on the state    
Although it is too early to draw clear conclusions from these recent developments, 
it is possible to make a number of preliminary observations related to key issues raised by 
the thesis.  First, the social media platform Facebook, was one of many other media 
platforms and tools used to mobilize people around the February 20 movement, 
particularly YouTube, blogs, and news websites.  Second, while in Egypt a significant 
segment of the youths behind the January 25 revolution were unaffiliated with any 
political group, Moroccan oppositional SMOs, mainly the ones studied in the current 
research, such as the Moroccan Association of Human Rights, the Islamic-oriented 
Justice and Charity, the Unified Socialist Party, and the Amazigh cultural movement have 
played a central role in launching the February 20 movement, preparing and participating 
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in the protests, and campaigning in the media to promote the protests.  The state initially 
reacted by stepping up its repression of activists, especially those belonging to these 
SMOs and SMs, in a bid to crush the movement.  Third, the Moroccan government was 
itself inspired by the Egyptian revolution in that it gained a bigger awareness of the 
potential role of the Internet and social media.  As a consequence, the state has been 
leading an aggressive propaganda campaign on the Internet and through print media to 
discredit the February 20 movement and undermine its cause. It also stepped up its 
surveillance of social media, and many activists complained that their accounts were 
hacked, which prompted York (2011) to assert that these media have a rich potential but 
also carry high risks for activists and political actors.  Fourth, for the first time in the 
modern history of the country, a movement, the 20 Februray movement, was able to unite 
under the same banners and slogans both ―radical‖ left and Islamist SMOs. The younger 
Moroccan generation had learnt from Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions that it was 
possible to build a strong and efficient pro-democracy movement that transcends, at least 
in the short run, ideological differences and ―animosity‖.  Finally, unlike the Egyptian 
January 25 revolution, which is rooted in a long online and offline struggle, initially 
pioneered by the Kifaya (meaning ―enough‖ in Arabic) movement since 2004, and 
continued by the April 6 youth movement since 2008
94
, Moroccan February 20 
movement is very recent and has yet to mature into an indigenous political movement 
with its own clear identity and collective action tactics.     
Equally important, many changes affected the studied websites some time after the 
data gathering and analysis phase was completed for the purpose of the present study.  
                                                 
94
 For a more detailed discussion of these two movements and their use of the Internet, see Oweidat et al., 
2008 and Faris, 2008.  
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Three of them are not updated any longer, while six, most of which belong to Islamic-
oriented SMOs, and organizations in the alter-globalization movement, have been 
replaced by newer versions.  In addition, a number of these SMOs are trying to benefit 
from the surge in the popularity of social media by launching Facebook pages and 
allowing users to share content via these platforms.  These observations lend further 
credence and strength to some key findings of the study—namely, the questions of 
sustainability, and the inequalities between social movements in their ability to 
appropriate the Internet‘s potential.  The current thesis argues that leftist-oriented SMOs‘ 
slow and mainly inefficient appropriation of the Internet is partly due to their incapacity 
to mobilize young generations who constitute the majority of Internet users.  So far, the 
February 20 movement has permitted these SMOs to move closer to ―Facebookers‖ by 
supporting their demands and providing them with logistic help and training.  It is, 
however, too early to conclude that this tactical alliance will translate into long term 
support for these SMOs.    
In the next months and years, the Internet‘s use will continue to grow, further 
reducing the access divide in society and within social movements themselves.  The 
appropriation of the Internet in collective action will also gain more momentum as the 
various SMs are becoming more convinced of the utility and efficiency of the medium as 
a mobilizing tool.  There is no doubt that the Internet will be increasingly present in the 
long struggle of Moroccan civil society and social movements to establish a democratic 
and egalitarian society.  However, it is highly unlikely that the medium will determine the 
outcome of the struggle or its long-term consequences.  As Schroeder (2007) asserts,  
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Once a certain stage is reached, science and technology will affect societies in a 
similar way (homogeneity and pluralization), but they will leave the preexisting 
patterns in the other spheres of society (cultural, political, and economic) that are 
unaffected by science and technology to converge or diverge according to their 
own logic. (pp. 124–5) 
This certainly holds true for Morocco, too, since the political and social injustices 
and challenges that have characterized the country‘s past and present will continue to 
hold sway in the near future until they are resolved through social and political conflicts, 
and/or compromises and consensus between antagonists.  Technology—i.e., the Internet, 
in this case—will certainly play a part in this process, but it will not determine its course.  
Going back to the Sisyphus imagery as used by Lise Garon to describe Moroccan civil 
society, we can safely say that the Internet may ease Sisyphus‘ plight while pushing the 
rock of change up the steep hill, but it will not necessarily prevent the rock from falling 
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Action  
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Mustafa Sandiya  Not cited in thesis Chi_tro@yahoo.fr  
Soufian  ladham Democratic Association 
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coordinator 
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Said Rahmouni Unemployed 
Graduates’ movement   
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Unified Socialist Party Teacher, Party central 
committee member 
212-661977722 
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International 
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Aboubakre Jamaï Le Journal Magazine Former editor aboubakr@yahoo.fr  
Toufik Bouashrine Al Massae newspaper (former) Chief Editor  taoufikmasae@gmail.co
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Yahya Yahyawi 
(Not cited in thesis) 
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(not cited in thesis) 
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Appendix B. Oral consent script 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH  
RESEARCH TITLE: The Use of the Internet by Social Movements in Morocco: 




You are invited to participate in a program of research being conducted by Mohamed 
Ben Moussa of the Department of Communication Studies of Concordia University, 7141 
Sherbrooke Street West Montreal, Quebec Canada H4B 1R6, Phone (514) 848-2424 ext. 
2555. 
A. Purpose 
You have been informed that the purpose of the research is to study the political role of 
the Internet in Morocco and that the research is part of the requirements for obtaining a 
PhD degree in communication studies at Concordia University.   
B. Procedures 
You have understood that you will participate in the project as an informant and that the 
interview will last from one and half to two hours, and that it will be recorded.  
C. Risks and Benefits 
You have understood that there are no risks involved in this interview. 
D. Conditions of Participation 
• You have understood that you are free to withdraw your consent and discontinue 
your participation at anytime without negative consequences.  
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• You have understood that your participation in this study is CONFIDENTIAL (i.e., 
the researcher will know, but will not disclose your identity).  
• You have understood that the data from this study may be published.  
 You have understood this agreement and that you freely consent and voluntarily 
agree to participate in this study.  
 
 You have been provided with Concordia University Research Ethics and 
Compliance Officer’s contact details in case you have questions about your rights as a 
research participant.  
 
 
 
